This book began many years ago with a question prompted by footage of a Bob Hope camp show—What did World War II soldiers mean when they said they were fighting for women? That question turned into a research paper for the women's history seminar led by Kathleen Brown and Phyllis Mack at Rutgers University. With guidance from my wonderful committee—Alice Kessler-Harris, Beth Bailey, John Chambers, and Ginny Yans—the paper became a dissertation. Along the way, many friends, classmates, colleagues, mentors, and reviewers have significantly improved my thinking and prose. Notable among these are Karen Balcom, Michael Birkner, Ed Blum, David Cohen, Petra Goedde, Chuck Grench, Susan Hartmann, Lou Moore, George Roeder, Heather Schell, and Stacy Sewell. I wish to thank Jim Sparrow and Alison Lefkovitz for sharing with me their research on wartime marriages and veteran readjustment in Chicago and Morris, Illinois. Robert Townsend provided me with several useful sources and allowed me to cite his unpublished essay on postwar readjustment. J. Robert Lilly was kind to fax page proofs of his book on sex crimes by World War II GIs just before my manuscript was due to press. John Elliott helped me record the "Orphan Ann" broadcast included in chapter 5. For other illustrations, I am indebted to the Stars and Stripes, the American Airpower Heritage Museum, and Chuck Greening and his family. I am also grateful to the many archivists and librarians who helped me at Rutgers University Special Collections and University Archives, the Rutgers Oral History Archives, the Harry S. Truman Library, the Gerald R. Ford Library, the University of Chicago Special Collections Research Center, and the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and in San Bruno, California. A Gutenberg-e award from the American Historical Association and Columbia University Press provided a deadline and generous funds to support completion of this manuscript.

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INTRODUCTION

Real and Imaginary Women

_A Miss Yourlovin_ was the name of a B-24 bomber assigned to the Mediterranean theater of operations during World War II. The plane’s crew named and decorated it with a pinup girl copied from a calendar or men’s magazine. The pinup saunters toward her viewers wearing abbreviated panties and nothing else; an arm coyly covers her bare breasts. To the left of the name and image are three rows of miniature bombs, each denoting one of the forty combat missions completed by the men who served as the plane’s crew. What appears to be damage from enemy fire is visible above and to the left of the pinup’s head.¹

This combination of sentimentality, eroticism, and danger was characteristic of GI culture. The women who dominated soldiers’ artwork, reveries, and rumors were objects of nostalgic yearning and subject to independent desires. This independence made women fitting mascots for military aircraft; to the men who crewed these powerful machines, heavy bombers seemed to have minds of their own. But female independence, particularly in the case of bombers, also represented danger to the men who depended on them for survival. Should a system malfunction, the members of the bomber’s crew were vulnerable to capture, injury, and death.

Real women seldom held such power over soldiers, but many men felt keenly dependent on the wives and sweethearts they left behind when called to serve. Although absent from barracks and battlefields, loved women nevertheless played key roles in the emotional lives of American servicemen. While their soldiers were stateside, wives and sweethearts made their presence felt through loving letters, flattering photographs, and frequent visits to military bases; some followed husbands from one assignment to the next. Once parted by overseas service, loved women seemed to gain a greater hold over soldiers’ emotions. They figured prominently in waking and sleeping fantasies, representing the domestic comforts and erotic pleasures—the “way of life”—for which many men claimed to fight and to which they longed to return.

Although strong enough to justify military service, this “romance of reunion” was weakened by doubt.² Many soldiers feared that during their absence from home, the women they loved would prove unfaithful; wartime obligation thus seemed to threaten domestic stability. Again, women’s independence was part of the problem. Separated for years and by miles of ocean, men had little control over their wives’ and sweethearts’ behavior and limited faith in feminine virtue. Some suspicions were merited; plenty of men received “Dear John” letters, a
term coined during this war. Many more worried without ground. Psychiatrists speculated that soldiers' own infidelities were the source of such fears. Whatever the cause, this fear of betrayal was widespread.

As seductive and disturbing fantasies became entangled in soldiers' memories of home, the difference between real and imaginary women was sometimes hard to discern. Long separations allowed fears to fester and desires to multiply. Describing this dynamic, psychoanalyst Therese Benedek recounted the case of a shy young soldier who worshipped one woman from afar yet addressed his love letters to another. While overseas, he could pretend that his dream girl was his lover, but this fantasy did not survive the soldier's return home. Learning that his love had married, he suffered feelings of betrayal even though his correspondent faithfully awaited him. Although most servicemen were not so self-deluded, sociologist John Cuber judged "nostalgic distortions," along with imagined infidelities, to be a major threat to family stability among the veterans he studied.

While real women were transformed into dream girls, imaginary women came to seem real. Airmen commonly described the machines that carried them into battle as magnificent and sentient female entities. "Maybe the darn things are just inanimate objects," one pilot wrote in his diary, "but it is hard to believe when you fly them in this racket." A heavy bomber, if properly tended and treated with respect, would protect "her" crew, returning them safely to base despite heavy damage from enemy fire. This belief in protective, even maternal, bombers helped airmen endure the dangers of combat. Legendary radio announcer Tokyo Rose was another imaginary woman who became real to her American fans. She provided servicemen with a different sort of psychological defense, allowing them to articulate and at the same time externalize their own anger and anxieties by recounting what they purportedly heard. These stories took on a life of their own and, in the war's aftermath, contributed to a real woman's conviction for imaginary crimes.

This book investigates the women who populated soldiers' memories, thoughts, and fantasies in order better to understand how these men experienced wartime military service and what they expected from postwar America. Roughly sixteen million men served in the World War II military, representing more than ten percent of the American population and 75 percent of men born between the years 1918 and 1927. Almost one in every five families contributed servicemen for the nation's defense. Of these men, more than two-thirds were conscripts; others volunteered in the expectation that they would be drafted. They served willingly, if involuntarily, but in many ways their understanding of national obligation, proper conduct, and the rightful rewards of service differed significantly from that of the state they served.
My study of soldiers’ beliefs about and behavior toward real and imaginary women illuminates these differences, in many cases revealing a strong undercurrent of antipathy toward the army in which they served. Writing and talking about their families back home, particularly their wives and children, prompted men to explain why they fought and what they sacrificed to become soldiers. By tying military to familial obligation, they also asserted limits on the state’s legitimate claim to their service. In repeating rumors about members of the Women’s Army Corps, servicemen expressed hostility not only toward military women but also toward the Army, which, they believed, overstepped its bounds by recruiting women. To many minds, this act threatened to destroy happy homes, turning otherwise faithful wives and sweethearts into “government-issue prostitutes.” Distrust of military officials, as well as of women, was also apparent in the rumor that Tokyo Rose warned her American listeners that the antimalarial drug Atabrine would make them impotent or sterile. In recounting these rumors, soldiers indirectly accused the Army of endangering their health and domestic happiness. Underlying this rumor was widespread resistance to the administration of Atabrine; the result was a malaria epidemic motivated in part by soldiers’ desire to escape service on Pacific island bases.

Wartime military service evoked feelings of pleasure and power as well as anger and fear. Soldiers’ attitudes and conduct in Germany revealed that the men regarded sex as a right of conquest. Despite the threat of punishment and repeated warnings of sinister fräuleins who sought to seduce and trap unsuspecting soldiers, many servicemen violated the Army’s non-fraternization policy even as they fought the Germany army. After victory, fraternization became even more prevalent, for soldiers believed that their service entitled them to sexual rewards. So widespread and firmly held was this belief that by their behavior soldiers forced the revision of Army policy. Except for restrictions on cohabitation and marriage, the fraternization ban did not survive the summer of 1945. Perhaps more seductive than sexual domination of a conquered people were the aggressive pleasures of aerial combat. Although muted by repeated exposure to danger, these pleasures remained with most men as they completed their tours of duty. Indeed, even airmen incarcerated in German prison camps celebrated the joys of flight and the excitement of combat in their artwork and poetry.

Each chapter of this book examines one of five categories of real or imaginary women: the idealized wife, the promiscuous Wac, the seductive fräulein, the maternal bomber, and the legendary Tokyo Rose. Together they provide a new perspective on the men who served, shedding light on wartime conflicts of obligation and desire. These conflicts, although seldom directly articulated, were never far from the surface of soldiers’ thoughts and beliefs about women, family, and home. By looking beneath the surface, we gain a deeper understanding of the nature of military service and consent and of the domestic yearning that drove the postwar marriage and baby booms.
Government Records and Social History

My research draws on the many documents, both private and official, that preserve soldiers' wartime thoughts and experiences for friends, family, and scholars. As poet and former soldier Karl Shapiro observed in his memoir, "writing is a part of soldiering." Although poets and novelists were a minority, most servicemen wrote frequent letters home, many for the first and only time in their lives. Some kept diaries, typically beginning with induction or their arrival overseas and concluding just before their return home. Servicemen and their families preserved a multitude of wartime letters and diaries and have donated much of their correspondence to archives. As a result of popular interest in the World War II generation, many of these documents also have been reproduced or transcribed online or in printed memoirs and edited collections.

Participants and their families were not the only ones to preserve wartime correspondence. Army mail censors also reproduced portions of soldiers' letters and recorded the contents of their packages. Documented censorship violations tend show soldiers at their worst: collecting gold teeth from enemy dead or disparaging their female comrades. Some, however, reveal a more romantic side. Through coded messages, servicemen attempted to communicate their current location or future movements to worried loved ones. Sometimes, codes simply hid loving messages from the prying eyes of company officers, who commonly mocked the prose of the lonely, lovestruck GIs they commanded. Like other intelligence officers, mail censors also monitored and reported on military morale and popular rumors.

Censorship reports and other World War II military records are wonderful sources of social history. In their intrusive attempts to manage morale, arrest rumors, treat neuroses, and regulate behavior, military officials documented popular practices, attitudes, and fears. These studies, investigations, and reports, although designed to assist policy decisions or to punish misconduct, also recorded soldiers' words, thoughts, and actions, often with an emphasis on the seamy side of Army life.

Social scientists in the Army's employ interviewed, observed, and surveyed American soldiers. This information, as sociologist Samuel Stouffer predicted in his introduction to *The American Soldier*, has proven as valuable—if not more so—to historians as policy makers. In regard to the Women's Army Corps, for example, surveys documented the depth of soldiers' hostility toward the corps, but analysis of the data provided little guidance on how attitudes might be changed and enlistments thus increased. Rather, it revealed an irrationality that seemed immune to Army publicity campaigns. To an historian, however, these responses, particularly soldiers' written comments, provide useful insight into the emotions and illogic that derived from military service and nostalgic longing.
Irrationality was less disturbing to the many psychiatrists enrolled in the Army; after all, it was a professional assumption. As a group, however, these doctors were undecided whether the psychological weakness they diagnosed derived from wartime environment or from individual predisposition. Although their primary responsibility was the preservation of manpower, entailing quick treatment and return to service with little follow-up, Army medical officers were keen, and often sympathetic, observers of soldiers and military life. In order to better understand the feelings of anxiety experienced by the airmen he treated, for example, one Mediterranean theater flight surgeon even submitted himself to a fifty-mission tour of combat duty aboard a heavy bomber.

Finally, investigations into wartime misconduct preserve important information about soldiers' beliefs, behavior, and motives. Inspector general and judge advocate case files, for example, typically include transcripts of interviews with witnesses and suspects. These documents allow servicemen to voice complaints and suspicions, justify their actions, or deny culpability. In overseas investigations, they also allow foreign nationals to tell their side of the story. In addition to the Army, U.S. Department of Justice officials contributed to my research by unintentionally acting as folklorists. FBI special agents assigned to Iva Toguri’s case recorded legend when they interviewed former soldiers who claimed to have heard Tokyo Rose.

Many of the government documents I consulted allow soldiers to speak for themselves, sometimes with the guarantee of anonymity. Others record the analyses of trained observers, providing insight into beliefs and attitudes common to the men who served. Military records also describe events and conflicts seldom reported in the popular press, recounted in letters home, or recalled during oral history interviews. Military historians have long recognized the value of these and other official documents, but it is time for gender and social historians to make more use of them, for in no other circumstances do we have the opportunity to study the majority of the nation's young men in such intimate detail.
Notes

**Note 1:** The bomber survived World War II but not peacetime reconversion. The art on its fuselage, however, has been preserved by the American Airpower Heritage Museum of the Commemorative (formerly Confederate) Air Force.

**Note 2:** Magda Fahrni uses this term to refer to popular wartime "narratives of homecoming" that conclude with a "welcoming embrace between the returning hero and the girl he'd left behind." Since the war's end, historians have perpetuated this romantic notion by underestimating or ignoring the difficulties of reintegrating former soldiers into civilian society. Magda Fahrni, *Household Politics: Montreal Families and Postwar Reconstruction* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), chapter 3.


**Note 5:** Excerpt from Kenneth Book's diary, Donald Vining, ed., *American Diaries of World War II* (New York: The Pepys Press, 1982), 306.

**Note 6:** I italicize *Tokyo Rose* to denote that the name refers to a legendary woman rather than to a real radio announcer.


**Note 9:** On Army medical officers' assessment of Atabrine resistance, see Medical Department, United States Army, *Neuropsychiatry in World War II*, vol. 2, *Overseas Theaters* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1973), 531–2; S. Alan Challman, "Report of Medical Department Activities in Southwest Pacific Area" (13 September 45), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Interviews, Miscellaneous Interviews in the Pacific, Box 1349, Office of the Surgeon General World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31(ZI), RG 112, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).

**Note 10:** I use Wac to refer to members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC).


CHAPTER 1

Fighting for Home

Writing of his experiences as a battalion medical officer with the First Infantry Division in Tunisia, psychiatrist Herbert Spiegel concluded that combat troops were "predominantly motivated by love rather than by hate" or by "abstract ideas," such as world peace, individual liberty, or representative democracy. Combined with concern for their own reputations, soldiers' devotion to their comrades and to their combat unit kept them in the field. Survey data collected by the Research Branch of the Army's Information and Education Division confirmed Spiegel's observations. Even in the Pacific theater, where hostility toward the Japanese ran high, hatred did little to enhance soldiers' "combat readiness." Although servicemen generally agreed that the American war effort was "worthwhile," they evinced little knowledge of or interest in official war aims. Combat soldiers reported that they found greater strength in unit cohesion, "self respect," and "sense of duty" than in national ideals.¹

Love of comrades kept men in the field, but the power of this love had limits. Sent by the Army Surgeon General to study psychiatric casualties in Italy, John Appel found that after 200 to 240 days in combat, the average infantryman "became worn out." Noting that British riflemen were able to remain in the field "almost twice as long," Appel attributed this difference to more efficient rotation policies and to stronger combat motivation. The British soldier "fight[s] for survival,"² Appel observed, whereas the American "fights for his buddies or because his self respect won't let him quit." After several months in combat, there was little incentive for an American soldier to continue fighting. He had already proven himself under fire, and most of the men with whom he trained and entered combat no longer fought beside him. To address this problem of motivation, Appel advocated development of an ongoing orientation program that would "make the goal of winning the war more meaningful to the combat soldier" by focusing on Axis plans to "subjugate [the] United States."³ Appel believed that this approach would convince the soldier "that he is fighting to protect himself and his family from what he has seen happen to other countries with his own eyes" and thus improve American combat performance.

Appel's family-centered formulation of American war aims was intended to help GIs translate national goals into personal commitment, but by focusing on private interests rather than on national ideals, he inadvertently touched on
another problem of motivation. Although love of home and the desire to protect one’s family from the designs of fascist dictators produced a willingness to serve and fight, this motivation was, as social psychologist M. Brewster Smith noted, "double-edged." It was a short step from fighting for home to fighting to go home. Furthermore, domestic concerns might distract a soldier’s attention from military matters. Finally, time away from home generated doubts about civilian, and especially feminine, virtue. Nevertheless, soldiers commonly explained why they served and fought in terms of home and family—particularly wives and children—for as the war progressed, the American military increasingly relied on the service of husbands and fathers. 

This chapter explores how romantic love and familial obligation shaped soldiers’ attitudes about military service and how military service affected their expectations about postwar domesticity. In the waiting arms of wives and sweethearts, young men found both a reason to serve and the promise of escape from wartime stress. They idealized the women they left behind and imagined reunions that were at once erotic and domestic. Yet a strong undercurrent of distrust disrupted this seductive fantasy, threatening to undermine military morale and motivation. Nevertheless, GIs shared with the American home front a remarkable faith in matrimony, looking homeward for the peace, security, and affection they craved.

In a letter home to his wife, one infantryman explained why he risked injury and death in his nation's service. "I am fighting for America," he wrote. "Well, then, what is America? America, to me, is my wife, home, and mother. I am fighting so I can go home to my wife. She is the spirit of Americanism, of truth, purity, love, and devotion." He assured his wife that his comrades felt the same: "Every dogface over here has a sweetheart, wife, mother, or a child that he is fighting for." This confusion of women and war aims, of family and nation, was characteristic of servicemen's attempts to articulate their commitment to military service. Historian Robert Westbrook has analyzed such formulations, explaining them as contrived solutions to the problem of liberal obligation. He argues that because liberal political philosophy offered no compelling rationale for sacrifice unto death, government officials and corporate advertisers portrayed women and children as objects of national, as well as familial, obligation. They thus justified military service through appeals to private interest, urging male citizens to fight for their families. Yet Westbrook provides little evidence of how individual soldiers perceived their obligation to family and to state. More important, he fails to explore how familial and sexual "objects of obligation" also served as objects of wartime desire.
Although love of family might inspire martial valor, it also was the source of a contrary wish to leave war behind and return home. Infantry lieutenant Charles Taylor's letters to his wife, Barbara, illustrate this conflict of duty and desire. Marriage and fatherhood provided Charles with a personal stake in the war. "I love you and despise this whole mess," he wrote, "and I do so wish it would be over soon and too, I hope we would all be back home soon. I love you a million times I love you, and you and Sandra Lee [their young daughter] are all in the world I am over here for. You know if it were not for you two I would not want a thing to do with all this." He told Barbara that her love and prayers gave him the courage to endure combat and even to take risks. Reassigned to rear-echelon duties, however, Charles's military ardor quickly faded and his longing for the sexual and domestic pleasures of home became more intense. In part, he suffered from feelings of guilt and a sense of diminished self-importance; no longer actually fighting for his country, he deprecated the contributions of noncombat soldiers like himself. But, more important, after three months in combat, Charles felt he had fulfilled his obligation to the nation and deserved to be reunited with his family. Of the possibility that he might be shipped to the Pacific soon after V-E Day, he wrote: "I am one of these 'I-want-to-go-home' boys but bad. I feel that that war is someone else's not mine. Oh, it's mine too, but really and truly I do not want any part of it at all."

A strong attachment to home was, at best, an ambivalent source of martial inspiration. At worst, it was an incentive to desert. Soon after arriving in Australia, one serviceman sent a letter to his sweetheart asking whether it would "make a difference to you if I got a dishonorable discharge." "I've just got to get back to you," he wrote. Although this stated preference for dishonor over separation might simply have been a romantic gesture, the man who wrote it tried to evade Army censorship by using a civilian mailbox. The letter never reached its intended recipient; caught by Army censors, it probably caused its sender considerable trouble.

Twice as likely as their unmarried comrades to go absent without leave (AWOL), husbands and fathers were particularly reluctant to leave home. The wife of a soldier who had gone AWOL on two previous occasions described her husband's behavior just before he was shipped overseas: "He knew he was going overseas, and when he came home I was expecting trouble. He said he just wasn't going back. I talked and talked to him about not being a deserter. He cried and said I just wanted him to be in the Army. I had to put him on the train twice. I wanted him to do the right thing." Having convinced her husband to leave home and return to his Army unit, this dutiful wife wrote long letters every day they were separated, reassuring him of her love. Although an extreme case, many other men shared this soldier's wish to remain home, and, once overseas, the desire for home became even more intense.
Going home was the central preoccupation of many overseas soldiers, and its hold on their minds increased with time. "From an idea, to a wish, to an all-embracing, increasing and overpowering longing, thoughts of home, home, home finally dominate the soldier's whole existence," psychiatrists Roy Grinker and John Spiegel wrote of combat airmen who longed for the furloughs they could expect after completing their tours of duty. Grinker and Spiegel's observations also applied to ground troops who returned home less consistently and in smaller numbers. Noncombat soldiers, particularly those assigned to relatively isolated areas, such as Greenland or Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, were similarly obsessed. One staff sergeant who served at a weather observation station in Greenland named this mental state "isolationitis." Far away from "civilization" (i.e., white society and commercial recreation), soldiers afflicted with the disease suffered from a keen sense of deprivation and nostalgia. "[T]hwarted by the lack of all those things associated with 'home,' love, admiration, understanding, or just plain pampering," they yearned to escape the dreary monotony and loneliness of small, isolated outposts. The soldier who described this condition eventually succumbed to mental illness.11

Psychiatrist S. Alan Challman blamed deprivation and isolation for much of the mental illness in the Southwest Pacific theater of operations, where rotation quotas were so low that GIs claimed they were as likely to be struck by lightning as sent home on furlough before the war's end. Yet even without much hope of rotation (in fact during a period in 1943 when the system had halted), servicemen's most pressing question for theater commander Douglas MacArthur was some form of, "When do we go home?" These questions were elicited by a survey of white enlisted men stationed in New Guinea; it asked, "If you could talk with General MacArthur, what are the three most important questions you would ask him about the War and your part in it?" GIs posed only half as many questions about American military strategy and the progress of the war. Single and married men, volunteers and draftees, noncommissioned officers and privates, all believed that they and their comrades had already "done our share." They pleaded for relief from the heat, disease, and poor sanitary conditions, insisting that they deserved or needed to go home.12

Some psychiatrists blamed civilians for servicemen's lack of motivation. Although cheerful, affectionate letters from home were popularly believed to bolster military morale,13 soldiers' families too often failed to live up to this standard. Some letters needlessly worried the soldiers, mentioning illnesses or other difficulties that the men were incapable of resolving. Others cultivated a debilitating nostalgia. One Pacific area medical officer complained that "mail from home does not promote the 'win the War,' 'kill some Japs for me,' 'we're proud of you' note, but tends to increase nostalgia with the 'wish you could be with us,' 'when are you coming home?' theme." In his opinion, sentimental songs only aggravated the problem. Other medical officers deplored the negative psychological impact of bad news from home—family illnesses, financial problems, suspected infidelity. According to William Menninger, who
served as director of the Army's Neuropsychiatric Consultants Division, such problems often "became precipitating factors in emotional disturbances." Looking back on the war, he remarked, "It might have been wise to have had a nation-wide educational course in letter writing to soldiers."14

Edward Strecker, chair of the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine's psychiatry department and a psychiatric consultant to both the Army and Navy, was even more strident in his criticism of civilian letter-writing practices. His April 1945 lecture "Psychiatry Speaks to Democracy," better known as "the mom lecture," castigated American "moms" (as distinguished from mothers) for failure to "wean" their male children. Strecker blamed moms for draft dodging and the high rate of military rejections.15 Through mail call, moms' dangerous influence penetrated the military. Letters from moms to sons in the services were typically whiny and gloomy and "heavily perfumed with sickly sentimentality masquerading as love." By filling soldiers' "minds with worries about home," they disrupted the young men's adjustment to military life. Furthermore, moms undermined military motivation by encouraging sons to choose self-preservation over honor—even to the point of feigning illness before combat. A discharge for psychoneurosis was the common result of such missives. Misguided maternal love threatened servicemen's physical, as well as mental, health, as in the case of a marine hospitalized on the eve of battle after receiving a letter from his mom. Medical officers feared that the emotional distress produced by the letter was so severe that the marine "would scarcely have had a fair chance to come through with his life" and might endanger his comrades.16

Some data from overseas theaters backs up Strecker's assertions. One Pacific area medical officer, for example, accused servicemen's parents and spouses of using family emergencies as a means to bring sons and husbands home on compassionate furloughs. But because the military situation precluded the soldiers' return, such stratagems simply upset the men they were intended to help. Most servicemen, however, were not innocent of the desire to evade military duty and escape danger. Arthur Sprague, an American Red Cross (ARC)17 field director assigned to the 129th Infantry Division observed that after combat his caseload increased and changed significantly. Before combat, the bulk of his time was spent answering inquiries from wives and parents in the United States about the health and welfare of servicemen. After combat, requests for home condition reports by soldiers predominated. Sprague observed, "In most cases there is that hope that something will develop which will allow the soldier to return home." Roy Grinker and John Spiegel, likewise, noted that many servicemen hid their wish to be relieved of duty behind professions of domestic responsibility: "My (mother, wife, child) needs me."18
Although few went so far as Strecker, many fellow psychiatrists worried that attachment to and yearning for home weakened the American military. In the *New England Journal of Medicine*, for example, J. L. Henderson and Merrill Moore blamed dependent, neurotic mothers and absent or alcoholic fathers for their sons’ “so-called ‘war neuroses.’” William Menninger agreed that loving ties to home could be “pathological.” If a man’s dependence on his wife or mother was “too great,” homesickness might prevent his adjustment to military life, for the Army required a different sort of dependence—on commanding officers and male comrades rather than on women. Yet Menninger stopped short of condemning the nostalgia associated with letters from home, noting that it “added to the emotional value of victory and maintained a sense of emotional solidarity with one’s own people,” thereby inhibiting identification with enemy soldiers. Abram Kardiner and Herbert Spiegel even credited familial bonds with helping soldiers endure hardship. Roy Grinker and John Spiegel came to a similar conclusion, noting that “a gratified, happy childhood with *biparental* influences contributes a reserve strength on which a man may draw in times of danger.”

The moment of reunion, particularly between husband and wife, was a major source of wartime fantasy. Most servicemen had rehearsed this event many times in their minds before it actually took place. These imaginary reunions were romantic and typically erotic, as in this dream described by Maj. Albert Spitzer to his wife Freda:

> [A]ll I can remember is coming down the gangplank in New York . . . slowly, with a steady step—I didn't say a word, neither did you, but it sure was a long kiss and long hug—. . . soon thereafter we were on a hotel roof of some hotel and dineing, (champagne of course) we never left that hotel for you had reserved a room there . . . but that’s all there is to it honeychild—but it really was something, the dancing was superfine as was the waltz—I couldn’t ask for anything more . . . it was just you and I—wonderful wasn’t it?

Freda responded, “Your tale of your dream is almost insupportable. It is so much one of mine—but a waking one—that its hard to take.” This dream reunion became a shared fantasy. Albert continued to refer to it in later letters from Europe, where he served with the Ninth Armored Division; he wanted the couple’s actual reunion to be as close as possible to the celebration he imagined—just the two of them on a hotel roof, no children. Freda had already planned a wardrobe designed to cultivate nostalgia and desire. She would meet the boat in the tweed dress Albert had sent from England, looking “like the glamor gal you may have built me up into.” At the hotel, she would wear one of her old evening dresses,
“something that has memories for us both.” Yet Freda and Albert also shared more domestic fantasies—sitting beside the fireplace, eating buttered popcorn while the children slept; in the master bedroom, "our bed is turned down ready for the two of us." 

While Albert was overseas, he and Freda began making plans to realize their dream of owning a house in the New Jersey suburbs. Included in Albert’s dream home was "a large radio or console, with the best musical recordings, a living room, to live in, a fireplace, the kids, a dog or two, a healthy and happy surrounding . . . not luxury mind you, but the best under the circumstances." As Freda began her hunt for such a house in the summer of 1945, Albert sent letters of advice and packages full of crystal and china from Europe. Although somewhat less refined, Charles Taylor’s dream of a ranch "out in the country where it is quiet and nothing bothers us," shared some elements with Albert’s. Longing for domestic comfort, both men hoped to make a "better life" for themselves and their families outside of the bustle of the city. Adolph P described a similar fantasy in letters home to his rather skeptical wife. In spite of the fact that he had lived in Chicago and worked as a tool inspector before joining the Army, Adolph dreamed of life on a small chicken farm. "He writes of nothing but it now," his wife told the University of Chicago sociology student who interviewed her.

Although she did not share his rural fantasy, Mrs. P believed her husband’s love for her had "intensified" since their separation. "He idolizes me," she reported. Freda Spitzer noticed a similar change in her husband. Reserved to the point of avoiding the words "I love you" when at home, Albert began composing ardent love letters to Freda soon after he arrived in Europe. "I’ve always been ineffable in throwing bouquets at you," he admitted, "but my heart, (oh, if you could only hear it swell) my thoughts hold you in reverence—way up there—you know that place which a man reserves for ‘the only one’—‘how attractive she is’—‘what a head she has on her shoulders’—‘what a mother’—‘what a woman’ . . . ” Other soldiers sent equally sentimental letters to the wives and sweethearts they adored but were compelled to leave. Yet as Albert noted after a week of censoring enlisted men’s letters, this adoration was often tinged with distrust. Thousands of miles away from home, servicemen worried about betrayal by the women they loved and to whom they hoped to return.

Observing the tension between idealization and doubt, Army psychiatrists Meyer Maskin and Leon Altman hypothesized that these two seemingly contradictory attitudes toward women were, in fact, intimately linked and characteristic of military culture. As early as basic training, they argued, wives and sweethearts “assume[d] exaggerated value” as symbols of the soldier’s past. This “enhanced desirability,” however, also was a source of anxiety for soldiers who feared losing loved women to “more successful and available rival[s].” Another psychiatrist, Albert Mayers, who served with the 94th Infantry Division in Europe, found apprehension about the fidelity of a wife or sweetheart to be common among overseas soldiers. He described the case of one enlisted man whose letters home to his wife were full of “bizarre” and
unfounded accusations. Mayers diagnosed the "presence of a delusion of infidelity" and "indications of a paranoid personality" but observed that even seemingly normal men suffered from a similar anxiety. "Most often in the 'normal,' the entire conflict is repressed," he wrote, "but if the question is ever aired, as during a 'bull session,' the conversation becomes charged with considerable feeling." Roy Grinker and John Spiegel noted the same phenomenon. Although less convinced than Mayers that such fears were unwarranted, Grinker and Spiegel reported that airmen who had returned from overseas service were often driven "to confirm real or unrealistic suspicions of their women's unfaithfulness."25

Charles Taylor's letters to his wife illustrate this dynamic of love and distrust, along with the psychological effects of overseas combat service. Charles was a loving husband and father who doted on his wife Barbara and their young daughter Sandra Lee, but soon after arriving in Europe, he began to worry that Barbara might be untrue. The strain of combat intensified his fear of betrayal. Physically vulnerable and emotionally fragile, Charles became increasingly dependent on assurances of wifely devotion. "I do really need you, honey," he wrote from Germany, "I guess more than I ever thought it humanly possible to need anyone." He declared, "I am only in love with you and I am true to you alone" and pleaded for a similar pledge from Barbara. His apprehension exacerbated by delays in the mail, Charles continued to demand assurances of his wife's fidelity after he was removed from combat. But with time, Charles's anxieties dissipated; regular letters from Barbara, including an indignant reply to his insinuations, seemed to do the trick.26

With stories circulating about "Piccadilly commandoes," grateful mademoiselles, and promiscuous fräuleins, wives and girlfriends might be equally doubtful of their soldier's fidelity. Yet although male infidelity was a personal problem between husband and wife or soldier and sweetheart, female infidelity was a national concern and a military problem. A woman who married a civilian rather than waiting for her soldier "sabotaged" the nation's war effort. Servicemen complained that in the face of such betrayals, fighting men might come to feel that they had "nothing left to fight for." Speaking from bitter experience, one soldier wrote, "The girls in the states aren't to be trusted. I know that from the way the girls are throwing these guys over, over here to marry some 4F jerk. These guys are sweating and dying for what? The one I thought was waiting on me threw me over for someone else."27 Such complaints of female inconstancy can be found in censorship reports from all American theaters of operations. The fact that these women had once been cherished idols only made the denunciations more bitter.

Established at an airbase in India, the "Brush-Off Club" mocked the military cult of American womanhood by institutionalizing evidence of women's infidelity; as part of their initiation ritual, servicemen displayed portraits of and read letters from the women who deserted them. The organization's membership was divided between "just sweating" and "active" members. A
"just sweating" member was a man whose last letter from his sweetheart was cool or written far too long ago for comfort; he suspected but could not prove that she had been untrue. An active member was a serviceman who had received a definite brush-off: a "Dear John" letter, news of his fiancée’s marriage to another, or reports from family or friends that his sweetheart had been seen with another man. Publicized in both the military and civilian press, the organization spread to Army bases throughout the American theaters of operations, where jilted GIs established their own rituals. In New Guinea, for example, Army Air Force engineers posted photographs of the women who gave them the brush off on an "operations board" with the heading Casualties Sustained on the Home Front. Romantic studio portraits or sexy homemade pinups, these pictures had probably once graced bedside tables or footlockers, reminding the men of happier times they hoped to recapture; now they represented a betrayal of trust.

Although some "just sweating" members of the Brush-Off Club probably overreacted to delays in the mail, others had real cause for concern. The term "Dear John" letter was coined during World War II when some servicemen received letters like this one to an enlisted man named Ahmed:

The time has come to clear things between us. You will have realized, before now, that our marriage was a mistake. I beg of you to put an end to this mistake and get a divorce. . . . As a matter of fact, I have never been yours, but now I belong to someone else, and this finishes things between us.

Another soldier’s faithless fiancée was less direct than Ahmed’s wife; she never formally broke off their engagement, but at the end of a long letter, she mentioned that she had recently married a "broadminded" sailor who wouldn’t "mind you writing me occasionally." After receiving a series of insulting letters from her GI boyfriend Saul Kramer, Anne Gudis’s response was a brief and well-deserved: "Go To Hell!"

Like the other letters, Gudis’s brush-off message was submitted by the scorned serviceman for publication in Yank. A photograph of her V-mail was printed in the Army magazine and received attention from the New Jersey press. In her hometown of Newark, Gudis wrote, "People could not have had more to say if I had murdered someone." The object of a great deal of unwanted publicity, she received approximately one hundred letters from strangers, both civilians and servicemen, including Kramer’s commanding officer who charged her with damaging unit morale. Some of the men who contacted Gudis asked for dates, but most of the letters criticized her behavior, for Americans agreed, "to jilt a solider is a serious offense." Despite or perhaps because of the uproar, the couple quickly reconciled, and by December 1943, Gudis promised, "I have cast all other men aside as far as the future is concerned and am waiting only for you." They married soon after Kramer's discharge in November 1945.
In the press, popular culture, and private letters, American women were bombarded with the message that it was their duty to be true to the soldiers (even though their husbands and boyfriends might not have been so faithful). Most wives and sweethearts internalized this expectation of sexual fidelity to absent servicemen. One told University of Chicago researchers: "We war wives are placed on a shining altar by our husbands, and it is up to us to keep their faith." In a letter to her husband, Robert, an infantry officer stationed in Germany, Jane Easton likewise professed a strong commitment to marital fidelity. Condemning erring wives and sweethearts as "animals" motivated to cheat by biological urges or, with some compassion, as lonely women looking to love, she reminded her husband that "there are a greater number who are virtuous." "Believe me," she wrote, "there are true mates waiting over here for their soldiers." Jane included herself among them.32

Dissatisfied with professions of virtue, some suspicious soldiers employed more direct tactics to ensure their wives' fidelity. One requested his mother to "investigate and keep her eyes open to see whether or not his wife might be seen 'with another man.'" The officer assigned to censor this letter wrote, "I howled when I read it—it struck me as very funny, because I happen to know just how jealous this particular soldier is."33 Many women reported that in-laws and neighbors (with or without a soldier's prompting) scrutinized their behavior for any sign of impropriety. In Morris, Illinois, University of Chicago researchers discovered "an alert community-wide network of gossip and informal espionage." One young service wife described this system of surveillance:

The wife of a veteran could do something and everybody in town would be talking about it. . . . Somebody sees you riding down a street, and they say, "uh-huh—she's out." If somebody in service comes up and talks to you they say, "Well she's going with him." The in-laws would do an awful lot of that. . . . They'd see you out with your husband when he came home and then they'd come up and give you little remarks like "Oh, she done alright while you were in service." Or, "oh I see she's with you tonight."34

Close scrutiny combined with the threat that any apparent misstep would be reported to absent boyfriends or husbands caused many women to modify their behavior in order to conform to community standards. Mrs. G, a Chicago service wife who lived in an apartment above her in-laws, told the sociology student who interviewed her: "[T]hey watch me constantly. . . . My mother-in-law yells when I go out so I keep her from worrying by staying in. Maybe her daughters put ideas in her head. I always tell her that is silly because how could I write to him and think about him all the time if I did not care for him. She still watches me." Mrs. G reported that her days were "wrapped up" in caring for her young child, but her nights
were free. Although she longed to leave the house, this young wife passed the time alone reading in her room in order to avoid upsetting her mother-in-law, a woman who deemed it her duty to ensure the fidelity of her son's wife.  

Community oversight, however, proved inadequate to staunch the flow of rumors about wives and sweethearts who were "running around" in the soldiers' absence. By January 1945, such rumors had become so widespread that the ARC publicly chastised thoughtless or malicious gossips who sent "I thought you ought to know" letters to overseas soldiers. Along with real instances of infidelity, these unfounded allegations, according to ARC representative Margaret Hagan, had created a "serious morale problem" in overseas theaters. Unable to evaluate the situation for himself, a soldier could only worry, and his anxieties might infect his comrades. Philip Tykulsker, an ARC representative on Guadalcanal, reported such a case. According to Tykulsker, a soldier approached him with domestic problems. His wife was reported to be behaving badly. She would disappear from their house, leaving their child all alone, and had been seen in the company of "strange men." It turned out that the source of this information, the soldier's mother, was unreliable. She objected to her son's marriage as "beneath him" and sought to destroy it. Inquiries to the ARC chapter in the soldier's hometown and correspondence with his wife cleared up the misunderstanding and preserved the soldier's marriage.

Careless correspondence could be equally damaging to the soldiers' morale. Two unrelated sentences in a letter from a parish priest to an overseas soldier were almost responsible for the latter's divorce. "It's amazing how some war widows behave," the priest wrote. In a separate paragraph, he mentioned that he had not seen the soldier's wife "for quite a while." On receiving this letter, the soldier cabled his parents to begin divorce proceedings. Cooler heads prevailed, however, and the marriage was saved. An ARC investigation revealed that the priest had not seen the soldier's wife, because she worked nights in a defense factory and cared for her children during the day. He had not intended to insinuate that she was untrue and was "horrified" to learn of the trouble his letter had caused. This story, as reported in Stars and Stripes, was intended to soothe soldiers' marital anxieties, asserting that "[m]isleading letters from careless friends and relatives have caused more domestic upsets . . . than has faithlessness of wives at home."

Despite such assurances, many GIs remained skeptical; some went so far as to ask the ARC to investigate their wives' morals. In response to such requests, the organization clarified its policy on "marital problems": it would not "under any circumstances assist in collecting evidence of misconduct, infidelity, or other causes of marital conflict to be used in divorce action," nor would it "make loans or grants to enable anyone to collect such evidence." Servicemen, nevertheless, continued to demand these services. Seeking to expose and punish erring wives, GIs even appealed to the federal government for assistance. Willing to
believe the worst of his wife, one soldier wrote from France to the Secretary of War asking for help in obtaining a divorce; a purportedly trustworthy friend had reported to him that his wife was "running around" with other men. Other soldiers contacted the government hoping to deprive unworthy wives of dependency allotments.

Particularly galling to servicemen and their advocates was the notion that unfaithful wives might profit from their perfidy. Newark judge James Pellechcia made news when he threatened to jail adulterous service wives brought before him in family court. He promised to suspend the sentences provided the women took prompt action to discontinue allotment payments. Pellechcia was quoted in Newsweek as declaring, "If I had my way, soldiers' wives who are unfaithful would be branded with the scarlet letter and have their heads shaven," like French women who took German lovers. In Chicago, Illinois, state's attorney William Tuohy publicly vowed to prosecute servicemen's wayward wives on criminal adultery charges. He ordered a review of recent divorce cases to identify potential perpetrators. Tuohy's action was inspired by the widely reported case of wounded combat veteran Stanley Heck. From his hospital bed in Temple, Texas, Heck—a double amputee and winner of the Silver Star and the Bronze Star—filed suit for divorce from his wife Henrietta on the grounds of desertion and adultery, demanding that she account for $2,500 in savings and allotments. Heck also sought $50,000 in damages from his wife's lover, 49-year-old Alvin Schupp, for depriving the soldier of a happy home and devoted wife.

In Congress, Sen. Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado introduced the topic of punishing wayward wives at hearings on a bill to increase the allotments paid to enlisted men's dependents. Although the legislation's intent was to soothe soldiers' worries about the financial welfare of wives, children, parents, and siblings, Johnson urged Army administrators to use this opportunity to address "the problem of immoral women marrying soldiers." Gen. Miller G. White, assistant chief of staff for Army personnel, dodged the issue by charging that any policy designed to deprive unfaithful wives of allotment payments might unfairly penalize innocent women, for charges of immorality were often based on hearsay. However, the question of whether to punish sexual disloyalty was unavoidable; it resurfaced at House hearings on the same legislation three months later. This time, cuckolded soldiers found a more aggressive advocate in Rep. John J. Sparkman of Alabama who proposed a bill that would allow servicemen to terminate dependency allotments "upon showing good cause."

Army administrators were well armed with arguments against such a measure. Gen. Jay L. Benedict of the Joint Army Navy Legislative Board testified that while he had "no quarrel whatever with the principle" of punishing wayward service wives, his concern was the difficulty of assessing the validity of servicemen's complaints. Similarly, Gen. White asserted
that it would be impossible to investigate every charge of infidelity, for Army offices were flooded with "all sorts of reports" of wartime infidelity, many of which were frivolous and unfair:

We get letters from mothers-in-law saying that the daughter-in-law is not faithful to Johnnie who is in Africa. We get letters from friends. We get letters from the soldier that somebody has told so and so, who told him, that his wife was not behaving herself. We have plenty of cases, unfortunately, where the soldier grabs at a straw to throw the wife overboard. There probably are many cases where the payments should be stopped, but how we could ever determine the right from the wrong is something I can't answer.

However, justice to women, even virtuous wives and mothers, was not a sufficiently compelling political argument. Military officials achieved their policy goal by arguing that moral investigations would cause the nation's soldiers and sailors to worry unnecessarily about the fidelity of their wives. Indeed, Gen. Benedict compared the effect on morale of the proposed policy to enemy propaganda. Everyone involved in the 1943 debate over amending the federal system of dependency allotments asserted that the changes they proposed would protect soldiers' interests while the men were absent from home. When the bill finally came to a vote, without a provision for moral investigations, there were no nay votes in the House.

Like their legislators, most Americans—both soldier and civilian—believed that individuals, as well as the state, owed the soldiers a debt of gratitude and, in the case of service wives, fidelity. Wifely devotion, however, was not simply a wartime duty. Marriage to a soldier brought postwar obligations. As the soldiers' return became imminent, service wives came under increased scrutiny and pressure. Beginning in 1944, a whole literature arose on "the rehabilitation of war veterans," much of it aimed at women—mothers, fiancées, and especially wives. Accorded a key, if not the primary, role in the soldiers' "readjustment" to civilian society, women were bombarded with advice from a wide range of experts.

Psychiatrist Alexander Dumas and his collaborator Grace Keen described readjustment as a "two-way" process in which the former soldier "must do his part," but like many of this genre, their *Psychiatric Primer for the Veteran's Family and Friends* emphasized feminine responsibility. Although the authors noted that the majority of American servicemen would be "returning to mothers instead of wives," three of the five representative women around whose experiences their chapters were organized were wives, the fourth was a fiancée, and the fifth a mother. Not surprisingly, given popular anxiety about momism, Dumas and Keen's primary advice to mothers was to "cut those apron strings." Wives, by contrast, were encouraged to organize their lives around the needs of husbands and children. Grace Sloan Overton, author
of *Marriage in War and Peace*, justified this attention to GI marriages by explaining that although most servicemen might return as sons, they would become "the majority of husbands, lovers, and fathers among us if our American family life goes on."\(^{48}\)

With the future of the American family at stake, young wives—whose questionable morals had seemed to threaten military morale and motivation—became, in historian Susan Hartmann's words, the nation's "potential redeemers." Domesticating the returning soldiers was the daunting task that awaited them. This generation of men, professional advice-givers asserted, were altered by wartime experiences. Military service and time away from home made them restless, aggressive, and resentful of civilians. Yet with proper guidance, a loving wife might be "the anchor" that steadied her soldier "during the stormy period of readjustment." In the pages of *Ladies' Home Journal*, one combat veteran advised women to be patient with their soldiers—to forgive angry outbursts, emotional distance, and sexual indiscretions. Most important, however, a wife might help her soldier and sustain her marriage by becoming the "goddess" he imagined her to be. Similarly, Marine Corps psychiatrist Herbert Kupper called on women to mobilize their feminine wiles in the name of readjustment. Although skeptical of real women's ability to live up to the soldiers' ideals, Kupper advised wives to behave as during the couple's courtship. By temporarily deferring to the soldier's demands and suppressing her own desires, a wife might forestall disillusionment. But as Susan Hartmann has noted, wives also played a more active role in Kupper's rehabilitation plan. A dutiful wife was responsible for assessing her husband's needs and monitoring his behavior. If he failed to adjust after several months home, she should urge him to seek counseling. The goal behind much of this advice was to rebuild the veteran's ego so that he might reclaim his proper role as head of household. Grace Sloan Overton addressed this issue through the instructive story of Marybelle who at first resisted her husband Bob's postservice educational plans by asserting her rights as wartime breadwinner. The training that Bob wished to pursue would require the couple to sell their house and move to another city; Marybelle would have to give up the job at which she excelled. Marybelle pressured her husband to return to his prewar job, but he had no wish to resume that line of work and made no effort to find another job. It looked as though the marriage was "heading toward tragedy," but counselors "help[ed] Marybelle to see that Bob's inspiration was her biggest project." Conjugal peace was restored once Marybelle allowed Bob to take "the lines of the family back in hand."\(^{49}\)

Despite all the coaching, most experts agreed that even the most patient and attentive wife might encounter difficulties. An "epidemic of GI divorces" was an anticipated side effect of the soldiers' return. Wartime separation strained most marriages, and "hasty" war marriages, contracted on the basis of a few weeks or months of acquaintance, were judged particularly fragile. Grace Sloan Overton and others outlined steps to preserve such marriages, but many observers predicted their collapse.\(^{50}\) Indeed, sociology professor Willard Waller, in his influential and alarmist contribution to the literature, questioned whether war marriages were
"really marriages" and described hasty postwar marriages as "equally hazardous." In fact, he advised the readers of *Ladies' Home Journal* that "[s]ometimes the woman in a man’s life may help him most by not marrying him immediately after his release from the service." Nevertheless, Waller declared "the personal side of reconstruction" to be "woman's work." Along with good jobs and an extensive system of social services, loving wives and mothers facilitated the process of rehabilitating bitter and "maladjusted" veterans who might otherwise destabilize American society and politics.51

Press reports from abroad seemed to confirm home front fears and to justify the flood of advice. From a civilian perspective, the prospect of postwar domestic peace looked dim. With the relaxation of news and mail censorship following the Allied victories over Germany and Japan, Americans back home began to learn a great deal about military misconduct abroad. In the summer months of 1945, fraternization between American soldiers and German women, along with the skyrocketing rate of sexually transmitted diseases among American service personnel in Europe, made the front pages of most American dailies. That fall, a new wave of articles explored the question of what to do about an anticipated "spring crop of fraternization babies;"52 Stories about GIs and "geishas" soon followed.53 At around the same time, journalists began reporting from Europe that American soldiers had earned a bad reputation as a result of "a general increase in . . . drunkenness, petty robbery, assaults, and destruction of civilian property," not only in Germany but also in former allied nations. Civilian concern reached such a pitch in the fall of 1945 that Edward C. Betts, judge advocate general for American forces in Europe, tried to dispel the "unfounded" fear that the war had produced a "reservoir of potential criminals" in the returning soldiers.54

Reports of GI promiscuity and misconduct contributed to a picture of potential postwar disaster and fueled a popular movement to reunite soldiers with their families as quickly as possible. In the summer and fall of 1945, the families of overseas servicemen began pressuring the American government to "bring back Daddy" or send wives and fiancées abroad. As early as May 29, Maine congresswoman Margaret Chase Smith responded to press reports on fraternization by publicly urging Secretary of War Henry Stimson to permit American wives to join their husbands stationed in Europe. The policy of shipping women overseas would, she argued, assist soldiers’ "rehabilitation" and "prevent further disintegration of the American home and the American family life."55 Soldiers and their families flooded the mail with pleas to expedite the discharge of sons, husbands, and fathers. In September, President Harry Truman estimated that he received one thousand such letters daily.56 By winter, service wives in major cities throughout the nation had organized local chapters of the "Bring Back Daddy Club," dedicated to convincing government officials to release fathers from their military
obligations. Finally, in January 1946, servicemen in all major theaters of operations took to the streets, organizing mass demonstrations to protest the seemingly slow pace of demobilization.

From the fall of 1945 through the summer of 1946, World War II veterans made their way home en masse; that spring and summer thousands of American service wives and fiancées began heading overseas to occupied Germany and Japan. Reunited with their husbands and sweethearts at home and abroad, American women served on the frontlines of a national effort to rehabilitate war veterans. The question remained: were they up to the task? University of Chicago researcher Anne Hurley was skeptical. In the spring of 1945, while interviewing soldiers' families in Morris, Illinois, Hurley worried about the "problem of these dangling war wives." Despite all the scrutiny, service wives seemed to receive little or no community support. In Hurley's estimation, they were "unaware of what was going on in the rest of the world" and unprepared for their soldiers' return. Most wives simply sat home and waited, "expecting everything to be just the same when their husbands come home." They had "no conception" of the challenges they would face. Carol Bauman Lefevre came to a similar conclusion in her 1948 University of Chicago Master's thesis based on interviews with one hundred service wives. Noting the women's optimism about the stability of their marriages, Lefevre commented, "There may be wishful thinking or lack of realization of readjustment difficulties on the part of some wives." Blanche W, for example, believed that wartime separation had saved her marriage. She and Bill were "on the verge of separation" when he joined the Navy. Blanche complained that before he left, Bill preferred time with his friends to time spent at home. But, she asserted, military service had "taught him to appreciate" his wife and young son; she now hoped that Bill "would stay and be satisfied." The student who interviewed Blanche commented, "This case seemed to me to be the best case of possible un-adjustment in the post-war period, of all the cases I have interviewed."

Yet University of Chicago interviews reveal that service wives were not wholly sanguine about the prospect of their husbands' return. Most of the women anticipated conflicts over financial or household management, vocational plans, marital sex, or child-rearing practices. They recognized changes in themselves and expected to find their husbands somewhat altered, though not always in ways they could predict. As she awaited the return of her husband Eli in the summer of 1945, Chicago service wife Roselyn F seemed more concerned than most. Perhaps having read some of the literature on veterans, she commented, "[W]hen a person is away at war you get more nervous and irritable and all that." Friends observed changes in Eli when he was home on furlough, but to Roselyn's eyes he remained unchanged. Nevertheless, she anticipated difficulties. Another service wife told sociology student Mildred Handler that although she had been married four years, the two years apart from her husband made her marriage "seem like a dream." Purportedly eager for reunion, this wife also dreaded the event. She explained, "I want him to come home and yet I'm kind of scared. I'm afraid he'll seem like
a stranger." Other women worried less about changes to their husbands than to themselves.
One wife, for example, feared that a newfound independence would jeopardize her marriage.
The problem, she told her interviewer, was that her husband "wants someone to depend on
him. He wants the earth and moon to set on him. . . . And for the first time I've formed an idea
of what I want—all kinds of securities, emotional and the like."61

War brides, who had never set up independent households with their husbands except
perhaps temporarily near military bases, faced a greater challenge. In addition to helping
soldier-husbands reintegrate into civilian society, these women had their own adjustments to
make. Charlotte P, who married Mel soon after he enlisted, confided to her interviewer that
after only three months of living together as husband and wife and more than two years of
marriage by correspondence, she was "sick of writing letters" and had come to feel that she
and Mel did not "know each other any longer." Differences had developed between them
during their separation. Fearing the "next war," Charlotte did not wish to become a mother;
Mel still wanted children. Other hurdles included setting up and learning to run her own
household and helping her husband find a job. Twenty-one years old and living with her
parents, Charlotte had "never bought food or cooked, or anything like that," and 25-year-old
Mel had "never held down a real job." An instrument specialist aboard a cargo plane, he hoped
to find work with an airline but did not have any concrete employment plans.62

Despite many public and parental concerns, war marriages tended to be far more permanent
than anticipated. In fact, sociologists Eliza K. Pavalko and Glen H. Elder Jr. found that
servicemen who married during the war were less likely to divorce than comrades who were
married before the war began, perhaps because the couple was aware of the risks before
taking their vows. A comment by one service wife seems to confirm this insight. She told her
interviewer that the "only difficulty" she had encountered was convincing her concerned
parents that she was prepared to "cope with marriage during the war." She tried to reassure
them by telling them that she loved her fiancé "enough to accept him as he would be after the
War, regardless of what the change might be." Although this young wife anticipated that her
husband would have problems "adjusting to civilian life" and that the two of them would
"have to get to know each other again," she looked forward to his return.63

Whether newlywed or long-married, most young couples were unprepared for the difficulties
that accompanied even the most successful readjustment. The oft-fantasied first moments of
reunion tended to be as tentative as they were passionate. Naval officer Jerry C reported that
although he and his wife Evelyn exchanged daily letters and many photographs during their
twenty-two month separation, he was initially "surprised at the way she looked." Commenting
that "[a]nticipation is always greater than actual reality," he described their "sexual
adjustment" as slower than when they first married. Other conflicts revolved around
housekeeping and in-laws, but a year after Jerry's return to the United States, the student
who interviewed the couple judged their adjustment to be almost complete. Evelyn and Jerry were expecting their first child and sought to move out of her parents' house. Evelyn, who had been employed as a social worker, was now a full-time homemaker. She had become "more domestic" since Jerry's return and had come to see "the home as a center of our life." Jerry, only recently discharged and now the family's sole breadwinner, was debating whether to resume graduate studies or to enter the civilian workforce right away.64

Although Evelyn and Jerry seemed to affirm the strength of the traditional family, the case of Bess and Harold W exemplified civilian fears about the war's impact on marriage. Bess found Harold much changed by his experiences as a prisoner of war. She described him as argumentative, impatient, profane, and distrustful. He told her that while he was in prison, "he heard all sorts of stuff about what the wives of prisoners were doing." Some women asked for divorces "so that they could marry this year's hero rather than last year's prisoner. Others asked for money so they could have babies with other men." Harold, nevertheless, became extremely dependent on his wife, who seemed determined to make their marriage work. Initially "nervous" around other people, Harold preferred to be alone with Bess. Unsure about what he would do for a living, he allowed his wife to convince him to go back to school for accounting courses. At the time of the interview, Bess expressed some doubts about the future of her marriage but was doing her best to avoid arguments with Harold. The interviewer shared Bess's doubts but commended "the wife's desire to help her husband in any way she can," concluding that the marriage would probably survive.65

Bess and Harold's marriage illustrates the weight individual Americans placed on domesticity as a balm for war wounds. Harold did not participate in this interview, but we know from Bess that, like many others, he had been eager to wed before leaving for overseas service so that he would have "something to come back to." Like Jerry and Evelyn, Bess and Harold were expecting their first child and searching for a home of their own. It seems likely that the baby was planned and was intended to cement the marriage, for advice-givers like John Mariano characterized children as a "stabilizing force which tends to cause marriages to hold." Impending parenthood certainly seemed to focus Harold's restless energy. He read as many baby books as he could find and even planned to take charge of the baby's nighttime feeding for fear that Bess would be too tired to mix the proper formula.66

Although sometimes reluctant to become parents during wartime, most young couples believed that children would strengthen marriage bonds. One wife, for example, deplored childless marriages, commenting, "There's no sense in getting married if you don't have children." However she also worried that an absent father might find it difficult to love a child he did not know.67 Many wives sought to remedy this potential side effect of separation through correspondence. A baby or young child was typically the main topic of letters to soldier-husbands. Mothers also sent regular snapshots and other mementoes, such as baby's
first shoes, overseas. They taught their children to recognize portraits of "daddy" and to behave in a manner that would make their fathers proud. Freda Spitzer, for example, admonished her 2-year-old son Bobby to "eat nice so that when Daddy came home he would be pleased with the way he ate." An absent father often became part of a child's imaginative world. Once as Freda was writing to Albert, Bobby pretended to greet his father as he walked through the door. According to his mother, 3-year-old Sherman P conversed with a portrait of his father "for hours at a time." Another soldier's child said her evening prayers before a photograph of her father. Like Sherman, she often spoke to the picture, asking it questions such as, "Can I go out and play?" Her fantasy father's answer was always, "Yes." But when the time for reunion came, children were not always able to connect the men standing before them with the indulgent fathers they imagined. One young boy, for example, was reportedly "bewildered" to learn that "daddy" was a person rather than a photograph.

Returning servicemen, likewise, often were unprepared to become fathers to children they barely knew. Morris veteran Tom C was unable to be present at his daughter's birth; he did not meet her until he returned home from overseas service. The child greeted Tom as instructed by her mother but began crying when her father picked her up for the first time. Yet, over the course of several months, the 2-year-old came, in Tom's words, "to act to me like any other kid would to their fathers." Tom told University of Chicago researcher Walter Eaton that fatherhood gave him a new sense of responsibility, and Eaton noted the pride Tom took in his daughter's good manners. Although parental responsibilities seemed to smooth Tom's readjustment to civilian life, for many other first-time fathers, they were complicating factors. To Rick B, for example, fatherhood was a source of frustration. He resented the demands of his young daughter's nap and feeding schedules and complained that the child was spoiled. His wife judged that Rick would have preferred a childless reunion. "He wants it to go on just as it was" before he left, she confided to Eaton. Other wives made similar observations. One explained, "When they want to go, that's all there is to it—they can't be bothered with children.

The difficulties Tom and Rick experienced were common to many returned soldiers who also were first-time fathers. At Stanford University, psychologist Lois Meek Stolz became aware of veterans' concerns about their war-born progeny while teaching a course on child psychology; she found that several of the former servicemen in her class were interested in the topic for "personal rather than academic" reasons. This experience prompted Stolz to study how wartime separation affected relations between father and child, based on an experimental group of nineteen veterans of overseas service and a matched control group of fathers (some of them veterans) who had been able to watch their children grow. Compared to the control group, returned fathers were particularly anxious about their ability to assert authority within the family and to establish themselves as breadwinners. One confided to Stolz, "I went through a period of wondering whether I could live up to the responsibilities of a husband."
Not surprisingly, all of the men in the experimental group experienced some form of rejection—crying, shyness, or refusal of paternal affection—from children who regarded them as strangers; this behavior reinforced the former servicemen’s insecurities. In most cases, returned fathers responded by assuming the harsh role of disciplinarian; they thus alienated their firstborn children and produced conflict within their reconstituted families. Years later, as historian William Tuttle has shown, many of these conflicts remained unresolved. The returned fathers who participated in Stolz’s study viewed their firstborn children through a negative lens. Compared to the control group, they were twice as likely to find fault and much less prone to praise their young sons and daughters. They described the children as unhappy, demanding, unresponsive, disrespectful, and selfish. All but one blamed the child for interfering in the reunion between husband and wife, and most worried that the mother-child bond had become too strong in the father’s absence. A predictable result of such concerns, given popular condemnation of momism, was the servicemen’s fear that their sons had become sissies. Complicating the situation was many veterans’ ambivalence toward their war-born children, perhaps reflecting unconscious doubts about their legitimacy (and thus wives’ fidelity). One father, for example, described his daughter as “sort of an adoption really.” Another admitted that initially his son “didn’t particularly seem like my child too much.” Most of the men in the experimental group found it easier to love their postwar children; only two of the sixteen second-time fathers claimed to love both equally. By contrast, the control group fathers were slightly more likely to report feeling closer to their first than to their second child; seven of the sixteen claimed to love both equally.

While married veterans adjusted or readjusted to family life, discharged bachelors pursued the bonds of matrimony with increasing ardor. Walter Eaton’s fieldwork in Morris, Illinois, helps explain this phenomenon. A veteran himself, Eaton moved to Morris with his wife Jean in 1945. While there, he drank with his subjects at local taverns, visited veterans in their homes, and spoke with the men several times during their first months back in Morris. Eaton observed that recently returned soldiers were often restless and ill at ease in their own homes. Released from military obligation, soldiers often avoided civilian responsibilities. A recently divorced service wife complained that her former husband would “be gallivanting around all day” and “too doggone tired to make it to work at night.” One former soldier described this behavior, “It’s sort of a prolonged leave—that’s the atmosphere prevailing.” Every night and in some cases earlier in the day, veterans congregated in local taverns, such as the Seven Gables, where they could gamble in the back room, drink at the bar, and generally “blow off steam.” Nevertheless, after months of renewing old acquaintances and celebrating newfound freedom, most married veterans settled into domestic routines, and many bachelors began to long for married life.
Eaton’s interviews reveal that some of the least stable veterans sought marital solutions to their adjustment difficulties. Mike T, for example, had lived in his parents’ home collecting G.I. Bill unemployment benefits (“rocking-chair money”) since returning five months earlier; every night he could be found drinking in one of Morris’ taverns. After sharing a couple of beers with Eaton one afternoon, Mike complained that his "nerves" were bad and that he was drinking too much but confided that he hoped to turn his life around. His plan was to leave town, take an apprentice course at a big factory, and marry his girlfriend Margaret. Mike believed that married life would "settle me down quite a bit," observing that it had had a similar effect on other veterans. As a married man, Mike predicted, he would stay home at night instead of going to taverns; he would drink less and become a "steady" worker. However, Mike’s plan to achieve stability through employment and marriage was only half formed. Although he had selected a potential mate, he could not answer Eaton’s question about where he would find the apprenticeship. Ed M, another "rocking-chair veteran," also shared Mike’s faith in matrimony. Marriage, he asserted, "will be the best thing in the world for me. . . . Do me good in every way." He joked that it might even motivate him to hold down a steady job.76

To Eaton’s surprise, by late summer 1946 even John N, a proud former marine who had previously denied any interest in marriage ("No use [buying] the cow when the milk’s free."), was engaged to be married. A skilled tradesman with a short temper and a weak work ethic, John had, in Eaton’s words, become "troubled and worried by his present behavior." He looked to his fiancée for help and blamed her when his behavior failed to improve, as in one night when Eaton ran into a very drunk John. The former serviceman complained about "that damn woman of mine" and addressing Eaton insisted, "I shouldn't be out like this, you see who I'm out with don't you." The sociologist noted, "The inference evidently was that he wouldn't have been out with these fellows and shouldn't have been out with them—but that he and his girl had an argument and that that was responsible for the trouble." Although skeptical of John’s marriage plans, Eaton predicted that if he married, John might "settle down and continue to live in Morris." If not, "he may find himself in six months somewhere in Texas or China, god knows where."77

Like Mike, Ed, and John, most Morris citizens (veteran and nonveteran alike) tended to classify married men among the best adjusted or most settled of the returned soldiers. Given a set of cards, each bearing the name of a former serviceman, unmarried veteran Tony L arranged them into three piles based on level of satisfaction since returning home. The best-adjusted men enjoyed some form of financial security; many were happily married, and all had "something to come back to." Among the second group (veterans whose adjustment Tony judged average) were men who had steady jobs or who were attending school but whose future was unclear. Tony included many of his married acquaintances among this group, explaining that these men were "forced into being halfway contented." Tony, who worked for a local
manufacturer and planned to enter Springfield Junior College, placed himself among the third
group of veterans, men who were dissatisfied with their civilian occupational status or
unhappy in their marriages. When asked to perform the same task, Roy B, a married
nonveteran who until recently had seemed a confirmed bachelor, explained that in his
opinion the best-adjusted veterans benefited from wifely encouragement and a feeling of
familial obligation. Less settled veterans "[p]robably . . . didn’t feel their family obligation
quite as strongly."78

A source of military motivation and a panacea for postwar ills, marriage accompanied by
career and homeownership represented security, stability, and satisfaction to young men
and women whose lives were disrupted first by depression and then by war. Although the
economic crises of the 1930s inhibited nuptiality, war and peace inspired high rates of
marriage and fertility, confounding demographers’ forecasts and temporarily reversing long-
term downward trends.79 The men who served in the nation’s armed forces were in the
forefront of this domestic revolution. They represented three-quarters of the male population
between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine in 1947, when the median age at first marriage
was 23.7 years old. Although disproportionately single when they entered military service,
these men proved more prone to marry than their civilian counterparts. The federal
government facilitated this marital propensity through military dependency allowances and a
broad array of veterans’ benefits,80 but economic incentives alone cannot account for
servicemen’s and veterans’ enhanced desire for domestic bliss. Along with government
subsidies and economic prosperity, popular faith in the beneficial—even restorative—effects of
matrimony helped propel the marriage and attendant baby booms.

Although the transition from soldier to husband, father, and breadwinner could be rocky, the
anticipated epidemic of broken homes never materialized. A sharp but brief postwar upsurge
in divorce was dwarfed by an even greater and longer-lasting increase in matrimony. In places
like Morris, older veterans, born between the years 1916 and 1918, returned home to try to
take up where they left off. Most of the bachelors married while in service or soon after being
discharged. Returning husbands readjusted to the families they had been forced to leave
behind. As a group, these men made little use of GI Bill benefits, but four years after the war’s
end and roughly three years since their discharges, they had almost matched the economic
and domestic achievements of peers who did not serve. Military service seemed to have
temporarily disrupted but not significantly altered the course of their lives. By contrast, war
was a turning point in the lives of the youngest Morris veterans, inducted in their late teens
and discharged at around age twenty. By 1949, 43 percent had already left town or planned to
leave in pursuit of educational and employment opportunities not available in Morris.
Although sociologist Robert J. Havighurst emphasized "continuity" in the behavior and
accomplishments of these young men, Glen H. Elder Jr. and his colleagues found that the majority of men who entered military service before the age of 21 believed that "their life has followed a different and more rewarding course as a result."\textsuperscript{81}

With wife and often baby in tow, the younger cohorts of veterans were "pioneers" of a mass migration in search of affordable and child-friendly housing. They left small towns and overcrowded cities for places such as Park Forest, south of Chicago, or Island Trees, later Levittown, on Long Island. Thanks to Levitt & Sons' recruitment strategies and to government-backed home loans, by 1951, close to 90 percent of the men who rented or owned property in Levittown were white World War II veterans; their modal age was 29 years old. The developers of Park Forest—home to \textit{Fortune} magazine editor William H. Whyte's "organization man"—also sought to populate the town with white veterans and their families, promising them an escape from the noise, dirt, and crime of the city.\textsuperscript{82} "[H]arbinger[s]," in William Whyte's words, "for the way [America] is going to be," these family-centered housing developments also satisfied the former servicemen's desire for domestic comfort and security.\textsuperscript{83}
Notes


Note 2: Ruth Jamieson, however, has shown that the British military also worried about the "tentative and fragile nature of men's resolve to subordinate their private and personal interest to the public and general good." Ruth Jamieson, "The Man of Hobbes: Masculinity and Wartime Necessity," Journal of Historical Sociology 9 (1 March 1996): 19–42.


Note 4: Stouffer et al., American Soldier, 2:169.


Note 6: Base Censorship Detachment #1, "Special Examination of Mail from 36th Division and VI Corps Headquarters" (12 September 1943), File: 311.7/319.1, Special Morale Reports, Box: Morale Reports #1 thru #2, G-2 Headquarters Records, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 492, NACP.

Note 7: Westbrook, Why We Fought, chapters 2 and 3.


Note 15: Twelve percent of all recruits, or over 1.8 million men, were rejected for neuropsychiatric reasons. Menninger, *Psychiatry in a Troubled World*, 341–2, 347.


Note 17: Through its Home Service and Military and Naval Welfare Service programs, the ARC facilitated communication between servicemen and their families and conducted investigations into home conditions, such as a family illness, the birth of a child, or a financial problem.

Note 19: My emphasis.


Note 21: The couple had one son, Bobby, and were expecting a second child in February 1945.


Note 23: Albert Spitzer to Freda Spitzer (26 January, 15 February, 12 August 1945), Albert and Freda Spitzer Correspondence, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries; Litoff et al., "Miss You," 213–4, 252; Interview 2906, File 4, Box 74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 24: Interview 2906, File 4, Box 74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library; Freda Spitzer to Albert Spitzer (8, 14 November 1944) and Albert Spitzer to Freda Spitzer (23, 28 October, 15 November 1944), Albert and Freda Spitzer Correspondence, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries.


Note 26: Litoff et al., "Miss You," 197–9, 209, 226–7, 238–9, 249–50.


Note 31: Litoff and Smith, Since You Went Away, 55–63.


Note 33: Comment Sheet TC-1014 (15 March 1944), File: 726, Box T-1411, G2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 34: Researchers affiliated with the University of Chicago's Committee on Human Development studied the war's impact on soldiers and their families in Morris, described as a "typical small Midwestern city." Robert J. Havighurst et al., The American Veteran Back Home: A Study of Veteran Readjustment (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951), v–vi, 39–40; Walter H. Eaton, "Research on Veterans' Adjustment," The American Journal of Sociology 51 (March 1946): 483–5; Walter Eaton, Interview with "3 Morris Girls" [1946], File 9, Box 101, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 35: Interview 2907, File 4, Box 74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library; Carol Baumann LeFevre, "The Satisfactions and Dissatisfactions of One Hundred Servicemen's Wives" (M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1948), 30–31.


Note 38: Robert E. Bondy to Harvey D. Gibson, Re: *Policy on Requests for Assistance with Marital Problems* (2 February 1944), File: 900.61 All Theaters, Activities Other than Health for the Military, Box 1416; Elmer Wood to Charlotte Johnson, Re: Chapter Participation in Moral Investigations (30 May 1944), File: 610.11 Home Service Activities, General 1944, Box 960; both in Group 3, ARC Records, RG 200, NACP.


Note 40: The allowances were drawn from enlisted men’s pay and supplemented by the federal government. Officers received no supplement.

Note 41: Conviction for a first offense brought the penalty of a $500 fine or a year in prison or both.


Note 45: Ibid., 19, 28, 115.


Note 48: Dumas and Keen, Psychiatric Primer for the Veteran's Family and Friends, 12–3, 16–28; Overton, Marriage in War and Peace, 59–60. On momism and readjustment, see Plant, "The Veteran, His Wife, and Their Mothers."


Note 52: "Nothing Else to Do," Newsweek 26 (1 October 1945): 58. For more on censorship and fraternization, see chapter 3.


Note 57: Bring Back Daddy Club “To Our Legislators” (ca. February 1946). In December 1945 and
January and February 1946, President Harry S. Truman received daily letters, telegrams, and
petitions from Bring Back Daddy Club members in Chicago, Duluth, Atlanta, Milwaukee, St. Paul-
Minneapolis, Syracuse, Oklahoma City, Buffalo, Mobile, Toledo, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, Peoria, and
several smaller cities; General File, keyword "Bring," White House Central Files, Harry S. Truman
on this topic, see the conclusion.

Note 58: For more on this topic, see the conclusion.

Note 59: Anne Hurley, "Conversation with Mr. Tope of the Methodist Church" (10 April 1945) and
"Conversation with Godfrey Berg" (20 April 1945), both in File 8, Box 15, Ernest W. Burgess Papers,
Department of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library. See also Havighurst et al.,

Note 60: The interviews used by LeFevre were conducted by University of Chicago students during
the final year of the war. LeFevre, "The Satisfactions and Dissatisfactions of One Hundred
Papers, Department of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 61: Interview 3306, File 5, Box 74; Interview 43 in Mildred Handler, "Ten Cases in the
Adjustments of Servicemen's Wives," File 9, Box 121; both in Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department
of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library; LeFevre, "Satisfactions and Dissatisfactions,"
126, 131–4. See also Campbell, Women at War with America, 203–7; McDonagh and McDonagh,

Note 62: Interview 3305, File 5, Box 74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department of Special
Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 63: Eliza K. Pavalko and Glen H. Elder Jr., "World War II and Divorce: A Life-Course
Perspective," American Journal of Sociology 95 (March 1990): 1222–4; Interview 3367 in Carolyn
Barnes, "Problems of Adjustment of War Marriages" (August 1945), File 4, Box 128, Ernest W.
Burgess Papers, Department of Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 64: Interview 4551, File 6, Box 74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department of Special
Collections, University of Chicago Library. On typical patterns of adjustment to reunion, see Reuben
Hill and Elise Boulding, Families under Stress: Adjustment to the Crises of War Separation and

Note 65: Interview 4445, File 6, Box 74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Department of Special
Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 66: Ibid.; Mariano, Veteran and His Marriage, 54.

Note 67: Interview 2350, File 3, Box 74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, University of Chicago Library,
Dept. of Special Collections.

Note 68: Freda Spitzer to Albert Spitzer (30 April 1945), Albert and Freda Spitzer Correspondence,
Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries; Interview 2906, File 4, Box
74, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, University of Chicago Library, Dept of Special Collections; Havighurst,


Note 71: These and other names of persons interviewed by Walter Eaton are pseudonyms. Interviews with Tom C (17 April 1946), Rick B (8 June 1946), and ’3 Morris Girls” [1946], File 9, Box 101, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Special Collections, University of Chicago Library; Havighurst et al., *American Veteran Back Home*, 83–4.


Note 76: Havighurst et al., *American Veteran Back Home*, 75–80, 111–18; Walter Eaton, Interviews with Mike T (29 May 1946) and Ed M (5 June 1946), File 9, Box 101, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 77: Walter Eaton, Interviews with John N (25 May 1946), File 9, Box 101 and Glen H [September? 1946], File 1, Box 102, both in Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.

Note 78: Walter Eaton, Interviews with Tony L [spring 1946] and of Roy B (12 June 1946); both in File 1, Box 102, Ernest W. Burgess Papers, Special Collections, University of Chicago Library.


**Note 82:** Levittown had an explicit "whites only" policy, whereas Park Forest developers and residents quietly but effectively excluded African Americans until 1959.

CHAPTER 2
The Slander Campaign

On 28 July 1943, Station DEBUNK, an English-language radio station broadcasting Axis propaganda to the American home front, reported that twenty members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps\(^1\) had to be shipped from North Africa back to the United States because of pregnancy. At first glance, this broadcast might seem to support the contention of American public officials, like First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, that slanderous rumors about female soldiers were the result of Nazi propaganda.\(^2\) But as one counterintelligence officer noted, "This particular rumor with varying figures has been widely circulating before." He wryly remarked that German broadcasters exhibited "some restraint" in limiting the number of pregnant Waacs to twenty. Homegrown rumors usually put that number much higher, ranging from several dozen to 250,000 women (at a time when the entire corps consisted of considerably fewer than one hundred thousand members).\(^3\)

The Army's investigation into the salacious rumors that hobbled its efforts to recruit and retain Waacs during the spring and summer of 1943 revealed that the so-called slander campaign originated not with the nation's enemies but with its own soldiers. Indeed, the Germans were slow to recognize the propaganda value of such rumors. By the time of the DEBUNK broadcast, insinuations of sexual immorality within the WAAC were already widespread and had been reported as fact in the popular press.

This chapter traces the hostile rumors back their source and documents their spread from soldier to civilian. As other historians have shown, such rumors thrived and spread in the fertile ground of gendered assumptions about the nature of military obligation and service.\(^4\) But the slander was not simply a product of wartime constructions of gender but also a consequence—and perhaps the most telling manifestation—of the conflict between national goals and privatized notions of military obligation, for attacks on the corps' reputation were made in the name of protecting individual homes. Soldiers sought to prevent wives, sisters, and sweethearts from enlisting. As much as it exposed hostility toward military women, this incident also revealed servicemen's dependence on the women they loved and were forced to leave behind.
Even as the War Department threw its weight behind Massachusetts Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers's bill to establish an auxiliary corps of civilian women serving with the Army, military planners were aware from British and Canadian precedent that the corps would likely attract malicious gossip. Although the bill made its way through Congress with minimal opposition, it was not without critics. Accusing his congressional colleagues of moral cowardice in the face of pressure from the War Department, Rep. Clare Hoffman of Michigan dramatically declared that he would put "the welfare of my country first" by voting against the WAAC bill. Women, he asserted, could best serve the nation not by joining the Army but by remaining at home. If women became soldiers, "who then," he asked rhetorically, "will maintain the home fires; who will do . . . the humble, homey tasks to which every woman has devoted herself; who will rear and nurture the children; who will teach them patriotism and loyalty; who will make men of them, so that, when their day comes, they too, may march away to war?" In the Senate, Francis T. Maloney of Connecticut, likewise, worried that the women's corps would "cast a shadow over the sanctity of the home." Such concerns would continue to haunt the new organization.

The WAAC, nevertheless, enjoyed close to a year of relative calm, growing to over sixty thousand members between May 1942 and June 1943. Aside from an embarrassing and widely reported story about a young auxiliary who went absent without leave (AWOL) from Fort Des Moines in Iowa and was later discovered working as a dancer at a local burlesque theater, the corps enjoyed fairly positive press coverage. An August 1942 article in Time magazine, for example, described the "skirted auxiliary" as a "shrewd Army move" and characterized the corps' officer candidates and auxiliaries as intelligent, dedicated, and well adjusted. Yet even the most sympathetic news story might contain a note of ridicule. The same Time article portrayed the young women as somewhat overzealous, saluting "so often, so insistently that visiting regular Army officers had to use liniment on the arms that returned those salutes." More ominously, some of the women seemed determined to transgress gender norms by learning jujitsu and carrying weapons. 

The corps' early image problems had less to do with bad press than with rumors emanating from the Army itself. In January 1943, WAAC Director Oveta Culp Hobby was concerned enough about servicemen's antagonism toward their female comrades to request an attitude survey. By April, it was clear that this hostility was both retarding recruitment efforts and causing some women to regret the decision to volunteer for service. From Toledo, Ohio, recruiter Marion Lichty reported on an auxiliary who requested release from service after a male officer embarrassed her in front of office coworkers with stories of "tough" and promiscuous Waacs. Another soldier apparently "took delight in telling a WAAC enrollee that one hundred out of a thousand Waacs were discharged for pregnancy." Servicemen also made
sure that civilians—particularly women—were well aware of real or alleged indiscretions. By the time of Lichty’s investigation, USO (United Service Organizations) lounges and service centers, where local women assisted and entertained GIs, had become “virtual hot beds of rumors.”

In April 1943, rumors of Waac promiscuity were repeated on the floor of the Massachusetts State House. During a hearing on a bill that would permit women to serve as jurors, Rep. Daniel F. Sullivan of Lowell responded to testimony in favor of the bill by disparaging women who had recently shouldered new civic obligations. He charged that eighty-six Waacs stationed at Fort Devens had been discharged for pregnancy and that fifty-four more were being returned from Africa for the same reason. When confronted by Army intelligence officers two months later, Sullivan insisted that he had no wish to discredit the corps; he was “merely passing on a report” he heard from a confidential source whom he identified simply as an “Army medical officer.” From personal observation as master of ceremonies at a dinner-dance club in Ayer where Fort Devens was located, Sullivan admitted that Waacs seemed “very well behaved.” He blamed military personnel for most of the rumors, suggesting that jealous nurses were the main problem, even though his informant was male.

By May, a noticeable slowdown in recruiting led WAAC officials to suspect a subversive source behind the rumors. Alerting Army intelligence to “indications of an organized whispering campaign,” Director Hobby requested an investigation. Her request was initially declined. One intelligence officer noted that the slanderous allegations Hobby identified were “in a similar vein” to those found by mail censors in soldiers’ letters home from overseas. Another suggested that time might be better spent improving WAAC publicity than in investigating rumors. Less than a week after this refusal, the rumors found their way into the national press.

On 8 June 1943, syndicated columnist John O’Donnell created uproar by reporting news of a “super secret agreement” between WAAC Director Hobby and “high ranking military officials” to provide servicewomen with contraceptives and prophylactics. O’Donnell was Washington bureau chief for the New York Daily News. Like his boss, publisher Joseph Medill Patterson, O’Donnell was a former isolationist and tireless New Deal critic. Six months earlier, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had awarded the journalist a mock Iron Cross for a column critical of American soldiers in the field. The 8 June column was as much an attack on the Roosevelt administration as on the new organization. Characterizing the imaginary agreement as a “victory for the New Deal ladies” and a defeat for the sexual double standard, O’Donnell constructed a conspiracy (with Eleanor Roosevelt at the helm) to send American women into battle zones and into pre- or extramarital sex. Forced to retract his allegations, O’Donnell and his publisher remained determined to discredit the corps. Soon after this incident, O’Donnell
was discovered "canvassing Army general hospitals." He sought ascertain the number of Waacs hospitalized for pregnancy and thus defend his reputation with undeniable proof of promiscuity.\textsuperscript{12}

The government moved quickly to deny O'Donnell’s explosive allegations. Seeking to reassure current and future servicewomen and to shame rumormongers, officials typically blamed Axis elements rather than acknowledge American hostility—a tendency that would later characterize the push to prosecute Iva Toguri (a.k.a. Tokyo Rose) on charges of treason.\textsuperscript{13} Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson declared the "sinister rumors" to be "absolutely and completely false," reminding Americans that Waacs were a "cross section of the womanhood of our nation." Repeating slanderous stories about female soldiers not only insulted American womanhood but also aided the nation’s enemies by undermining the Army's efforts to increase its "combat strength." Commander of Army Service Forces Gen. Brehon B. Somervell blamed "a person . . . sympathetic to the Axis" (meaning, it turned out, O'Donnell) for the rumors' spread, although he admitted that he did not know whether the stories were actually "inspired by the Axis." Eleanor Roosevelt was less circumspect. She scolded the American public for "fall[ing] for Axis inspired rumors like children."\textsuperscript{14}

Blaming enemy agents, however, was not simply a public-relations strategy—although there was some element of that. WAAC leaders wrongly believed, in the words of director of training Gen. Don C. Faith, that "enemy sources both within and without the country" held some responsibility for the rumors, even if they were not entirely to blame. The timing of the slander campaign seemed to support that suspicion. Director Hobby first became concerned about the rumors in January 1943 when bills to convert the corps from auxiliary to full military status were simultaneously introduced in both houses of Congress. The slander became more vicious and disruptive after Senate approval of the bill in February and March hearings by the House Committee on Military Affairs. John O'Donnell’s derogatory column and others like it were published as members of Congress considered revised and amended versions of the bill and provided opponents with new grounds for objection. Most important, after the bill became law on 1 July, the rumors were perfectly timed to disrupt the corps’ transition to full military status, which required auxiliaries to reenlist as soldiers subject to Army discipline by September.\textsuperscript{15}

The Army’s investigation into the rumors’ source and the process through which they spread began soon after the publication of O'Donnell’s allegations and continued through much of the summer. It focused on two questions. The first was whether enemy agents were responsible for the widely circulated stories of sexual impropriety among members of the women's corps. The second was the whether there was a factual basis to the rumors.
Despite the many public pronouncements linking WAAC rumors to German propaganda, intelligence officers uncovered little evidence to suggest that the slander campaign was Axis-inspired. One case that seemed to support suspicions of enemy involvement was that of Hugo S, a native of Germany who was reputed to be a member of the German American Bund. Hugo had been a naturalized citizen of the United States since 1931; at the time of the investigation, he lived in New Jersey and was employed by a local manufacturer. He came to the attention of military authorities because of a statement he made before two coworkers on 24 April 1943—the familiar claim that five hundred Waacs had been shipped from Africa to New York because of pregnancy. Intelligence officers traced the source of the rumor from Hugo to his brother Richard, also suspected of subversive activities. Richard claimed he simply repeated a rumor that had long circulated in his hometown of Paterson; his goal was to prevent his niece (Hugo's daughter) from joining the WAAC. Investigators remained convinced that the brothers were spreading WAAC rumors "with malicious intent" but found no evidence of a deliberate smear campaign. In fact, some of the interview material suggested that, although Hugo probably suffered from divided loyalties, his purported pro-Nazi sympathies were likely overstated, particularly by coworker George H, the indignant father of a WAAC corporal. After hearing about the rumored pregnancies from another colleague, George searched out Hugo and punched him, knocking the other man to the ground; Hugo retaliated with a lawsuit.\textsuperscript{16}

A less likely fifth columnist was Army Air Force officer Charles S, who, in a letter to WAAC officer Margaret M, repeated rumors circulating around Camp Polk in Louisiana. "It might interest you," he wrote, "that there were 165 pregnant Waacs in one month—not official figures but it came from a good source. A friend of mine was in the hospital and one of the nurses told him. I understand that before the girls go out on passes they have to show that they have . . . contraceptives." Capt. S's latter statement was of particular interest to Army intelligence because of its timing, about a week before John O'Donnell's infamous column, and its similarity to the journalist's allegation that military officials were issuing contraceptives to the auxiliaries. Although described as "frank" and "cooperative" by investigators, Capt. S provided little useful evidence when interviewed a little over a month after writing the above letter. He was unable to identify the sources of his information with any certainty. The other officers and enlisted men at Camp Polk were able to elaborate on the rumors. One, for example, claimed to have heard that the high rate of pregnancy among Waacs was responsible for their recent transfer to another location. But all of the men interviewed were similarly vague about their sources.\textsuperscript{17}

On the question of whether or not the scandalous stories were based on fact, intelligence officers discovered some instances of "moral laxness" among individual Waacs but little evidence of rampant promiscuity. Lt. Lawrence Kerns's investigation of the Second WAAC Training Center in Daytona Beach, Florida, uncovered the most dirt. There, until recently, most of the women had been housed in hotels, and those who wished found ample
opportunity to enjoy the city's nightlife in company with the soldiers and sailors who flocked to the resort on weekends. Servicemen bragged about their sexual conquests, and civilians complained of public drunkenness and promiscuous behavior in parks, near taverns, or on the beach. Certainly the records and recollections of local civilian and military police confirmed several cases of sexual misconduct—Waacs interrupted in the middle of coitus or found cohabiting with servicemen in hotel rooms and tourist cabins. But persons interviewed during the course of this investigation largely agreed that the troublemakers were a small minority and that on the whole, WAAC auxiliaries and officers were well behaved. Statistics back up this assertion. During the period between 1 January and 8 July, medical officers documented thirty-six illegitimate pregnancies out of a fluctuating population of five to ten thousand women and thirty-seven cases of sexually transmitted diseases. The rumored number of infections, however, was twenty-four hundred, representing roughly half of the Waacs stationed in Daytona Beach at the time of Kerns's investigation.\(^{18}\)

Although rumors were similar elsewhere, the rates of illegitimacy and infection in Florida were unusually high. Officers assigned to investigate Waac behavior at Fort Devens, Fort Des Moines, Fort Oglethorpe, and Camp Atterbury uncovered far fewer instances of misconduct. Despite Rep. Daniel Sullivan's claim that eighty-six of the Waacs stationed at Fort Devens had been discharged because of pregnancy, medical records revealed only eleven pregnancies (six to married women) and eleven cases of sexually transmitted diseases among the more than six thousand Waacs stationed there between 1 January and 26 June. At Camp Atterbury in Indiana, thirty-four unwed Waacs were rumored to have been "sent home pregnant." In truth, four women had been discharged for pregnancy, and in only one case was there any question of legitimacy. Furthermore, since their arrival four months earlier, there had been no reports of disturbances involving Waacs, save for one caused by a drunken soldier, and that incident was judged by the camp's intelligence officer to "reflect in no way" on the auxiliary or the corps.\(^{19}\)

Investigators' findings generally conformed to Capt. Charles D. Frierson's assessment that the conduct and "sexual morality of the average [Waac] is higher than that of the average civilian girl, possibly because of the lack of opportunity for delinquency" but "probably in greater measure due to pride in the Corps." Like service wives, Waacs were well aware of public scrutiny. They sought to protect their own reputations and that of the corps by enforcing through peer pressure "a proper demeanor and freedom from even the appearance of evil on the part of other members." Observed in taverns and nightclubs near Fort Des Moines, the women appeared "dignified" and "respectable" and were seldom intoxicated, typically limiting their alcohol consumption to one or two drinks over the course of the night. On the question of sexual misconduct, Frierson interviewed hotel managers, clerks, housekeepers, and bellhops. He uncovered one case of a Waac who reputedly "solicit[ed] sailors nightly in the lobby of one of the second-class hotels." But the rest of the hotel workers reported that they
had never witnessed any misconduct or worried about Waacs being involved in "immoral proceedings." Des Moines drugstore owners confirmed this impression, informing Frierson of only a "dozen instances" of contraceptive purchases by corps members, most by married women.20

Although the Waac of rumor was diseased and infectious, sexually transmitted diseases were never a serious health problem among corps members. In fact, the rate of infection among Waacs was significantly lower than the rate among servicemen and among the general population of civilian women.21 Over the seven-week period ending 14 May 1943, for example, the projected annual rate for Waacs was 5.3 per thousand;22 36 auxiliaries out of a total of 50,079 received treatment. The rate for servicemen was roughly five times higher. Furthermore, infected soldiers seldom named Waacs on contact reports. During that same seven-week period, only twenty-four of an estimated thirteen thousand soldiers treated for sexually transmitted diseases identified a Waac as their "probable source of infection."23

As historian Leisa Meyer has shown, WAAC regulations, along with selection processes, helped produce this remarkably chaste corps of women. Placing respectability above health considerations, WAAC officials—perhaps wisely in light of the uproar produced by John O'Donnell's infamous allegations—withheld access to birth control and instruction on methods to prevent sexually transmitted diseases. They sought to recruit women who shared their bourgeois moral standards and disqualified from service any recruit found to suffer from a sexually transmitted disease. However, as Gen. Faith admitted in an off-the-record interview with intelligence officer Capt. C. C. Pierce, some Waacs "did not have the moral standards which the corps would obviously desire." In fact, a few proved to be former prostitutes—a situation that most WAAC leaders blamed on careless recruiting and the lowered educational (read "class") standards imposed on the corps by the Army in hopes of meeting ambitious enlistment quotas. Faith explained that the organization did its "best to weed out undesirables during the course of enrollment," but in cases in which such women went undetected, discharges were sought under the WAAC Code of Conduct, which prohibited members from behaving in a manner that would discredit the corps. Evidence of public drunkenness or of pre- or extramarital sex, for example, was justification for discharging the offender.24

Despite lack of substance, the stories about promiscuous Waacs made sense to wartime Americans. Rumors about the corps drew on the historical equation of camp followers with prostitutes and harnessed popular concerns about female sexuality unleashed by war. Although subject to restriction (including curfews and nightly bed checks) and to surveillance by military police, Waacs fit the profile of suspect women. Living on Army bases beyond the oversight of family and home community opened them to criticism and unkind speculation. Like the transient "victory girls" who were reputed to have replaced professional prostitutes
imprisoned under the May Act, Waacs were rumored to provide sexual services to soldiers stationed near them. Indeed, many rumors implied that the Army recruited women to perform sexual acts rather than clerical tasks—to serve, in other words, as "government-issue mistresses." Although investigators did not examine Army policies (except to confirm that O’Donnell’s charges were false), official attitudes certainly contributed to the perception that women were recruited as servicemen’s companions if not mistresses. In the summer of 1942, for example, just months after the corps was established, the New York Times reported on European theater commander Gen. Dwight Eisenhower’s proposal to bring African American Waacs to England. The women would "perform duties such as car driving and secretarial work and also provide companionship for thousands of Negro troops." The unstated goal behind this troop requisition was to discourage black servicemen from seeking the company of white women. Two years later, during the Allied invasion of Germany, another proposal to use servicewomen as sexual deterrents made the news. Allied officials had quietly planned to bring large numbers of American Wacs and members of the British Auxiliary Territorial Service to rear echelon areas in Germany. The hope was that in addition to performing clerical tasks, the servicewomen would discourage fraternization between male troops and German women by serving as soldiers’ dance and bridge partners. Much to the horror of WAC officials, this plan became public as a result of a statement issued by British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery’s headquarters. This story sparked both official denials and denunciation of the corps from at least one radio pulpit.

Even the Army’s promotional efforts might be blamed for some of the confusion about whether Waacs should be regarded as companions or comrades. In August 1943, when the first WAAC battalion arrived in England to the strains of “Let Me Call You Sweetheart,” Stars and Stripes publicized the event with several articles emphasizing the Waacs’ femininity and desirability. The armed-forces newspaper even reported that aboard the ship to England, tickets to WAAC parties were so valued that they were “accepted as legal tender in high stakes craps games.” Encouraging servicemen to take advantage of this opportunity to hear from "girls back home," the newspaper published a list of the new arrivals organized by hometown and state. The following year the Stars and Stripes even sponsored a competition to crown "the prettiest Wac in the United Kingdom," calling on servicemen to send in photographs of likely candidates for publication and public admiration.

When off-duty, Wacs stationed in overseas theaters of operations were expected to attend a multitude of social events as enlisted men’s companions. In the China-Burma-India theater, for example, invitations were so numerous that WAC officials instituted dateless nights and quiet hours to provide enlisted women with some respite from the constant attention. And even at relatively isolated posts within the continental United States, Wacs were subject to
constant social demands. At Fort Knox in Kentucky, "rationing the available free time of the Wacs into the desired number of dances, entertainments and other activities" had, according to an intelligence officer, become a "real problem." On the European continent, the Army inspector general noted that "the demand for WAC attendance at dances and parties far exceeds the supply of enlisted women." In order to ensure "fair coverage" the women's corps maintained a record of invitations accepted. This attention to equity was important, for some of the bitterest complaints about female soldiers focused on their purported failure to fulfill social obligations. GIs accused enlisted Wacs of preferring dates with officers over enlisted men or with rear echelon soldiers over combat veterans. The latter charge was particularly damning and circulated in the form of an oft-repeated story: An infantryman starts up a conversation with a Wac sitting near him in a service club. She asks him whether he served in combat, and when he says yes, she walks away, informing him that Wacs do not associate with "paid killers." In a slightly different version of the story, a WAC officer declines a party invitation on behalf of the women under her command, stating "I don't believe that any of my girls would care to go out with any overpaid murderers!" However, the male officer organizing the party gets the last word, "In that case, I don't think we'd like to go with any of your underpaid (censored)!!" The censored word was likely "whores." In telling these stories, soldiers not only criticized Wacs; they also voiced resentment of officers' privileges and of rear echelon soldiers' access to scarce commodities. The implication was that Wacs were selfishly more concerned with career advancement or comfort than with boosting the morale of the men who most deserved their—and every citizens'—gratitude.

At the end of its extensive ten-week investigation, the Army's intelligence division concluded that popular prejudice, rather than Army policies, enemy propaganda, or actual misconduct, was to blame for the slander. In his report to Director Hobby, Gen. George V. Strong described the rumors as "the outward manifestation of a psychological adjustment the American public is undergoing in regard to women in uniform." Off-color stories about female soldiers, he wrote, "furnish a lively topic conversation in all walks of life." Unable to pinpoint responsibility for the rumors' origins, Strong concluded that most of the persons who spread them did so thoughtlessly and without subversive intent. A parallel investigation by WAAC recruiters, however, told a somewhat different story. They found that rumors in the communities they visited generally originated with soldiers and were, in many cases, intended to obstruct recruitment. Both intelligence officers and recruiters were correct.

As Gen. Strong's analysis suggests and Leisa Myer has argued, the slander's spread was facilitated by dominant constructions of gender that made female soldiers appear at once ludicrous and threatening. The strange spectacle of women in military uniform marching like men, or, even stranger, delivering commands, was the opportunity for a joke at the women's expense:
I saw a few Wac's that came over here. They looked pretty smart but as usual they outsmarted themselves. This is what happened—the girls were marching down the street and their first sgt. gave the following command—"Company halt—left face right face—forward march."[7] The girls fell right into step except one and the sgt. yells out—"Gertie, get in step"—with a Brooklyn accent—Well, I thought I would die laughing. The sgt. got angry at us and tried to show off her commands. She gave—left flank—march—and then she gave—right flank—march and the girls dispersed in different directions and started to run into one another. . . . It was very unmilitary like but indeed comical.

Recounted by a soldier stationed in England, the joke was on women who tried—and predictably failed—to behave like their male military counterparts. The danger was that women would also mimic servicemen's sexual conduct and, in the words of one airman, think that "the uniform gives them the right to slack up with any Tom Dick or Harry." Women who behaved in such a manner—the majority of Wacs, according to this serviceman—relinquished their right to "command the respect of a decent man."35

Although the rumors were shaped by shared assumptions, concern was concentrated among military men. Most stories about sexual immorality within the women's corps began on Army bases and spread from soldier to civilian—to wives and sweethearts, service club hostesses, shop clerks, taxi drivers, waitresses. Among civilians, young women living near Army camps were usually the most hostile toward the corps. Intelligence officers often attributed this to feminine jealousy; local women, one reported, "deplore extra competition for the dwindling supply of men." Informed by familiar clichés about gossiping women, other intelligence reports like the one just quoted blamed civilian women for many of the rumors that troubled the corps. But further investigation revealed that women's attitudes derived largely from what they learned from male soldiers. When the wife of one intelligence officer asked her coworkers at an Indianapolis insurance agency what they thought of the corps, she found that the women with the lowest opinion of Waacs were all hostesses at the local servicemen's club. They told her that soldiers had advised them not to join the corps, informing them that "the Waacs were a 'bunch of tramps', 'were immoral', and that the organization was generally undesirable to belong to."36

On furlough and in letters home, servicemen repeated the rumors to family and friends. In his hometown of Norwood, Ohio, for example, Sgt. Willard C reportedly "halted all interest in enrollment" by repeating the rumor that "there were 100 Wacs pregnant at Camp Atterbury" where he was stationed. A few months later, recruiter Lt. Barbara Fenton told a similar story from Minnesota. Visiting his mother in Red Wing, one young serviceman told the men and women of his hometown that "trainloads and busloads of WACs were brought into the post for just one purpose," which was an "immoral display to amuse the soldiers." Fenton concluded: "I hope you don't think I am an alarmist to repeat this to you, but when service men come
home and insist they'll disown their own sisters for joining forces with so-called 'prostitutes,' I
feel something should be done. Tales told by servicemen have hurt recruiting more than any
one thing.\textsuperscript{37} The worried tone of Fenton's memo was warranted.

In some cases servicemen deliberately undermined the Army's enlistment efforts by targeting
potential inductees. Heading to Pittsburgh with plans to enroll, three well-qualified WAAC
recruits were convinced to remain civilians by a couple of soldiers they met on the bus.
Appalled by the men's "lurid picture" of Army life, they caught the next bus home instead.
While the report on this incident does not record what the two men said, it is likely that the
women heard the "two most repeated . . . rumors" in the area at that time: 1) that 80 percent
of all Wacs were pregnant; 2) that officers ordered their men to socialize with servicewomen
because the Army would see that Wacs were "fixed up" if pregnant and "taken out of
circulation until cured if diseased."\textsuperscript{38} Together with sensational press accounts, such rumors
almost brought recruitment to a halt. Between February and August of 1943, enlistment
dropped from a peak of 12,270 to just 839 women per month. From Utah, for example,
recruiters reported that many women had withdrawn applications for enrollment at the
insistence of a brother, husband, or boyfriend in the armed services. Others were unwilling to
join due to the stories they had heard from soldiers.\textsuperscript{39} Only the aggressive All-States
Recruiting Campaign that began on the final day of August and continued into December 1943
drove monthly enrollment figures back into the thousands. But the size of the corps never
exceeded 100,000 members, considerably below its initial recruitment quota of 150,000.\textsuperscript{40}

In the spring of 1944, a nationwide poll of potential recruits (women between the ages of 20
and 50) conducted by the public relations firm Young & Rubicam under George Gallup's
direction revealed the extent of the damage. Startlingly, attitudes toward the corps seemed to
have worsened somewhat since an earlier survey from the summer 1943. Although
respondents recognized the importance of the work performed by Wacs, they were reluctant
to volunteer. Compared to the previous group surveyed, they were more likely to ascribe their
reluctance to the corps' bad reputation. These women were well aware of soldiers' derogatory
attitudes. More than half had a husband, brother, or boyfriend in the Army, and although only
a quarter of them reported consulting the men about volunteering for service, 83 percent of
those who did were advised against it.\textsuperscript{41}

By linking the women's corps to prostitution and promiscuity, male military personnel
attacked the young organization where it was most vulnerable—the respectability of its
predominantly white, middle-class members.\textsuperscript{42} As Beth Bailey has shown, a woman's success
on the middle-class marriage market depended largely on her reputation for sexual virtue.
Recognizing the cultural power of this standard, WAAC leaders sought to safeguard the
reputation of the corps and its members by restricting and punishing sexual behavior. Rumors
and press reports undermined this effort by suggesting, in the words of one worried mother,
that the Army was recruiting women of "low moral character" to gratify male soldiers' sexual desires. Fear for her good reputation and marital future might discourage an auxiliary from reenlisting or a civilian woman from volunteering, and servicemen ensured that women made this connection between marriage and military service. In a letter to his future wife Bertha, for example, Sgt. Alexander Bell warned, "What ever you do don't you dare join [the Army or Navy]. . . . One of the Waves stationed at the navy base here, says the work she is doing and the place isn't fit for a decent girl." He asserted in a later letter that he would never marry a woman who had performed military service.

Although soldiers shared among themselves gossip, dirty jokes, and even pornographic images of purported servicewomen, women were often their intended audience. Censorship violations recorded on comment sheets under the category "disparaging military personnel" were commonly found in letters addressed to wives, sweethearts, mothers, sisters, and other female friends. In the Southwest Pacific theater of operations—where white servicemen frequently measured their isolation in terms of access to white women—soldiers' accusations against the corps were often sexually explicit. Some compared servicewomen to the Japanese Army's comfort women, and many included what they claimed was the standard price for sexual services. Maj. Richard R, for example, alleged that Wacs usually charged $32 and that many were "coming home rich." Cpl. Thomas Y estimated the price for sex to be somewhat higher. "[T]he Wac here are doing a land office business and I'm not kidding," he wrote to a female friend. "[T]hey are 'selling what they used to give away' for about $50 a slice. I hope you get what I mean." Sgt. Robert B's account of Wac sexual misconduct was particularly graphic. "In all my travels," he wrote, "I have never seen women care less about their morals." Sgt. B claimed that several had already been sent home pregnant and complained:

They are giving their bodies up to most any one that comes along. They have been caught in broad daylight and not in any secluded places either. They sit right out here in the area and let men play with them during the day. I know this is true for I have seen it. One girl was so hot that she opened the front of her fatigue trousers so that the fellow could get his hand in. . . . [The nurses] are just about as bad. . . . I would never consider marrying a girl who had been in any branch of the service, if I were a single man, and no one else would either.

Many accounts of Wac immorality were designed to discourage loved women from enlisting or to justify the prohibition. Sgt. B's letter reveals that his wife had previously mentioned joining the corps, although she claimed to be "only kidding."

At Fort Benning in Georgia, a rather "sheltered" 19-year-old officer candidate from Iowa pursued a similar tactic. Worried about his girlfriend Emmy's interest in enrolling, Don L described a purportedly unladylike Wac named Phyllis in a letter home to his parents. "Phyllis disgusted me with her beer drink[ing], but," he wrote, "at least, she never cut loose
with any vulgar language," the way other Wacs did. Don claimed that if Emmy ever became a Wac, he "wouldn't have anything to do with her." "I [am] not going to let my girl unnecessarily [turn in] to that type of person," he insisted, "unless she'd rather not remain my girl, and that's her business." Don's remarks triggered an investigation when his indignant mother forwarded this letter to Director Hobby. The investigation revealed that Don could not have attended the party, because he was on duty that night; furthermore, Phyllis was a civilian. The investigating officer concluded that Don's unfavorable comments about the corps were directed at Emmy and that his goal was to "keep her home waiting for him."

Like Don, many servicemen threatened to end relationships with, break engagements to, or even divorce women who became Wacs. From Italy, one soldier wrote to his wife:

I assure you, your letter shocked me so, and it was not appreciated by no means. If you join the WAC's, you and I are thru for good, and I'll stop all allotments and everything. I'll not have my wife to be meat for the boys, as I see what they are over here in the WAC's. So you may become a WAC and if it's true, then I'm thru and I'll [n]ever want to see you again, if that's what you are going to do. I never thought my wife would double-cross me by joining the WAC's or the Army.

Responding as dramatically as if his wife had taken a lover—indeed accusing her of double-crossing him—this serviceman, like others, threatened to stop dependency allotments and to commence divorce proceedings. Comment sheets and censorship morale surveys from all theaters of operations record a multitude of similar warnings. Although it is impossible to know if such threats reflected the writers' intent or if they simply revealed servicemen's determination to keep their wives and sweethearts out of the Army, there is some evidence that servicemen did disown or divorce women who became Wacs. In a letter home to her parents after the first week of basic training, Pvt. Ann Bosanko described one of her comrades at Fort Des Moines as a recently divorced woman whose husband "divorced her for joining up, but has now calmed down and is clamoring for a remarriage."

As a group, servicemen were far more hostile toward the corps than was the American population generally. The spring 1944 Young & Rubicam survey revealed that a large majority of civilians, both male and female, respected the corps and its members for the important jobs they performed. Asked whether they would advise a sister, friend, or daughter to volunteer for service, 37 percent of civilian men answered in the affirmative; a similar number stated that they would "leave it to the girl's own decision." Only 28 percent reported that they would warn against enrollment. In the context of widespread "apathy" and continuing rumors, this response seemed so positive that the public relations firm urged the Army to enlist civilian men in their efforts to increase WAC enrollment. A fall 1943 survey of white enlisted men revealed soldiers' attitudes to be far less favorable. Most servicemen believed that Wacs
contributed little to winning the war and that the women would be better employed in
defense factories. Only 17 percent would advise a friend to volunteer, and 70 percent asserted
that they would not like to see their sisters become Wacs.\textsuperscript{52}

The few [Wacs] I have made contact with are the same as whores. I have seen
plenty of them since coming here 9 months ago. My opinion of these bums is
based on what I have seen. It is nothing at all to see them stagger out of the
bushes at night with a soldier. On many a weekend they wind up in a hotel
room with someone. If my sister ever tried to join them I would kill her first.\textsuperscript{53}

The statement above was written in response to an invitation on the final page of the soldier
survey to write "any further remarks . . . as fully as you like." This invitation elicited an
intensity of feeling that the more structured questions did not capture. More than a third of
the 3,434 soldiers who took the attitude survey responded to this question. Not surprisingly,
the vast majority of their comments were critical, and many concerned Wacs' purported
promiscuity. An Army Research Branch analysis of such remarks described them as
"irrational," even "hysterical." Characterized by "profanity . . . elaborate exclamation points,
capital letters, reiteration of charges, violent expressions of contempt and horror," these
responses exhibited such excessive distress that psychologists diagnosed the presence of
"strong unconscious motives of hostility, jealousy, frustration . . . aroused concomitantly."\textsuperscript{54}

Why were servicemen so much more vehemently opposed to the WAC than were male
civilians? Part of this discrepancy probably lay in the desire of draft-age men (18 through 45
years old) to remain in the civilian workforce. The Army made this connection between
women's voluntary service and the military draft explicit in November 1943, attributing an
increased draft quota, in part, to a lag in WAC recruitment.\textsuperscript{55} In addition, there is
considerable evidence that servicemen, in Leisa Meyer's words, resented "women's entrance
into a previously male-only preserve." Many insisted that women were out of place on Army
bases, and those who feared losing their noncombat job assignments to Wacs were
particularly antagonistic. Noting the "bitterness" of such men in his July 1943 report on
hostile rumors at Fort Knox, intelligence officer Henry C. White speculated that "a large
proportion of the responsibility . . . lies with this class of personnel."\textsuperscript{56} Compared to the Army
as a whole, the men who held replaceable jobs were significantly more likely to assert that it
was "not necessary to the war effort to have women in the Army" and that "Wacs do less
important work than non-combat men." However, on the question of whether or not to advise
a sister or girlfriend to enroll, Research Branch pollsters judged the differences to be
"slight."\textsuperscript{57}

Soldiers' resistance to the women's corps ran deeper than age-old resentment of female
interlopers in a previously masculine sphere. As far as servicemen were concerned, the
problem was not simply that female soldiers invaded Army bases and took over coveted
noncombat jobs. The more pressing danger was that their wives, sisters, and sweethearts might enlist. Social class (as measured by level of formal education) significantly affected servicemen's attitudes toward the corps. Better educated servicemen were considerably more likely than their less privileged comrades to assert that they would discourage a sister or girlfriend from volunteering for service. Soldiers whose formal education ended with grade school appeared to be less attached to what researchers called the "middle class lady concept"; they also were more likely to see military service as an opportunity for advancement and the acquisition of new skills. But the slander was not confined to middle-class soldiers; all ranks and races spread WAC rumors. Length of service was an equally powerful determinant of soldiers' attitudes. New recruits were far more favorably inclined toward the WAC than men who had been in the Army for six months to a year or more. Finally, the men most opposed to the corps were those with the least investment in soldiering; they were significantly more likely than other men to think that their own work was "not worthwhile" and that they "would be more useful" as defense workers than as soldiers.

The process through which civilian men were transformed into soldiers helps explain why military service fostered hostile attitudes toward the WAC. Selected, examined, inducted, and tested, young men were first classified and then assigned to forts and camps across the United States. In basic training, inductees learned to march in formation and to use and care for weapons "by the numbers" of Army field manuals. Along with these new skills, basic training taught submission to leaders and conformity to peers. When not marching or being drilled in the use of weapons, men often were assigned duties they found demeaning, tasks that in civilian society were commonly assigned to women or racial minorities: washing dishes, cleaning latrines, mopping floors, collecting garbage. White middle-class recruits were particularly sensitive to this perceived loss of status; as a group, they developed a whole arsenal of "adjustive reactions" that enabled them to maintain self-esteem while acceding to Army discipline. Psychologist Irving Janis, who served with the Army's Research Branch, used this concept to explain patterns of behavior common to men in basic training. "Goldbricking," for example, became almost a game among inductees, who competed to see who could look busy while completing the least amount of work. Realizing they had no choice but to obey orders when assigned menial tasks, they asserted their will and protected their self-esteem by indulging in this disguised form of protest.

Resisting and submitting to military hierarchy and discipline, recruits became part of a family of men. Although most learned to find some pleasure in this new affiliation, basic training was fraught with emotional conflict. Young men responded to their commanding officers as they had to their fathers, initially resenting their power but ideally (from the standpoint of Army officials) identifying with their authority. As observed by psychologists and psychoanalysts, the resemblance between military and early childhood socialization was most striking in the way both processes provoked sexual fears. Awakening without the erections that were habitual
in civilian life, recruits often sought reassurance by making jokes of their anxiety. Irving Janis described a hypothetical round of such jokes. One man might start the conversation by pointing to his penis and saying, "This damn thing is getting so useless that pretty soon I won't even be able to [piss] out of it." Another might join in with the remark: "Hell I couldn't get a [hard on] now even if I had a movie star in bed with me."63 The conversation would continue along these lines, with other men confessing to a similar lack of sex drive. They jokingly attributed the Army with "castrative intentions," sometimes commenting, "They might as well cut the damn thing off as soon as you get into the Army, and be done with it." Although a recruit might make such remarks in a humorous, self-deprecating manner, the comments revealed real concern about impotence and sterility. The perennial rumor that Army cooks, under orders, secretly added saltpeter to the men's food was another symptom of this fear. Reputedly responsible for the men's diminished sex drive, saltpeter was supposed to make them more easily disciplined as soldiers.64 Some servicemen were concerned enough to look into the matter when assigned to KP (kitchen police) duty; daily lessons in submission made the rumor seem plausible. Janis speculated that men's need to reassert their virility fueled the compulsive and boastful promiscuity into which some soldiers "plunged" after basic training.65

Because many young men experienced military service as a threat to their manhood, they were peculiarly dependent on women, not simply as available sexual partners but also, and more important, as the obverse—absent and unsullied ideals. Yet as I demonstrated in the preceding chapter, idealized wives and sweethearts were as often objects of anxiety as of desire. "A woman is the only clean and decent thing a man has in this world," one soldier wrote, adding, "Let's keep them that way . . . " Worried that women would soon be subject to military conscription, this soldier vowed to "do everything in my power to prevent it," for he and his comrades considered Wacs to be "bums," unworthy of servicemen's "respect." Likely drafted and dissatisfied with his Army assignment, this serviceman complained that a full quarter of soldiers "aren't doing anything to win the war and would be doing a thousand times more for the war effort if they were back home in their old jobs." If manpower were more efficiently and effectively deployed, Wacs would be unnecessary. Many other soldiers' comments about the WAC combined criticism of the Army with hostility toward military women.66

The question that seemed to produce the most anxiety on the Army survey of attitudes about the WAC asked soldiers to imagine how women might best serve the nation if drafted for civilian or military service. Among the choices were working in a defense factory, taking a government job, or joining one of the women's services (WAC, WAVES (Navy), SPARS (Coast Guard), Army Nurse Corps, or Women Marines). Reading between the lines, suspicious soldiers, like the one quoted earlier, worried that military conscription was in the works. A few believed that drafting women would benefit the war effort, but most were emphatically
opposed. Many insisted that such a plan would demoralize soldiers and "jeopardize" the "moral character of the country"; one even threatened to desert. "I intend getting married in the near future," he wrote, "and if ever a bill was passed of drafting women for the WAACS & mine was inducted—the Army wouldn’t keep me from leaving here a second. I’d go to any extent to make dam sure, she’d be released." To protect his fiancée's "morals" and thus preserve his future happiness, this soldier was determined to combat his nation’s efforts to draft a sufficient force of female soldiers.67

Servicemen’s concerns about military conscription were not without grounds. In the fall and winter of 1942, Army planners quietly examined the possibility of drafting five hundred thousand women annually before concluding that such a plan was too controversial to pursue. A Gallup poll from the following summer confirmed this insight. It found that Americans were divided on the question of whether single women, ages 21 through 35, should be drafted for military service. The group most in favor of such a policy was women in that age range.68

Although military conscription was not on the legislative agenda, the question of women’s obligation to the nation at war and of the state’s power to compel women’s labor became topics of broad and active public debate with the introduction of Sen. Warren Austin and Rep. James W. Wadsworth Jr.’s National War Service Bill. Based on British precedent, the bill would insert women ages 18 through 50 into the nation’s selective service system as part of a civilian labor pool that could be drafted to fill shortfalls in agriculture and industry. Military personnel, government employees, pregnant women, mothers of dependent children, and caretakers of the sick and elderly were exempt from service. The proposed legislation generated considerable opposition from labor advocates, peace activists, and rightwing mothers.69 As historians Holly Stovall and Linda K. Kerber have shown, opponents sought to discredit the bill by mobilizing domestic anxieties; they charged that conscripted labor would endanger American home life along with American democracy. Despite such efforts, a Gallup poll from the summer of 1943 revealed broad public support for a national service bill. Seventy-nine percent of those surveyed favored drafting women and men to meet labor shortages,70 recognizing in the words of Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson, "the equality in obligation of all to serve on the firing line, or in the shop, or on the farm in the way that will best serve the Nation."71

Where domesticity seemed to clash most with government policy was less the conscription of women than of parents. With the so-called father draft approaching in late summer 1943,72 Gallup asked poll respondents to decide whether the Army should draft three hundred thousand married fathers or the same number of single women for noncombat military jobs. The father draft exposed a chink in gendered assumptions about wartime obligation. Fearing "the break up of too many families," a large majority of American civilians—male and female—agreed that unmarried women should be drafted before fathers. Seventy-two percent of single
women surveyed in late summer 1943 were among the hypothetical policy’s supporters. This finding is important, because Young & Rubicam’s interviews revealed that although only a small portion of potential Wacs wished to volunteer, many more were willing to serve if drafted. The pollsters found, furthermore, that a civilian labor draft would make military service more attractive. Forty-eight percent of the women surveyed indicated that they would prefer enlistment in one of the women’s services to conscripted employment in industry. Better jobs and the opportunity to travel, particularly to overseas theaters of operations, were among the prime inducements.\textsuperscript{73}

Perhaps women’s willingness to serve was what made soldiers so anxious, for they believed that wartime obligation differed according to sex.\textsuperscript{74} Men were obliged to fight for the state, women to wait faithfully for their servicemen. Women’s contributions to the war on farms, in factories, or in government offices, though valuable and admirable, were secondary to romantic and domestic commitments. If and when conflict arose, familial obligation trumped civic duty. Willing to leave their homes to serve the state, servicemen resented what they perceived as the Army’s effort to interfere in their domestic affairs by recruiting, or worse drafting, women. Many donned the traditional mantle of male defender, claiming to protect wives, sweethearts, and sisters from regimentation, immoral associates, and predatory GI “wolves.”

Yet, behind the mask of chivalry, self-interest was apparent. The fear driving much of the slander and most prohibitions against military service was that loved and idealized women would prove no better than Wacs were rumored to be. One GI explained his opposition to the corps in this manner, “[I]f I had a wife that joined the W.A.A.C.’s I would divorce her, because probably she would be going out with some other soldier, and the normal girl will do those things and it would only end up in a broken home after the war . . .” He predicted that a woman who served would become “an entirely different person than when you left her much to your disappointment.” The problem was not that Wacs were abnormal but rather that the average woman placed in similar circumstances would behave in the same manner. Away from parental restraints and thrown into bad company, even a “nice girl” might be “ruined,” dashing soldiers’ hopes for happy postwar homes. Indeed, wives and sweethearts might discover that they enjoyed their independence and later rebel against the domesticity soldiers so desired. Wacs, another soldier asserted, “would never be satisfied to return to keeping house or raising families.”\textsuperscript{75}

Most servicemen assumed that the Army changed whomever it touched, usually for the worse. Young soldiers, one of the groups most hostile to the WAC, were particularly disturbed by changes they noticed in themselves. Surveyed in the fall of 1945, the majority of white enlisted men under the age of 25 reported a significant decline in personal habits and morals as a result of their Army experiences.\textsuperscript{76} This perception helps account for soldiers’ belief that
military service would damage women's character. It also helps explain their yearning for "the sweetness and decency that only the home can provide." Because the Army changed them, soldiers sought stability at home. They expected women to preserve the prewar status quo and attributed to them the power to restore men's moral compasses. Asserting that the nation needed women to "stay home," one soldier explained that women's wartime responsibility was to "help get the democracy . . . ready for the soldiers that come back, & be able to help straighten their men out of their regimental complexes & back into the free thinking civilian he was before he gambled his life for his country." 77

Military conscription forced men to leave their homes and to defer their plans for the future. Although most consented to this sacrifice, they resented the Army for disrupting, and in many cases endangering, their lives. Anticipating an economic depression once the war boom ended, soldiers worried about their chances of earning an adequate income and settling into a satisfying family life. 78 They wondered whether they would have the opportunity and ability to become husbands, fathers, breadwinners, and homeowners. Because servicemen believed the material and social bases of mid-century manhood were at stake, they clung more tightly to the women they loved and remembered. Their fears of inadequacy aroused not only yearning for wives and sweethearts but also hostility toward military women. Wacs represented the possibility of female independence at a time when men were particularly dependent on women's affection. Away from home and in service to the nation, these women were freed from family obligations and, the servicemen feared, wedding vows.
Notes

Note 1: Founded as the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in May 1942, this organization's official name changed to Women's Army Corps (WAC) on 1 September 1943 when the corps and its members gained full Army status. I use Waac and Wac to refer to corps members.

Note 2: Jo Ellen Adams, "1st Lady Defends WAACs' Morals," [New York?] Daily News (9 June 1943), File: 330.14: O'Donnell Column & Rumors (9 June 1943), Box 92, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).


Note 9: Treadwell, Women's Army Corps, 170–71, 195–6; Marion O. Lichty to Commanding General, 5th Service Command, Re: Investigation of Rumors in Toledo, Ohio (14 April 1943), File: 330.14 O'Donnell Column & Rumors (9 Jun 1943), Box 92, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 11: Treadwell, *Women's Army Corps*, 201; Oveta Culp Hobby to Office of the Director of Administration, ASF (18 May 1943); J. M. Roamer to A. C. of S. G2 (22 May 1943); L. R. Forney to J. M. Roamer (3 June 1943); all in File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. thru 6–10–43, Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.


Note 13: For more on Iva Toguri and the legend of *Tokyo Rose*, see chapter 5.


Note 16: James A. Kelly, Report of Case II-bl7803m (2 August 1943); George V. Strong to Oveta Culp Hobby, Re: Origin of Rumors Concerning the WAACs (21 August 1943); both in File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. 7–17–43 thru 7–31–43 (6–11–43), Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP. Treadwell, *Women's Army Corps*, 214–6.

Note 17: John Lansdale Jr. to Director of Military Intelligence, Eighth Service Command (25 June 1943) and enclosure; Ferdinand I. Moore Jr., Report of Investigation VIII-12481m (3 July 1943); both in File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. 6–21–43 thru 6–30–43 (6–11–43), Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.


Intelligence Service, Re: Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (3 July 1943), File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. 7–1–43 thru 7–16–43 (6–11–43); all in Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.

Note 20: Charles D. Frierson, "Summary of Investigation: Origin of Rumors Concerning Women's Army Auxiliary Corps" [July 1943], File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. 7–1–43 thru 7–16–43 (6–11–43), Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.

Note 21: Public Health Service rates were calculated by different methods, but as Mattie Treadwell points out, the rate of sexually transmitted diseases among civilian women was generally 87 to 90 percent that suffered by men, whereas the rate of disease among servicewomen was consistently and significantly lower. Treadwell, *Women's Army Corps*, 193, 372, 398, 447, 469, 618–20.

Note 22: Rates for 1943 and 1944 remained low at 8.3 and 10 per thousand, respectively. Meyer, *Creating GI Jane*, 229n.

Note 23: John A. Rogers to Col. Catron, Re: Venereal Disease in WAAC Personnel (22 May 1943), enclosure in C. C. Pierce Jr. to Officer in Charge, Re: Interview with Brigadier General Don C. Faith (23 June 1943) and enclosure, File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. 6–21–43 thru 6–30–43 (6/11/43), Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.


Note 26: A common phrase in soldiers’ letters and survey responses.


Note 28: For more on fraternization, see chapter 3.


Note 31: The London edition of Stars and Stripes carried almost daily coverage of the competition from 7 October through 14 November 1944.


Note 34: George V. Strong to Oveta Culp Hobby, Re: Origin of Rumors Concerning the WAACs (21 August 1943), File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. 7–17–43 thru 7–31–43 (6–11–43), Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.


Note 36: Charles D. Frierson, "Summary of Investigation: Origin of Rumors Concerning Women's Army Auxiliary Corps" [July 1943]; Jackson A. Jordan to Officer in Charge, Re: Origin of Rumors Concerning the Women's Army Corps (26 July 1943); both in File: MID 322.12 W.A.A.C. 7–1–43 thru 7–16–43 (6–11–43), Box 579, Army Intelligence Decimal Files, Entry 47B, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.

Note 37: Shirley L. Berton report on Norwood (ca. 18 June 1943), File: 330.14 O'Donnell & Rumors (9 Jun. '43); Barbara L. Fenton to Dorothy McCandlish, Re: Unfavorable Publicity for the Women’s Army Corps—Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 38: Carol Hossner Bessey recalled a similar—though less discouraging—encounter with a soldier on her way to enlist in Salt Lake City, Utah. Battle of the WAC (Ashton, Idaho: privately published, 1999), 3–5. Edward J. Permar to Director, WAAC, Third Service Command, Re: Rumors (3 July 1943), File: Rumors-Morale, Box 192, Historical and Background Materials Relating to the Legislation and Administration of the WAAC and Its Successor, The Women's Army Corps 1942–1949, Entry 55, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.
Note 39: Mary L. House to Commanding Officer, Headquarters Utah Recruiting and Induction District, Re: Report on Adverse Propaganda Encountered by Recruiters in the Field (20 August 1943), File: (330.14) O'Donnell Column & Rumors (9 June 1943), Box 92, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 40: During World War II, enlistment never again reached the heights of February 1943. It averaged about three thousand women per month until the end of the war. Higher entrance requirements were partially responsible for the lower enlistment figures. Treadwell, Women's Army Corps, 172–4, 231, 235–46, 765–6.

Note 41: Young & Rubicam, “A National Study of Public Opinion Toward the Women's Army Corps” (Spring 1944), Box 204, Historical and Background Materials Relating to the Legislation and Administration of the WAAC and Its Successor, The Women's Army Corps 1942–1949, Entry 55, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP. See also Treadwell, Women's Army Corps, 246–7.

Note 42: Compared to male soldiers, Waacs were relatively well educated; most had completed high school, and many had attended college. The vast majority had been employed as clerical workers before they entered the military. On WAAC demographics, see Meyer, Creating GI Jane, 73–5; D'Ann Campbell, Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 22–7; D'Ann Campbell, “Servicewomen of World War II,” Armed Forces & Society 16 (Winter 1990): 252–4.

Note 43: Beth Bailey, Sex in the Heartland (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 77–8; Josephine G. Kison to Oveta Culp Hobby (12 June 1943), File: 330.14 O'Donnell & Rumors (9 Jun. '43), Box 92, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 44: Treadwell, Women's Army Corps, 211–4; Alexander Bell to Bertha Moss (20 June 1943, 26 May 1944), Alexander and Bertha (Moss) Bell Correspondence, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries.

Note 45: One of the most popular sets of pornographic images circulating among soldiers on New Guinea was a series of eight photographs showing a white woman in a WAC uniform performing a striptease. Agent 2289 to Officer in Charge, Re: Obscene Photos of a WAC (4 December 1944), File: CIC Correspondence -1944, Box T-1425; Information Slips 44–1157, 44–1264, and 44–1305 (21 October and 1 November 1944), File: Information Slips APO 929, 1001–1099, Box T-1422; all in G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 46: Pacific theater intelligence files housed at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, are particularly fruitful sources of censored letters. Boxes T-1409-T-1415, T-1418-T-1420, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP

Note 47: Comment Sheets TC-2181 (25 November 1944) and TC-2060 (9 August 1944), File: Comment Sheets, 1944, R-Z, Box T-1420; Comment Sheet 920–45–223, File: 742, Box T-1411; both in G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 48: Mrs. C. V. L to Col. Oveta Culp Hobby (10 October 1943); Emily C. Davis to Director, Women's Army Corps, Re: Conduct of Waacs at Fort Benning Georgia (n.d.); Col. Oveta Culp Hobby to Mrs. C. V. L. (2 November 1943), all in File: 330.14, Box 92, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.
Note 49: Base Censorship Detachment No. 6, Morale Report for Period Ended 31 August 1944 (1 September 1944), File: Morale Reports, Base Censorship Detachment #6, Box: Morale Reports 1 thru #2, G-2 Headquarters Records, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 492, NACP; Treadwell, Women's Army Corps, 212–3.


Note 51: Young & Rubicam, "A National Study of Public Opinion Toward the Women's Army Corps" (Spring 1944), Box 204, Historical and Background Materials Relating to the Legislation and Administration of the WAAC and Its Successor, The Women's Army Corps 1942–1949, Entry 55, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 52: Research Branch, Morale Services Division, Army Service Forces, "What the Soldier Thinks of the WAC" (10 December 1943), Box 8, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 53: One of 1,381 written responses to question 39, Survey 90, Reel 20, Box 2, War Department Special Staff, Information and Education Division, Formerly Security-Classified Microfilm Copy of Records Relating to the Morale of Personnel 1942–1945, Entry 477a, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 54: "Analysis of the Argument that the WAC's are Bad for a Girl's Character," File: S-90: Attitudes Toward Women in the Service, Box 11, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, & Reserve), Research Division, Reports and Analyses of Attitude Research Surveys, Entry 92, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.


Note 57: Research Branch, Morale Services Division, Army Service Forces, What the Soldier Thinks of the WAC (10 December 1943), Box 8, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.


Note 60: Frederick H. Osborn to Miller G. White, Re: Research on Soldiers' Opinions about the WAC (n.d.) and "Analysis of the Argument that the WAC's are Bad for a Girl's Character," File: S-90: Attitudes Toward Women in the Service, Box 11, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, & Reserve), Research Division, Reports and Analyses of Attitude Research Surveys, Entry 92, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330; Research Branch, Morale Services Division, Army
Service Forces, "What the Soldier Thinks of the WAC" (10 December 1943), Box 8, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165; both in NACP.


**Note 62:** William Menninger described this process as oedipal in nature. *Psychiatry in a Troubled World*, 46.

**Note 63:** Bracketed words show where Irving Janis used the words "urinate" and "erection" but commented, "Obviously a less formal term occurs in actual conversation."

**Note 64:** Psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte recorded similar rumors among European soldiers. French soldiers complained of "doctored wine" and German troops of iodine in their meat and coffee rations. South African cooks were accused of putting "bluestone" (or copper sulfate) in Army food. British soldiers believed their bread ration was tainted, and even British servicewomen complained that sedatives were added to their tea. Marie Bonaparte, *Myths of War*, trans. John Rodker (London: Imago, 1947), 52–5.

**Note 65:** Janis, "Psychodynamic Adjustment to Army Life," 159, 168–70.

**Note 66:** Survey 90, written responses to question 39, Reel 20, Box 2, War Department Special Staff, Information and Education Division, Formerly Security-Classified Microfilm Copy of Records Relating to the Morale of Personnel 1942–1945, Entry 477a, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

**Note 67:** Ibid. and Survey 90, File: S-90: Attitudes Toward Women in the Service, Box 11, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, & Reserve), Research Division, Reports and Analyses of Attitude Research Surveys, Entry 92, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.


Note 71: Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Hearings on S. 666, 407.


Note 75: Survey 90, written responses to question 39, Reel 20, Box 2, War Department Special Staff, Information and Education Division, Formerly Security-Classified Microfilm Copy of Records Relating to the Morale of Personnel 1942–1945, Entry 477a, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165; "Analysis of the Argument that the WAC's are Bad for a Girl's Character," File: S-90: Attitudes Toward Women in the Service, Box 11, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, & Reserve), Research Division, Reports and Analyses of Attitude Research Surveys, Entry 92, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330; "Censorship Survey & Morale Report, B.C.O. 7 (1–15 April 1945)." File: Base Censor Office #7, Base Censor Office Correspondence, Military Intelligence Service, G-2, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498; all in NACP.

Note 76: Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, vol. 2, Combat and Its Aftermath (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 610–13, 631–3; Research Branch, Morale Services Division, Army Service Forces, "What the Soldier Thinks of the WAC" (10 December 1943), Box 8, Director of the Women's Army Corps Security-Classified General Correspondence, Entry 54, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165; Research Branch, Information and Education Division, "Some Soldier Attitudes about the Effects of Army Life" (31 July 1946), File: Spec. Memo No. 8, Box 989, Research Division, Surveys on Troop Attitudes, Entry 93, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330; both in NACP.

Note 77: Menninger, Psychiatry in a Troubled World, 97; Survey 90, written responses to question 39, Reel 20, Box 2, War Department Special Staff, Information and Education Division, Formerly Security-Classified Microfilm Copy of Records Relating to the Morale of Personnel, Entry 477a, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Think the Biggest Problems Are That Will Be Facing Them After the War” (20 June 1945), File: MTO-42, Box 1030; both in Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.
CHAPTER 3
Fraternization and the Uncensored Occupation

Less than a week after American troops first set foot on German soil, reports of soldiers fraternizing with German civilians had already reached the United States. Associated Press and United Press correspondents filed stories about friendly German civilians who welcomed the invaders. The New York Times printed both articles on 16 September and on the following day published a photograph of a smiling German family gathered around a jeep conversing with American soldiers. On 17 September, the day that photograph was published, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe, contacted his commanding generals, ordering that such behavior be "nipped in the bud." It was a violation of the Allied non-fraternization policy banning "friendly, familiar, or intimate" contact between Allied soldiers and German nationals. Four days later, Eisenhower received a message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt via Army chief of staff George C. Marshall. While urging Eisenhower to "discourage" fraternization, the president was more concerned about appearances than actual behavior. He demanded that photographs documenting friendly relations between Germans and Americans be "prohibited." On the following day, Eisenhower assured the president that he and his generals were committed to both concealing and suppressing friendly contact between Americans and Germans. Stories and photographs of fraternizing soldiers had been added to the military's list of censorable news items, and any documented violation of policy would be "dealt with by proper disciplinary procedure." Private correspondence was likewise censored, and letters that referred to serious violations of the ban were to be forwarded to the Army's personnel section for further action.

From the start, censoring letters, news reports, and photographs proved easier than enforcing the Allied non-fraternization policy. Although the majority of soldiers probably conformed to the policy, a large minority did not, and violations increased as the war progressed. The problem of fraternization became more complicated once fighting stopped. Before V-E Day, it was an internal issue of conduct and security; afterwards, it unfolded into a public relations nightmare. The Army retained the fraternization ban through the summer of 1945 with an eye to appeasing home front opinion, but this strategy caused even greater scandal. Violations skyrocketed just as censorship regulations were relaxed.
Fraternization between American soldiers and German women exploded into a national debate in the summer of 1945. What troubled so many Americans, including the soldiers themselves, was the sexual nature of German-American relations. The ban covered all friendly mingling with former enemy nationals, but the term "fraternization" quickly became synonymous with illicit and adulterous sex. Although some servicemen attempted to shift the blame to unfaithful wives or uncooperative Wacs, this episode highlighted male, rather than female, sexual misconduct and threatened to sever the loving bonds that had sustained men and women through separation and hardship.

Months before the Allied invasion of France, the question of how soldiers should behave toward enemy nationals was a major topic of concern for American and British officials. Prior history suggested that prohibiting social relations would be futile. After World War I, occupation soldiers had been ordered to treat the conquered Germans with "dignified reserve," but relations quickly grew warmer, in part because of the practice of billeting Allied soldiers with German families. The friendships resulting from the failure of anti-fraternization measures eased the administration of occupied territories. The problem, from the standpoint of Allied policy makers, was that Germans remained unconvinced of their war guilt after World War I. Determined to learn from past mistakes, the policy makers drew up new, more stringent rules of conduct. From the beginning, however, key military officials involved in formulating the non-fraternization policy predicted that the prescribed standard would be impossible to maintain, warning that soldiers would be tempted to fraternize with young women, no matter their nationality. Bowing to "realism," policy makers recommended that British and American servicewomen and volunteers be included in "large numbers" among the occupying forces.5

Officially announced on 12 September 1944, one day after American troops first entered German territory, the non-fraternization policy was designed to protect Allied soldiers and to punish Germans. The policy directive distributed to Army commanders in fall 1944 explained the need for non-fraternization primarily in terms of Nazi ideology and German versus American or British national character. Military planners anticipated that Germans, believing themselves a master race, would not accept defeat and that Allied forces would have to confront a strong underground resistance movement assisted by a word-of-mouth propaganda campaign. Women, children, and old men might attempt to associate with Allied soldiers, appealing to their conquerors' "generosity and spirit of fair play" in order to "influence the sympathies and thoughts of the occupying forces," thus "minimizing the consequences of defeat and preparing the way for a resurgence of German power." Non-fraternization was intended to combat such "insidious" stratagems and also to "command respect" from citizens.
of the occupied nation. Army planners believed that an aloof and well-disciplined occupation
force would be particularly impressive to Germans, who had been taught to revere military
order and power. Finally, the "avoidance of mingling" was intended to show German soldiers
and civilians that their support of Adolf Hitler's National Socialist regime had "brought them
complete defeat and . . . caused the other people of the world to look upon them with
distrust."6

This directive was very clear about what constituted fraternization, but materials addressed to
the individual soldier were less straightforward. The non-fraternization policy prohibited
social association between Allied soldiers and Germans and even restricted official contacts to
"the minimum necessary."7 A booklet designed to orient soldiers on proper attitudes and
conduct in Germany, however, served to confuse the situation by suggesting that the men
might converse with, or even marry, German nationals without violating American military
law. The Pocket Guide to Germany was prepared before the non-fraternization policy had
been fully formulated. Like the Army's Pocket Guide to France, it included a guide to
conversational German that, in Army historian Joseph Starr's words, "would have been of use
principally to those bent upon violating the policy of non-fraternization." A soldier who read
the guide would learn how to introduce himself to Germans; a quick study might figure out
how to barter with cigarettes and chocolate. To discourage such interactions, the booklet was
withdrawn from circulation before it could be distributed.8 The drawback was that without
the guide, individual soldiers lacked guidelines on how to behave in enemy territory.

The editors of Stars and Stripes attempted to fill this void with news stories, editorials, and
cautionary tales intended to warn soldiers away from German civilians. They launched their
anti-fraternization campaign with a 22 September editorial that cautioned American soldiers
against giving gum to German children who—like other European children—begged for the
treat. The editors explained that such gifts sent the wrong message. Americans came to
Germany as conquerors, not as "pals," "liberators," or "suckers."9 A few days later, the armed
forces newspaper published a story on "enemy agents and soldiers in civilian clothes" believed
to be responsible for an attack on three American military police. This story emphasized the
importance of non-fraternization as a security measure to prevent espionage and sabotage.
"Don't get chummy with Jerry," another editorial advised; civilians might seem friendly and
harmless, but every German man, woman, and child was "part of the Nazi war machine."10
The guide to German language printed to the left of the newspaper's masthead was anything
but friendly. Beginning on 4 October (the day the Pocket Guide was withdrawn), the
newspaper provided American soldiers with the vocabulary appropriate to a conquering force,
words and phrases such as: "surrender," "come here," "step aside," and "get off the street."11
Although bombarded with anti-fraternization messages from a variety of sources, American soldiers did not receive individual orders until January 1945, when the Army issued its "Special Orders for German-American Relations." Published in the form of a small booklet designed to be tucked inside a helmet liner, these orders instructed soldiers to avoid contact with Germans except on "official business." On those unavoidable occasions, the Army advised servicemen to be "firm but fair," warning that Germans "regard kindness as a weakness" and would take advantage of any relaxation of Allied vigilance.12

The stern tone of military orders and pronouncements was not equaled by enforcement of the fraternization ban. Posing as an enlisted combat replacement, Maj. Arthur Goodfriend, editor in chief of Stars and Stripes in Europe, investigated the effects of the non-fraternization policy in October 1944. "Pvt. Arthur Goodwin" was assigned to an infantry unit near Aachen where he interviewed his temporary comrades and witnessed several troubling incidents of American kindness toward German civilians. GIs treated Germans as a liberated rather than as a conquered people. They flirted with German women, played with local children, assisted housewives with their chores, and provided food to hungry families. Violations of Allied policy were flagrant. Both officers and enlisted men disregarded the fraternization ban, but not one man had been court-martialed for unlawfully associating with German civilians.13

In addition to lack of guidance, Goodfriend blamed the GIs' "generous" nature and the lure of domestic comforts for the non-fraternization policy's present, or perhaps imminent, failure. American soldiers, he argued, were led astray by their sense of "decency," treating enemies as well as allies with kindness. GIs' desire for female companionship was another threat to Allied policy. "The mere fact that German companionship can generally be found indoors—a welcome relief from the cold, wet and mud without—is an important influence," Goodfriend wrote. The seductive warmth and cleanliness of German homes was difficult for even the most "principled and motivated" soldier to resist. Goodfriend advocated stricter enforcement of the fraternization ban and a more effective information and education campaign but concluded that "unless the basic human desires of the soldier are taken care of . . . there can be no solution of the problem."14

Although Goodfriend's analysis focused on the domestic rather than the erotic allure of fraternizing, a Stars and Stripes editorial based on his findings acknowledged that when a GI's "arm isn't hugging an M1 [rifle], it aches to hug a girl."15 American military officials were well aware of the sexual desires that motivated servicemen to seek female companionship and used every weapon in their public education arsenal to scare soldiers away from sexual partners deemed dangerous. An 18 October Stars and Stripes editorial, for example, warned readers to beware of "Jerry's deadliest V weapon—VD." It focused on the dangers of sexual contact with prostitutes and pick-ups in recently liberated countries, characterizing them as "time-bombs," "mines," and "booby traps" (pun probably intended). Any soldier who lacked
the "character," "caution," or "common sense" to avoid such women would likely contract a sexually transmitted disease "left behind" by German soldiers.\textsuperscript{16} This equation of women and weapons was common in the Army's VD prevention materials. In the summer of 1943, for example, one "educational" poster designed to combat a wave of syphilis in England pictured a pistol floating above the heads of three "loose" women. The question, "Loaded?" was superimposed between the women and the gun. "Don't take chances with pickups," the poster warned. "Loose women may also be loaded with disease."\textsuperscript{17}

Sexual intimacies were more perilous in Germany, where women were infected not only with disease but also with "hate." This message was communicated in a radio spot broadcast over the American Forces Network:

\begin{quote}
A tap tapping of heels, a German girl walking by—pretty to look at. Her smile is nice too.

Don't play Samson to her Delilah... she'd like to cut your hair off—off at the neck.

Don't fraternize!\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Like the biblical seductress Delilah who betrayed her lover Samson, German women, the radio spot suggests, were tempting but treacherous. They lured American lovers into bed only to kill or castrate them. This announcement was one of a series of anti-fraternization messages broadcast regularly during the winter and spring of 1945. Designed to scare servicemen away from German civilians, several of the spot announcements focused on the specific dangers of associating with enemy women.

The admonition "you can't be friendly" animated the military's anti-fraternization campaign and was the title of a purportedly true "frontline vignette" about a soldier who carelessly walked into a trap set by an elderly couple and baited with an attractive teenage girl. Another story in the same issue of Warweek (a weekly insert in Stars and Stripes) told of a hauntingly beautiful "mystery woman" who appeared every night near American lines wearing a white gown that looked transparent in the moonlight. This "lady in white" turned out to be a spotter who helped German artillery target American troops, but by day, she was indistinguishable from the other civilian women who lived near American lines.\textsuperscript{19} A few weeks later, Stars and Stripes editors sought to discourage their readers from giving rides to female refugees walking along German roads: "The hitchhiker looks like a harmless sort of gal. Like an ordinary civilian trying to get away from the war. And maybe she is." But, the editors warned, she might be an agent of the German Army, carrying radio equipment in her bags that would allow her to transmit American conversations to her superiors.
Despite all the warnings, most of the women encountered by GIs in the fall and winter of 1944/1945 posed little threat to their conquerors. In the 1930s, most of these women had supported (or at least not actively opposed) the Nazi regime; perhaps they had joined the *Bund deutscher Mädel* (League of German Girls), the auxiliary of the *Hitler Jugend* (Hitler Youth). If young and unmarried once the war began, they might have been drafted for service to the state on farms, in factories, or with the military. But after years of devastating aerial attacks by Allied bombers and with the German Army in wholesale retreat, civilians of both sexes looked to American troops for freedom from the hardships of war and as a bulwark against the Red Army advancing from the East. During the early days of the Allied invasion, many civilians ignored orders to evacuate; they greeted the advancing Americans with banners, flowers, smiles, and V-signs.

American soldiers encountered little resistance from German civilians. By most accounts, Germans were extremely docile and eager to please their conquerors. Although some servicemen argued that these civilians should be treated with kindness, others viewed German friendliness with distrust. To their eyes, smiling faces masked deep hatred. "The fraulein with the pretty smile is liable to stab you in the back," one infantryman wrote, "and that brat coming down the street . . . is liable to pull a luger out and shoot." Certainly the National Socialist resistance movement, the Werwolf, recruited heavily among teenage boys and girls. Although initially relegated to support roles, young women fought side by side with their male comrades and felt the same strong commitment to the "ideals of our irreplaceable Führer." Particularly during the final months of war, Werwolves were responsible for acts of sabotage and for small-scale attacks on Allied soldiers. They also intimidated and punished Nazi dissidents and Germans who cooperated with their conquerors. But the military press and many individual soldiers overestimated the threat of such attacks, for during the last few months of war, support for the Nazi regime had largely eroded. As historian Perry Biddiscombe points out, Werwolf attacks simply "increased public hatred of an already discredited regime."

Despite their distrust of German civilians, some GIs defied the fraternization ban, cooperating with enemy nationals in order to evade detection by military police and avoid punishment. The non-fraternization policy, although designed to protect Americans and to punish Germans, actually penalized Americans but not Germans. A soldier found guilty of fraternizing might be fined, jailed, and reduced in rank, whereas a German civilian faced no punishment. This frustrating situation spurred protests by soldiers and debates among Army officials about whether and how to punish Germans. In a letter to *Stars and Stripes*, Capt. J. A. Witt blamed fraternization on American friendliness and German craftiness, accusing the Germans of "attempting to induce the soldiers into conversation and into their homes" with smiles and bottles of schnapps. Reflecting the attitudes of many fellow servicemen, Witt urged the Army to punish both parties. However, during the war Germans were often unaware of
the Allied non-fraternization policy, and even if they were, punishing them for associating with American soldiers defeated the ban’s intended purpose. Such a practice would suggest to Germans that the U.S. Army was unable to control its soldiers, instead of demonstrating civilized abhorrence for German militarism. If Germans were legally responsible for upholding Allied policy, American soldiers might excuse themselves from conforming to military discipline. Finally, imprisonment was probably not an effective threat to hungry people, many of whom had lost their homes. In the end, the idea of charging Germans with violating the non-fraternization policy was rejected in favor of placing large sections of German towns "off limits" to American troops. Germans could then be charged with the offense of "[i]nviting or conducting any member of the Allied Forces into a place designated 'Off Limits' or 'Out of Bounds,' or supplying goods or services to such member in any place."²⁶

Soldiers’ letters from the early months of 1945 reveal divided opinions on the fraternization ban and a considerable amount of fraternizing. Many servicemen heeded the warnings with which they were bombarded, commending the policy and asserting that they had no wish to socialize with "Hitler’s frauleins." Others testified to sexual frustration and bemoaned the penalties imposed by the fraternization ban. "If only I could figure out a way to beat this fraternization thing," one infantryman wrote. "Honest, these darn women are driving me nuts."²⁷ But as early as February and March 1945, some American soldiers had already begun to brag about romantic conquests. A corporal with the 748th Tank Battalion, for example, described a new girlfriend: "I know a girl here she is German and she is nuts about me and I could get anything I want off of her, she sure is OK."²⁸

Undeterred by threatened punishments, many soldiers fraternized flagrantly. In March 1945, an Associated Press reporter interviewed Sgt. Francis W. Mitchell who was among the first American troops to enter the German city of Cologne. Based on the interview, the writer described this scene in the ruined city: German civilians greeted American soldiers by tossing them loaves of bread and feeding them beer, pretzels, and cherry preserves. Meanwhile, young women ("very pretty too," Mitchell commented) played music on a phonograph. "It got real cozy," Mitchell said, "but soon we had to break it off to get on with the job." The article concluded that the fraternization ban could only be enforced once military police arrived. The reporter quoted Mitchell, "Non-fraternization works if somebody is there, with a club, but right at the front where a soldier is risking death, you cannot scare him with a $65 fine."²⁹

The problem, according to Stars and Stripes, was that military police and military government personnel were busy performing more pressing duties. The fast paced Allied advance left them stretched too thin to enforce the fraternization ban. By March 1945, lonely soldiers who longed for female companionship might violate the policy with some guilt but little fear of punishment.³⁰ This news article, however, only told part of the story. Observation and interviews of American troops by Army social science researchers in April 1945 revealed
that men performing occupation duties were among the worst offenders. Assigned to one locale for several weeks or even months, the men found time to form liaisons. Many had casual sexual contact with German women, and some had regular girlfriends. Furthermore, the MPs and security guards who enforced the fraternization ban were notorious for arresting erring soldiers and then returning later to continue other men’s seductions. Frontline soldiers had fewer opportunities to establish stable relationships but did engage in casual sex in German towns on their way to the front or back to the rear. When the fighting stopped, combat troops quickly caught up with their rear echelon comrades, as evidenced by skyrocketing rates of sexually transmitted diseases during the first months of the occupation.

This was not a one-sided seduction. To the eyes of many American servicemen, German women were astonishingly forward. They gathered on the sidewalks near Army billets, "talking and laughing among themselves, and smiling at passing soldiers." Riding bicycles through town or stopping to adjust their skirts, pretty young women displayed shapely legs for the benefit of their American admirers. These actions provoked the desired response, turning soldiers' heads and fueling sexual desires. The motive behind such behavior was a mystery to Army investigators. Never considering how economic necessity might serve as incentive, social scientists speculated that such displays were "a spontaneous reaction to prolonged [sexual] deprivation" and a possible result of Nazi soldier worship. They also feared that German seductiveness might be part of a "deliberate program of subversion." Whatever the underlying intent, flirtatious behavior attracted the attention of the men assigned to occupation duties, among whom violations of the fraternization ban were common. Army field observers predicted that the "woman problem" would only grow worse after V-E Day.

During the late months of the European war, the problem of fraternization took on an "ugly new angle." In March 1945, Stars and Stripes correspondent Ernest Leiser reported that American soldiers were responsible for a wave of violent sexual attacks on German women. This article was never published. Instead, a little over two months later, the newspaper reported a wave of false rape charges by "frauleins bent on sabotage." A poster entitled "Hello Sucker" expanded this theme by depicting a shapely German woman beckoning a soldier into a tavern. Sitting on his lap, she raises a glass to his lips; later in bed, she yells "rape." Although publicly accusing German women of sabotage and perjury, military officials were privately worried about the troubling increase in rape complaints brought against American troops; they rose from 31 in February 1945 to 402 in March and 501 in April. These numbers are small by comparison to those attributed to the Red Army, but U.S. Army officials believed that rape accusations represented only a small portion of actual assaults. Such underreporting was and is common in rape cases, but in wartime Germany, the percentage reported was likely lower than in allied or liberated countries. As enemy nationals, German women were often reluctant to bring their cases to the attention of American military
authorities, and typically only the most violent attacks and furious self-defenses went to trial,\textsuperscript{38} for rape was judged less on the question of consent than on the degree of physical resistance.\textsuperscript{39}

One case from the final weeks of the European war illustrates the difficulties Army officials experienced in deterring sexual violence and judging rape cases. On 27 and 28 April 1945, eight enlisted members of a field artillery battalion entered a German house near their gun position in Geisling. They went to wash up, shave, and drink schnapps. Inside the house, they found two women living with an elderly bedridden man. Over the course of two days, at least four of the eight men had sexual intercourse with the two women on several occasions. The women did not struggle, but they did not submit willingly. The Americans outnumbered them and carried guns. One of the two women could not identify the soldiers who undressed and penetrated her but remembered crying as they did so. The other woman, Frau N,\textsuperscript{40} recognized the men she accused of raping her. She testified that on the evening of 27 April, she was awakened by a man holding what looked like a pistol, taken from her room, and raped by her abductor and several of his comrades. The following day, Frau N grabbed hold of the kitchen stove when a soldier tried to pull her into the bedroom. He succeeded and had sexual intercourse with her while she, in her own words, lay "like a piece of wood." Three more men followed their comrade's example and violated her again. A little over a week later, the men involved were arrested on rape and fraternization charges, although the person who brought charges against them remains a mystery.\textsuperscript{41}

This incident followed a scenario that was common during the final months of the European war. Armed soldiers, usually in pairs or in groups, entered a strange house and forcibly engaged in sexual intercourse with the female occupants. In some cases, servicemen threatened the women and their families with violence; in others, the threat was implicit. Some men were caught in the act or charged afterward, but most went free, because fear also inhibited their victims from reporting the crime.\textsuperscript{42}

The details of this otherwise unremarkable rape case have been preserved, because approximately five days after the arrest, the commanding general of the artillery corps to which the accused men belonged called battalion officers and noncommissioned officers to assemble before him. Gen. S delivered a lecture to his men, using this case to illustrate the seriousness and dire consequences of rape. Directly following this meeting, the general had the arrested enlisted men brought before him and several other officers. The precise wording of the general's statement was a matter of dispute, but all involved agreed that he threatened the accused rapists with quick conviction and execution. Although this incident had an ameliorating effect on discipline within the corps, it triggered an investigation of the general's actions. While awaiting trial, the alarmed enlisted men wrote letters to Sen. Beriah Green of Rhode Island and to Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas asking for help. Green and
Douglas forwarded the letters to the Under Secretary of War who ordered an investigation of the general's alleged threats and of the charge that German women were "creating a feeling of utter insecurity among our soldiers by untrue charges of rape and that these tactics may be part of a plan by the Germans."

Gen. S was reprimanded for actions deemed "indiscreet, intemperate, and lacking in good judgment." The accused enlisted men escaped punishment, despite investigators' failure to uncover any evidence of false accusations. The Army's case against them was weak. Although the women involved did not consent to sex, by their passivity they failed, in the judge advocate's opinion, to "put the accused on notice" that they were committing sex crimes; on his advice, rape charges were withdrawn. The defendants were instead tried for fraternization and acquitted even of this lesser charge. In light of the ample evidence of fraternization, it is surprising that the accused soldiers were not convicted even though the dismissal of rape charges was common practice. Without proof of a violent struggle, sex crimes committed by American soldiers were often tried as fraternization cases.

Judging the crime of rape was complicated by the conditions of war. The legal argument that accused soldiers were unaware that they were engaging in nonconsensual sex was certainly self-serving, and Army judicial officials deplored the idea that a soldier on entering a strange house with rifle in hand might believe he had "accomplished a seduction." On the other hand, German women, although seldom saboteurs, were not simply victims of male aggression. Many of the women encountered by American soldiers had supported and even benefited from the war, at least in its early stages. Their welfare depended on that of the German Army and the National Socialist state, and as the war progressed, they suffered as a result of German military defeats. Like the young soldiers who were their peers, German women often refused to continue fighting in the face of almost certain defeat. Instead, they preferred to surrender to their conquerors, having been warned by Nazi propagandists to expect rape.

During the final months of war and the hungry times that followed, many German women lived in a precarious state "between rape and prostitution," in the words of sociologist Annemarie Tröger, a grim continuum between violent coercion and desperate choice. Most women were not raped by American soldiers, nor did they prostitute themselves. Some performed domestic services for individual soldiers. Taking in laundry, for example, gave women access to American food, soap, and cigarettes, the black market currency of postwar Germany. Others found employment as translators, clerks, or food service workers with the American occupation. As historian Petra Goedde points out, because these women enjoyed better access to American commodities and a higher ration status, they were "under less
material pressure to seek relationships with American soldiers than others.” In fact, having an affair might jeopardize their employment.\textsuperscript{50} On the other hand, working for or near American troops also opened women to sexual advances and sometimes exposed them to violence.

Women lucky enough to be employed by the U.S. Army did double duty as objects of desire. In June 1945, for example, attractive German women replaced male waiters, adding cheer to the 116th Infantry Regiment’s officers’ mess in Bremerhaven. It was a notable event for the bored, “female-starved” soldiers who had little else to occupy themselves.\textsuperscript{51} At around the same time in Oberliederbach, Pfc. M took advantage of an assignment to accompany kitchen worker Fräulein H on an errand to collect irons. The driver, who witnessed the event, reported that Pfc. M kissed and embraced Fräulein H and that “the girl did not object.” At Pfc. M’s request, the driver turned down a dirt road and got out of the jeep to give his comrade a chance to “lay her.” Again the young woman did not protest, and the extent of her cooperation or resistance is unclear from the driver’s testimony.\textsuperscript{52} She probably felt that she had little choice but to tolerate Pfc. M’s advances but seems to have averted the serviceman’s determined effort to pressure her into sex.

Although rape cases were uncommon after the war’s end, the relationship between American soldiers and German women (a disproportionately large percentage of the population of occupied towns) was fraught with potential violence. Billeted in a private home that also served as their company’s command post, officers of the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment in Hainstadt employed two sisters, Fräuleins B, to perform domestic tasks. The B sisters owned the house and visited it several times a week. The younger sister characterized the servicemen who occupied the house as generally well behaved, except for Lt. H who made “improper advances” on several occasions and once struck her when she refused him. The sisters reported this incident to another officer but did not pursue the matter further. A week later, with the help of two comrades (including the officer to whom the sisters reported the earlier attack), the lieutenant attempted to rape another Hainstadt woman. Fräulein G had had less contact with American soldiers stationed in her hometown than the B sisters. She took in laundry for a soldier named Sam, but Sam was not among the men who broke in to the G family home, assaulted Fräulein G, and threatened to shoot her father on that night in mid-July. All three women involved enjoyed “good reputations in the town”; they were not known to date or socialize with American soldiers.\textsuperscript{53}

These incidents might never have come to the attention of the Army inspector general. Fräulein G did not report the attempted rape to American authorities, because she feared “that the soldiers might avenge themselves” and correctly believed that the men would “all stick together.” The other members of the assailants’ combat unit were silenced by loyalty, as well as by fear. Pfc. C, a cook who learned about the attempted rape from a comrade, wanted to do the right thing but was unwilling to report the crime, because he explained, “I would
only be proven a liar and my life would be made a living \textit{HELL} under their command."
Suffering pangs of conscience, the devout enlisted man unburdened himself in a letter to his wife: "[I]t's disgusting to know so many men have fought and died thinking they were fighting for things that are right then after the victory has been won to see such crimes by our leaders. I wonder how long the leaders of our nation think that America will escape the judgement of God?" Despite his wish to see the guilty punished, Pfc. C was a reluctant witness when interviewed in the course of the investigation prompted by his letter. The letter had been forwarded to Gen. George C. Marshall by Pfc. C’s equally devout wife, who counseled the general to "let God be your guide in such matters and ... act accordingly."

Pfc. C’s letter reached his wife because postal censorship had been relaxed following the German surrender. Unit officers were no longer required to read enlisted men’s mail. The relaxation probably emboldened Pfc. C to vent his feelings. The regulations that had kept news of the American crime wave in Germany from publication in American newspapers were also eased after the Allied victory in Europe. But while American forces fought in the Pacific, news reports were still subject to oversight by Army press censors.

Censorship of both mail and press served several functions. Although its primary purpose was to prevent strategic information from falling into enemy hands, it also provided military authorities with intelligence on soldiers’ attitudes and conduct. For the purposes of this chapter, the most important aspect of wartime censorship was its role in domestic propaganda. By withholding information that might present the Allied war effort in a less-than-virtuous light, military officials ensured that Americans on the home front received a whitewashed version of World War II. Even after the fighting stopped, self-censorship on the part of soldiers, reporters, and publishers softened the image of American forces in Europe. In January 1946, for example, a senior editor at W. W. Norton deemed \textit{Conqueror’s Road}, Australian journalist Osmar White’s unflattering account of the invasion and occupation of Germany, "not suitable for publication in the United States at the present time.” White’s manuscript criticized Allied military and occupation policies and portrayed American GIs as looters, fraternizers, and worse.

While American troops still fought Hitler’s army, news stories on GI misconduct in Germany were heavily censored. In the winter of 1944/1945, the Army admitted that renegade soldiers sold military supplies on the French black market and publicized the severe punishments administered to those involved. Combat troops, however, were immune from journalistic criticism. Press censors restricted publication of stories on the orgy of looting in Germany that was, by one journalist’s account, so virulent that a “bystander often wonders whether we are not fighting a war on [the] side and as [our] chief occupation waging [a] campaign [of] grand larceny on [a] colossal scale.” The same censored news story criticized soldiers for their mistreatment of German prisoners and civilians, particularly women; the writer reported that
"since enforcement [of the] non-fraternizing rule [the] proportion [of] rape cases has taken [a] steep bound upwards." This account was withheld by press censors, but in May 1945, at the behest of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, it circulated among the corps and division commanders in Gen. George S. Patton Jr.'s Third U.S. Army. Bradley urged his subordinates to give GI misbehavior "further attention" and to use "whatever steps . . . as you deem necessary" to combat the problem. "Now that the fighting is over," Bradley's memo concluded, "[misbehavior] may be one of our most important questions, as it effects the reputation of our Army and the attitude of our men when they go home."59

American civilians would eventually learn of looting, black marketeering, and fraternizing in Germany,60 but rape remained a taboo subject. Under the topic of "sex crimes," for example, the New York Times Index for 1945 listed only a few overseas stories; these included reports of rumored mass rapes by Soviet, French colonial, and African American soldiers in France and Germany and by Japanese troops in Manila but not the general increase in serious crimes by American soldiers overseas. Together, these stories suggested that rape was a crime committed by foreigners or by black men but not by white GIs.61

This journalistic approach mirrored American policy, which treated rape as a racial, rather than as an Army-wide disciplinary, problem. Military statistics seemed to confirm racist preconceptions. African American soldiers in Europe were charged with rape at rates disproportionate to their numbers. For example, of seventy-seven rape cases reviewed by the Third Army's judge advocate, twenty-six involved black servicemen.62 Theater-wide statistics were even more worrisome.63 To combat this problem, Army officials recruited black chaplains, including Presbyterian minister Beverly Ward, to tour Europe as part of a crime and disease prevention effort. Appealing to love of family and racial pride, Ward exhorted his listeners to avoid "women of easy virtue," who might "accuse you of rape for the purpose of creating racial trouble in the Army and back home."64 There is no evidence of such a scheme. Rather racial discrepancies in rape accusations and sexual assault charges likely derived from both Nazi ideology and American bigotry. As noted earlier, German women expected to be raped by their conquerors, particularly by racial Others. They also recognized that most white soldiers shared their prejudices. Many of the white officers who commanded black troops believed the worst of their men, and white GIs generally were angered by the interracial liaisons that developed between African Americans and European women.65 Furthermore, interviews of occupation soldiers (MPs, security guards, and military government personnel) in April 1945 revealed that the "alleged sexual activity of American Negro troops has had the effect of aligning American white troops as 'protectors' of white (German) women against black (American) soldiers."66 On the other hand, women, like Fräulein G, who were assaulted by white servicemen, particularly officers, might justifiably expect little assistance or justice
from American authorities. Together this evidence suggests that German women underreported sexual assaults by white as compared to black soldiers and that the American military was more likely to pursue charges against African Americans.

Even news of lesser crimes was slow to appear in the American press. The majority of news stories about the criminal and otherwise objectionable behavior of American soldiers in Europe were not published until spring 1946 or later, when most of the men who participated in the fighting had been replaced by new arrivals. Possibly this lag in reporting incidents of misconduct can be attributed to a reluctance to criticize the behavior of soldiers who had sacrificed years of their lives for the Allied war cause. In their 1947 exposé on the American occupation of Europe, former Stars and Stripes reporters Bud Hutton and Andy Rooney (later of Sixty Minutes fame) criticized their journalistic colleagues for self-censorship, but Hutton and Rooney's report was similar to those published in the popular press at the same time. They attributed the worst of the misconduct to "Occupation Joe," rather than to his fighting predecessor, "GI Joe."

American soldiers were also responsible for civilian ignorance. Although many servicemen freely admitted to theft, they were far more circumspect on the topic of sexual misconduct. Like fraternization, looting was a court-martial offense, but most soldiers seem to have felt little compunction about stealing watches from German prisoners, silverware from German homes, or shoes from German stores. In letters to family and friends, they freely admitted to having "liberated" valuable objects from their owners; many GIs sent portions of their spoils home as "souvenirs." Pfc., later Cpl., Cliff Hope, for example, suffered no qualms about mailing home a package of contraband articles from Germany but felt extremely guilty about his attempts to fraternize both just before and soon after the end of hostilities.

For many American soldiers, sex was a far more troubling issue than theft. Certainly some men, disregarding censorship regulations and legal penalties, were unable to resist the temptation to brag about sexual adventures abroad. This letter from a married sergeant addressed to a friend, probably a fellow soldier, was excerpted in a bimonthly censorship report:

You should see my girl over here too, she sure is a honey. She is only 21 and she said she is sure she will like the U.S. when we are married and I take her back with me. As tho, after seeing these Nazis kill our boys off, I would be crazy enough to take her back with me even if I were not married. All the boys have German girls now and they sure are good. They will make good wives for the German boys after we leave them. They will be a lot smarter too.
Other men, like Pfc. C, felt obliged to confess misdeeds committed by members of their military unit. Most, however, wished to keep this knowledge from ever reaching their parents, siblings, and sweethearts—especially their mothers and wives. By having sex with an enemy national, a serviceman might betray not only American war aims but also his mother's moral teachings and his own marriage vows.

One division commander attempted to harness soldiers' fear of exposure to combat promiscuous sex and the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. In response to a sharp increase in rates of infection just weeks after the end of hostilities, Gen. Holmes E. Dager, commander of the 11th Armored Division with troops performing occupation duties in Germany and Austria, ordered a letter of notification sent to the "nearest relative" of any infected soldier. Informed the recipient that his or her son, brother, or husband had "contracted a social disease," the letter assured anxious relatives that the soldier would "receive the finest and most modern treatment available." This highly unpopular policy came to the attention of the Army inspector general division after outraged GIs sent copies of the form letter to Stars and Stripes. One anonymous serviceman complained: "I haven't contacted any of the social diseases, nor do I intend to, but . . . if I should happen to contact any such disease I certainly would not want my mother to know of it." Another man charged that the policy would "ruin many homes" and "contribute to more wrecked health." The division chaplain concurred, asserting that the policy was flawed from both a practical and a moral standpoint. First, it would encourage servicemen to conceal their symptoms, likely spreading infection to "the innocent" on their return home. Moreover, the chaplain believed that "a husband should confess all faults and sins to his wife as well as to his God . . . face to face and not be reported on by a third party." Because it violated the War Department's policy on reporting and treating sexually transmitted diseases and threatened to embarrass the Army as well as individuals, this attempt to shame soldiers into good behavior was quickly halted.

This incident exemplifies military officials' desire, on the one hand, to leverage the moral power of civilian censure and, on the other, to prevent embarrassing disclosures that might harm the Army's reputation. For example, lists of "DOs and DON'Ts" printed and distributed by the First Army in response to "pillaging and general lawless conduct" in France and later Germany, concluded by reminding soldiers "the folks back home are watching us" and urging the men to make their folks proud. In the summer and fall of 1944, proposals to combat fraternization included a civilian letter-writing campaign to be directed by the Army's Bureau of Public Affairs. The proposed campaign was never implemented, perhaps from the fear that such a campaign would produce public distress without improving GI behavior.
Like individual soldiers, most military officials would have preferred to keep such matters quiet, but the sensational intertwined topics of fraternization and sexually transmitted diseases attracted a great deal of press coverage. Despite continuing restrictions on stories about overseas misconduct, the *New York Times* published weekly news articles on the failing fraternization ban between the beginning of May and the end of July; at points, the topic received daily coverage.\(^77\) Local newspapers and national magazines reported that large numbers of American soldiers flagrantly violated military law, enjoying friendly relations with attractive German women who "dressed . . . to charm," wearing low-cut blouses and remarkably short skirts.\(^78\)

Having long received a sanitized version of war, many civilians were scandalized by glimpses of the misconduct and promiscuity rampant in Europe. A trickle of negative news stories about the nation’s soldiers appeared in the American press before V-E Day,\(^79\) but stories of misconduct were overshadowed by those emphasizing the servicemen’s ingenuity, integrity, and kindness to war victims (especially orphaned children). Few civilians were prepared for the postwar flood of bad press. Having learned to view the nation’s soldiers as virtuous liberators, civilians were pained to read about immoral behavior.

Wives, mothers, and sisters were particularly appalled by stories of promiscuity in postwar Europe. George Gallup’s surveys revealed a significant divergence in male and female civilians’ attitudes toward fraternization. American women overwhelmingly believed that servicemen should be prohibited from dating German women; those under the age of 30—which included the majority of soldiers’ American wives, sweethearts, and future girlfriends—were particularly emphatic. By contrast, American men were only slightly more likely to disapprove than to approve of such fraternizing. The poll also found that "[f]amilies with a member in the armed forces in Germany are more opposed to fraternization than those with no member of the family in the occupation forces."\(^80\)

Some women sought to improve soldiers’ behavior by appealing to conscience. Indirectly addressing the topic of fraternization and fornication, Cpl. Cliff Hope’s mother wrote to her son, "Now that the fighting part of the war is over, I do not know what you’re doing or what your set up is. However it may be that you’ll have temptations to do things that under normal conditions would not interest you at all." She advised Hope to follow his conscience and to avoid "anything that is not manly, clean or morally straight." Insisting she did not doubt his virtue, she wrote that she hoped his good example would "help another buddy go straight." The underlying message was, in Hope’s words, "Don’t do anything you’d be ashamed to come home and tell us about." Hope did not reproduce his response to this letter but did include an excerpt from his diary: "Read beautiful letter from Mother warning me against some of the things I have been doing. I make no excuses. Someday all this shall pass." Maternal
admonitions contributed to the son’s feelings of guilt but did not affect his behavior. Soon after Hope received this letter, he became involved in an intensely romantic but platonic relationship with a young German woman he met while on guard duty.\textsuperscript{81}

In response to bad publicity and anxious letters, many soldiers wrote home to their wives and mothers, insisting that the problem of fraternization was overstated. "To say 100% of the G.I.’s are fraternizing is a down right dirty lie," one infantry sergeant wrote in June 1945. "Take my word for it honey there is in reality very few doing that. Actually I only know of two or three cases in my company of 202 men."\textsuperscript{82} Another young serviceman took a different tack. Conceding that many of the men in his unit fraternized with German women, he reassured his parents that he was "different from all the rest of the GI’s in Germany" and would strictly adhere to military regulations.\textsuperscript{83}

Certainly not all soldiers violated the non-fraternization policy or indulged in extramarital affairs, but many servicemen, while away from the watchful eyes of family and hometown community, committed acts that they might have considered but never carried out under ordinary circumstances. There are no good statistics on the number of servicemen who fraternized with German women, but estimates from the summer of 1945 suggest that while in some units only a few men were intimately acquainted with German civilians, in others, fraternization "was the rule rather than the exception."\textsuperscript{84} By August 1945, 62 percent of white enlisted men surveyed by Army social science researchers believed that "most" or "almost all" American soldiers in Germany "had some friendly contact with German girls."\textsuperscript{85} Another measure of fraternization was the rising rate of sexually transmitted diseases among GIs in Germany. Between 27 April and 25 May 1945, the number of new cases more than quadrupled, increasing from 197 per week to 957 per week. The situation became worse as the summer progressed into fall and winter.\textsuperscript{86}

By June 1945, "shacking up" was common among men of the 29th Infantry Division stationed in and near Bremen. Investigators from the Army’s inspector general section found that once promised anonymity, approximately 80 percent of enlisted men admitted to violating the non-fraternization policy. Most of the men were former combat soldiers and assured their interviewers that they could be "trusted to treat the Germans as they should be treated, that is, not to become friendly with them." For these men, fraternization was simply a sexual and recreational activity, and they resented the Army for restricting their freedom. Some believed that fraternizing with German women was wrong, but most did not consider it criminal. Many GIs compared the fraternization ban to the nation’s earlier attempt to prohibit the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Moreover, they argued that rescinding the ban would actually further American policy objectives. It would, many believed, increase the number of soldiers using condoms and prophylactics and thus decrease the high rate of sexual transmitted diseases among American troops.\textsuperscript{87} Others asserted that relaxing the
fraternization ban would assist soldiers in identifying Nazis; two men reported having discovered hidden guns and radios while shacking up with German women. Finally, some GI critics of the ban argued that social (and even intimate) contact with Germans was the best way to reeducate them. 

Fraternization did not imply forgiveness. The majority of American soldiers surveyed in late April/early May 1945 agreed that Germans were collectively guilty and should suffer as a nation. The fact that most of the rapes committed by American troops in Europe occurred in Germany suggests a strong correlation between sex and vengeance. Furthermore, sociologist and criminologist J. Robert Lilly found that sexual assaults on German women tended to be "more brutal and humiliating" than attacks on French or British women. German nationals were more likely than citizens of allied or liberated nations to be raped before witnesses or to be beaten and sodomized by their American assailants.

Even consensual sex might be tinged with a desire to punish. One Jewish serviceman, for example, fraternized with the goal of discrediting Nazi racial theories. His story was related in May 1945 by an admiring coreligionist: "My ambition was to sleep with some female Nazi and then tell her I'm Jewish," he wrote. "I can't do it but I met one boy who did it. He said the reaction was something worth seeing. She turned pale and couldn't speak." In this case, the greatest pleasure derived from the sex act was the ability to humiliate.

Conquest was a more common motivation than vengeance. As one soldier told Army social science researchers, "The best way to show these Germans who won the war is to sleep with their women." In April 1945, one infantryman who acted on this impulse bragged about his new circumstances in a letter that was probably addressed to a fellow soldier:

I'm living the life of reilly right now. I have a three room apt with a german woman 26 yrs old whose husband is in Russia. Its too good to last... I've been getting all the beer I want. Last night I had a bottle of good scotch. This all reminds me of the last few days of the African campaign. The war can't last much longer. I'm writing this laying in bed. My "housekeeper" is washing all my clothes. I'm wearing her husband's pajamas and dressing gown. This is the life.

This serviceman derived pleasure not only from his luxurious accommodations but also from the fact that his housekeeper and paramour was the wife of an enemy combatant. Lying in the other man's bed and wearing his pajamas and dressing gown seemed to enhance this soldier's enjoyment of the sexual fruits of victory.

Despite this sexualized desire to dominate and punish German women and men, American soldiers tended, as a group, to absolve their particular girlfriends of responsibility for Nazi atrocities. Individual Germans encouraged this tendency by denying culpability and claiming
ignorance of concentration camps. They represented themselves as victims and bystanders rather than as aggressors and appealed to their conquerors for kind treatment. Although such pleas were initially greeted with skepticism and anger, over time, they proved effective in softening soldiers’ attitudes toward the generally submissive German population.95

Whatever the motive, less than a month after the end of fighting in Europe, fraternization had become commonplace. In May 1945, military police attached to the Twelfth Army Group reported the arrest of one thousand men for that crime. This number was less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the men who served in that group, but these arrests represented only a small proportion of actual violations. Military police often turned a blind eye to fraternizing couples, and officers were sometimes reluctant to punish infractions. On learning that two of his officers had attended parties with local women, the commander of the American military government detachment for Berlin declined to pursue legal charges against two such “valuable officers.” Instead, he “let them off with a good dressing down.” Of this incident, Lt. Col. John J. Maginnis commented in his memoir, “Already it was apparent that non-fraternization was going to be impossible to control.”96

The threat of arrest did not deter most soldiers from violating the fraternization ban. In fact, prohibition seems to have added spice to some relationships; sneaking around was part of the fun. Even straight-laced combat engineer Henry Giles, who was faithfully devoted to his fiancée, Janice Holt Moore, seemed to derive vicarious enjoyment from the antics of a fellow soldier: “One of the boys is shacked up with a girl right here in the hotel,” Giles wrote in his diary on 24 June 1945. “He calls her his little Nazi. With Lieut. Hayes on the prowl, they have to be careful. When they hear him coming she rolls out the back side of the bed & hides under it. Hayes hasn’t found her yet.”97 Many American servicemen were caught with German women in their beds; the files of the European theater’s judge advocate general contain several such cases. But for all the men caught, many more evaded detection or avoided punishment.

Overzealous military police sometimes arrested soldiers whose behavior simply looked suspicious,98 but the fraternization cases that went to trial generally concerned flagrant violations of the ban. Military police apprehended American servicemen and German women together in dark parks, brothels, German houses, and Army billets. In Offenbach, for example, two officers patrolling a park for fraternizers from their quartermaster battalion discovered Pvt. B of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in the company of Frau K. They found a blanket spread on the ground beside the weapons carrier Pvt. B drove and observed the enlisted man button his trousers as they questioned Frau K. Found guilty of fraternizing, Pvt. B was sentenced to six months’ confinement at hard labor and fined $90. After sentencing, his defense counsel along with four court officers entered a plea for clemency. Pvt. B, they wrote, “has served the regiment well . . . , volunteering for and going on many extremely dangerous
patrols." Moreover, Frau K, who served as a witness for the prosecution, "was possibly prejudiced to the United States since she had lost both her husband and father during the war and may have been using the non-fraternization policy as a means of revenge." Pvt. B's prison sentence was suspended. Other cases included in the files of the European theater judge advocate general suggest that soldiers found guilty of fraternizing seldom served their full prison sentences.

In mid-July 1945, American and British occupation officials moved to relax the ban's strictures. After 14 July, American soldiers would be permitted to "to talk with adult Germans on the streets and in public places." Other restrictions remained in place. American soldiers were prohibited from visiting German homes or marrying German nationals. Although justified as a response to the "rapid progress . . . made in carrying out Allied de-Nazification policies," this modification of occupation policy was an implicit admission of defeat. The fraternization ban, as contemporary critics pointed out, proved unenforceable. Men like Pvt. B brazenly disobeyed military law and received token punishments.

In the spirit of denazification, *Stars and Stripes* announced the policy shift as an opportunity for soldiers to communicate the disgust they felt on learning of German concentration camps. However, it quickly became apparent that public conversation was in fact public courtship. American soldiers took immediate advantage of their newfound freedom to mingle and flirt with young German women. On the sunny afternoon of 15 July, journalist Gladwin Hill reported, GIs "sat on grassy river banks, chugged up and down stream in American boats and zipped around streets with the zest of a child diving into a box of candy previously accessible only by stealth." Although the title of this piece was "Few Fraternize as Ban Is Lifted," Hill attributed the lack of intimacy more to German "resistance" than to American reluctance. A little more than a week later, *Stars and Stripes* reported, "Every American newspaper from Maine to California carried pictures of you and you and you—if, first, you are in Germany and, second, if you spent a few hours with a fraulein. The dailies carry such captions as this: "Relaxation of Non-Fraternization Wins Approval of GIs in Germany." *Stars and Stripes* published its own pictures of German-American flirtations and embraces in the weeks following the 14 July announcement. The Paris edition even printed a short item on the seductive power of German kisses.

The new visibility of fraternizing couples added fuel to public debates about the meaning of such behavior and who was to blame. No longer fearing that German women consorted with American soldiers for purposes of sabotage, American observers worried that they embraced their conquerors far too willingly. Contemporary commentators attributed this behavior to National Socialism and national character as well as to material need. Journalist Judy Barden portrayed German women as sexual predators. With low-cut necklines and even lower morals, they were willing to trade "candy bars and cigarettes for their souls." Acknowledging the
effects of fear and hunger, Barden nevertheless insisted that under similar circumstances American and British women would have behaved differently. "Under Hitler," syndicated columnist Ray Tucker wrote, "German women were taught to be promiscuous to such an extent that they became unmoral rather than just immoral. Thus, they constitute a constant temptation to our troops, as violations of the non-fraternization order have demonstrated." The sensational discovery of SS chief Heinrich Himmler's *Lebensborn* program, a system of maternity homes for wed and unwed mothers of racially desired offspring, seemed to support these allegations. Although such stories misrepresented the homes as part of a breeding program for the Nazi racial and military elite, it is true that wartime conditions and measures, such as the creation of state-run brothels, fostered nonmarital sex and reproduction. But German willingness was only part of the problem. By the fall of 1945, it was apparent from press reports that American soldiers abroad were demonstrating considerable sexual initiative and had earned an unsavory reputation among former allies.

Once again, Wacs and cheating wives received more than their fair share of the blame. Operatic soprano, movie star, and USO entertainer Grace Moore, for example, charged that unfaithful wives and sweethearts had driven "disillusioned" servicemen into the waiting arms of German women. In the pages of *Stars and Stripes*, soldiers attacked civilians and servicewomen who criticized the fraternizers. Like Moore, they asserted that American women were the source of the problem. Responding to a letter from a Wac who criticized fraternizing soldiers and signed herself "Disgusted, and How!!!," one man rehashed the persistent rumor that Wacs scorned enlisted men's invitations. He concluded that the women were, thus, responsible for servicemen's misconduct. "You talk about soldiers running around with German girls? And why not?" he wrote. "We EM would rather go out with any American girl in preference with any two girls in Europe. But this is the way it stands. We see a Wac and say 'hello,' and what happens? She walks right by us as if we were dirt." By this time, however, female misconduct was old news. As I have shown in earlier chapters, promiscuous women were the focus of public and private concern while the fighting continued. But soon after the Allied victory, fraternizing servicemen began to overshadow faithless wives. If Germany had become, in the words of one worried mother, a "nation of prostitutes," Americans proved to be willing johns. Although some would defend the servicemen's right to behave as they liked, many soldiers were deeply ashamed of their own excesses.

Sexual guilt became a major mental health problem among American troops preparing to leave postwar Europe. In the October 1947 issue of *Mental Hygiene*, two Army medical officers reported that 30 percent of neuropsychiatry and 50 percent of urology patients seen by doctors at the 121st General Hospital, serving the redeployment and replacement centers at Bremen, suffered from what they termed "venereal-disease anxiety." The authors noted that colleagues at other Army medical facilities reported similar findings. Servicemen diagnosed with this malady believed they had contracted sexually transmitted diseases and complained
of physical symptoms, but the true source of their discomfort was psychological. Such men were commonly identified by repeated visits to the hospital's urology clinic even after receiving negative test results; they were then referred for psychiatric counseling. Most venereal-disease anxiety sufferers had "frequently deviated from the accepted moral standards" of their premilitary life by engaging in pre- and extramarital sex, and many had previously been treated for a sexually transmitted disease. Others agonized over a single indiscretion. Preparations for redeployment—including a final physical exam—often precipitated anxiety, for sufferers feared that examination would reveal "stigmatizing scars," representing "permanent physical disability."111

Most men suffering from venereal-disease anxiety gained "insight" into the psychological sources of their symptoms through outpatient treatment. Recounting the "long, lurid tales" of their sexual excesses and receiving their doctor's reassurances provided these men with some peace of mind. Others required hospitalization. In such cases, exposure to and acceptance by nurses and female Red Cross workers played a major role in their treatment. Women's condemnation was what these men feared. In the words of one sufferer, they felt "unfit to be in the room with an American girl." A "good Christian" and a devoted father and husband, this 30-year-old sergeant "intended to go back to my wife the way I left her," but he engaged in sexual intercourse with a woman he met on leave. Twenty days later he showed up at the urological clinic complaining of "pains in the groin, burning pain in the genital area, weakness, tremulousness, and inability to sleep." Although his tests were negative, the sergeant was unable to believe that "there was nothing wrong with me." In time and with the help of individual therapy and group sessions, this patient was able to return to his family, but even upon discharge from the hospital, he exhibited symptoms of sexual guilt. Economist Eli Ginzberg and his colleagues recorded a similar case in their study of military manpower. Cpl. N, a married combat infantryman, caught a sexually transmitted disease while performing occupation duties in Germany. Convinced he was diseased even after his gonorrhea was cured, the corporal was hospitalized for months and continued to receive psychiatric counseling through the Veterans Administration into the 1950s. Although happily married and a successful salesman, he was "still plagued with occasional feelings of guilt" over a single sexual indiscretion.112

"Boys act differently over here. They are away from home; they forget everything," one young serviceman confided to his doctors when he was admitted to an Army hospital for treatment of a sexually transmitted disease.113 Despite the dictates and punishments of conscience, American soldiers in Germany—many of whom had been virgins or faithful husbands prior to military induction—learned to regard sex as a commodity and a fruit of military conquest, rather than as an expression of married love. German-American relations were not wholly devoid of romance; some men did find enduring love and wed women they met there.114
More commonly, servicemen formed temporary liaisons. In many cases, they planned to return to wives and sweethearts in the United States without revealing their wartime affairs.\textsuperscript{115}

Fraternization confirmed many Americans’ fears that by disrupting normal relations between men and women, the war had corrupted the nation’s sexual morals. Before V-E Day, women were more likely to be faulted, but the flood of stories about fraternizing and diseased soldiers that followed the end of fighting in Europe shifted concern away from female to male promiscuity. Published images of servicemen embracing the nation’s former enemies suggested betrayal and threatened the "disintegration of the American home," in the words of Rep. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine. She proposed reconstituting fractured military families as the best solution to misconduct abroad. In a public letter to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Smith urged him to combat fraternization by permitting soldiers’ wives and fiancées to join their husbands and sweethearts in Europe. She asserted that shipping American women to Europe "would both improve the morale and efficiency of the soldiers and be of tremendous value in rehabilitation." Smith’s proposal struck a chord with many worried Americans; within a week of her announcement, she claimed to have received more than 200 supportive letters.\textsuperscript{116}

In the summer of 1945, with combat still raging in the Pacific, such proposals were impracticable. War Department officials worried about logistics and morale problems should the plan be undertaken too soon. On the other hand, a preliminary study asserted that sending soldiers’ dependents to Germany was a "necessity if non-fraternization is to be made workable."\textsuperscript{117} In January 1946 as GIs throughout the overseas theaters of operations protested the slow pace of demobilization, the Army publicly committed itself to shipping tens of thousands of American women and children to Europe.\textsuperscript{118} By reuniting husbands and wives and encouraging soldiers to marry their American sweethearts, this policy sought to reduce fraternization, boost morale, and improve moral conduct. Creating American communities in Germany would, military planners hoped, also exert a domesticating influence on unmarried men; with the women’s arrival, even bachelors would have to guard their behavior or else "word concerning their improper associations could get back home." The commander of the military government regiment for Bremen Enclave noted with seeming satisfaction that men whose wives were expected to arrive in the near future had "particularly withdrawn from social association with Germans." Although contemporary politicians and commentators likely overestimated this policy’s ameliorating effects, it (along with restrictions on public displays of affection) helped quell civilian concern about unrestrained male sexuality and the erosion of American family life at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{119}
Notes


Note 2: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) "Policy on Relations Between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany" (12 September 1944), enclosed in J. L. Tarr to Commanding General, Seventh Army and Commanding General, First French Army (27 September 1944), File: 250.1–2; Dwight Eisenhower to Omar Bradley (17 September 1944), File: 250.1–1; both in Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).


Note 5: Joseph R. Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II (Frankfurt-Am-Main, Germany: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, 1947), 1–10; Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 97–9; Goedde, GIs and Germans, 45; "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany" (12 September 1944), enclosure in J. L. Tarr to Commanding Generals Re: Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany (27 September 1944), File: 250.1–2, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.

Note 6: "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany" (12 September 1944), enclosure in J. L. Tarr to Commanding Generals Re: Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany (27 September 1944), File: 250.1–2, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP. See also Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 10–14; Goedde, GIs and Germans, 45–6.

Note 7: "Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany" (12 September 1944), enclosure in J. L. Tarr to Commanding Generals Re: Policy on Relations between Allied Occupying Forces and Inhabitants of Germany (27 September 1944), File: 250.1–2, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.

Note 8: The guide was later reissued; a white sticker pasted to the front cover of each black booklet informed recipients that "[n]othing contained herein should be considered a relaxation of the Non-Fraternization Policy." Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 8, 14–15, and appendix 5; Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany (Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, 1953), 129–30; Goedde, GIs and Germans, 46–50; Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 97; Reuters, "Troops Told to Give Up English-
German Books,” *Stars and Stripes*, Paris ed. (9 October 1944); "Occupation Force Warned on Actions: 'Pocket Guide' Tells Men Not to Kick Germans, but Bars 'Good-Will Errand,” *New York Times* (11 May 1945); SHAEF to War Department (3 October 1944), File: 250.1, Box 67, Civil Affairs Division General Records, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

**Note 9:** "Will We Gum Up the Victory?” *Stars and Stripes*, Paris ed. (22 September 1944). See also Andy Rooney, "German Kids Are Asking for Gum, Chums," *Stars and Stripes*, Paris ed. (15 September 1944) and letters to *Stars and Stripes*, Paris ed. (21 October 1944).

**Note 10:** "Troops Vanish; Fraternizing in Reich Tabooed” and "Don't Get Chummy with Jerry,” *Stars and Stripes*, Paris ed. (25 September and 20 October 1944).

**Note 11:** *Stars and Stripes*, London ed. (4, 6, 7, and 9 October 1944).

**Note 12:** Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II*, 15 and Appendix 2; "Bradley Lists 'Battle Orders' for GIs Dealing with Nazis," *Stars and Stripes*, Paris ed. (12 December 1944); Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, "Special Orders for German-American Relations" and accompanying letter to "John Jones" (n.d.), File: 250.1–1, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.

**Note 13:** Arthur Goodfriend to Chief of Special and Information Services, "Report on Fraternization between Germans and American Officers and Men," File: 250.1–1, Box 12, G1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF) and Frederick H. Osborn to John H. Hilldring (23 November 1944), File: 250.1, Box 67, Civil Affairs Division General Records, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165; both in NACP. See also Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 142; Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II*, 20; Goedde, *GIs and Germans*, 58–9.

**Note 14:** *Ibid.*

**Note 15:** "Don't Get Chummy with Jerry.”


**Note 17:** John E. Gordon to Chief Surgeon, ETO, Re: Educational Posters—Venereal Disease Control (31 August 1943), File: 726.1, Box 61, G1 Decimal File 1943–1946, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498, NACP.

**Note 18:** Ellipsis in original. John S. Hayes to Robert M. Furber (16 March 1945) and enclosures, File: 250.1–5, Box 12, G1 Decimal File, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP. See also Goedde, *GIs and Germans*, 72; Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II*, 20–21.


**Note 20:** "Sorry, No Rides," *Stars and Stripes*, Paris ed. (27 November 1944).

**Note 21:** For contemporary accounts of civilian submissiveness and eagerness to cooperate with their conquerors, see Osmar White, *Conqueror’s Road*, ed. Sally A. White and Neil McDonald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 47–9, 71, 97, 201–4; Saul Padover, *Experiment in Germany: The Story of an American Intelligence Officer* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 164–6, 168–75.


Note 24: Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan summed up the dilemma in his 14 March 1945 letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5: "... It is paradoxical that the general tenor of our current legislation is that we who are advancing into Germany with the intent of punishing the Germans should, in cases of non-fraternisation, punish only our own people." This letter can be found in File: 250.1–2, Box 12, G-1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.


Note 26: Lt. Colonel E. C. Woodall to Colonel Brooks (26 March 1945), File: 250.1–2, Box 12, G-1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP. Goede, GIs and Germans, 73; Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 67–9; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation of Germany, 129.


Note 29: A $65 fine was rumored to be the standard punishment for fraternizing. In fact, punishments were often more severe. Associated Press, "Americans Ignore Army Ban on Fraternizing as 'They Feel Sorry' for Cologne Civilians," New York Times (9 March 1945); "GI Fined, Jailed for Fraternization," Stars and Stripes, Paris ed. (27 February 1945).


Note 32: On the dramatic increase in rates of sexually transmitted diseases among American troops immediately after V-E Day, see Paul Padgett's article in Medical Department, United States Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, vol. 5, Communicable Diseases Transmitted Through Contact or by Unknown Means (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1960), 252, 255, 257, 259–2.
Note 33: Research Branch, Information and Education Division, Headquarters, ETO, "Reactions to the Non-Fraternization Policy among Troops Doing Occupation Duties in Germany" (April 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Surveys & Studies, Attitude Studies of EM, ETO, Box 1340, Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 34: Ernest Leiser to Stars and Stripes (14 March 1945), File: 250.1–1, Box 12, G1 Decimal file 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP. See also Goedde, GIs and Germans, 85; Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 176 n. 164.

Note 35: Earl Mazo, "Frauleins Bent on Sabotage are Crying Rape, Army Fears" and Associated Press, "Hello Sucker' Poster Warns Yanks of Getting Hooked on Rape Charge," Stars and Stripes, Paris ed. (19 May and 10 June 1945); Edward J. Hart, "The Order is Broken Every Hour," Sunday Express (3 June 1945), File: 250.1–10, G1 Decimal File 1944–1945, Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, RG 331 (SHAEF), NACP.

Note 36: The number of rape complaints was still high in May but began to decline once the war ended. Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 81–4.

Note 37: J. Robert Lilly recently estimated the number of rapes committed by American troops in Germany to be roughly eleven thousand over the course of about a year. Taken by Force: Rape and American GIs in Europe during World War II (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 11–12.


Note 39: Paragraph 14b of the 1928 Manual for Courts-Martial defined rape as "unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by force and without her consent. Any penetration, however slight, of a woman's genitals, is sufficient carnal knowledge, whether emission occurs or not. Mere verbal protestations and a pretense of resistance are not sufficient to show want of consent, and where a woman fails to take such measures to frustrate the execution of a man's designs as she is able to, and are called for by circumstances, the inference may be drawn that she did, in fact, consent." Quoted in United States v. Pfc. Frank B and Pfc. Samuel B in Inspector General investigation of Rape of German Women by American soldiers, File: 70, Box 12, Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943–1946, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498, NACP.

Note 40: I use only the first initial of surnames to protect the privacy of persons involved in such cases.


Note 42: Lilly, Taken by Force, 119–23; Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 83; Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 220–1; Padover, Experiment in Germany, 297–8.

1945; both in File: 58 Censorship, Box 9, Historical Division Administrative Files, 1942-June 1946, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498, NACP; Dave Burns to Stars and Stripes, Paris ed. (29 March 1945).


Note 45: Joseph Starr reported that in the Europe theater of operations, the U.S. Army received 1,301 rape complaints, tried 623 cases, and convicted 297 American soldiers of rape between January and July 1945. Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 81–2.


Note 47: Seventh Army, "Judge Advocate Section Reports, 1 December 1944–31 May 1945," quoted in Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 220.


Note 50: Goedde, GIs and Germans, 89–91.


Note 52: Special Court-Martial Orders No. 16, 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (25 June 1945), File: M, Box 8, Judge Advocate General Case Files 1942–1945, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498, NACP.


Note 54: Ibid.


Note 58: See, for example, Dana Adams Schmidt, "12,000 Troops AWOL in Paris; Thousands Join in Black Market," *New York Times* (26 January 1945).

Note 59: This censored news article written by a reporter for the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* on 5 April 1945 was enclosed with Omar N. Bradley’s 7 May 1945 memo Re: Misbehavior of Allied Troops. See also Bradley’s 2 April 1945 memo on the same subject. Exhibits C-5 and C-6, enclosed in C. H. Bonesteel, *Report of Investigation Concerning Brigadier General S. . .* (6 June 1945), unnumbered file, Box 18, Inspector General Inspection Reports 1943–1946, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498, NACP.


Note 64: Chief Military Policy Division to Theater Provost Marshal (3 October 1944) and "Let’s Look at Rape!"; both in File: 250.1 Morals & Conduct vol. 2, Box 27, Adjutant General General Correspondence 1944–1945, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498; John Scotzin Re: Lecture of a Negro Chaplain through France (28 April 1946), File: Technical Intelligence Reports, Box 265, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War on the Racial Situation in the Army, Office of the Secretary of War, RG 107; Beverly Ward file, Box 1883, Chaplains Reports and 201 Files, 1920–1950, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, RG 247; all in NACP.

Note 65: See interviews of white officers and enlisted men collected by the office of Truman Gibson Jr., Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War on the Racial Situation in the Army, File: Technical Intelligence Reports, Box 265, Office of the Secretary of War, RG 107, NACP.

Note 66: Research Branch, Information and Education Division, Headquarters, ETO, "Reactions to the Non-Fraternization Policy among Troops Doing Occupation Duties in Germany" (April 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Surveys & Studies, Attitude Studies of EM, ETO, Box 1340, Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.


Note 68: See also Willoughby, *Remaking the Conquering Heroes*, 64–9.


Note 73: War Department policy prohibited disciplinary action against an individual for contracting a sexually transmitted disease. However, failure to report an infection could be a court-martial offense.


Note 75: GA to DC of S, Re: Conduct of Troops (15 June 1944) and enclosures, File: 290, Box 52 and S. E. Senior to Corps, Division and Separate Union Commanders, Re: Conduct of Troops in Occupied Germany (15 September 1944), File: 091, Box 12; both in Adjutant General Section General Correspondence, 1940–1947, U.S. Army Commands, RG 338 (First Army), NACP.

Note 76: Starr, *Fraternization with the Germans in World War II*, 20–21; John H. Hilldring to Julius C. Holmes (12 July 1944), Decimal 250.1, Box 67, Civil Affairs Division General Records, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.

Note 77: The *New York Times* published fraternization articles on 1, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 21, 27, and 28 May; 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, and 25 June; and 6, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 28 July 1945.


Note 79: Some examples are: "$60 Fine for Fraternizing"; "Americans Ignore Army Ban on Fraternizing as 'They Feel Sorry' for Cologne Civilians"; both in *New York Times* (27 February, 9 March 1945); Joseph S. Evans Jr., "Of Course They Fraternize—It's an Old Yankee Custom," *Newsweek* 25 (9 April 1945): 56–8; "Charge Americans with Looting in Germany," *Christian Century* 62 (9 May 1945): 573.


Note 84: Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 46.

Note 85: The answer for the category "older German civilians" was considerably lower. Research Branch, Information and Education Services, Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, "Changes in Attitude of Soldiers in the European Theater Toward the Germans from April 1945 to August 1945" (September 1945), File: ETO-97, Box 1017, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel 1942–1953, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330.


Note 87: In one week, the group of 27,000 servicemen assigned to Bremen Port Command reported eighty-two new cases of sexually transmitted diseases, a rate of 160 cases per 1,000 men per year.


Note 89: Research Branch, Information and Education Division, U.S. Forces European Theater, "Attitudes of Soldiers in the European Theater Toward Germany and the Germans" (July 1945), File: ETO-85, Box 1017, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel 1942–1953, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.

Note 90: See statistics in Lilly, Taken by Force, 11–12, 117–18; Starr, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, 82–3. On the correlation between sex and vengeance, see Levin, In Search, 275–6, 279–83; Goedde, Glis and Germans, 84–5.

Note 91: Lilly, Taken by Force, 120–1.


Note 93: Research Branch, Information and Education Division, European Theater of Operations, "Reactions to the Non-Fraternization Policy Among Troops Doing Occupation Duties in Germany" (April 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Surveys & Studies, Attitude Studies of Enlisted Men, ETO, Box 1340, Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 95: Goedde, GIs and Germans, 60–61, 104–5; White, Conqueror's Road, 90–3, 144–5; Saul K. Padover, "Why Americans Like German Women," The American Mercury 63 (September 1946): 357; Stouffer et al., American Soldier, 564–5, 568–73. Research Staff Section, Information and Education, European Theater Service Forces, "Changes in Attitude of Soldiers in the European Theater toward the Germans from April 1945 to August 1945" (September 1945), File: ETO-97; Research Staff, Information and Education, European Theater Service Forces, "What the American Soldier in Germany Says about Germany and the Germans" (November 1945), File: ETO-110; both in Box 1017, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel 1942–1953, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.


Note 98: See, for example, the case of Pfc. H who was picked up by military police for "suspected fraternization." The MPs saw Pfc. H walking down the same street as two German women, but they did not see or hear him converse with the women. Pfc. H was found not guilty of the charge. Trial of Pvt. Harry H, 346th Engineer General Service Regiment (20 June 1945), File: H, Box 6, Judge Advocate General Special Court Martial Case Files 1942–1945, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498, NACP.

Note 99: Case 453, 508th Parachute Infantry (28 June 1945), File B, Box 4, Judge Advocate General Special Court Martial Case Files 1942–1945, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, RG 498, NACP.


Note 107: Army News Service, "Shave Heads of Wives Untrue to GIs, Grace Moore Urges," Stars and Stripes, Paris ed. (29 July 1945); "Faithless Wives Decried," New York Times (28 July 1945). The Stars and Stripes story was printed beneath juxtaposed photographs of (1) a German woman embracing an American soldier on a beach in Germany; and (2) American men and women drinking and dancing at the Stork Club in New York City, where, Moore asserted, too many military wives could be found "gallivanting around."

Note 108: "Disgusted and How!!! to Stars and Stripes; D. J. D. to Stars and Stripes; both in Paris ed. (30 July and 7 August 1945).

Note 109: "Mother of a Soldier in Germany" to Time 46 (1 October 1945): 12.

Note 110: See, for example, Serviceman (name withheld) to Time 46 (12 November 1945): 6.


Note 113: Wessel and Pinck, "Venereal-Disease Anxiety," 637.


Note 115: Although there are no statistics on the number of men in Germany who violated their marriage vows, surveys of enlisted men conducted in postwar Italy show that married soldiers were less likely to engage in sexual intercourse than their unmarried peers. Nevertheless about 60 percent did, as did 75 percent of unmarried soldiers, no matter whether or not they believed their American sweethearts remained "loyal." Research Branch, Information and Education Section, MTOUSA, "VD Problems of White Enlisted Men in MTOUSA" (10 September 1945) and "VD Problems of Negro
Enlisted Men in MTOUSA’ (25 September 1945), Files: MTO-69 and MTO-70, Box 1030, Entry 94, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel 1942–1953, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.

**Note 116:** Margaret Chase Smith to Henry L. Stimson (29 May 1945), Statements and Speeches vol. 3, p. 414, and news articles in Scrapbook vol. 32, pp. 107, 119, 121, 125, 129, 140, 142, 145, all in Margaret Chase Smith Collection, Northwood University.

**Note 117:** J. H. Hull to Chief of Staff, OPD Re: Movement to Europe of Dependents of Officers and Enlisted Men (18 June 1945), File: 510 1 June–30 June 1945, Box 611, G1 Decimal File, War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NACP.


CHAPTER 4
Love and the Machinery of War

In his autobiographical essays on his eight months in combat, poet Richard Hugo recalled that he volunteered for service as a B-24 bombardier hoping to overcome feelings of weakness and inadequacy. A virgin and a "sissy," he wished to feel "masterful" as a flier:

I . . . foolishly thought facing and surviving danger would give me a spiritual depth and a courageous dimension I lacked and desperately wanted. "I went hunting wild after the wildest beauty in the world." And when . . . I woke up one day, around my fifteenth mission, and realized I could be killed, things were never the same.¹

Quoting Wilfred Owens’s "Strange Meeting," Hugo characterized his desire for aerial combat as a hunt for "the wildest beauty in the world." Although he did not describe his emotions in training or on his early missions, this passage suggests that at least temporarily Hugo discovered within himself the forceful, masculine qualities he craved.

Inside heavy bombers, young men—particularly bombardiers like Hugo who dropped tons of explosives on targets below—became masters of destruction. Early in their military careers, they reveled in the power of the massive aircraft that carried them into battle, regarding the machines as extensions of themselves. With experience, however, real and imagined terrors overshadowed the pleasures of aerial combat. The targets of enemy antiaircraft gunners and fighter pilots, airmen became painfully aware of their vulnerability and dependence. Nevertheless, they continued to fly.

In Hugo’s case, desire for social acceptance trumped fear of death,² but for many airmen shame was insufficient incentive to remain in combat. In the hope of averting capture, injury, or death, airmen carried lucky charms and developed ritual behaviors. Some young men experienced a rebirth of religious faith. Others derived comfort from an inflated confidence in the abilities of the men with whom they flew and on whose skills their lives might depend. But experience undermined most airmen’s faith in luck, ritual, comrades, and perhaps even God.
Combined with the pleasures of aerial combat, fear produced an affectionate, even worshipful, attitude toward aircraft. Like other soldiers, airmen sought refuge in the arms of local women and found solace in letters and photographs from home, but as Douglas Bond, who served as director of psychiatry for the Eighth Air Force in England, noted, some men’s love of aircraft surpassed their love of women. Although they were often decorated with massive images of scantily clad women and given names like Miss Yourlovin, Flamin’ Mamie, or Hump Time, heavy bombers were not simply vehicles of pleasure or objects of erotic desire. In the words of a poem by an unknown prisoner of war, they were valiant “queens” who “revel[ed] in flight” and combat. These warrior queens were also devoted mothers who loved their crews and fought to protect them from harm. So strong was the attachment of man for machine that airmen frequently mourned the loss of loved planes and sometimes regarded mechanical failure as akin to marital infidelity.

This chapter explores how aerial combat affected individual men, relations between comrades, and attitudes toward military aircraft. It follows the men from enlistment and training into combat, focusing on how conflicts between love and fear, power and impotence, shaped their sense of themselves as men and as combatants. It examines changing relationships among men and between man and aircraft, for the powerful and potentially dangerous women who dominated airmen’s hearts and minds were not human but mechanical.

There are many reasons why young men competed for the honor of engaging in aerial combat. A highly trained and elite military organization, the Air Corps attracted many volunteers who preferred it to other branches of the military. The pay was better and promotion quicker. Furthermore, the Air Corps offered some hope of professional mobility; particularly as a pilot, a bright young man might learn skills that would prove valuable to his postwar civilian or military career. Finally, the life of an airman, although not always comfortable, was certainly less grueling than that of a foot soldier. Of course, less rational motives also played a role in a young man’s decision to volunteer for aerial combat. Some were attracted by aggressive publicity campaigns, but for many volunteers, the glamour of aerial combat did not simply derive from recruitment films or from newsreels highlighting the role of the Army Air Forces.

Many airmen had, as boys, fantasized about flying and dreamed of becoming pilots. Being accepted as Air Corps cadets was a fulfillment of their childhood fantasies. For example, the first chapter of fighter pilot Robert L. Scott Jr.’s 1943 memoir, God Is My Co-Pilot, is entitled “I Knew What I Wanted.” Scott had wanted to fly since he was a child. Ross Greening, a
medium bomber pilot, shared these longings. Recording his memories a decade after the war’s end, Greening recalled being fascinated with flight since seeing his first plane at the age of four. A photograph from three years later clearly documents the boy’s glee on his first plane ride. After graduating from college in 1936, Greening applied for pilot training at the Air Corps Flying School at Randolph Field, Texas. Less dedicated airmen reported similar longings. David Zellmer, a dancer with Martha Graham’s troupe, enlisted in the Army Air Forces soon after he received notification of his 1A draft status. “I could ‘imagine’ myself as a flier, not a soldier or sailor,” he wrote. Zellmer could still remember the view from a barnstorming plane at age twelve; afterward, he and his brother spent hours beneath their father’s desk pretending to fly in a "cockpit" fabricated from the desk, an overturned chair, and a small rug. 8

The love of flying was, perhaps, strongest among pilots but was not confined to them. Many gunners, radio operators, navigators, and bombardiers joined the Air Corps because they wished to fly. Gunners Eugene Carson and his twin brother John had been fascinated with flying since they were children. Enlisting in the Air Corps, John was assigned to a bomber crew, while Eugene, who had trained and worked as a baker, unhappily found himself back in the kitchen. Through perseverance and a forged note from his widowed mother, he finally finagled a combat assignment aboard a B-17. 9 Lyman Clark, another aerial gunner, had been president of his high school model airplane club and would have preferred pilot training, but he viewed the opportunity to become a gunner as a chance to fulfill his "childhood dream" of flying. Even though he never took control of an aircraft while in gunnery school, Clark reveled in the opportunity to soar and dive inside of AT-6 training planes. A popular poem spoke to the situation of men like Clark. Anonymously authored, "A Gunner’s Vow" began: "I wish to be a pilot./And you along with me./But if we all were pilots,/Where would aviation be?" Although disappointed, the gunner of the title concluded that a pilot was just a "chauffeur" while the gunners "do the fighting" and vowed that he and his comrades would be the "best damn gunners/That have left this station yet." This poem was obviously some consolation to Dallas Moody who was sent to gunnery school after failing to qualify for pilot training. He clipped a copy of it from his camp newspaper and sent it home to his family. Another gunner, Joseph P. Bruckler, reproduced a slightly different version of the poem in the diary he kept as a prisoner of war in Austria. 10

As fliers, young men discovered magnificence in themselves, airborne and looking down on "the poor earthworms below." In a letter to his parents, bombardier Byron Lane described flying as an "ultra-aliveness, like being king of the mountain—no one can touch you." For Moritz Thomsen, who "washed out" in pilot training, flying was the feeling that the plane "was nothing but an extension of your own unlimited potential." Moving in unison, man and aircraft broke "free of the laws of gravity" and "bored holes" in the yielding sky. This sexually charged feeling of power was common to many airmen in training and is evident in some of
the names with which airmen christened their assigned planes—Big Dick, Cock O’ the Sky, Nine Yanks and a Jerk, Purple Shaft. The boast "big dick" graced at least five Eighth Air Force bombers, as well as innumerable crew positions—spelled out or symbolized by a roll of the dice.  

In addition to feelings of mastery, young men discovered a new sense of belonging as members of a combat crew. While some airmen were sent overseas as individual combat replacements, most arrived as part of a crew. They met the men with whom they would enter combat during the final phase of training. This event has an almost magical quality in many airmen’s memoirs. Unable to recall the details of the day when he met his crewmates, bombardier Moritz Thomsen remembered an intense feeling of love for them. The ten men, he wrote, were immediately "joined in an absolutely uncritical brotherhood," but this camaraderie did not long survive their entry into combat, as Thomsen was reassigned to another crew and fear of injury and death came to overshadow brotherly love.

Less mystical but equally affectionate, aerial gunner and poet John Ciardi characterized his B-29 crew as a group of men joined by a common interest in "whiskey, women and airplanes." A large portion of Ciardi’s first diary entry is devoted to describing his comrades at a dinner party thrown by pilot Robert Cordray for the other members of the crew. After enjoying a good steak dinner and a great deal of rum, Ciardi wrote:

...[W]e all made pretty speeches to each other, decided all over again that we're the best crew in the business—which of course we are—and made vows for the future... We all shouted, loved each other very much, and got up—mostly drunk.

Unlike Thomsen, Ciardi’s loving attachment to this group of men survived combat. According to Cordray, he and the surviving members of the original crew became "life-long friends," largely through Ciardi’s efforts.

Inexperienced airmen were eager to enter the fray after many months of training. According to their contemporaries, new arrivals were easy to spot amidst veteran airmen. Bright-faced and cocksure, they viewed their more experienced comrades as "flak-happy’ or spiritless" and denigrated the fear they would soon come to know. The contempt for fear common to men who had not yet seen combat was perhaps the reason why veteran airmen often taunted new arrivals. Rummaging through the belongings of untried airmen, combat veterans would lay claim to various articles, explaining that they planned to retrieve these items when their owner was shot down and insisting that this event was inevitable. Displacing their own feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness onto the newcomers, veteran airmen also vented
their hostility toward men who did not share their fears. In most cases this practice only managed to convince new men that they would better withstand the stress of combat than those who came before them.

Untried airmen often viewed combat as a test of manhood, and they hoped to perform well. Describing a group of copilots who had recently arrived overseas and were waiting to be checked out for combat, pilot and prisoner of war John Muirhead mused: "How hard we all worked for the honor of combat; how bitter it was for any of us to fail, to wash out at any stage of our progress from neophyte cadets to the elitism of terror." He compared the aspiring combatants who stood before him to "trembling virgins waiting for the first touch on their flanks." This metaphor of combat as a loss of virginity is common to many bomber crew memoirs. Having learned to love flying, the first combat mission was, for many airmen, a sexual initiation. "If you ask a woman what emotions she felt on that special day when she lost her virginity," Donald Currier wrote, "she would probably respond: 'anticipation and apprehension, exhilaration and relief.'" Currier reported that he and his crewmates "felt the same way" on the eve of their first mission. Like many other novice airmen, they were too excited to get much sleep the night before this mission and did not need to be awakened for their first early morning briefing.

More than injury or death young men feared failure or cowardice as they prepared to enter combat, a May 1944 survey of Army Air Forces combat personnel revealed. Although John Ciardi did not confide such precombat performance anxieties to his diary, the entry describing his first raid on Tokyo reveals the pleasure he derived from his crew's calm competence:

I was cockeyed proud of the crew. Not a rattle in the bunch. The interphone clicked off the attacks easily and accurately. Every man was functioning calmly and well and it was a proud thing to know. This is a pilot's air corps, but it takes eleven men to fly a 29. And eleven men have to lose their fear to be sure of themselves before a crew can function. We functioned.

This mission to Tokyo came complete with attacks by Japanese fighter pilots and the engine troubles endemic to B-29s, but Ciardi seems to have reveled in these difficulties because they underscored his crew's courage. On that day, Ciardi was the man he imagined himself to be; undisturbed by fear, he performed his part well.

Although successfully completing his first mission might allay an airman's fear of failure and allow him to enter the ranks of combat veterans, typically it did not prepare him for the terrors to follow. To an inexperienced flier, aerial combat was "fun," "exciting," even "beautiful." That was how bombardier Moritz Thomsen described his first mission to
Navigator Ray Dunphy's account of his third combat mission conveys this excitement along with a detachment from danger characteristic of novice airmen:

Boy! oh Boy! I had a ringside seat for the bombing. Straddled my parachute and looked down through the glass. Man oh man did they smash the hell out of that target. It sure was fun to watch those bombs run up the buildings—Just like in the movies. One nazi pilot taking off ran smack into one. McKee was in formation with the 93rd and blew up over target. . . . Saw one Nazi go down in flames.

Enjoying the spectacle, Dunphy seemed unmoved by the destruction of another bomber and the death or probable capture of its crew. Commenting on a similar situation during one of his early missions, Donald Currier, also a navigator, wrote, "It didn't register in my mind at all what that fiery sight really meant in human terms."

Shielded from the grim realities of combat apparent to any foot soldier, airmen often viewed combat as a game, keeping score on the sides of their bombers. Each bomb stencil denoted a credited mission. A swastika or rising sun represented each "confirmed kill" of an enemy fighter by the crew's gunners. Other markings signified ships sunk or bridges or trains destroyed. A purple heart meant that a member of the crew had been wounded in action. Holes and patches also disclosed the combat history of a plane and its crew. According to bombardier Byron Lane, accruing battle scars was part of the game; the crew that returned to base with the most holes in their bomber was "the winner."

In the name of good sportsmanship, fliers shunned those among them who shot at enemy airmen forced to bail out of damaged aircraft. While this taboo reflected the hope that under similar circumstances one might be granted the same protection, this sense of fair play was also a symptom, in Douglas Bond's words, of airmen's "desire to keep the basic realities at a distance." Airmen "killed" planes, not fighter pilots; they bombed factories and oil fields, not civilians. If machines were their enemies and infrastructure their targets, they were not killers nor would they be killed. In fact, downed and captured airmen were often surprised and disturbed by both the hostility of enemy civilians and the damage they witnessed on the ground. Confronted by the sight of four Italian children who had been "clinging together in terror" before they died, B-26 pilot Ross Greening wrote, "I had to close my eyes." Although initially reluctant to accept his share of responsibility for such deaths, he gained a new understanding of the terrors he and his comrades had inflicted on civilians thousands of feet below.
A combination of ignorance, denial, and identification with the aircraft that carried them into combat allowed novice airmen to escape fear as well as guilt. Enshrouded in “huge, dependable, magnificent machines, bristling with machine guns, flying serenely at high altitudes, capable of destroying whole cities and any enemy fighter bold enough to come into range,” these men enjoyed a false sense of “security” and a borrowed “potency,” in the words of Norman Levy, a psychiatrist who served with the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces in the Mediterranean theater of operations. Although informed of the dangers they would face, most did not fear combat. Copilot Jesse Pitts described this mind-set: “We were eager; we were unafraid. The risk of death inebriated us like a sparkling wine.” The exhilaration of “being shot at and missed” seemed to confirm the conviction “they can’t get me.” In addition to intoxicating risk, inexperienced fliers enjoyed a new outlet for their aggressive and erotic energies, dropping tons of explosives on targets far below. Although unable to see the damage inflicted, Moritz Thomsen recalled the “sense of power and satisfaction” he experienced on his first mission as he watched bombs explode. He compared the act of releasing bombs to “the moment of ejaculation.” Another bombardier, Richard Hugo, whose combat initiation preceded his sexual initiation, described his target “open[ing] like a flower below [the plane’s] nose.”

Aerial combat triggered feelings of helplessness as well as of mastery. Anchored to crew positions within the plane’s interior by oxygen hoses, communications equipment, and the cords of their electrically heated suits, airmen were relatively immobile in heavy bombers flying at altitudes of over ten thousand feet. Portable oxygen units provided less than ten minutes of walking around time. Each member of the crew saw only a piece of the war and depended on the vigilance of his fellows for safety. This limited scope of vision and action produced unpleasant sensations of passivity and vulnerability. Although he had initially enjoyed a very sexualized satisfaction in the destructive power of the bombs he dropped, Moritz Thomsen soon felt more like a target than a combatant. “Trapped” in the Plexiglas-covered nose of the bomber, he felt helpless, “waiting for something unspeakable to be done” to him. One tail-gunner turned this sense of being a target into a grim joke when he decorated his position with a crude bull’s eye beside the words “shoot here Jerry.”

Heading toward a target, airmen experienced building tension as they prepared for combat. The crew’s gunners might be idle for hours, restlessly scanning the sky for the approach of fighters. The appearance of enemy planes after hours of apprehension often came as a relief, for shooting provided the gunners with an outlet for aggression and a release of tension. Before entering combat, bombardier Byron Lane confided to his diary that he imagined himself to be a “dealer of death,” but he soon found himself playing the role of “glorified nose gunner.” Although each bombardier was an officer trained in the use of the Norden bombsight, only the lead bombardier actually operated this complicated piece of equipment during a bomb run. The others simply released their bombs on his cue. Likewise, unless riding in the lead plane or guiding a crippled aircraft back to base, a navigator was simply a “flying
bookkeeper" who monitored the plane's course and kept the crew's mission log. However, gun turrets in the nose of the plane did allow bombardier and navigator the release of shooting at their attackers. The plane's commander and executive officer, the pilot and copilot were denied even this satisfaction. More like truck drivers in a convoy than hotshot fighter pilots, their job was to fly at a constant speed and altitude nose to tail with the other members of their squadron. A defensive measure for mutual protection, formation flying concentrated firepower but allowed little room for evasive or aggressive action when under attack by enemy fighters or antiaircraft artillery.28

Once aware of their helplessness in the face of danger, airmen lost much of their initial enthusiasm for combat. Flak from antiaircraft guns, which looked innocuous, even beautiful, to novices, was dark, evil, and terrifying when seen with experienced eyes. It crept up soundlessly from below, tearing its victims apart and leaving a "smutty black cloud" in its wake. Formation flying and fighter escorts protected airmen from attack by enemy fighter planes, but fliers could not fight against flak nor could they avoid the antiaircraft guns concentrated in and around the cities and industrial facilities they targeted. Although some men fired at flak in frustration, their only defense was the armor plating on their plane and their own body armor. Enemy attack was not the only danger airmen faced, although it was the most feared. Human error could be equally deadly. Collisions while forming or in formation took the lives of many young airmen. Mechanical failure on the runway was another danger, particularly during takeoff when the planes were full of gas and loaded with tons of bombs. Bad weather was also an enemy; while it might ground enemy fighter pilots and confuse antiaircraft gunners, low visibility made takeoffs, landings, and formation flying far more deadly. An airman's belief in his own invulnerability seldom withstood these dangers. In many cases, a growing fear replaced an imagined omnipotence.29

With experience, combat lost its game-like quality. The mission tally painted on the side of a plane came to seem less a "scoresheet" than a countdown to the day when the men would be eligible for rotation to noncombat duty in the United States. Fliers, unlike ground troops, served a set number of missions or combat hours called a tour of duty. Following the British precedent and on the advice of their own psychiatric consultants, the Eighth Air Force in England (the largest of the Army's air forces) instituted a twenty-five-mission tour of duty for heavy bomber crews in the spring of 1943. The tour of duty provided airmen with an incentive to remain in combat; if they were lucky, they might survive to go home. Heavy bomber crews assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy flew twice as many sorties but received double credit for flights over the Alps into territory usually bombed by the Eighth. In other theaters of operations, tours of duty were defined in different terms, but contemporary observers agreed that establishing such guidelines served to preserve the airmen's mental health and sustain their commitment to duty.30
Between July 1942 and July 1943, the Eighth Air Force’s first year of combat, fewer than 25 percent of airmen completed their tours of duty. Most became casualties during their first ten missions. The statistics of survival were as follows: "63% survive 5 raids; of this 63%, 69% survive 10 raids; of this 69%, 82% survive 15 raids; of this 82%, 79% survive 20 raids; of this 79%, 83% survive 25 raids." Attrition rates for the following year were only slightly less grim. Conditions improved with the introduction of fighter planes able to escort bombers from England deep into German territory. But this improvement was a mixed blessing for airmen. As danger decreased, Eighth Air Force officials increased the number of missions required of each man from twenty-five to thirty in the spring of 1944 and from thirty to thirty-five later that summer. Pacific theater bomber crews suffered lower rates of attrition. Consequently, they were required to spend more time in the air. Furthermore, personnel shortages and lack of shipping space often meant that airmen remained in the theater and in combat even after completing their official tours of duty.

Whether stationed in England, in Italy, or on a Pacific island, an airman had likely seen a comrade’s plane go down in flames once he had flown several missions. He might have witnessed the death or tended to the injuries of a crewmate. The longer a man was in combat, the more likely he had helped pack up the personal belongings of a fellow airman, now missing or dead, for shipment to his family. The empty barracks that had once housed the members of an aircrew or the bed in which a deceased comrade had slept were reminders of loss. The arrival of replacements to fill beds and quarters provided some relief from this tension, but the presence of new men also underscored the absence of old friends. Veteran airmen often resented the cocky new arrivals and seldom made friends from among the replacement crews. As B-17 copilot Truman Smith observed, "Strangers die easier." Attempting to control the pain of loss by limiting their emotional attachments, survivors withdrew even from the men they loved best, the other members of their crew.

In combat, airmen learned to love and hate the men whose actions might protect or kill them. When interviewed by psychiatrist David Wright after completing their combat tours, more than 70 percent of airmen reported that they "develop irritability and a quick flaming anger at their crew-mates, in a way entirely foreign to their usual feelings and action, as their operational tours progress." The men lashed out at each other. The monthly dances held by operational groups often occasioned fist fights. The critiques that followed air raids, Wright wrote, were "marked by the most violent and outspoken recriminations, in open meeting, of someone else's judgment and technique." Although living comrades could be attacked, taboos against speaking ill of the dead (or even speaking of them at all) made it difficult for men to acknowledge hostile feelings toward fallen comrades. Psychotherapy sessions conducted by
medical officers unearthed a wealth of repressed hostility in airmen suffering from depression. Grieving the loss of a comrade, an airman might punish himself, not because his actions had caused the death but rather because he had wished it.  

In his memoir, bombardier Moritz Thomsen recorded an appalling feeling of "triumph" when he learned that Bob Wylie, commander of the aircrew to which Thomsen had once been assigned, was dead. Intermingled with sorrow was exultation at having survived. Similar feelings of relief and satisfaction were uncovered by psychiatrists using sodium pentothal (the "truth serum" of Hollywood fame) to liberate repressed emotions. The death of a comrade might represent life to a survivor. Aerial gunner Eugene Carson described this belief: "in my mind I had the thought that they had gone down in my place while I beat the odds." Nevertheless, there was a strong identification between living and dead airmen. Empty beds and barracks were not simply symbols of loss; they were also mementos mori—reminders of one's own mortality. Gunner and poet John Ciardi wrote in his diary:

It hurts . . . to pass the bunks the boys left. Hodges, Hunt, Dreier, Nyen, Yanik. It hurts when the smiling boys go down. The smiling, and competent, and warm. The good men chance took down. . . . It hurts and it darkens to see them go. And a lot of it because it might have been any one of us, or all of us, or me.

Witnessing the death or injury of a comrade, particularly a crewmate, could trigger crippling fear. Having once believed in his invincibility, a man became equally convinced of his imminent demise. In his autobiography, novelist and B-25 bombardier Joseph Heller recounted such an event later fictionalized in Catch-22 as the recurring scene of Snowden's death. Returning from a mission over Avignon, France, Heller was called on to care for the top-turret gunner who had been wounded by flak. On the same sortie, his crew's copilot panicked, sending the plane into a steep dive; the terrified Heller believed his plane had been shot down, "like the plane on fire I had witnessed plummeting only a few minutes before." These events shattered what Heller called "my idiotic faith in my own divine invulnerability." Afterward, Heller wrote, "I was frightened on every mission . . . even certified milk runs." Like his fictional alter ego Yossarian, he became convinced "they were trying to kill me" and began bringing an extra flak suit on every mission.

In most cases fear was not linked to an isolated event; it was an unexpected emotion that crept up on an unwary airman. John Ciardi, who had been so pleased with his crew's performance on their first combat mission, was surprised to find himself awake and wracked with anxiety twelve days later, the night before his fourth mission. Having once lived up to his heroic ideal, Ciardi was disturbed to find that he could not remain "unmoved" by the possibility of his own death; he hoped that his anxiety was simply a temporary and anomalous response. But this mission did nothing to soothe his fears. It was long and stressful. While over Japan, one of the plane's four engines malfunctioned, making it a target for Japanese
fighter pilots. Once the crew had escaped attack by heading out to sea, they feared they would run out of fuel and be forced to ditch their plane in the Pacific where the chance of being rescued was distressingly low. When he finally returned to base, Ciardi thought he had "really survived something." Sometime that day he also found time to compose "Elegy for a Cove Full of Bones," a poem about his desire to escape "the vaporing coves of death." 38

The change Ciardi noted in himself was common to combat personnel. The afterglow of the first mission often suffused the next few, but after three or four, most airmen's attitudes toward combat changed dramatically. No longer cocky young men eager to join the fray, fliers with four or five bombing missions under their belts became conscious of an almost overwhelming anxiety. This anxiety was not confined to time spent in combat; even on the ground, airmen were consumed with the dangers of flying. Anticipating future perils, airmen often suffered from insomnia, especially on the night before a sortie. Others relived traumatic experiences in battle dreams. The men's alcohol and cigarette consumption increased markedly during the course of their tours. Many reported loss of appetite and long bouts of depression and despondency. 39

American servicemen generally tolerated open expressions of fear. Beginning in basic training, they were taught to consider fear a normal response to combat. Lectures, training films, and handbooks urged men, when in battle, to admit they were afraid and to continue fighting. A man suffering from incapacitating anxiety (known as "operational fatigue" in the Army Air Forces) would receive medical treatment rather than punishment. But there were limits to this permissiveness. Commanding officers were seldom as tolerant as the Army's self-help literature, 40 and other airmen were liable to charge a comrade with cowardice if he proved unable to withstand combat stress.

Flight surgeon Milton Layden recorded such a case. More than halfway through his tour of duty, a bombardier aboard a B-17 experienced difficulty breathing while flying toward a "particularly dangerous" target. Fearing he would die of asphyxiation, the airman attempted to bail out of the plane before dropping his bombs. He was restrained by the crew's navigator and only ceased his struggle when he learned that the mission had been scrubbed because of bad weather. Later that night at the officer's club, a pilot called the bombardier "yellow," saying he ought to be "kicked out" of the squadron; others present agreed and declared they never wanted to fly with him. No one defended the bombardier, and his squadron commander began making plans to "get rid" of him. Demoralized by the charge of cowardice and fearful that his symptoms would recur, the bombardier requested a transfer to noncombat duty. It was at this point that he met with Layden, who as flight surgeon was responsible for treating physical and mental disorders and for preserving squadron manpower. Layden began the session by assuring the anxious airman that he was not "yellow" and was "man enough" to complete his tour of duty. Layden also sought to evoke feelings of shame: What, he asked, will
your friends and family think of you when you return home? How will you tell them that you "quit" and left your "buddies to go on"? Presented with the choice between a manly or ignoble future, the bombardier returned to combat "with enthusiasm." Prompted by Layden, the other men of the squadron helped cement their comrade's commitment by congratulating him on his rediscovered courage. Layden's patient successfully and honorably completed his tour of duty, but if he had insisted on removal from combat, his future would have been very different. He would have remained an object of scorn to the men of his squadron, and as an officer "medically fit to fly," he might have had to submit to the further humiliation of a disciplinary hearing before his group's flying evaluation board or even court-martial proceedings.41

Charges of cowardice were often leveled not by comrades but by the airman against himself. Case studies collected by medical officers reveal that these self-accusations could be as painful as punishments meted out by the Army Air Forces. One sufferer, a B-24 navigator who succeeded in flying six combat missions before he was incapacitated by anxiety, appeared before psychiatrist Norman Levy with tears in his eyes. He did not wear his wings, because he felt he was no longer entitled to that symbol of his status as a combat flier. In the words of a similarly situated navigator, he was distressed to discover that "I'm not the guy I thought I was." Shame and loss of self-esteem typically accompanied fear. Anxious airmen worried about losing the respect of their comrades and the love of their wives and sweethearts. Such feelings played an important role in both therapeutic treatments and administrative decisions regarding the disposition of men who were no longer willing to fly. On the one hand, flight surgeons were deft at manipulating such emotions, as Milton Layden demonstrated. On the other, psychiatrists like Norman Levy interpreted the absence of guilt as an indication that a man lacked "moral fiber" or "intestinal fortitude" and should thus be punished for cowardice rather than treated for a psychiatric disorder.42

Although only 3 to 4 percent of airmen were removed from combat as a result of cowardice or anxiety, many recorded conflicts of manliness, duty, and fear. After seven weeks in combat, John Ciardi contemplated requesting a ground assignment; by then the transient anxiety that disturbed his sleep before his fourth mission had become a constant, nagging companion. "I'd frankly bow out if I knew how to," Ciardi wrote in his diary. "I could go to Col. Brannock tomorrow and say I quit and be busted down to private. But I can't let myself and won't." He was unwilling to "accept the humiliation of being a general duty KP" after enjoying the admiration bestowed on combatants, but concluded: "I'd grab at any reasonable excuse to save face." Two months later, Ciardi was able to withdraw from combat without losing face—a move he believed to have saved his life. He accepted a desk job writing citations, awards, and letters of condolence—including letters to the families of his former crewmates who died when their plane exploded over Tokyo Bay soon after Ciardi's reassignment. Aerial gunner Ralph Edwards experienced a similar conflict. The night before his twenty-seventh mission,
which he anticipated would be a "tough one," Edwards confided to his diary: "I am afraid to go up again and wish I had the nerve to admit it openly." Yet, for Edwards as for Ciardi, fear of shame trumped fear of death. Edwards remained in combat, completing his fifty-mission tour of duty even after two members of his crew were killed on mission number forty-five.\(^4^3\)

Paradoxically, admitting to fear was a courageous act. A survey of combat veterans revealed a great deal of sympathy and a strong undercurrent of admiration for airmen who withdrew from combat because they "couldn't take it." Although some (no more than 5 percent) recommended punishment, a majority of the men agreed "it might happen to anyone." Sixteen percent of officers and twenty percent of enlisted men believed that, after completing many missions, it took "more guts to quit than to go on."\(^4^4\) If asked, B-24 bombardier Richard Hugo might have secretly agreed with the latter group. Suffering from nightmares and somatic symptoms of stress, Hugo presented a surface of calm courage, pretending even to sleep while en route to a target. In an essay written decades later, Hugo juxtaposed his own show of courage, a performance intended to impress his comrades, with the real courage exhibited by Charlie Marshall, a bomber pilot who refused to fly after enduring a series of accidents. Believing he had reached his "limit," Marshall braved the censure of his peers and threats from his superior officers in order to be relieved from combat. Hugo's high regard for Marshall's resolve was retrospective. Hugo explained: "[I]t never occurred to me that I admired a man for doing what I feared to do because if I did no one would admire me."\(^4^5\)

By the time of their tenth mission, most airmen were still scared but had learned to cope with fear. Many turned to religion. Although there were certainly confirmed atheists aboard heavy bombers, the majority of airmen found strength and comfort in prayer. Ralph Edwards, for example, petitioned God for the courage to complete his tour of duty after returning from the traumatic mission on which two members of his crew were killed by enemy fire. Painfully aware of the high attrition rates among men in his squadron, Edwards's diary is filled with such prayers and with thanks to God for his survival. Flying Fortress pilot Charles Alling found himself humming "A Mighty Fortress is Our God," while flying through antiaircraft fire over a particularly dangerous target. "I felt the presence of the Lord," he wrote in his memoir, which derives its title from the hymn, "and I put myself in his hands. I had total faith." Alling's faith was seemingly confirmed; although their plane was full of holes, he and his crew returned to base unharmed.\(^4^6\)

Promising life in the immediate future as well as the hereafter, the religion of combat attracted many new converts. Pilot Philip Ardery noted a dramatic increase in church attendance among previously nonobservant airmen. Although he did not attend church regularly, Ardery began saying brief prayers during combat missions and every night before going to sleep. Jack Fisher, also a pilot, was "born again" after his sixteenth mission, when a piece a flak pierced the windshield near his head. Unharmed, Fisher became convinced that
"the hand of The Almighty, of God, was upon me" and that his life was in God’s care. A terrifying raid on the Ploesti oil refineries, likewise, inspired navigator Donald Currier to pray for the first time in his life: “God, give me my life, and I will never ask for anything else again.” The act of praying enabled Currier to transcend his fears and provided him with a lasting faith in God’s love.47

Hoping that their prayers for survival would be answered, airmen looked to their group chaplains for assurance. In addition to presiding over Sabbath services and holiday rituals, military clergymen heard confession, gave communion, and led ecumenical prayer meetings before each combat mission. Chaplains also met the planes that returned to base and attended to the injured and dead. Gerald Beck, a Franciscan friar assigned to the 389th Bombardment Group, was particularly adept at ministering to his flock’s spiritual and temporal needs. He forcefully shepherded nonobservant Catholics back to the fold and reached out to Protestants and Jews. Airmen of all faiths and of no faith sought Father Beck’s counsel and attended Catholic mass; over the course of a year, attendance increased sixfold. To bolster the men’s courage, the priest not only blessed departing crews but, until ordered to stop, also accompanied them on combat missions. Even after he was confined to the ground, Father Beck continued to offer emotional support by sleeping in the enlisted men’s barracks the night before a scheduled mission. “The superstition,” Philip Ardery wrote, “was that a crew would not be shot down as long as he was sleeping in their quarters.” Father Beck was both spiritual leader and lucky charm, and like many of the men to whom he ministered, he was also an avid gambler. However, Beck’s skill at cards and dice was likely augmented by the airmen’s reluctance to bet against their intermediary with God.48

Gambling was both a pastime and a way of life for combat airmen. Games of chance helped relieve tedium, particularly on remote air bases. Furthermore, as B-29 pilot Chester Marshall explained in his diary, playing poker and baccarat helped reduce building "tension . . . as the countdown to a successful completion of our combat tour continues.” More important, the dangers of combat unleashed an impulse to gamble, for luck as often as skill or experience seemed to determine who lived and who died. In John Ciardi’s words, “Imponderable chance became our life.” Tellingly, Ciardi’s final diary entry describes his unwillingness to volunteer for a dangerous mission. He preferred instead to cut cards and let fate determine who among the gunners would accompany their crew into combat.49

Regarding aerial combat as a gamble, fliers literally calculated their odds of survival. John Ciardi described this process: "we add our losses per mission, derive percentages, forecast future losses, compute the percentages." At "even money" or "two to one," Ciardi and his comrades could believe they might survive. The problem was that mathematical formulas could not divine who would live or die.50 Hoping to beat the odds, airmen covered their planes with good-luck symbols—four-leafed clovers, winning poker hands, horseshoes—and
developed a variety of personal and collective rituals. The ground crew chief of the B-17 *Penny Ante* began such a ritual by giving the plane’s pilot a penny before takeoff to be returned at the end of each combat mission. By the logic of this ritual, the lucky penny would protect the plane and aircrew, and the men would survive to repay the loan. According to copilot Jesse Pitts, *Penny Ante* was popularly regarded as a "lucky ship" by the men of the 524th Squadron, many of whom requested assignment to the plane on their final missions. The plane’s luck lasted through the end of the original aircrew’s tour of duty only to be shot down two months later. Pitts concluded his memoir with this final note on the power of ritual:

> On May 24, 1944, target Berlin, the *Penny Ante*’s new crew, flying their sixteenth mission, were apparently hit by fighters after bombs away. The plane appeared to explode, and six chutes were seen. It is said that the crew had not continued the custom of taking the penny and returning it.\(^5\)

Airmen’s belief in luck was roughly as strong as their faith in prayer.\(^5\) B-26 pilot Ross Greening, a survivor of James Doolittle’s daring raid on Japan, carried a lucky rabbit’s foot on every flight. Although not normally superstitious, Greening explained, "I was the same as many others: I went along with superstitious beliefs just in case there might be something to it." By the time of his twenty-seventh combat mission, however, the charm had become an emotional necessity, and its loss unnerved him: "I couldn't help thinking about the many close calls that I'd had while carrying it." Later that day, Greening was shot down and captured by Italian soldiers. Most airmen carried some form of lucky charm into combat. One bombardier never flew without a Bible and a scarf made from the parachute of a dead friend. Cosmopolitan copilot David Zellmer ritually pinned to his flight suit a small jade goddess, a gift from Martha Graham; in his pocket he carried a miniature copy of the *Bhagavad-Gita*.\(^5\) Other airmen borrowed their charms and rituals from more experienced comrades. On the advice of a veteran navigator with only two missions left to fly, bombardier Moritz Thomsen wore the same shirt on every mission; by the end of his combat tour, this shirt was caked with filth and stank of anxiety. Airmen did not launder lucky articles of clothing for fear that the luck would be washed away.\(^5\)

Airmen regarded luck as a limited quantity. They refused to fly "jinx ships," like *Bad Penny*, *Ole Black*, *Poisonality*, and *Taurus*, planes that had suffered a string of mechanical failures and accidents. Other aircraft were shunned for having survived a remarkable number of missions. The danger was that their luck had been "used up."\(^5\) Airmen had the same fears about themselves. Each combat mission brought a chance of injury, capture, and death, and whenever military officials increased the number of missions in a tour of duty, airmen unhappily recalculated the odds. Such a policy provoked this complaint from pilot Kenneth E. Booke: "One new development that has us all highly peeved, is the fact that they have raised our missions from 25 to 30. It is the same as telling a man that he has to fly until he gets shot down." Although informed that hazards had decreased since the spring of 1943 when the
twenty-five-mission tour was instituted, Booke insisted that aerial combat had become no less
dangerous. Like many others, Booke believed that he had completed his tour of duty after
flying twenty-five combat missions, the extra five were "free gratis for old Doolittle" (James
Doolittle, commander of the Eight Air Force). Airmen regarded the death of a comrade on one
of these five missions as "an unnecessary tragedy" caused by unfeeling officials and unfair
policies.\textsuperscript{56}

Having beaten the odds by completing their tours of duty, few airmen volunteered for further
combat. Those who did were considered foolish by their comrades. Perhaps resenting the
ostentatious show of courage and commitment, airmen circulated stories of men who
inevitably died while flying additional missions. Navigator Fred Rochlin's autobiographical
account of his wartime experiences in Italy includes the story of an overly ambitious bomber
pilot named Brad who continued to fly after finishing his fifty-mission tour of duty. Hoping to
be promoted to the rank of colonel, Brad was an effective and well-respected lead pilot. He
was awarded a Silver Star and other honors but did not live to make colonel. Moritz Thomsen
recounted a similar story about Bert Stiles, a B-17 copilot and author of the popular and
posthumously published memoir \textit{Serenade to the Big Bird}. Craving literary fame and wishing
to gather more "combat material" for his stories, Stiles volunteered for service as a fighter
pilot after completing his tour of duty. He died escorting bombers over Germany. The moral of
these stories was that it was dangerous to tempt fate.\textsuperscript{57}

More important than prayer or luck was confidence in crew and equipment. Most airmen
assigned to a permanent crew were loath to fly with any other.\textsuperscript{58} But, in combat, personnel
needs outweighed personal preferences. Some men were never assigned to a permanent
aircrew; most flew with several other crews in addition to their own. This was a stressful
situation for airmen who did not know if they could depend on another crew as they had
learned to depend on their own. John Ciardi, for example, was troubled to learn that pilot
Robert Cordray would be transferred to another crew and that a former copilot would take
Cordray's place. "Nothing changes until it gets worse," he commented in his diary. Although
every member of a combat crew contributed to the success of the whole, the pilot was the focus
of his fellows' hopes and fears, for, in bombardier Moritz Thomsen's words, he "held our lives
in his hands." As aircraft commander, the pilot determined whether or not a mechanical
problem or damage to the plane required the men to abort their mission and return to base.
In case of catastrophic battle damage, he was responsible for crash landing the plane, ditching
it in water, or ordering the other crewmembers to bail out.\textsuperscript{59}

Commenting on the bonds within bomber crews, psychiatrists Roy Grinker and John Spiegel
reminded their readers that airmen's attachment to machines was equally strong: "Crew
members habitually refer to each other as 'my pilot,' 'my bombardier,' 'my gunner,' and so on,
and their feeling for their plane is equally strong, since its strength and reliability are as
important as those of any human members of the crew." The popular practice of naming and decorating planes helped cement this identification between men and machine. Navigator Donald Currier explained: "When they give you an airplane and say 'this is yours,' you immediately want to personalize it—to make it distinctive. You want to christen it and put your own art work on it." Perhaps because they had not yet entered combat, Currier and his crew selected a particularly martial mascot. *Wood's Chopper*, named for pilot John Wood, featured a muscular arm bringing a bloody axe down on Hirohito's neck (Hitler's already severed head lay nearby). Designed to represent the crew's resolve to destroy their nation's enemies, this image was an assertion both of ownership and of readiness for battle. Other crews named their assigned planes after entering combat.

The words and images painted on bomber fuselages were expressions of both group cohesion and individuality. After selecting a name, the members of an aircrew would pool their money to hire a talented sign painter or mechanic. Sometimes the crew provided the painter with a photograph, cartoon, or pinup to copy. Often the artist helped choose the image, and some even created original designs. The practice of naming and decorating bombers augmented group cohesion; afterwards the men would identify themselves as the crew of a particular plane. The process of identifying as a crew and with a plane did not stop with the choice of name and art. Airmen often paid extra to have their crew's mascot painted on the backs of their leather flight jackets or flak helmets. They also painted their own names, nicknames, mascots, or the names of their sweethearts beside the positions they manned. An airman might even name his guns. Gunner George Watt, for example, debated whether or not to name the right waist guns he manned *Doran's Revenge*, in memory of a fallen comrade, but finally decided in favor of the boastful pun, *Watt's Cooking*.

The practice of naming and decorating military aircraft has attracted the attention of social and cultural historians who interpret the art as a reflection of sexual politics in the nation at large. Elaine Tyler May, for example, uses a B-29 named *Shady Lady* and decorated with a massive nude to illustrate popular fears of female sexuality as an "aggressive, destructive force." In John D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman's history of American sexuality, an aircraft named *Slick's Chick's* serves as an example of official attempts to "boost morale and encourage heterosexual fantasy in the sex-segregated military." Through a different lens, Robert Westbrook sees these painted pinups as idealized images of girls-next-door, "striking evidence" of how private obligation was mobilized for the purpose of national defense.

There is some truth to each of these interpretations. Naming and decorating practices reflected individual and group attitudes about sexuality, combat, luck, and loving commitment. The images that graced heavy bombers were predominantly female and often scantily clothed. Not simply sexually provocative, some of these imaginary women also took aggressive action. Sporting names like *Pistol Packin' Mama* and *Impatient Virgin*, they were
picted carrying firearms or dropping bombs on targets below. On the other hand, wives and sweethearts and even children, mothers, and sisters often served as inspiration for heavy bomber names and Nose Art. The B-17 Miss Prudy, for example, was named in honor of pilot Charles Alling’s beloved sister, who died of spinal meningitis just before the crew entered combat. The plane featured a portrait of a young woman, her hair blowing in the wind, superimposed over a white wing, perhaps representing Alling’s belief that his sister was “an angel on my wings.”

The feminine identification of heavy bombers went deeper than the names and images painted on their bodies. In fact, many military aircraft featured names but no other artwork, and some were not decorated at all. Furthermore, although a seductive, seminude pinup was the most popular World War II Nose Art motif, many airmen adorned their assigned planes with masculine or gender-neutral names and images. Yet even a seemingly masculine bomber, like Fearless Fosdick (named for the Dick Tracy-like character featured in the Li’l Abner cartoon strip) or Butcher Boy, was imagined to be female. Air and ground crew members consistently referred to these planes with the pronoun “she,” not “it” or “he.”

Airmen lavished these feminine machines with loving care. They were disappointed when assigned to fly another airplane into combat and apprehensive when other crews flew theirs. Radio operator Harley Tuck’s diary reveals a possessive and protective attitude toward the plane Hi Jinx. After the B-17 was damaged in combat, Tuck noted the progress of repairs in his diary. Once the plane was again ready for combat, he and the other members of his crew even debated forfeiting a two-day pass “rather . . . than let someone else let Hi Jinx get all shot up.” Less than a month later, after learning that the plane was shot down while flown by another crew, Tuck wrote: “All of us feel pretty rotten about losing that crew in Hi Jinx. She was one of the best ships on the line, nothing wrong. . . . Losing the ship is hard to take, but the real thing should be & is the loss of a crew.” Tuck mourned the loss of human friends, but as his diary entry suggests, the loss of machinery could be similarly traumatic. Philip Ardery’s memoir describes an ardent fellow pilot, Ed Fowble, whose beloved B-24 was mortally damaged in a mid-air collision. Like an anxious family member, the worried pilot awaited the decision of whether or not his plane would be repaired. He was disappointed to learn that the plane would be scrapped and sadly watched mechanics strip it for spare parts. “Every time a nose wheel tire, or a wing light, or a flight indicator was removed from his ship it cut Ed’s heart out,” Ardery wrote.

Fliers’ attachment to individual aircraft grew stronger with combat experience. “Maybe the darn things are just inanimate objects,” pilot Kenneth Booke wrote of B-17s in general and of his own Reddy Teddy II in particular, “but it is hard to believe when you fly them in this racket.” Reddy Teddy II was one of the older aircraft assigned the 407th Squadron and was experiencing engine trouble by the time of Booke’s later missions. Booke, nevertheless,
confided to his diary that he "would rather fly her than any of the new ones." With a change of engines, he was certain "she could be the best ship in the [squadron] again." A veteran of twenty-eight combat missions with two more to go, Booke was very aware of the dangers he had yet to face, but he believed that with proper care Reddy Teddy II would carry him through his tour of duty.67

To the men who flew them, heavy bombers were not simply mass-produced machines but magnificent female entities that fought to protect their crews from flak and enemy fighters. Endowing it with "spirit" and "soul," pilot John Muirhead, described a B-17 as a divine being who "would put her strength in my hands," "bear me to the end," and "give herself to my mad purpose with perfect courage and beyond all human love." Gunner William Rasmussen variously described Hell's Belle, the "battle-hardened" B-17 assigned to his crew, as a "bird of prey," a "demon," a "dragon," and an "angry tiger." Ferocious as "she" was in battle, Belle was nevertheless concerned for the safety of "her crew," making sure after every mission that "we had all survived." On the crew's final mission, Belle remained aloft long enough to enable Rasmussen to escape the confines of his Sperry ball-turret before falling to her death.68

This devotion to bombers was evident not only on airbases but also in German prison camps where many fliers, including Muirhead and Rasmussen, were incarcerated after their planes were shot down. Although food was the primary topic of conversation among hungry prisoners, "hangar flying came in a distant second," according to pilot Billy B. Blocker. Imprisoned airmen, particularly pilots, spent much of their time reliving traumatic events, daydreaming about past glories, and swapping their favorite flying stories. Among the crafts produced by prisoners of war were many elaborate models of military aircraft, portraits of bombers, and depictions of aerial combat. In "Wartime Logs" provided by the YMCA and intended as keepsakes, prisoners of war composed poetic tributes to valiant, if ill-fated, bombers. Bombardier Joel Tutt even copied down John G. Magee Jr.'s famous sonnet celebrating the joys of "High Flight."69

T. H. G. Ward, an anthropologist who was also a pilot, argued that this reverential attitude toward aircraft, characteristic of pilots even during times of peace, was a product of erotic pleasure, on the one hand, and of fear and dependence, on the other. In addition to a sense of the plane as an extension of himself, a pilot enjoyed a feeling of "one-ness" with his machine, described by Ward as moving in unison, like a "couple on a dance floor." This metaphor made clear that pilot and airplane were two separate entities sharing an intimate moment as man and woman. But a plane did not simply follow her partner's lead; she was a powerful and independent entity who demanded to be treated with loving tenderness and the appropriate respect. Otherwise, the results could be deadly. Ward saw pilots' personal rituals as evidence
of a love for and a fear of aircraft, with emphasis on the latter. But in aerial combat, the possibility of mechanical failure paled beside the dangers of enemy fire. Safe and relatively comfortable inside their planes, fliers were threatened from without.\textsuperscript{70}

Heavy bombers were the ultimate phallic mothers. Often decorating planes with women straddling or holding bombs, airmen imagined them to be both powerful and nurturing. Their dependence on the aircraft for heat and oxygen certainly heightened this confusion of machine and mother. On high altitude missions, airmen were physically attached to the interior of their bomber by oxygen masks and heated flying suits, as well as by communications equipment. So obvious was the analogy that the electrical cord connecting heated suits to sockets in the plane became known as an "umbilical cord" by the men of Philip Ardery's squadron, although its official nickname was "pigtail." Copilot David Zellmer described this dependence in his memoir. After completing eleven missions, he wrote, "I feel I'm becoming part of the plane": "I breathe only when attached to the plane's oxygen system. My heart beats only if the propellers are turning. I hear only when the radio is turned on. The plane's wings are my arms; the Automatic Pilot is my brain." To Zellmer this dependence was a threatening loss of identity,\textsuperscript{71} but other men seem to have found comfort in the womblike interiors of bomber planes. In his prisoner of war diary, navigator Eugene Halmos wrote of the day he bailed out over Germany: "I didn't want to jump, didn't want to leave the plane which suddenly seemed warm and alive—and safe—to me." Halmos's reluctance to jump was understandable in light of the capture, interrogation, and imprisonment that awaited him below, but his feeling of safety within the damaged plane was misplaced.\textsuperscript{72} The strength of the maternal metaphor is evident in the names with which some combat crews christened their planes: \textit{Our Mom, Mother of Ten, Maternity Ward} (piloted by John V. Ward), and \textit{Dear M.O.M.} (named for Marion O. McGurer, the mother of a bombardier who was severely wounded in combat).\textsuperscript{73}

Bombers were not simply protective. Like any good mother, they also were self-sacrificing. The legendary title character of air-sea-rescue officer Don Midlam's novel \textit{Flight of the Lucky Lady} was a heroic B-29 who survived damage that would have destroyed "lesser planes" in order to return her crew safely to their home base. Although mortally wounded on her final mission, the plane nevertheless "battled" to remain aloft so that her crew would have enough time to bail out.\textsuperscript{74} This conceit is partly explained by the standard procedure for bailing out while in enemy territory. The aircraft commander would steady the plane and put it on automatic pilot so that all crewmembers would have time to escape. Alive and falling slowly, airmen suspended by parachutes watched their planes crash to the ground (or, in the case of the \textit{Lucky Lady}, into the Pacific Ocean).
Although oxygen masks and electrical suits were not necessary within the pressurized and heated interior of a B-29, the maternal metaphor still resonated with some of the men who crewed these aircraft. The newest, largest, and most powerful of American military aircraft during World War II, the B-29, with its mechanical difficulties, was perhaps a less likely mother than a B-24 or the even more popular B-17. More an object of admiration than of devotion, the massive bomber was, in pilot Chester Marshall’s words, a "monstrous beauty." Decades after the end of the war in a letter to a former comrade, John Ciardi described the B-29 as "a stirring sight, even when I expected it to kill me." In his "Poem for My Twenty-Ninth Birthday," written while overseas, John Ciardi described the plane as a "metal womb," a source of murderous destruction. And yet the most famous and destructive of maternal bombers was a B-29—*Enola Gay*, named by pilot Paul W. Tibbets for his loving, supportive mother the day before he and his crew were scheduled to drop the first atom bomb on Hiroshima. The massive plane that "gave birth" to the atomic age also protected her crew, safely carrying them through the explosion and the shock waves that followed. *Enola Gay*, tail-gunner George R. Caron concluded, was "the right name for plane Number 82." Toward the end of their combat tours, airmen often suffered crises of faith, fearing that crew, plane, luck, and prayer were insufficient to ensure their survival. Although seldom as deadly as his first combat missions, the final mission of an airman’s tour of duty was regarded as a jinx. It was the only thing standing between him and the safety of home. Once on the ground fliers celebrated their good fortune. Combat crews on Saipan threw boisterous "Alive with 35" "graduation parties." In England, airmen marked the occasion by flying ahead of their formation to land with flares firing. On the ground, they were served steak dinners at a table of honor and ceremoniously awarded certificates of membership in the "Lucky Bastard Club." Signed by squadron commanders, these elaborate documents congratulated the men on having survived their combat tours, attributing their good fortune to the grace of God or the "fickle finger of Fate." Following these celebrations, the elation often faded. Psychiatrists noted that many men fell into a temporary depression after completing their tours of duty. The guilt and anxiety that haunted airmen while in combat intensified before dissipating. But once these emotions dissipated, psychiatrists observed, airmen "appeared to forget . . . the reality of the internal and external stress to which they had been subjected and came to talk about combat like novices. Once again they were strangers to fear and intolerant of it." Forgetting their fears, airmen could once again enjoy the erotic and aggressive pleasures they had known while in training and in combat, pleasures that were perhaps bolstered by the proof of invincibility provided by their having survived the dangers of flak and enemy fighters.
For some men, combat was simply an exercise in terror, but many others experienced more complicated emotions. The machinery of war mobilized their desires as well as their fears. While eager to escape danger, men like David Zellmer felt "hobbled to the ground" when relieved of combat duty. Although unwilling to fly further bombing missions, he mourned his "clipped" "combat wings" while awaiting orders to return to the United States. In combat, he had discovered an "intensity of feeling" comparable only to performing with Martha Graham's troupe. Once returned to the United States, Zellmer was disappointed by the dull earth-bound safety for which he had once longed. Removal from combat meant survival, but it was a loss of power, comradeship, and superhuman love.
Notes


**Note 2:** Ibid., 97.


**Note 4:** These are all names given to bombers whose artwork has been preserved by the American Airpower Heritage Museum. The term "hump" refers both to the act of sex and to flights over the Himalaya Mountains between India and China in the China-Burma-India theater.

**Note 5:** The B-17 was known as "queen of the sky." "Death of a B-17" in Royal D. Frey, "Poets Laureate of Stalag I," Aerospace Historian 16 (Winter 1969): 38.

**Note 6:** On responses to mechanical failure, see Bond, Love and Fear of Flying, 21–2.


**Note 9:** Eugene T. Carson, Wing Ding: Memories of a Tail Gunner (n.p.: Xlibris Corporation, 2000), 9, 37–53.


Note 12: Once in combat, however, crew assignments often shifted to accommodate squadron personnel needs. Thomsen, My Two Wars, 135–8, 174.


Note 14: Ciardi, Saipan xxiii–xxiv.


Note 18: Ciardi, Saipan, 40.

Note 19: Ibid., 37–44.

Note 20: Thomsen, My Two Wars, 17–71. See also Myers, Shot at and Missed, 48.


Note 22: Currier, Fifty Mission Crush, 74.

Note 24: Bond, Love and Fear of Flying, 79–81; Grinker and Spiegel, Men Under Stress, 43, 307; Greening, Not as Briefed. 62. See also Lane, Byron’s War, 191. See also Sherry, Rise of American Air Power, 209–11.


Note 26: The experience of medium bomber and B-29 crews differed. B-25s and B-26s were flown at lower altitudes and so were not equipped with heat or oxygen. B-29s had pressurized, heated cabins.


Note 32: Medical Department, United States Army, Neuropsychiatry in World War II, 2: 894; McManus, Deadly Sky, 299–300; Link and Coleman, Medical Support of the Army Air Forces in World War II, 661, 852–4, 941, 944; LeRoy, "Medical Service of the AAF," 422; John C. Flanagan, "Report on Survey of Aircrew Personnel in the Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth Air Forces" (29 March 1944), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Aircrew Personnel, 8th, 9th, 12th, & 15th A.F., Box 1315 and John M. Murray, "Report of Survey of the Far East Air Forces" (ca. Summer 1944), File: (730 Neuropsychiatry) Inspections, Consultants' Visits in Pacific Army Air Forces, Box 1349; both in Office of the Surgeon General World, War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.


Note 35: Thomsen, My Two Wars, 199–200, 203–4; Levy, Personality Disturbances in Combat Fliers, 16–7; Carson, Wing Ding, 119; Studs Terkel, "The Good War" (New York: Ballantine, 1985), 198.

Note 36: Ciardi, Saipan, 82–3.


Note 38: Ciardi later learned that the crew's flight engineer had miscalculated the remaining fuel and that there was plenty to get them back to base. However, while in the air, he was ignorant of the fact and anxious about his chances of survival. Ciardi, Saipan, 58–61, 93, 120–21; Cifelli, John Ciardi, 83–86; Keith Wheeler, Bombers over Japan (Chicago: Time-Life Books, 1982), 118.


Note 44: This statistical difference might reflect a discrepancy in the composition of the pool of respondents. Eighty-three percent of the enlisted men surveyed, compared to 60 percent of officers, served on heavy bomber crews. Flanagan, *Aviation Psychology Program*, 216–7.


Note 49: To save weight so that the number of incendiaries aboard each B-29 could be increased, the number of guns, ammunition, and gunners was reduced. Marshall, *Sky Giants over Japan*, 178; Ciardi, *Saipan*, 64, 103; Jackson Lears, *Something for Nothing: Luck in America* (New York: Penguin, 2003), 143–4, 219, 251; Ciardi, *Saipan*, 95, 103.

Note 51: Pitts, Return to Base, 75–6, 221–2, 237, 262. See also Marshall, Sky Giants Over Japan, 178–9; Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 104; Grinker and Spiegel, Men Under Stress, 184; Linderman, World Within War, 66–71.

Note 52: Sixty percent of veteran airmen (both officers and enlisted men) reported that "feeling that you were lucky and would not get hit" helped reduce their fear of combat. A slightly higher number of enlisted men reported deriving similar benefits from prayer. Flanagan, Aviation Psychology Program, 217. See also Stouffer, American Soldier, 2:188.

Note 53: Greening, Not as Briefed, 53–9; Bond, Love and Fear of Flying, 78, 145; Zellmer, The Spectator, 19, 26. See also Lane, Byron's War, 190.

Note 54: Thomsen, My Two Wars, 203. See also Myers, Shot at and Missed, 101; Bert Stiles, Serenade to the Big Bird, 37; Carson, Wing Ding, 111; Koger, Countdown!, 33.


Note 56: Vining, American Diaries of World War II, 296, 304; Stouffer, American Soldier, 2: 383–5; Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 104; Grinker and Spiegel, Men Under Stress, 182.


Note 58: Ninety-eight percent of airmen stationed in Europe agreed that it was "very important" or "important" to fly with the same crew. Flanagan, Aviation Psychology Program, 217; Stouffer, American Soldier, 2:348–50; Research Branch, Special Service Division, Headquarters ETOUSA, "Attitudes of Combat Crews Toward Their Flying Jobs, Promotion, and Assignment" (7 July 1944), Information and Education Division, Microfilm Copies of Card Information on Attitudes and Opinions of Military Personnel 1941–1950, Entry 91, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.

Note 59: Ciardi, Saipan, 88–9; Ciardi, "About Being Born and Surviving It," 14; Thomsen, My Two Wars, 137; Rehm, "Fifty Missions over Europe," 7; Grinker and Spiegel, Men Under Stress, 23–4.


Note 63: Nose Art is a registered trademark of the American Airpower Heritage Museum.


Note 66: 30 December 1943, 1, 5, 6 and 10 January and 7 February 1944 diary entries, Harley Tuck, diary; Ardery, *Bomber Pilot*, 68–70.


American veterans of the Pacific war still remember *Tokyo Rose*. She was the most dangerous and seductive of the enemy radio announcers who broadcast propaganda to American troops. During the war, she attracted avid listeners who passed the time in the tropics by circulating stories about what she said and speculating about who she really was. After the Japanese defeat, former servicemen reminisced about *Tokyo Rose*, and when the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) called for witnesses able to recognize her voice and to remember her words, many veterans eagerly volunteered their memories. In interviews conducted by FBI agents and in their own sworn statements, these men claimed to remember the peculiarities of her voice and delivery; they were certain that they could identify *Tokyo Rose* were they to hear her again. Many characterized her voice as "soft," "smooth," "sultry," or "sexy"; she spoke with a slight accent, or they were amazed by its lack. When asked to describe the content of *Tokyo Rose*’s radio show, some former servicemen recounted taunting tales of unfaithful wives who were dating draft-dodgers. Others remembered more ominous broadcasts. They claimed that *Tokyo Rose* "welcomed" American troops to the Pacific by predicting their movements and warning of impending attacks.

Between December 1945 and June 1949, FBI agents collected former servicemen’s stories about *Tokyo Rose* with the goal of building a treason case against Iva Toguri. Toguri was an American Nisei who had been visiting a sick aunt in Japan at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Despite her efforts to return home to the United States, Toguri was trapped as an enemy alien in Japan for the duration of the war. During that time, she supported herself by working as a typist and, after November 1943, as a popular announcer for the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. On the air, Toguri called herself "Orphan Ann," but her American listeners often referred to her (as well as to other female announcers) as *Tokyo Rose*. Toguri became known as "the one and original 'Tokyo Rose' who broadcasted from Radio Tokyo" only after she agreed to an interview with two American journalists on 1 September 1945.

The news that reporters had discovered the real *Tokyo Rose* reached the United States just weeks after the U.S. government had announced that no such woman existed. The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS), the
government agency responsible for monitoring enemy broadcasts, was the 
source of this announcement. FBIS reported that no one in its employ had ever 
heard the name Tokyo Rose broadcast over Japanese frequencies. 
Furthermore, FBIS operatives were unable to identify a probable candidate to 
fit the widely varying descriptions. The report singled out Toguri's "Orphan 
Ann" as the woman "most servicemen seem to refer to when they speak of 
Tokyo Rose" but characterized the "legends" that "piled up about 'Tokyo Rose'" as "apocryphal."4

Hello there Enemies . . . how's tricks? This is Ann of Radio Tokyo, 
and we're just going to begin our regular programme of music..news 
and the zero hour for our Friends . . . I mean, our enemies! . . . in 
Australia and the South Pacific . . . so be on your guard, and mind the children don't hear! . . . All set? . . . O.K. here's the first blow at 
your morale . . . the Boston Pops . . . playing "Strike Up the Band."5

With these words, Iva Toguri opened her segment of the popular Japanese 
radio program, "The Zero Hour," on 22 February 1944. This was a typical 
broadcast. As the announcer "Orphan Ann," Toguri welcomed her American 
listeners (whom she also called orphans) to the program by telling them to 
expect a "subtle attack" on their morale. She urged servicemen to sing along to 
sentimental songs like "The Love Parade," and then, pretending her "Orphan 
Choir" had declined the offer, she comically affected pique: "You won't alright you thankless wretches, I'll entertain myself and you go play with the mosquitoes." Later broadcasts followed the same format. Preparing her "honourable boneheads" for a "vicious assault on your morale," Toguri made humorous references to Pacific island discomforts (too many mosquitoes, not enough beer) and played "sweet" music by performers such as Rudy Vallee and His Connecticut Yankees, Victor Herbert, and Bing Crosby.6

In one broadcast, "Orphan Ann" informed her listeners that she was preparing 
to "creep up and annihilate them with my nail file" while she "lull[ed] their 
senses" with a Victor Herbert waltz, "Kiss Me Again." But Toguri's scripts and 
FBIS transcripts show no sign that she ever broadcast Japanese intelligence or 
threatened American soldiers.7 Yet American servicemen have long asserted 
they heard words that Japanese documents and American radio monitoring 
equipment did not record. Their memories, memoirs, letters, and diaries are 
the only evidence we have of such broadcasts.
The issue, then, is how to assess the historical value of this evidence. One option is to treat servicemen’s stories as factual accounts of what they actually heard. Taking that approach, Iva Toguri is the most likely candidate for the role of Tokyo Rose. Even before Toguri became the topic of sensational news stories, American soldiers and war correspondents identified Tokyo Rose as the female announcer on "The Zero Hour," and many accounts of Rose’s broadcasts were partly modeled on Toguri’s, but whereas "Ann" invited servicemen to "sit back, close your eyes, and relax" while they listened to music, Rose urged her listeners to "go back to your homes before it is too late." Yet treating soldiers’ Tokyo Rose stories as evidence of actual broadcasts would mean overlooking too many important facts (among them, that stories about Tokyo Rose predated "Orphan Ann's" November 1943 debut). Even the contention that some other woman might have broadcast the words soldiers remembered and wrongly attributed to Iva Toguri (as Toguri’s defense lawyers, and later her biographers, tried to do) requires a stretch of the historical imagination. To make this argument, one would have to disregard both FBIS’s failure to identify a real Tokyo Rose and Toguri’s long-standing identification with the moniker.

Lack of sufficient evidence to convict or absolve has always been the difficulty of assessing the case against Iva Toguri. Radio Tokyo officials burned agency records before American troops arrived in Japan. Iva Toguri retained several scripts in her possession and distributed others to American soldiers as souvenirs, but these documents do not cover her entire broadcast history. Furthermore, for all the agency’s monitoring, FBIS representatives were able to provide government lawyers with only a few clear recordings; most broadcasts were recorded on wax cylinders that were later shaved and reused.

All available documentary and recorded evidence supports the conclusion that FBIS officials were correct more than fifty years ago when they characterized Tokyo Rose as an American "invention." Like all legends, Tokyo Rose has basis in historical fact. Toguri’s "Orphan Ann" segments were sandwiched between propaganda-tinged news, skits, and commentary. However, the bare facts of Japanese broadcasts do not account for the radio personality so many servicemen talked about, wrote about, and still remember. Rather, this legend was born of emotions, like anger, alienation, and anxiety—feelings about the war, the military, and American civilians that soldiers were otherwise unable or
unwilling to acknowledge. The emotions that gave rise to *Tokyo Rose* later fueled the drive to punish Iva Toguri when she became entangled in the legend.

The most striking aspect of Iva Toguri’s 1949 treason trial was the discrepancy between what she actually broadcast and what former soldiers remembered hearing. One of the recordings presented by the prosecution as evidence of treason contained this example of propaganda, described by journalist Francis O’Gara as "sometimes insolent, sometimes almost affectionate":

Hello you fighting orphans of the Pacific. How’s tricks? This is after her weekend Annie back on the air strictly under union hours. Reception O.K.? Why, it better be because this is all request night and I’ve got a pretty nice program for my favorite little family—the wandering boneheads of the Pacific islands. The first request is made by none other than the boss and guess what. He wants Bonnie Baker in "My Resistance is Low." My, what taste you have sir, she said. (music)

By contrast, the veterans who served as ear-witnesses for the prosecution remembered far more sensational and damaging broadcasts. The day after the jury listened to the government’s recordings, former Army lieutenant Jules Sutter Jr. testified that in early September 1944 (about two weeks after the broadcast above), he heard Toguri tell Americans on Saipan that the island was "mined with high explosive[s]" and would be "blown sky high" unless U.S. forces evacuated the area within 48 hours.

On the following day, Marshall Hoot, who had commanded a rescue and patrol boat assigned to the area of the Gilbert Islands, provided the prosecution with even more damaging testimony, reportedly moving some of the women in the courtroom "close to tears." Under cross-examination by defense attorney Wayne Collins, a lawyer well known for his defense of Japanese American detainees, Hoot produced an intimate and affecting letter he had written to his wife in the first week of January 1944. Although the letter did not record the words Hoot would later attribute to Iva Toguri, it did characterize such broadcasts as demoralizing:

We have a radio now and we get Tokyo best. They have an American Jap girl who has turned down the United States for Japan. They call her Tokyo Rose and does she razz us fellows out here in the Pacific, telling how well Japan is getting along and to hear her start out you would think she was broadcasting from the U.S. and sorry we were loosing so many men and ships. It sure makes the fellows sore.
Prosecution lawyer John B. Hogan read the entire letter, including Hoot’s sentimental closing, “Honeybabies, I must lay off for today, hope I dream of you tonight as I think of you all day,” into the court record in order to establish the date on which Hoot claimed to have heard Toguri “congratulate” the commander of a naval bomber squadron “on his safe landing” in the Gilbert Islands. To this welcome, she added this warning: “you will be sorry if you don’t leave soon or now.” According to Hoot, this broadcast alerted him and his comrades to expect an attack, for in his experience, these predictions generally proved true. Hoot testified that a few days after the broadcast, the Japanese conducted a bombing raid on Abamama, killing two of his men.\(^\text{18}\)

To combat such damaging testimony, Toguri’s lawyers produced ear-witnesses of their own, former listeners who had served in the American armed forces and who characterized the “Orphan Ann” broadcasts as friendly and entertaining rather than vicious and demoralizing. Defense attorneys also attacked the credibility of the prosecution’s ear-witnesses, but in the case of Marshall Hoot, this strategy backfired. Wayne Collins charged that Hoot had altered his testimony from an earlier version of the story confided to journalist Payne Knickerbocker. Furthermore, Collins insisted that there were no casualties in the air raid Hoot described, but the Navy veteran had the last word, responding with indignation: “I beg your pardon, I ought to know. I helped bury them.”\(^\text{19}\)

Marshall Hoot proved an effective prosecution witness, but FBI records reveal that Hoot’s story changed dramatically over the course of a year. In June 1948, special agent Chester Orton reported that Hoot was "of the opinion that the woman he heard signed off the radio as Tokyo Rose." When prompted, however, Hoot did recall a Christmas Eve broadcast by an announcer who called herself "Annie," but he denied that Toguri’s was Annie’s voice. Months later in March 1949 Hoot swore that Toguri’s was the voice he had heard over Radio Tokyo, asserting, "This woman always referred to herself as Ann, Orphan Ann, or Little Orphan Annie, and I never heard her call herself Tokyo Rose."\(^\text{20}\) Despite this change, Hoot’s testimony cannot be dismissed as an outright fabrication. As demonstrated by the letter Hoot exhibited in court, it had some basis in fact. But the details of his testimony derived less from actual Radio Tokyo broadcasts than from the collective experience and shared culture of American military personnel who served in the Pacific theaters of World War II.

Tokyo Rose was an American creation, a female villain who articulated emotions the servicemen were unable or unwilling to acknowledge. Her reputed threats catalogued their fears. Her legendary prescience reflected their feelings of powerlessness. Her taunting words articulated their sexual anxieties. Her accusations against American civilians, especially women, were their own. Sexual and racial difference, however, concealed that American servicemen were the source of Rose’s pronouncements and allowed the men to evade
responsibility for their own words. The medium of radio itself facilitated the masquerade by
unleashing listeners' imaginations and by fostering, in Susan Douglas's words, a "strong
collective sensibility."21

To understand the emergence of Tokyo Rose, we must return to her birthplace in the Pacific
theaters of World War II, where leisure facilities were inadequate, time weighed heavily, and
many American servicemen listened to Radio Tokyo's English language program of
propaganda, news, and American music. These radio shows, which were sometimes broadcast
over public address systems, were a major source of amusement for soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and marines who listened to them while literally "sweating out" the time between missions or
the next Japanese move.22 This in-between time was a period of anxious anticipation,
characterized by hard work and boredom and punctuated by small-scale enemy attacks.
Combined with demands for military secrecy, it was fertile ground for speculative rumors
about future movements and impending operations.23 The omniscient radio announcer who
knew when and where the men would be going while they still awaited orders, Tokyo Rose
was an outgrowth of these rumors.

Daily life in the Pacific was full of uncertainty; soldiers lived in constant anticipation of
danger. Japanese airplanes might attack at any time of day or night. Warnings attributed to
Tokyo Rose provided the illusion of predictability. The rumor that Rose had announced an
attack gave men time to prepare for the eventuality. These stories were also emotional outlets;
they enabled servicemen to articulate their fears, if only indirectly. Such warnings, however,
provided no escape from anxiety; some men imagined dangers far more dreadful than the
ones they actually experienced.

Tokyo Rose's imagined warnings were often ominous; she voiced the servicemen's worst
fears. In February 1948, James G, a former lieutenant who had been attached to the 500th
Bombardment Group on Saipan told FBI agents that at first members of his group had
"regarded [Tokyo Rose's] program and predictions as humor"; her threats gave them an
"occasion to laugh and joke." According to Lt. G, Rose's predictions of Japanese air raids
proved so accurate that the Americans did not laugh for long; they soon became "very serious
and on edge relative to forthcoming attacks which she predicted." When she warned them
one evening to prepare for poison gas, he remembered that the men became extremely
agitated, wondering whether it would be best to await the attack in their foxholes or nearby
caves.24 A similar rumor made the rounds of the 6th Infantry Division in August 1944. It
triggered a run on gas masks among the anxious servicemen who prepared themselves for the
attack and by their actions gave further credence to the warning.25 The men must have
imagined the "horrible death" that would have resulted from such an attack.26
These threats, however, were American in origin. In regard to the Saipan rumor, FBI case files reveal that some of Lt. G’s comrades recalled similar rumors, but none substantiated his story. Furthermore, the lieutenant’s former commanding officer admitted that had he learned of the threat from Lt. G, he would probably have ignored it, for he regarded the young man as overly “excitable.” He described Lt. G as “the type of soldier who sat around in full combat equipment when Japanese troops were not within 1500 miles of the island . . . and most Army personnel . . . considered the danger negligible.” Army counterintelligence officers publicized American responsibility for the latter threat by printing an article in the 6th Infantry newspaper on the day that the attack was supposed to occur; the piece playfully chided the men for their gullibility and reminded them that it was their “duty to expose all rumors and rumor mongers.” Other than rumors like these, there is no evidence that Radio Tokyo broadcasts ever warned American soldiers to prepare for such an attack, and the Japanese military never used chemical weapons against American troops.

Rumors of impending poison gas attacks, sometimes attributed to Radio Tokyo or Tokyo Rose, proliferated throughout the Pacific and were especially prevalent in censorship reports from the summer and fall of 1944, as American troops prepared to invade the Philippine Islands. This period produced rumors reflecting servicemen’s fears; the men did not know precisely where they would be going, but they knew they would soon move into a new round of combat. Furthermore, American servicemen probably understood that poison gas was a weapon of last resort, and they certainly knew that the situation of the Japanese military was becoming more desperate. Rumors about Japanese use of poison gas floated around Pacific army bases throughout the war, but by the end of 1944 after the successful invasion of the Philippine Islands, many servicemen were better able to dismiss them. In December 1944, for example, one man advised a friend to disregard stories about Japanese chemical or German biological weapons: "Almost invariably there is no truth in them," he wrote. "So don’t worry, whatever terrible weapons the Nazis and Japs are saving for us, you may be sure that we have something twice as terrible as they do." Indeed, as this man wrote, American weapons and tactics were becoming more terrible. The Army Air Forces had already commenced bombing raids on the Japanese mainland, and American ground forces had increased their use of flame-throwers. In March 1945, fire and airpower were combined when B-29 bombers began dropping incendiaries on Tokyo and other densely populated areas of Japan. A photo reconnaissance plane named Tokyo Rose and decorated with a comic portrait of its namesake led the way. It was the first American warplane to fly over Tokyo since the Doolittle raid of 1942, and its crew’s photographs of the Japanese mainland provided the Twentieth Air Force with a map for future attacks.

As the American victory drew closer, threats attributed to Tokyo Rose began to seem more amusing than frightening. Unable to recall the poison gas threat (recounted earlier by another member of the 500th Bombardment Group), one senior officer told FBI agents that rumored
gas attacks and *Tokyo Rose* broadcasts were "treated as joke[s]." His diary from late fall 1944 included sardonic commentary on American victories vociferously denied by *Tokyo Rose*. American servicemen delighted in stories of attacks that never happened and ships that remained afloat even after *Rose* announced that they would be or had been sunk. These tales were funny because the expansive claims and explosive threats were so obviously empty:

> Tokyo Rose sure is a laugh. We get a big kick out of listening to her. If we would believe all she tells us over the radio we never would win this war. But that program sure is the laughing thing of our army. I wonder what she will say when we walk right into Tokyo?33

On 7 August 1945, the day after an American B-29 dropped the first atom bomb on Hiroshima, Navy officials got in on the joke, issuing a mock citation that commended *Tokyo Rose* for "bring[ing] laughter and entertainment to" American troops in the Pacific.34

A peculiar affection animated many servicemen's accounts of *Tokyo Rose*. Her purported pronouncements were, according to one former Army counterintelligence officer, "an unending source of satisfaction" to American soldiers who served in the Pacific. "Thousands of letters went home from the troops telling of the girl's all-knowing, all-seeing powers," Gen. Elliot Thorpe wrote in his memoir, "and no matter how small a unit each soldier would stoutly maintain his unit had been specifically mentioned on Radio Tokyo."35 Servicemen who feared that they had been "forgotten" relished stories of the time when *Tokyo Rose* singled out their unit for special attention. By welcoming American units to the area and informing them of Japanese interest in their plans, she gave them a sense of importance, compensating for the seeming indifference of American civilians.

Servicemen took pride in the reputed recognition of *Tokyo Rose*. During the war, they wrote home about it and marked the occasion with notations in their diaries. Years later, many former servicemen recalled the time when *Tokyo Rose* talked about their unit. In December 1947, one former Seabee contacted the FBI with the story of how *Tokyo Rose* welcomed the 100th Naval Construction Battalion to the Pacific on 10 February 1944, nine days after the battalion landed in the Marshall Islands and eight days before that landing was made public. In between musical selections, she had introduced herself to the men: "This is Tokyo Rose calling the 100th Seabee Unit in the Majuro Islands," and asked, "How do you boys like our coco[nuts]?" She told the men that their wives were unfaithful and promised a Japanese air raid in the very near future. Despite the imaginary threat, the Seabees were not attacked at this time, although two Japanese planes were spotted flying over the island while an airstrip was under construction.36 In this case, *Tokyo Rose's* alleged broadcast was probably more
comforting than threatening, assuring the Seabees that they made a noticeable contribution to
the American war effort—an important assurance for the many men who felt their work to be
invisible and their suffering futile. 37

Stories of Tokyo Rose provided American servicemen with the opportunity to boast of their
military prowess. Adopting her imagined insult as a badge of honor, members of the 41st
Infantry Division proclaimed themselves "the Butchers," and a medical officer noted, "The
favorite broadcast heard by our troops comes from Tokyo. The Division had more publicity
from Tokyo than the United States. The Japs called us the '41st Division Butchers' and we
were proud of that name." According to George S. Andrew Jr. who served with the 41st
Division, Rose was quick to recognize the division's fighting prowess. She "indirectly
conceded" their success by calling them "the Butchers" early in the war, while American
civilians did not seem to notice their abilities or sacrifices until late February 1945 when "the
Butchers" were dubbed the "Jungleers" by the American press. 38 Other units also claimed
the "Butchers," 39 and years later many veterans recalled and took pride in the epithet. 40

Tales of Tokyo Rose provided soldiers with the opportunity to valorize themselves and to
criticize American civilians. In the course of their narratives, servicemen often attested to a
renewed sense of commitment. Her words, designed to frighten and demoralize, could have
the opposite effect. Yet the martial enthusiasm inspired by Tokyo Rose was marked by traces
of doubt. Although servicemen could embrace her insults and discount her threats, they were
unable to ignore her intimations that American civilians had betrayed them, because her
words were their own. The distrust she was accused of having fostered between soldier and
civilian had in fact originated with American servicemen and found outlet in their stories of
Tokyo Rose.

Along with insults, threats, and predictions, Tokyo Rose taunted American servicemen with
news from home. According to soldiers, she told them that while they were stuck out in the
jungle with only the mosquitoes for company, civilians were living well and having fun
without a thought for the soldiers. Civilian men were on strike (thus depriving the soldiers of
necessary war materiel), and women (particularly soldiers' wives and girlfriends) were
enjoying newfound sexual freedom by dating wealthy, malingering war workers. One
serviceman wrote that he had heard Tokyo Rose announce: "But that girl back home isn't
waiting for you. She's out drinking and dancing with some 4F who's rolling in easy money.
They are probably eating some nice thick steaks in some air conditioned café. But you won't
get any steaks for a long time out here." She voiced servicemen's complaints about the heat
and the food as well as the strong feeling that American civilians did not "know or . . . care
that a war is going on." 41
Tokyo Rose became the sultry, insinuating voice of civilian conscience in a 1945 war bond film that depicted American marines listening to the radio just before heading off to invade the island of Iwo Jima. The Treasury Department's Tokyo Rose made the sort of accusations often leveled against civilians by soldiers: that they were selfishly striking or frivolously spending their money instead of investing in the war effort. Civilian indifference to the war created the shortages that were ultimately responsible for deprivation and death in the Pacific.42

The Treasury Department's Tokyo Rose called herself the "voice of truth," and in this, she resembled the soldiers' Rose who told "mostly lies" but also some important and unpleasant truths.44 In the words of one paratrooper:

I've heard several of these propaganda stories from the Japs and Germans. They broadcast over the radio that our girls and wives back home are unfaithful. Most of its true too, but when soldiers hear it they go all to pieces. The war, as far as they are concerned is over for them.45

Although there is no evidence that Iva Toguri made broadcasts of this sort, female infidelity was certainly a popular Japanese propaganda theme. The colorful leaflets air-dropped on Allied servicemen during the war often featured lurid pictures of partially dressed women leaning against well-dressed men; the text printed beside these images indicated that the wives and girlfriends of Allied soldiers were frolicking with slackers "behind your back."46 However, this theme's resonance with and elaboration by servicemen cannot be explained away as the result of a successful marketing strategy. Japanese propaganda was less a source of concern than a vehicle through which soldiers, like this infantryman, could voice their doubts:

I get a kick out of the broadcast from Japan. Every day they feed us a lot of bull but a lot of it is the truth. At Hollandia they told us to clear out in twenty four hours or they would bomb us out. Then at Biak they said no one would get out alive. They just about spoke the truth. Then they always play some good jive tunes to cheer us up and end up by saying, "Wonder who is out with your wife about this time?" It sort of gets a guy to wondering.47

According to legend, Tokyo Rose’s sexual taunts could drive men to insanity, illness, and even death. One former soldier contacted the DoJ in 1949 with an offer to testify against Toguri. He claimed that she had singled out his buddy and killed him with her words. She told the young man that his wife was unfaithful, and as a result, this soldier lost his nerve, "jumped out of his foxhole," and "was immediately mowed down by Japanese gunfire."48 But American servicemen did not need Japanese propagandists to remind them of these fears.
In 1943, real or imagined "unfaithfulness of wife" rated high on the list of cases commonly seen by Red Cross social workers in Fiji. A medical department report for the same island in 1944 noted that by contrast to Tokyo Rose, whose broadcasts were consistently amusing, mail from home was often "depressive, especially when the men learn that their girl friends were running around or their wives stepping out." Soldiers' letters communicate their anger and despair:

> When most of us return home we won't have our girl friends or wives there to greet us. You probably see what's going on with the women running around. It's very cheap on their part. God almighty don't they have any respect for us? We are fighting for freedom so we can live a happy life with our families. Can't anything be done about what's going on back home?

Some servicemen blamed unfaithful wives and sweethearts for the high rate of suicide and mental disorders among troops in the Pacific. Particularly during the later stages of the war, their letters contained many violent expressions of hostility toward civilians, much of it directed at wives suspected of infidelity, usually in the company of 4-F boyfriends. Worries about unfaithful wives and predatory 4-Fs were common to soldiers in all theaters of operations, but in the Pacific, many blamed Tokyo Rose for fostering this anxiety.

Rose's reputation for wrongly accusing American women of infidelity became more pronounced in the postwar period. During the war, she was best known for predicting movements and attacks. But when the fighting was over and the difficult process of veterans' readjustment had begun, hindsight made her slander of American women more strident. The accusation that Tokyo Rose preyed on soldiers' fears of marital infidelity appeared more regularly in FBI interviews and postwar news features than they had in earlier accounts. These later stories allowed their tellers to repudiate, sometimes violently, earlier suspicions by attributing them to Tokyo Rose. When the members of an Ohio American Legion post requested clemency for Iva Toguri in 1956, a Massachusetts post quickly and unanimously denounced the plea, demanding revocation of the other post's charter. The Massachusetts veterans claimed that forgiving Toguri and reinstating her citizenship would equate her with (or even elevate her above) those American women who had (despite doubts fostered by the treacherous Tokyo Rose) remained faithful to the soldiers:

> [Tokyo Rose] made an effort, unsuccessful though it was, . . . to destroy in the still formative minds of these young men, not only the faith they had in the principles of their country, in their leaders and in their way of life, but she attempted to destroy the faith and love they felt so deeply for their loved ones at home, their wives, sweethearts, sisters, and mothers. Yes comrades, . . . turn to your wife and tell her that you recommend heroine-worship for the famous Tokyo Rose, the same wartime "Rose" who, in her broadcasts, quite often in your hearing, accused her and all the wives and sweethearts like her, of unfaithfulness
and moral laxity at home. These same wives and sweethearts who were spending all their spare time in prayer for your safety, or in efforts to make your lot an easier one if possible.\textsuperscript{54}

By insisting on the difference between American women and \textit{Tokyo Rose} (and by ensuring that Iva Toguri would not regain her American citizenship), former servicemen could disavow their own distrust. But during the war, the notorious announcer was not so different from other women.

Taunting, female, and unreal, \textit{Tokyo Rose} resembled the women soldiers left behind, for wartime separation bred suspicion and estrangement between the sexes.\textsuperscript{55} During the war, \textit{Tokyo Rose} was defined by femininity more than race and nationality. Although Americans often pictured her as a seductively oriental woman, the very white Amelia Earhart was also a prime candidate for the role.\textsuperscript{56} Most Japanese radio announcers were male, but "Tokyo Tony" lacked the resonance of \textit{Tokyo Rose}, Madame Tojo, or Miss Tokio.\textsuperscript{57} Like the alluring and horrifying images of women that have historically embodied men’s fear of castration, a seductive female voice best articulated servicemen’s anxieties.\textsuperscript{58} Representing both sexual danger and difference, \textit{Tokyo Rose} enabled men to acknowledge, displace, and later repudiate wartime fears of emasculation.

Transferring this fear onto \textit{Tokyo Rose}, American servicemen blamed her for the widespread rumor that Atabrine, the antimalarial drug used by the American armed forces in the Pacific, would make men sterile or impotent. According to her accusers, \textit{Tokyo Rose} urged the men to refuse to take their daily dose of the drug, thus convincing them to disobey orders, ruin their health, and endanger the American war effort. In 1948, Walter Winchell published an elaborate version of this story in the form of an angry letter to Toguri (addressed as "Rosie") from newspaper columnist Frank Farrell. Farrell, who had served as an officer with the First Marine Division, purported to quote a broadcast to marines on Guadalcanal (months before Toguri began her Radio Tokyo broadcasts in November 1943):

\begin{quote}
You poor little Marines, I wish you could spend the night with me. I am a little Japanese pin-up girl. But it wouldn't be any use. Your officers won't tell you because they want you to take these atabrine pills every day. . . .

Your officers don't dare tell you—but I will—that when you swallow those bitter little pills, they will not only turn you yellow for the rest of your life, but they will also prevent you from ever being able to make love again.
\end{quote}

Farrell attributed to \textit{Tokyo Rose} the high incidence of self-inflicted casualties as well as the "shameful" necessity of imposing an Atabrine discipline among the marines on Guadalcanal. Medical and intelligence officers likewise blamed \textit{Tokyo Rose} for this misinformation, but
even assigning the blame to an enemy agent did not check the spread rumors about Atabrine. They circulated among the troops throughout the war despite regular malaria education lectures.\textsuperscript{59}

Soldiers feared they had been sexually impaired and would remain so even after the war’s end. One lieutenant, who was later reprimanded for his letter, confided his anxieties in a letter to friends: "[T]hey claim [Atabrine pills] make you sterile for about 9 to 12 mos. after you stop taking them. And if a woman does catch it may disform the child. So now I [know] I won’t have any children for quite a spell after I get home."\textsuperscript{60} This lieutenant, like many of his comrades, foresaw a future of sterility, impotence, and possible internment, purportedly proposed and publicly denied by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Roosevelt was rumored to advocate the temporary internment of all men who had served in the Pacific on their return to the States. Depending on the teller, the purpose of internment was to cure the men of tropical diseases or wartime brutality and to protect civilians from the same.\textsuperscript{61} The men who circulated these rumors feared that military service had rendered them physically and psychologically unfit to return to their homes and families. Despite vigorous efforts to assure servicemen that Atabrine was harmless, medical and intelligence officers were unable to calm servicemen’s fears.

A drug that turned white skin yellow and whose other side effects were unknown,\textsuperscript{62} Atabrine heightened servicemen’s sense of exile from "civilization" and their estrangement from national goals. White men feared loss of status as much as the loss of their health; their yellow skin underscored the lack of difference between them and the island natives who lived in villages nearby most military bases. African American servicemen were even more likely than their white counterparts to believe that Atabrine endangered their reproductive health; institutional racism had cemented their distrust of the Army orders.\textsuperscript{63} Both black and white soldiers thought that their personal well-being was of little concern to the American military.

As months and years passed by with little hope of rotation, many servicemen came to see the Army as their enemy. Among American soldiers, the "general consensus" was that instead of fighting for their country, men were "fighting to get out of the Army and to get back home." Both widespread resistance to the administration of Atabrine and the resulting epidemic of malaria demonstrated a strong shared desire to evade military service. Some men tried to catch malaria, because they hoped for a discharge or transfer. Once hospitalized, patients often prolonged their stay by secretly spitting out the Atabrine pills they were required to swallow.\textsuperscript{64} Men commonly feared the effects of malaria as much as they did Atabrine,\textsuperscript{65} but many sought (consciously or not) to catch the disease, because they could see no other way out of the military. Atabrine discipline and policies prohibiting medical discharge for malaria would later block this avenue of escape. Under this discipline, each soldier’s canteen cup would be filled with no more than half an inch of water by an enlisted man assigned to that
duty. Carrying the cup in his left hand, the soldier would proceed to the Atabrine table, careful to keep three feet between himself and the next man. Another enlisted man would place the Atabrine pill in the open palm of the soldier's right hand, and without closing his hand, the soldier was required to face the supervising officer who would watch him put the pill in his mouth, finish the cup of water, and place the cup face down on the table.66

As the difficulties of administering Atabrine demonstrated, many American soldiers in the Pacific shared a lack of faith in officers, training, and national ideology. These feelings of alienation found an outlet in the creation of Tokyo Rose, the radio broadcaster who articulated the emotions servicemen did not wish to acknowledge. In the guise of reporting her words, soldiers accused civilians of indifference; they charged women with betrayal; and they aired the suspicion that Army superiors had emasculated them. This act of wartime ventriloquism served to externalize the breaches between American soldiers and civilians, officers and enlisted men, and men and women, but it depended on the belief that Tokyo Rose was a real woman and that she was responsible for the statements attributed to her.

Once the war ended, this fiction became difficult to maintain. American journalists quickly identified Iva Toguri as Tokyo Rose, and, initially at least, she proved willing to play the part. For the promised fee of $2,000, she agreed to an exclusive interview with reporters Clark Lee and Harry Brundidge, signing their 1 September 1945 contract "Iva Ikuko Toguri (Tokyo Rose)." Lee and Brundidge got their interview, but Toguri never received her pay; Brundidge’s editor refused to cover the high cost of the exclusive. Learning of the interview, Sgt. Dale Kramer, a reporter for Yank magazine, convinced Toguri to call a press conference, and on 4 September 1945, she shared her story with journalists gathered at a Yokohama hotel. Toguri informed her audience that she was only one of several English-language female broadcasters employed by Radio Tokyo, and she denied accusing soldiers' sweethearts of infidelity and taunting the men with their "forgotten" status. "I didn't think I was doing anything disloyal to America," Toguri told reporters, but her professions of innocence were unconvincing to those in attendance. Already there was talk of a treason trial,67 but in September 1945, Toguri's fate was unclear. Detained and interrogated by Army counterintelligence officers after her press conference, she was quickly released and became a minor celebrity in occupied Japan. The 15 September issue of the Marine Corps newspaper The Chevron hailed Toguri as "the best morale builder we had" and claimed that Pacific war veterans were forming a "Tokyo Rose Club."68 Toguri was slated to star in Army and Navy newsreels and dogged by Army autograph hounds. She obliged her fans by signing her name Iva Toguri and "Tokyo Rose"; these autographs would later serve as evidence against her.69

A month later in mid-October, Toguri was arrested. She remained in prison for more than a year, although no charges were filed. During that time Army intelligence officers in Japan investigated Toguri's activities as an employee of Radio Tokyo. They interviewed her former
colleagues and examined all available radio scripts. The investigating officers found that while American soldiers applied the name *Tokyo Rose* to Toguri (among others), "there is no evidence that she ever broadcast greetings to units by name and location, or predicted military movements or attacks indicating access to secret military information and plans, etc, [as] the Tokyo Rose of legend and rumor is reported to have done." Toguri's broadcasts "had little, if any, of the [demoralizing] effect intended" by her Japanese employers and did not violate any military law. Nevertheless, if civilian officials chose to pursue a case against Toguri, her broadcasts for Radio Tokyo could be construed as treasonous or as violations of the Espionage Act of 1917.70

Meanwhile in the United States, DoJ officials conducted their own investigation of Toguri's wartime activities. From fall 1945 through summer 1946, FBI special agents interviewed FBIS officials, journalists, Toguri's friends and acquaintances, and a wide range of military personnel.71 Based on these interviews and an analysis of available scripts and recordings, Nathan T. Elliff, chief of the DoJ's Internal Security Section, concluded that prosecution for treason was unwarranted. Toguri's broadcasts, he reported, "contained nothing whatever of propaganda, troop movements or any apparent attempts to break down the morale of the American forces." Months later he reiterated this assessment. Although employed by Japanese propagandists, Toguri's broadcasts were "innocuous and could not be considered giving aid and comfort to the enemy." Assistant Attorney General Theron Caudle concurred with Elliff's assessment of the case; he recommended to the attorney general that the case be closed, "subject, of course, to being reopened in the event more information is received at a later date."72 Toguri was finally freed from prison on 25 October 1946, but she would soon be jailed again.

Army officials feared that Toguri's release might result in a flood negative publicity,73 but the response bordered on indifferent. The story merited only a bland wire service story buried on a back page of the *New York Times*.74 It did not even merit a mention in *Time* or *Newsweek*. Toguri's attempt to reestablish American citizenship in 1947, however, was big news. It provoked angry protests from former servicemen and civilians intent on preventing her, and the troubling associations attached to her, from ever returning home.

The day Assistant Attorney General T. Vincent Quinn informed state department officials that the DoJ had "no objection" to issuing Toguri a U.S. passport,75 her situation changed. That same day, 24 October 1947, James F. O'Neil, National Commander of the American Legion, publicly called on the U.S. government not simply to prevent Toguri's return to the United States but to charge her with treason. "By her treasonable attempts to discomfort and demoralize American fighting forces, this woman renounced her citizenship in spirit if not in fact," he declared. "It is unthinkable that she should be accorded a haven by the government whose extinction she sought during the war." A treason conviction, he argued, would prevent

These pleas provoked concerned citizens and members of Congress to contact DoJ officials in order to communicate their displeasure. One message written on a newspaper photograph of Toguri simply read: "No! This worse than poisonous snake cannot claim U.S. as her home." Another indignant citizen insisted that allowing Toguri to return to the United States would be tantamount to "selling out the brave boys who gave their lives in the late wars." Many others agreed, charging Toguri with responsibility for servicemen's sufferings and even their deaths. Veterans' groups and California nativists added their voices to the protest, petitioning government officials to prevent Toguri's return.

Bowing to public pressure and hoping to appease Walter Winchell, the DoJ publicly reopened the case against Iva Toguri on December 3, less than a week after Winchell broadcast Mrs. Copeland's letter. The following day, James Carter, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, met with Winchell, who, according to Carter, was pleased with the news but was disappointed that he was not publicly credited with spurring the DoJ to act. Carter, who was accompanied by his predecessor Charles Carr, tried to convince Winchell to tone down his attack on Toguri, explaining that the case against her was weak. Carr told Winchell that as United States Attorney he had received letters from "GIs all over the world, criticizing [him] for his announced intention of prosecuting 'Tokyo Rose' and claiming that the 'Tokyo Rose' broadcast[s] . . . were morale builders." Winchell replied that Carr's correspondents were "probably communists" but conceded that many of Toguri's broadcasts were "innocuous." He agreed with Carter that "prosecution without a proper case" would be worse than letting the matter drop. Nevertheless, Winchell continued his attacks on Tokyo Rose, goading the government to gather more evidence against Toguri and other traitors. He would later compare Toguri's purported broadcasts to statements by Paul Robeson, better known to Winchell fans for his communist beliefs than for his musical and theatrical accomplishments.

In preparing a case against Toguri, FBI special agents interviewed veterans from across the nation, despite concerns that ear-witness accounts were of limited evidentiary value. The problem was that few of the men were previously acquainted with Toguri, and none told the same story. Most of the veterans' Tokyo Rose stories also failed to conform to the realities of Radio Tokyo broadcasts. Furthermore, many of those interviewed would not admit to
having been demoralized. Some even claimed that *Tokyo Rose* was an inadvertent morale builder; her show was entertaining and the propaganda ineffective. When pressed one ear-witness admitted that "weaker soldiers" might have been affected but insisted that most servicemen "got a big kick out of the broadcasts and thought they were a big joke." Yet veteran ear-witnesses contributed a great deal to the government’s credibility. Without the testimony of former soldiers, the prosecution would have depended on the statements of Toguri’s former colleagues, both Japanese military officials and Nisei collaborators, who, unlike Toguri, abandoned their American citizenship. By contrast, the most important witnesses for the defense were three former Allied prisoners of war who testified that they had been forced to assist Japanese propaganda efforts at Radio Tokyo. These men insisted that Toguri was a loyal American who, like themselves, broadcast for the enemy only under duress and without the intent of betraying her country.

Although the case against Toguri was weak, the government won an indictment in October 1948. Special Assistant Attorney General Tom DeWolfe, a veteran of radio treason prosecutions, reported that some of the grand jurors were skeptical of the government’s case. Complaining “it was necessary for me to practically make a fourth of July speech in order to obtain an indictment,” DeWolfe urged the DoJ to shore up the case by conducting further investigation in "the Orient." But the DoJ’s detective work in Japan created new problems for DeWolfe. Soon after the government won its indictment, witness Hirom Yagi admitted that his grand jury testimony was perjured. Harry Brundidge, who with Clark Lee had broken the *Tokyo Rose* story in 1945, had approached Yagi in the spring of 1948, promising him a free trip to the United States. All Yagi had to do was testify that while visiting Radio Tokyo, he had witnessed Iva Toguri broadcast demoralizing statements, such as "Soldiers, your wives are out with the war workers." Because a treason conviction requires two witnesses to the same overt act, Brundidge urged Yagi tried to recruit a friend to corroborate the story. Toshikatsu Kodaira, however, refused to give false testimony and later exposed the scheme. When confronted with the evidence, Brundidge denied the allegations, but Assistant Attorney General Alexander Campbell was unconvinced. However, Campbell advised against charging Brundidge with "subornation of perjury," because it would "completely destroy any chance of a conviction in [Toguri’s] case." Brundidge continued to assist the DoJ but would be disappointed when he was not called as a witness against Toguri.

Ultimately the government’s case depended on perjured testimony. Kenkichi Oki and George Mitsushio, two of Toguri’s former Radio Tokyo superiors, both swore they had seen and heard her broadcast this statement during the Battle of Leyte Gulf: "Now you fellows have lost all your ships. You really are orphans of the Pacific. How do you think you will get home?" The two men later recanted their testimony, claiming they had been compelled to make false statements.
For several days in September 1949, it looked as though even the perjured evidence was insufficient to convict. On the second day of deliberations, jury foreman John Mann attempted to call a hung jury. The jurors were divided nine to convict and three to acquit until day four, when the three holdouts came to the conclusion that Judge Michael Roche’s instructions left them no alternative but to vote with the majority. Iva Toguri was found guilty of one of the eight overt acts of treason with which she was charged—that of broadcasting from Tokyo "concerning the loss of ships.” After he delivered the verdict, Mann stated to reporters that he would have preferred to acquit. Others on the jury shared Mann’s concern that the “prosecution did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” and would later agree to meet with Toguri’s attorneys in an effort to overturn the verdict.

Despite jurors’ ambivalence, their decision to convict dispelled any doubts about the veracity of soldiers’ stories that the trial might have raised. Banner headlines reading “Tokyo Rose Guilty” made it easy for Americans to believe that a real woman had broadcast the taunts and threats routinely attributed to Tokyo Rose—in other words, that Pacific area disaffection had been fomented by Japanese propagandists rather than generated by American soldiers. The verdict at once affirmed wartime suspicions of Japanese-American loyalty and fulfilled the Cold War imperative to identify and punish homegrown traitors. Fined $10,000, sentenced to ten years confinement, and deprived of her citizenship, Toguri was threatened with deportation upon release from prison in 1956. Although allowed to continue living in the United States, she remained a stateless person until pardoned by President Gerald Ford in 1977.

By the mid-1970s, excesses had discredited the search for internal subversion, and many Americans had come to view the internment and relocation Japanese Americans as a blot on the nation’s honor. In 1974, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) took up Iva Toguri’s case as part of a campaign to rectify wartime injustices that included the rescission of Executive Order 9066 and reparations for detainees. Asserting that Toguri was the “victim of a legend” and wartime racism, the JACL urged President Ford to pardon her and restore her citizenship. The pardon campaign drew a great deal of support from the popular press, political office holders (particularly from California), and civic and veterans’ organizations. The national board of the American Veterans Committee came out in support of Toguri, along with three VFW posts and the 41st Infantry Division Association.

To the chagrin of Toguri’s JACL supporters, the American news media failed to distinguish between legend and reality when reporting her story. Even sympathetic stories tended to reinforce the Tokyo Rose legend. Although he later quoted from actual scripts, English professor and World War II veteran John Leggett opened his article on Iva Toguri with a description of entertaining and wholly imaginary broadcasts about lost ships and unfaithful wives. One member of the 41st Infantry Division put a positive spin on Rose’s legendary
threats in a letter to the *Jungleer*: "I can remember how on two different occasions Tokyo Rose warned us of an air attack at Oro Bay. . . . I could be one of the lives she saved." Another 41ster insisted that *Tokyo Rose*’s broadcasts improved division morale and cohesion when she referred to them as "a mighty enemy," probably referring to the proudly remembered rumor that she called them "the Butchers."³⁹

More than sixty years after the end of World War II and thirty years since Toguri’s pardon, the *Tokyo Rose* legend remains intact. World War II veterans still believe they heard words and voices never broadcast by Radio Tokyo, and their memories have become our history. John Costello’s *Pacific War*, published in 1981, four years after the pardon, featured a "sinister" and "taunting" *Tokyo Rose* whom he identified as Iva Toguri. More recently, Eric Bergerud, while admitting that some of the stories might have been "exaggerated," nevertheless insisted that "*[Tokyo] Rose did personalize many messages to specific units, which both amused and unsettled the soldiers involved."³⁴ Many other historians have perpetuated this distortion.³⁵

The persistence of the *Tokyo Rose* legend is a symptom of a widespread desire to believe in a "greatest generation." By disguising unpatriotic impulses, this legend enables the construction of a heroic narrative of suffering, sacrifice, and unswerving commitment. But Rose’s reputed pronouncements also betray what they were designed to conceal, alerting careful listeners to the emotional conflicts that characterized military service in the Pacific.
Notes

Note 1: I italicize Tokyo Rose to denote that the name refers to a legendary woman rather than to a real radio announcer.


Note 3: Contract signed by journalist Harry T. Brundidge and "Iva Ikuko Toguri (Tokyo Rose),” 1 September 1945. Toguri agreed to give him exclusive rights to her story for the fee of $2,000. A copy of this contract was Exhibit III attached to 1 May 1946 letter transmitting Iva Toguri’s case files to the DoJ, File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, Records of the Army Investigative Records Repository (IRR Files), Army Staff, RG 319, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).


Note 5: Exhibit XIX, Transmittal of Case Record, Toguri, Ikuko (Iva), (1 May 1946), File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP. Attachment to Summary of Treason Case (23 February 1948), Tokyo Rose file, FBI. This material is now available at NACP.


Note 7: Ibid. See also “Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen” (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 8: See, for example, "By Any Other Name," Time 43 (10 April 1944): 60; "‘Tokyo Rose’ on a New Scent," Stars and Stripes, London ed. (20 August 1945); "Words and Music," Time 46 (20 August 1945): 57; and "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.


Note 10: FBIS employees first heard tales of Tokyo Rose in the spring of 1943 and began receiving inquiries about her that summer. "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen” (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 12: The agency recorded most broadcasts on wax cylinders that were retained for a week to ten days and reused; however, a few permanent recordings were produced using an acetate disk recorder. Amory F. Penniwell testimony, Transcript of United States v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, vol. XVI, pp. 1667, 1676–78, Folder 35/73, Box 266, Case 31712, District Courts of the United States, RG 21; Report by Cassius E. Rathbun (9 January 1946), Folder 4/4, Box 3, Item 4, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118; both in NAPR.

Note 13: "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 14: Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman argue that while legends are "couched in the language of fact," they should not be read as the "literal truth" but rather as metaphors for larger emotional truths. The Psychology of Rumors (1947; reprint, New York: Russell & Russell, 1956), 162–9.


Note 16: Francis B. O'Gara, "Tokio Rose Forecast of Bomb Raids Told" San Francisco Examiner (4 August 1949).

Note 17: Marshall Hoot testimony, Transcript of United States v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, vol. XX, pp. 2181–2215, Folder 39/73, Box 266, Case 31712, District Courts of the United States, RG 21, NAPR. See also Duus, Tokyo Rose, 180–3; Stanton Delaplane, "The Lawyers Scream at Each Other" San Francisco Chronicle (4 August 1949); and O'Gara, "Tokio Rose Forecast of Bomb Raids Told."


Note 20: Report by Chester C. Orton (12 June 1948) and Report by Gary W. Sawtelle (18 April 1949), Tokyo Rose file, FBI.


Note 22: A War Department survey of the radio listening habits of Army personnel found that in the fall of 1943, 19 percent of American radio listeners in New Guinea listened to Radio Tokyo broadcasts. A later survey found an even higher percentage of listeners on Guam and Saipan; 43 percent of servicemen on Saipan reported listening to Radio Tokyo. In China and India-Burma, the respective percentages were 32 and 24. Research Branch, Army Service Forces, "Survey of Radio Listening and Facilities" [ca. 1943], File: SWPA-8, Box 1025; Research Branch, Information-Education Section, Research Branch, Information-Education Section, "Radio Listening in Pacific Ocean Area" (December 1944), File: CPBC-13, Box 1027; both in Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP. Research Unit, Information and Education Section, IBT, "Radio Listeners Among Enlisted Men in India and Burma"
(16 April 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Morale Surveys, IBT, Enlisted Men in India and Burma, Box 1312, Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

**Note 23:** See, for example, "Weekly Report No. 43" (19 August 1944), File: 32nd C.I.C. Det. Weekly Reports #41–60 (August 1944–January 1945), Box G-1466, Weekly Reports & Correspondence of Counter-Intelligence Detachments, OCCIO, G-2, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (SWPA), NACP. This report noted that times when the division was "relieved of combat" and operations were "static" were "very productive of a varied assortment of rumors pertaining to future moves . . ."

**Note 24:** Report by Joseph Genco (3 February 1948) Folder 5/6, Box 3, Item 5, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR.

**Note 25:** 6th Counter-Intelligence Detachment, "Weekly Report #19" (28 August–3 September 1944) and attachments, File: 6th CIC Det. Reports 15–23 (August–September 1944), Box G-1462, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (SWPA), NACP.

**Note 26:** In the late summer of 1944, one soldier wrote, "I think the Japanese are starting to use poison gas against us so maybe we will start using it too. That gas is pretty mean stuff, it creates mass murder and it's a horrible death with this new gas they have." "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (September 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

**Note 27:** Report by Harvey D. Kutz (7 June 1948), Folder 4/6, Box 3, Item 5, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR. (My copy of this report from the FBI reading room expunged this informant’s comments about Lt. G.‘s "excitable" nature.) Report by Fred G. McGeary (19 April 1948), Report by Joseph T. Genco (30 July 1948), Report by Samuel J. Levis (3 August 1948), and Report by Frank J. Ford (22 April 1949) Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

**Note 28:** 6th Counter-Intelligence Detachment, "Weekly Report #19" (28 August–3 September 1944) and attachments, File: 6th CIC Det. Reports 15–23 (August–September 1944), Box G-1462, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (SWPA), NACP. See also "Inter-Services Monthly Security Summary, Counter Intelligence S.E.A. and India Commands" (February 1945), File: 117320, Box 1339, Intelligence Reports, Entry 16, Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, NACP.


**Note 30:** "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (December 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 32: Report by Joseph T. Genco (30 July 1948) Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 33: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (March 1945), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.


Note 36: Report by Robert T. McIver (16 May 1949) Tokyo Rose file, FBI.


Note 40: One former member of the 32nd Infantry Division contacted the National Archives in the early 1970s to obtain a recording of the broadcast from 1942 or 1943 in which Tokyo Rose called his unit "the Bloody Butchers of Buna." An archivist wrote back that the collection of propaganda broadcasts did not include such a recording. The 24 December 1971 letter to the National Archives and the Archives' response are both located in the Tokyo Rose/Iva Toguri reference file in the Motion Picture, Sound, and Video Research Room at NACP.

Note 41: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (January and March 1945), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 42: Voice of Truth (1945), Item 35.1, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, RG 56, NACP.

Note 43: Ibid.

Note 44: Although almost all of the soldiers who listened to Radio Tokyo concluded that the programs were "mostly lies," 34 percent of those surveyed agreed that the broadcasts contained "maybe a little more truth than we cared to admit." Research Branch, Information-Education
Section, "Radio Listening in Pacific Ocean Area" (December 1944), File: CPBC-13, Box 1027, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.

**Note 45:** "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (July 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

**Note 46:** English language leaflets are reproduced in Heiwa Hakubutsukan o Tsukuru Kai, Kami No Senso Dentan: Boryaku Senden-Bira Wa Kataru (Emirusha, 1990), 5–43.

**Note 47:** "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (September 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

**Note 48:** This story is suspiciously similar to the opening scene of the 1946 movie *Tokyo Rose*. Alexander C to Thomas E. DeWolfe (1 September 1949), case file 146–28–1941, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (DoJ). All material from the DoJ's Criminal Division was received in response to a FOIA request.

**Note 49:** For more on wartime anxieties about wife infidelity, see chapter 1. "South Pacific Area, Base Surgeon's Report—Annual, 1943 (Fiji)," File: 73- (Neuropsychiatry) South Pacific, Annual Report, Box 1350 and Forbes H. Burgess, "Report of Medical Department Activities in Fiji Islands" (28 October 1944), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Interviews, Miscellaneous Interviews in the Pacific, Box 1349, both In Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31(ZI), RG 112, NACP.

**Note 50:** "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (January 1945), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

**Note 51:** Army censors noted a large increase in letters revealing "domestic problems" and "antagonism" toward civilians in the spring and summer of 1945. See especially March, April, and July 1945 editions "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda," Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP. See also Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, *No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 3, *Letters from the Front* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 5.

**Note 52:** Advice books addressed to soldiers' families, for example, blamed *Tokyo Rose* and her German counterparts for fostering distrust between American men and women. See Herbert I. Kupper, *Back to Life: The Emotional Adjustment of Our Veterans* (New York: L. B. Fischer, 1945), 101–2; Benjamin Bowker, *Out of Uniform* (New York: Norton, 1946), 146.

**Note 53:** For more on readjustment, see chapter 1.


**Note 55:** See Gilbert and Gubar, *No Man's Land*, vol. 3, chapter 5, and Cameron, *American Samurai*, 70–82.

**Note 56:** The rumor that Amelia Earhart was *Tokyo Rose* showed up in censorship letters and FBI interviews and has been published in Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 12; Fussell, *Wartime*, 39; Gunn, *They Called Her Tokyo Rose*, 2, 29.
Note 57: Lt. I. Henry Strauss used the name "Tokyo Tony" to refer to a male disc jockey on the program that also featured Iva Toguri. "The Zero Hour," Colliers 113 (8 January 1944), 56. Miss Tokio and Madame Tojo were other names American servicemen gave to the female voices they heard over Radio Tokyo.


Note 60: Peter L. Dal Ponte, Report of Investigation–Censorship Violation (29 March 1945), File 252 (APO 32, Information Slips), Box T-1430, Military Censorship Detachment, Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (AFPAC), NACP.


Note 63: See S. Alan Challman, "Report of Medical Department Activities in Southwest Pacific Area" (13 September 45), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Interviews, Miscellaneous Interviews in the Pacific, Box 1349; Jerome D. Frank, "Adjustment Problems of Successful Negro Soldiers," File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Adjustment and Maladjustment Problems of Soldiers, Box 1293; both in Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 64: Medical Department, United States Army, Neuropsychiatry in World War II, 2:531–2; S. Alan Challman, "Staff Study Presentation: Treatment of Psychiatric Casualties in New Guinea" (12 July 1944), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) NP Consultants, Ebaugh, Activities in 1945 in WESPAC and AFPAC, Box 1347; S. Alan Challman, "Report of Medical Department Activities in Southwest Pacific Area" (13 September 45), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Interviews, Miscellaneous Interviews in the Pacific, Box 1349; Milton Spark, "Report of Activities, Neuropsychiatric Section, 60th General Hospital" (29 January 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Lt. Col. Alan Challman—NP C I-58, Box 1297; all in Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31(ZI), RG 112, NACP.
Note 65: Research Unit, "Attitudes of a Cross-Section of Enlisted Men in the South Pacific Area on Medical Care, Malaria, and Malaria Control" (1944), File: SPA-2, Box 1024, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.

Note 66: Medical Department, United States Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, 6:553–4.


Note 70: Legal Section to OCCIO (OPS), Re: CIC Memorandum Report, subject: Toguri Ikuko (Iva) (17 April 1946), File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.

Note 71: Records of this investigation can be found in Item 4, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR and in Entry 1082, Select Subject Files Relating to the Treasonable Utterances of Iva Ikuko Toguri (a.k.a. Tokyo Rose), General Records of the Department of Justice, RG 60, NACP.


Note 73: "Problem Disposition of case of Ikuko Toguri" [c.a. spring 1946], File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.


Note 75: T. Vincent Quinn to Secretary of State (24 October 1947), case file 146–28–1941, DoJ.

Note 76: Apparently Toguri's plan was no secret; American Gold Star Mothers had already protested her plan to return in a 14 August 1947 letter to President Harry S. Truman, Iva Toguri's case file 146–28–1941, DoJ. American Legion press release R-112–47 (24 October 1947), Tokyo Rose file, American Legion Archives.

Note 78: Undated messages (signatures withheld); Franklin Maloney to Tom Clark (5 February 1948); Lucas County Council American Legion to Tom Clark (9 March 1948); Grand Parlor Americanism Committee, Native Sons of the Golden West to T. Vincent Quinn (22 December 1947); Gen. Lloyd M. Brett Post, Eightieth Division Veterans Association to Tom Clark (16 December 1947); Ruthven Post #33, American Legion to Department of Justice (3 December 1947); Native Sons of the Golden West to James Carter (13 November 1947); all in Iva Toguri's case file 146–28–1941, DoJ.


Note 81: T. Vincent Quinn to FBI Director (23 December 1947), case file 146–28–1941, DoJ.

Note 82: Attorney Tom DeWolfe complained of this fact in his 29 December 1948 letter Alexander Campbell, Folder 6/7, Box 1, Item 1, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR.

Note 83: Report by Samuel J. Levis (3 August 1948), Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 84: DeWolfe had earlier advised against prosecuting Toguri in a 25 May 1948 "Statement of the Case" (available from the Ford Library). Tom DeWolfe to Raymond Whearty (12 November 1948) and Tom DeWolfe to Alexander Campbell (12 November 1948), all in Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library. Tom DeWolfe to Alexander Campbell (12 November 1948), Folder 7/7, Box 1, Item 1, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR.


Note 87: For more extensive accounts of Iva Toguri's treason trial, see Kutler, *American Inquisition*, 13–32; Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, chapters 5 and 6; and Howe, *Hunt for "Tokyo Rose,"* chapter 15.


Note 89: *The San Francisco Chronicle* ran this headline on 30 September 1949.

Note 91: Under Section 401H of the Nationality Act of 1940.

Note 92: JACL Committee for Iva Toguri, "Iva Toguri (D’Aquino): Victim of a Legend," second ed. (May 1976); Clifford Y. Uyeda to Robert T. Hartmann (18 November 1976); Saul Rosen to Don Hayashi (17 November 1976); all in Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library.


EPILOGUE

Demonstrations and the Desire for Domestic Tranquility

Soon after the German surrender, and even before V-J Day, American servicemen and their families began pressuring the government to bring husbands, sons, and fathers home. By September 1945, President Harry S. Truman estimated that he received one thousand letters daily from persons seeking expedited discharges. Members of Congress were likewise deluged; that month they reported a backlog of eighty thousand letters and the receipt of thousands more each day. After months and in many cases years overseas, soldiers were impatient to be reunited with the families they left behind. The pace of demobilization, however, failed to keep up with popular demand, and conflict soon erupted between the nation’s soldiers and the government that they had sworn to serve. Once again, GIs fought to protect individual homes.

Long in planning but rushed in its final phases by the unexpectedly swift defeat of Japan, the Army’s demobilization plan was designed to appeal to servicemen’s sense of fair play and family values. Enlisted men were allotted points toward discharge based on time in uniform, overseas service, combat decorations, and dependent children. But these priorities were not always strictly observed. In the name of efficiency, for example, low-point men brought from Europe to the United States for transfer to the Pacific might be discharged before higher-point men who remained overseas. Such actions inevitably provoked cries of injustice. GI fathers and their many advocates were particularly vocal critics of delays in demobilization. Pleading family hardship, they implored their political representatives to discharge drafted fathers and to discontinue conscription of men with dependent children. Soldiers warned that the men’s prolonged absence threatened, in the words of New Jersey Rep. James C. Auchincloss, to produce a “generation of broken homes and fatherless children.”

As Christmas 1945 approached, the conflict between the government and its citizen-soldiers was close to the boiling point. Overseas servicemen were impatient with shipping delays. In the Mediterranean theater of operations, they responded with outrage to a Stars and Stripes report that two aircraft carriers with space for eleven thousand men had been diverted from Italy to England on the very day servicemen with fifty-five to fifty-nine points were slated for discharge. A group of eighteen GIs—four of them eligible for discharge—sent angry telegrams to several senators and to the Army Adjutant General’s office in Washington, D.C. Accusing the Army of breaking its “promise” to bring eligible men “home for Christmas,” they demanded an investigation of the “deployment policy now practiced in this theater.” A letter to Stars and Stripes signed by 404 soldiers complained that demobilization favored sports stars and generals’ sons and shortchanged high-point overseas veterans. Outraged by the
system of inequity that allowed Army "brass hats" to fly home for the holidays while GI
draftees remained overseas, the signatories warned that once discharged, veterans would
"level [their] sights" on the men who had been their former leaders.6

One month later, GIs in all major theaters of operations met and marched to protest a
January 1946 War Department announcement that there would be a slowdown in the rate of
discharges due to an insufficient supply of replacements. The protests started in the
Philippines two days after the announcement and gained momentum from a Stars and
Stripes report that implied Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson was ignorant of the workings
of the Army's point system. In Manila, thousands of soldiers (officers as well as enlisted men)
marched on Army headquarters and attended rallies, carrying signs that read, "When Do We
Go Home?" "Service Yes, But Serfdom Never," and "Are We Patterson's Playthings?" The
movement spread from the Philippines to Korea, Japan, China, Guam, Hawaii, India,
England, France, Austria, Germany, and even to the continental United States. In Frankfurt
guards dispersed GI demonstrators at bayonet point, and in Guam protestors burned
Secretary Patterson in effigy. Enlisted men booed and jeered at officers who sought to quiet
the uproar. But for all the bitterness and defiance, the protests were fairly orderly and
generally peaceful. Disgruntled soldiers selected representatives to present their case to their
superiors and to the public. GI delegates met with Army officials, drafted lengthy statements,
inserted advertisements in leading newspapers, called for congressional investigations, and, in
many cases, demanded Patterson's removal from office.7

Stranded servicemen decried the planned slowdown as "a breach of faith" on the part of
military officials and civilian political leaders. As citizen-soldiers inducted for the duration
plus six months service, they had fulfilled their duty to the nation, and now that the war was
over, they expected to return home by the end of winter. Occupying conquered territory and
guarding government property was, they insisted, properly the responsibility of the regular
army. If lack of replacements was the cause of the delay, other men, particularly those who
received deferments, should fill the gap. On a more personal note, soldiers complained of
family hardship due to long-term absence. From Austria, Cpl. William Norronib wrote that his
wife had spent two and half years without husband and home and that his daughter had been
deprived of her father's presence during her "formative years." Believing that he and his
comrades had been "double cross[ed]" by the Army, Cpl. Norronib appealed to his
commander-in-chief for a "remedy." Other soldiers were less deferential; they demanded their
rights as citizens and threatened to punish further delays at the ballot box—"No boats, no
votes."8

On the home front, servicemen's families deluged President Truman and their representatives
in Congress with letters describing troubles at home (an ailing parent, a failing farm, an
impoverished wife, a lonely child) requiring the soldiers' prompt return.9 Service wives were
particularly vocal and visible advocates for a more rapid demobilization. They banded together as mothers to pressure the government to "bring back Daddy." Born of wartime networks of sociability and mutual support, Bring Back Daddy Clubs and similar associations arose in cities and towns across the nation; members organized letter-writing campaigns and lobbied public officials. One congressman reported receiving two hundred pairs of baby booties with messages, such as "I miss my daddy." In January 1946 as the soldier protests died down, the women made news by cornering and detaining Army chief of staff Dwight D. Eisenhower on his way to testify before Congress. They pressed Gen. Eisenhower and their legislators to release soldier-fathers from their military obligations, arguing that "[f]athers cannot make good occupation soldiers because their hearts and thoughts are forever at home." "[F]or the good of the Country and the maintenance of the American home," fathers in uniform should be replaced with unmarried civilians who received wartime deferments or 4-F draft status or with single servicemen stationed in the United States and slated for discharged as surplus.¹⁰

Combined with the home front "hysteria to get the boys back home," the "near mutiny" abroad played into partisan politics.¹¹ As early as the 1944 presidential election, Republicans criticized the Army's demobilization plan under then commander-in-chief Franklin Delano Roosevelt. After V-J Day and particularly during the soldier protests, the political attacks heated up. Indeed, the New York Times charged that some members of Congress "encouraged and abetted a bring-the-boys-home campaign which disregards our international responsibilities and encourages such exhibitions as those in Manila and Le Havre." Although not all critics were Republican, members of that party, the minority in both houses of Congress, took the lead in denouncing the seemingly slow pace of demobilization. Hoping to benefit at the ballot box in the upcoming mid-term elections, they read aloud from soldiers' letters, initiated investigations, and proposed legislation to discharge all former prisoners of war, Purple Heart recipients, fathers, students, and soldiers with eighteen months' service. Yet none of these bills ever made it to the floor of Congress, another source of contention between the two political parties. Republicans accused Democrats of creating a bottleneck; the predominantly Democratic defenders of demobilization countered that critics had lost sight of the nation's foreign commitments and were retreating into isolationism.¹²

Despite public pressure and congressional posturing, Harry Truman stood firmly behind the Army and Navy demobilization plans, stating that both services had made admirable progress. "The wonder is not that some of our soldiers, sailors and marines are not yet home," he declared, "but that so many are already back at their own fireplaces." Truman reminded the American public that the nation's international responsibilities (and thus its need for military personnel) had not ended with the close of hostilities. "The future of our country now is as much at stake as it was in the days of the war," the president warned. Although he received more complaints and pleas from servicemen and their families, Truman was less sympathetic.
than his former colleagues in Congress. In a private letter to Sen. Harley M. Kilgore of West Virginia (like Truman, a World War I veteran), he complained that the demonstrations had "ruined our standing with the people with whom we have to deal, around the world." Truman blamed soft living ("sheets and gas heat in training camps") for most of the trouble but did not hesitate to disparage "lack of leadership" on the part of junior officers as well as "some dumb Generals."  

Sociologist Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues in the Army's Research Branch offered a different diagnosis. In Europe following the German defeat, social scientists observed a "sharp increase of feeling among the men that they had done their share in the war" and deserved to be sent home. Although most GIs favored a "tough peace," they believed that other men should be responsible for enforcing its provisions. Placing personal concerns above national goals, they were preoccupied with the question of when they would go home and resented the Army's efforts to retain personnel for postwar duties. Some accused Army officers of deliberately slowing the pace of demobilization in order to hold on to inflated wartime ranks and salaries. Others believed they were "pawns" in a political maneuver to push through the universal military training act proposed by President Truman. Many simply blamed Army inefficiency and bungling for the slowdown.

The January 1946 GI demonstrations do more than illustrate the shallow nature of servicemen's commitment to national priorities and military institutions. They also provide insight into the motives and desires of the generation of men who would later be celebrated by Tom Brokaw and others as the nation's, indeed the world's, "greatest," for their uncomplaining commitment to duty and sacrifice. Contrary to Brokaw's assertions, this generation did not serve without protest, but they generally limited their complaints to harmless gripes when the nation was at war. With the cessation of hostilities, most soldiers believed their obligation to serve also ended. It then became the nation's responsibility to bring them home as quickly as possible.

Rallying around the twin causes of democracy and domesticity, GI demonstrators demanded their rights as citizens and as current and future husbands and fathers. They denied the legitimacy of the Army standard of unquestioning obedience to higher authority and asserted their right to free speech and assembly, including the right to heckle high-ranking officers who sought to restore discipline. Indeed, servicemen commonly characterized their demonstrations as protests against involuntary servitude and Army fascism. In Paris, the "GI Liberation Committee" even proposed a program to "democratize" the Army by abolishing officers' privileges and reforming the military system of justice to include enlisted men on court-martial boards.
The promise of an economically secure and satisfying home life was as important to the protesters as civic equality. GIs longed, in the words of one stranded soldier, for the "pleasurable responsibility" of husband, father, breadwinner, and homeowner; yet many feared this goal had been too long deferred. Underlying the protests was a strong anxiety about the availability of educational and job opportunities and the stability of familial, particularly marital, relations. The serviceman quoted above, for example, was a 28-year-old communications specialist stationed in Brazil; happily married but childless, he worried that the delays would hurt his chances of "starting a home and a family." Fearing a postwar recession, many more worried about post-discharge job prospects. Continued service seemed to place the soldiers at a vocational, educational, and domestic disadvantage relative to their civilian counterparts.¹⁷

GIIs charged that the Army "robbed" them of their "rights" and "the fruits of our sacrifice" by keeping them from home.¹⁸ Having served in the name of private as well as national interests,¹⁹ they regarded the prompt resumption of civilian status and familial roles as their due. Retained overseas for months after the war's end, soldiers' sense of deprivation grew strong enough to disrupt military discipline. Discontented soldiers and their families effectively pressured the federal government to speed up discharges and shorten the training period for replacements, precipitously reducing the Army's combat effectiveness and threatening the nation's foreign policy objectives.²⁰ Rebellious though they were, the nation's soldiers proved to be model postwar citizens. Combined with prosperity, a generous array of preferences and subsidies, most notably the benefits enshrined in the GI Bill of Rights (Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944), smoothed the transition from soldier to civilian, enabling many veterans to match, and in the long run exceed, the educational, economic, and social accomplishments of peers who did not serve.²¹ Conforming to soldiers' understanding of why they served, these privatized rights and rewards helped ensure domestic peace.
Notes


Note 2: On planning for demobilization, see Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, chapter 1.


Note 5: Until September 1945, servicemen received one point for each month in service and another for each month overseas. Each dependent child up to a total of three was worth twelve points to a GI father, and combat veterans received five points for each military award or decoration, such as the Purple Heart or the Bronze Service Star.


Note 8: "GIs Protest on Slow Demobilization"; Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Abroad: Overseas Echoes of the Voices at Home"; "Gls Protest on Slow Demobilization"; "103 Gls Sign Protest"; all in New York Times (13, 19 January 1946). Petition to Harry S. Truman (7 January 1946); Cunardo S. Sarcia et al. to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); John F. Gribbon to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); William Norronib to Harry S. Truman (11 January 1946); all in File: Official 190-R, White House Central Files, Truman Library.

Note 9: Synopses can be found among the lists of letters forwarded by Truman's secretary William D. Hassett to the War Department during the fall and winter of 1945/1946. General File, White House Central Files, Truman Library.

Note 10: Bring Back Daddy Club of Milwaukee to Harry S. Truman (18 December 1945); Bring Back Daddy Club of Chicago to "Our Legislators" (ca. January 1946); Virginia H. Rowland to Harry S. Truman (8 February 1946); all in General File, Keyword: "Bring," White House Central Files, Truman Library.


Note 13: Statement by the President (8 January 1946); Harry S. Truman to Harley M. Kilgore (26 January 1946), File: Official 190-R, White House Central Files, Truman Library.

Note 14: Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, 2:578–82, 594; Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, 250–51; Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946. Vol. 92, pt. 1, 1076; pt 9, A168. Lawrence Milberg to The New York Times; "400 Soldiers Cable Discharge Protest"; both in New York Times (11, 16 January 1946). A Citizen to Harry S. Truman (7 January 1946); Sixty Men of the 730th Engineer Depot Company to Harry S. Truman (8 January 1946); Civil Censorship Division, Group B to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); Billie Ward to Harry S. Truman (8 January 1946); 309th Infantry to Harry S. Truman (9 January 1946); Stanley Crystal et al. to Harry S. Truman (11 January 1946); Terry P. Rempel to Harry S. Truman [January 1946]; all in File: Official 190-R, White House Central Files, Truman Library.


Note 16: Herbert C. Gould to Matthew J. Connelly (9 January 1946); Otis Levy to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); T. H. Rutherford Jr. to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); Missouri Farm Boys to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); 145 Men from 3170 Quartermaster Depot Company to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); GI Liberation Committee to Harry S. Truman (13 January 1946); all in File: Official 190-R, White House Central Files, Truman Library. United Press, "Paris Troops Urge Curbs on Officers"; Associated Press, "Specific Demand Listed"; both in New York Times (14 January 1946).

Note 17: Abe J. Lilly to Harley M. Kilgore (6 January 1946); David W. O'Grady et al. to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); both in File: Official 190-R, White House Central Files, Truman Library. "GI Protest on Slow Demobilization," New York Times (13 January 1946); Stouffer et al., American Soldier, 2:597–9, 609, 611–3.

Note 18: T. H. Rutherford Jr. to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1945); David W. O'Grady et al. to Harry S. Truman (10 January 1946); both in File: Official 190-R, White House Central Files, Truman Library.

Note 19: For more on this topic, see chapter 1.

Note 20: Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, 251–2, chapter 5.

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