

CHAPTER 5

The Legend of *Tokyo Rose*¹

American veterans of the Pacific war still remember *Tokyo Rose*.² She was the most dangerous and seductive of the enemy radio announcers who broadcast propaganda to American troops. During the war, she attracted avid listeners who passed the time in the tropics by circulating stories about what she said and speculating about who she really was. After the Japanese defeat, former servicemen reminisced about *Tokyo Rose*, and when the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) called for witnesses able to recognize her voice and to remember her words, many veterans eagerly volunteered their memories. In interviews conducted by FBI agents and in their own sworn statements, these men claimed to remember the peculiarities of her voice and delivery; they were certain that they could identify *Tokyo Rose* were they to hear her again. Many characterized her voice as "soft," "smooth," "sultry," or "sexy"; she spoke with a slight accent, or they were amazed by its lack. When asked to describe the content of *Tokyo Rose's* radio show, some former servicemen recounted taunting tales of unfaithful wives who were dating draft-dodgers. Others remembered more ominous broadcasts. They claimed that *Tokyo Rose* "welcomed" American troops to the Pacific by predicting their movements and warning of impending attacks.

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Between December 1945 and June 1949, FBI agents collected former servicemen's stories about *Tokyo Rose* with the goal of building a treason case against Iva Toguri. Toguri was an American Nisei who had been visiting a sick aunt in Japan at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Despite her efforts to return home to the United States, Toguri was trapped as an enemy alien in Japan for the duration of the war. During that time, she supported herself by working as a typist and, after November 1943, as a popular announcer for the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. On the air, Toguri called herself "Orphan Ann," but her American listeners often referred to her (as well as to other female announcers) as *Tokyo Rose*. Toguri became known as "the one and original 'Tokyo Rose' who broadcasted from Radio Tokyo" only after she agreed to an interview with two American journalists on 1 September 1945.³

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The news that reporters had discovered the real *Tokyo Rose* reached the United States just weeks after the U.S. government had announced that no such woman existed. The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS), the

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government agency responsible for monitoring enemy broadcasts, was the source of this announcement. FBIS reported that no one in its employ had ever heard the name *Tokyo Rose* broadcast over Japanese frequencies. Furthermore, FBIS operatives were unable to identify a probable candidate to fit the widely varying descriptions. The report singled out Toguri's "Orphan Ann" as the woman "most servicemen seem to refer to when they speak of Tokyo Rose" but characterized the "legends" that "piled up about 'Tokyo Rose'" as "apocryphal."⁴

Hello there Enemies . . . how's tricks? This is Ann of Radio Tokyo, and we're just going to begin our regular programme of music..news and the zero hour for our Friends . . . I mean, our enemies! . . . in Australia and the South Pacific . . . so be on your guard, and mind the children don't hear! . . . All set? . . . O.K. here's the first blow at your morale . . . the Boston Pops . . . playing "Strike Up the Band."⁵

With these words, Iva Toguri opened her segment of the popular Japanese radio program, "The Zero Hour," on 22 February 1944. This was a typical broadcast. As the announcer "Orphan Ann," Toguri welcomed her American listeners (whom she also called orphans) to the program by telling them to expect a "subtle attack" on their morale. She urged servicemen to sing along to sentimental songs like "The Love Parade," and then, pretending her "Orphan Choir" had declined the offer, she comically affected pique: "You won't alright you thankless wretches, I'll entertain myself and you go play with the mosquitoes." Later broadcasts followed the same format. Preparing her "honourable boneheads" for a "vicious assault on your morale," Toguri made humorous references to Pacific island discomforts (too many mosquitoes, not enough beer) and played "sweet" music by performers such as Rudy Vallee and His Connecticut Yankees, Victor Herbert, and Bing Crosby.⁶

In one broadcast, "Orphan Ann" informed her listeners that she was preparing to "creep up and annihilate them with my nail file" while she "lull[ed] their senses" with a Victor Herbert waltz, "Kiss Me Again." But Toguri's scripts and FBIS transcripts show no sign that she ever broadcast Japanese intelligence or threatened American soldiers.⁷ Yet American servicemen have long asserted they heard words that Japanese documents and American radio monitoring equipment did not record. Their memories, memoirs, letters, and diaries are the only evidence we have of such broadcasts.

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The issue, then, is how to assess the historical value of this evidence. One option is to treat servicemen's stories as factual accounts of they actually heard. Taking that approach, Iva Toguri is the most likely candidate for the role of *Tokyo Rose*. Even before Toguri became the topic of sensational news stories, American soldiers and war correspondents identified *Tokyo Rose* as the female announcer on "The Zero Hour," and many accounts of *Rose's* broadcasts were partly modeled on Toguri's,⁸ but whereas "Ann" invited servicemen to "sit back, close your eyes, and relax" while they listened to music, *Rose* urged her listeners to "go back to your homes before it is too late."⁹ Yet treating soldiers' *Tokyo Rose* stories as evidence of actual broadcasts would mean overlooking too many important facts (among them, that stories about *Tokyo Rose* predated "Orphan Ann's" November 1943 debut).¹⁰ Even the contention that some other woman might have broadcast the words soldiers remembered and wrongly attributed to Iva Toguri (as Toguri's defense lawyers, and later her biographers, tried to do)¹¹ requires a stretch of the historical imagination. To make this argument, one would have to disregard both FBIS's failure to identify a real *Tokyo Rose* and Toguri's long-standing identification with the moniker.

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Lack of sufficient evidence to convict or absolve has always been the difficulty of assessing the case against Iva Toguri. Radio Tokyo officials burned agency records before American troops arrived in Japan. Iva Toguri retained several scripts in her possession and distributed others to American soldiers as souvenirs, but these documents do not cover her entire broadcast history. Furthermore, for all the agency's monitoring, FBIS representatives were able to provide government lawyers with only a few clear recordings; most broadcasts were recorded on wax cylinders that were later shaved and reused.¹²

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All available documentary and recorded evidence supports the conclusion that FBIS officials were correct more than fifty years ago when they characterized *Tokyo Rose* as an American "invention."¹³ Like all legends, *Tokyo Rose* has basis in historical fact. Toguri's "Orphan Ann" segments were sandwiched between propaganda-tinged news, skits, and commentary. However, the bare facts of Japanese broadcasts do not account for the radio personality so many servicemen talked about, wrote about, and still remember. Rather, this legend was born of emotions, like anger, alienation, and anxiety—feelings about the war, the military, and American civilians that soldiers were otherwise unable or

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unwilling to acknowledge.¹⁴ The emotions that gave rise to *Tokyo Rose* later fueled the drive to punish Iva Toguri when she became entangled in the legend.

The most striking aspect of Iva Toguri's 1949 treason trial was the discrepancy between what she actually broadcast and what former soldiers remembered hearing. One of the recordings presented by the prosecution as evidence of treason contained this example of propaganda, described by journalist Francis O'Gara as "sometimes insolent, sometimes almost affectionate": **9**

Hello you fighting orphans of the Pacific. How's tricks? This is after her weekend Annie back on the air strictly under union hours. Reception O.K.? Why, it better be because this is all request night and I've got a pretty nice program for my favorite little family—the wandering boneheads of the Pacific islands. The first request is made by none other than the boss and guess what. He wants Bonnie Baker in "My Resistance is Low." My, what taste you have sir, she said. (music)

By contrast, the veterans who served as ear-witnesses for the prosecution remembered far more sensational and damaging broadcasts. The day after the jury listened to the government's recordings, former Army lieutenant Jules Sutter Jr. testified that in early September 1944 (about two weeks after the broadcast above), he heard Toguri tell Americans on Saipan that the island was "mined with high explosive[s]" and would be "blown sky high" unless U.S. forces evacuated the area within 48 hours.¹⁵

On the following day, Marshall Hoot, who had commanded a rescue and patrol boat assigned to the area of the Gilbert Islands, provided the prosecution with even more damaging testimony, reportedly moving some of the women in the courtroom "close to tears."¹⁶ Under cross-examination by defense attorney Wayne Collins, a lawyer well known for his defense of Japanese American detainees, Hoot produced an intimate and affecting letter he had written to his wife in the first week of January 1944. Although the letter did not record the words Hoot would later attribute to Iva Toguri, it did characterize such broadcasts as demoralizing: **10**

We have a radio now and we get Tokyo best. They have an American Jap girl who has turned down the United States for Japan. They call her Tokyo Rose and does she razz us fellows out here in the Pacific, telling how well Japan is getting along and to hear her start out you would think she was broadcasting from the U.S. and sorry we were *loosing* so many men and ships. It sure makes the fellows sore.¹⁷

Prosecution lawyer John B. Hogan read the entire letter, including Hoot's sentimental closing, "Honeybabies, I must lay off for today, hope I dream of you tonight as I think of you all day," into the court record in order to establish the date on which Hoot claimed to have heard Toguri "congratulate" the commander of a naval bomber squadron "on his safe landing" in the Gilbert Islands. To this welcome, she added this warning: "you will be sorry if you don't leave soon or now." According to Hoot, this broadcast alerted him and his comrades to expect an attack, for in his experience, these predictions generally proved true. Hoot testified that a few days after the broadcast, the Japanese conducted a bombing raid on Abamama, killing two of his men.¹⁸

To combat such damaging testimony, Toguri's lawyers produced ear-witnesses of their own, former listeners who had served in the American armed forces and who characterized the "Orphan Ann" broadcasts as friendly and entertaining rather than vicious and demoralizing. Defense attorneys also attacked the credibility of the prosecution's ear-witnesses, but in the case of Marshall Hoot, this strategy backfired. Wayne Collins charged that Hoot had altered his testimony from an earlier version of the story confided to journalist Payne Knickerbocker. Furthermore, Collins insisted that there were no casualties in the air raid Hoot described, but the Navy veteran had the last word, responding with indignation: "I beg your pardon, I ought to know. I helped bury them."¹⁹ **11**

Marshall Hoot proved an effective prosecution witness, but FBI records reveal that Hoot's story changed dramatically over the course of a year. In June 1948, special agent Chester Orton reported that Hoot was "of the opinion that the woman he heard signed off the radio as Tokyo Rose." When prompted, however, Hoot did recall a Christmas Eve broadcast by an announcer who called herself "Annie," but he denied that Toguri's was Annie's voice. Months later in March 1949 Hoot swore that Toguri's was the voice he had heard over Radio Tokyo, asserting, "This woman always referred to herself as Ann, Orphan Ann, or Little Orphan Annie, and I never heard her call herself Tokyo Rose."²⁰ Despite this change, Hoot's testimony cannot be dismissed as an outright fabrication. As demonstrated by the letter Hoot exhibited in court, it had some basis in fact. But the details of his testimony derived less from actual Radio Tokyo broadcasts than from the collective experience and shared culture of American military personnel who served in the Pacific theaters of World War II. **12**

Tokyo Rose was an American creation, a female villain who articulated emotions the servicemen were unable or unwilling to acknowledge. Her reputed threats catalogued their fears. Her legendary prescience reflected their feelings of powerlessness. Her taunting words articulated their sexual anxieties. Her accusations against American civilians, especially women, were their own. Sexual and racial difference, however, concealed that American servicemen were the source of *Rose's* pronouncements and allowed the men to evade **13**

responsibility for their own words. The medium of radio itself facilitated the masquerade by unleashing listeners' imaginations and by fostering, in Susan Douglas's words, a "strong collective sensibility."²¹

To understand the emergence of *Tokyo Rose*, we must return to her birthplace in the Pacific theaters of World War II, where leisure facilities were inadequate, time weighed heavily, and many American servicemen listened to Radio Tokyo's English language program of propaganda, news, and American music. These radio shows, which were sometimes broadcast over public address systems, were a major source of amusement for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who listened to them while literally "sweating out" the time between missions or the next Japanese move.²² This in-between time was a period of anxious anticipation, characterized by hard work and boredom and punctuated by small-scale enemy attacks. Combined with demands for military secrecy, it was fertile ground for speculative rumors about future movements and impending operations.²³ The omniscient radio announcer who knew when and where the men would be going while they still awaited orders, *Tokyo Rose* was an outgrowth of these rumors.

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Daily life in the Pacific was full of uncertainty; soldiers lived in constant anticipation of danger. Japanese airplanes might attack at any time of day or night. Warnings attributed to *Tokyo Rose* provided the illusion of predictability. The rumor that *Rose* had announced an attack gave men time to prepare for the eventuality. These stories were also emotional outlets; they enabled servicemen to articulate their fears, if only indirectly. Such warnings, however, provided no escape from anxiety; some men imagined dangers far more dreadful than the ones they actually experienced.

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Tokyo Rose's imagined warnings were often ominous; she voiced the servicemen's worst fears. In February 1948, James G, a former lieutenant who had been attached to the 500th Bombardment Group on Saipan told FBI agents that at first members of his group had "regarded [*Tokyo Rose's*] program and predictions as humor"; her threats gave them an "occasion to laugh and joke." According to Lt. G, *Rose's* predictions of Japanese air raids proved so accurate that the Americans did not laugh for long; they soon became "very serious and on edge relative to forthcoming attacks which she predicted." When she warned them one evening to prepare for poison gas, he remembered that the men became extremely agitated, wondering whether it would be best to await the attack in their foxholes or nearby caves.²⁴ A similar rumor made the rounds of the 6th Infantry Division in August 1944. It triggered a run on gas masks among the anxious servicemen who prepared themselves for the attack and by their actions gave further credence to the warning.²⁵ The men must have imagined the "horrible death" that would have resulted from such an attack.²⁶

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These threats, however, were American in origin. In regard to the Saipan rumor, FBI case files reveal that some of Lt. G's comrades recalled similar rumors, but none substantiated his story. Furthermore, the lieutenant's former commanding officer admitted that had he learned of the threat from Lt. G, he would probably have ignored it, for he regarded the young man as overly "excitable." He described Lt. G as "the type of soldier who sat around in full combat equipment when Japanese troops were not within 1500 miles of the island . . . and most Army personnel . . . considered the danger negligible."²⁷ Army counterintelligence officers publicized American responsibility for the latter threat by printing an article in the 6th Infantry newspaper on the day that the attack was supposed to occur; the piece playfully chided the men for their gullibility and reminded them that it was their "duty to expose all rumors and rumor mongers."²⁸ Other than rumors like these, there is no evidence that Radio Tokyo broadcasts ever warned American soldiers to prepare for such an attack, and the Japanese military never used chemical weapons against American troops. **17**

Rumors of impending poison gas attacks, sometimes attributed to Radio Tokyo or *Tokyo Rose*, proliferated throughout the Pacific and were especially prevalent in censorship reports from the summer and fall of 1944, as American troops prepared to invade the Philippine Islands. This period produced rumors reflecting servicemen's fears; the men did not know precisely where they would be going, but they knew they would soon move into a new round of combat. Furthermore, American servicemen probably understood that poison gas was a weapon of last resort, and they certainly knew that the situation of the Japanese military was becoming more desperate.²⁹ Rumors about Japanese use of poison gas floated around Pacific army bases throughout the war, but by the end of 1944 after the successful invasion of the Philippine Islands, many servicemen were better able to dismiss them. In December 1944, for example, one man advised a friend to disregard stories about Japanese chemical or German biological weapons: "Almost invariably there is no truth in them," he wrote. "So don't worry, whatever terrible weapons the Nazis and Japs are saving for us, you may be sure that we have something twice as terrible as they do."³⁰ Indeed, as this man wrote, American weapons and tactics were becoming more terrible. The Army Air Forces had already commenced bombing raids on the Japanese mainland, and American ground forces had increased their use of flame-throwers. In March 1945, fire and airpower were combined when B-29 bombers began dropping incendiaries on Tokyo and other densely populated areas of Japan. A photo reconnaissance plane named *Tokyo Rose* and decorated with a comic portrait of its namesake led the way. It was the first American warplane to fly over Tokyo since the Doolittle raid of 1942, and its crew's photographs of the Japanese mainland provided the Twentieth Air Force with a map for future attacks.³¹ **18**

As the American victory drew closer, threats attributed to *Tokyo Rose* began to seem more amusing than frightening. Unable to recall the poison gas threat (recounted earlier by another member of the 500th Bombardment Group), one senior officer told FBI agents that rumored **19**

gas attacks and *Tokyo Rose* broadcasts were "treated as joke[s]." His diary from late fall 1944 included sardonic commentary on American victories vociferously denied by *Tokyo Rose*.³² American servicemen delighted in stories of attacks that never happened and ships that remained afloat even after *Rose* announced that they would be or had been sunk. These tales were funny because the expansive claims and explosive threats were so obviously empty:

Tokyo Rose sure is a laugh. We get a big kick out of listening to her. If we would believe all she tells us over the radio we never would win this war. But that program sure is the laughing thing of our army. I wonder what she will say when we walk right into Tokyo?³³

On 7 August 1945, the day after an American B-29 dropped the first atom bomb on Hiroshima, Navy officials got in on the joke, issuing a mock citation that commended *Tokyo Rose* for "bring[ing] laughter and entertainment to" American troops in the Pacific.³⁴

A peculiar affection animated many servicemen's accounts of *Tokyo Rose*. Her purported pronouncements were, according to one former Army counterintelligence officer, "an unending source of satisfaction" to American soldiers who served in the Pacific. "Thousands of letters went home from the troops telling of the girl's all-knowing, all-seeing powers," Gen. Elliot Thorpe wrote in his memoir, "and no matter how small a unit each soldier would stoutly maintain his unit had been specifically mentioned on Radio Tokyo."³⁵ Servicemen who feared that they had been "forgotten" relished stories of the time when *Tokyo Rose* singled out their unit for special attention. By welcoming American units to the area and informing them of Japanese interest in their plans, she gave them a sense of importance, compensating for the seeming indifference of American civilians.

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Servicemen took pride in the reputed recognition of *Tokyo Rose*. During the war, they wrote home about it and marked the occasion with notations in their diaries. Years later, many former servicemen recalled the time when *Tokyo Rose* talked about their unit. In December 1947, one former Seabee contacted the FBI with the story of how *Tokyo Rose* welcomed the 100th Naval Construction Battalion to the Pacific on 10 February 1944, nine days after the battalion landed in the Marshall Islands and eight days before that landing was made public. In between musical selections, she had introduced herself to the men: "This is Tokyo Rose calling the 100th Seabee Unit in the Majuro Islands," and asked, "How do you boys like our coc[o]nuts?" She told the men that their wives were unfaithful and promised a Japanese air raid in the very near future. Despite the imaginary threat, the Seabees were not attacked at this time, although two Japanese planes were spotted flying over the island while an airstrip was under construction.³⁶ In this case, *Tokyo Rose's* alleged broadcast was probably more

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comforting than threatening, assuring the Seabees that they made a noticeable contribution to the American war effort—an important assurance for the many men who felt their work to be invisible and their suffering futile.³⁷

Stories of *Tokyo Rose* provided American servicemen with the opportunity to boast of their military prowess. Adopting her imagined insult as a badge of honor, members of the 41st Infantry Division proclaimed themselves "the Butchers," and a medical officer noted, "The favorite broadcast heard by our troops comes from Tokyo. The Division had more publicity from Tokyo than the United States. The Japs called us the '41st Division Butchers' and we were proud of that name." According to George S. Andrew Jr. who served with the 41st Division, *Rose* was quick to recognize the division's fighting prowess. She "indirectly conceded" their success by calling them "the Butchers" early in the war, while American civilians did not seem to notice their abilities or sacrifices until late February 1945 when "the Butchers" were dubbed the "Jungleers" by the American press.³⁸ Other units also claimed the "Butchers,"³⁹ and years later many veterans recalled and took pride in the epithet.⁴⁰ **22**

Tales of *Tokyo Rose* provided soldiers with the opportunity to valorize themselves and to criticize American civilians. In the course of their narratives, servicemen often attested to a renewed sense of commitment. Her words, designed to frighten and demoralize, could have the opposite effect. Yet the martial enthusiasm inspired by *Tokyo Rose* was marked by traces of doubt. Although servicemen could embrace her insults and discount her threats, they were unable to ignore her intimations that American civilians had betrayed them, because her words were their own. The distrust she was accused of having fostered between soldier and civilian had in fact originated with American servicemen and found outlet in their stories of *Tokyo Rose*. **23**

Along with insults, threats, and predictions, *Tokyo Rose* taunted American servicemen with news from home. According to soldiers, she told them that while they were stuck out in the jungle with only the mosquitoes for company, civilians were living well and having fun without a thought for the soldiers. Civilian men were on strike (thus depriving the soldiers of necessary war materiel), and women (particularly soldiers' wives and girlfriends) were enjoying newfound sexual freedom by dating wealthy, malingering war workers. One serviceman wrote that he had heard *Tokyo Rose* announce: "But that girl back home isn't waiting for you. She's out drinking and dancing with some 4F who's rolling in easy money. They are probably eating some nice thick steaks in some air conditioned café. But you won't get any steaks for a long time out here." She voiced servicemen's complaints about the heat and the food as well as the strong feeling that American civilians did not "know or . . . care that a war is going on."⁴¹ **24**

Tokyo Rose became the sultry, insinuating voice of civilian conscience in a 1945 war bond film that depicted American marines listening to the radio just before heading off to invade the island of Iwo Jima. The Treasury Department's *Tokyo Rose* made the sort of accusations often leveled against civilians by soldiers: that they were selfishly striking or frivolously spending their money instead of investing in the war effort. Civilian indifference to the war created the shortages that were ultimately responsible for deprivation and death in the Pacific.⁴² **25**

The Treasury Department's *Tokyo Rose* called herself the "voice of truth,"⁴³ and in this, she resembled the soldiers' *Rose* who told "mostly lies" but also some important and unpleasant truths.⁴⁴ In the words of one paratrooper: **26**

I've heard several of these propaganda stories from the Japs and Germans. They broadcast over the radio that our girls and wives back home are unfaithful. Most of its true too, but when soldiers hear it they go all to pieces. The war, as far as they are concerned is over for them.⁴⁵

Although there is no evidence that Iva Toguri made broadcasts of this sort, female infidelity was certainly a popular Japanese propaganda theme. The colorful leaflets air-dropped on Allied servicemen during the war often featured lurid pictures of partially dressed women leaning against well-dressed men; the text printed beside these images indicated that the wives and girlfriends of Allied soldiers were frolicking with slackers "behind your back."⁴⁶ However, this theme's resonance with and elaboration by servicemen cannot be explained away as the result of a successful marketing strategy. Japanese propaganda was less a source of concern than a vehicle through which soldiers, like this infantryman, could voice their doubts:

I get a kick out of the broadcast from Japan. Every day they feed us a lot of bull but a lot of it is the truth. At Hollandia they told us to clear out in twenty four hours or they would bomb us out. Then at Biak they said no one would get out alive. They just about spoke the truth. Then they always play some good jive tunes to cheer us up and end up by saying, "Wonder who is out with your wife about this time?" It sort of gets a guy to wondering.⁴⁷

According to legend, *Tokyo Rose's* sexual taunts could drive men to insanity, illness, and even death. One former soldier contacted the DoJ in 1949 with an offer to testify against Toguri. He claimed that she had singled out his buddy and killed him with her words. She told the young man that his wife was unfaithful, and as a result, this soldier lost his nerve, "jumped out of his foxhole," and "was immediately mowed down by Japanese gunfire."⁴⁸ But American servicemen did not need Japanese propagandists to remind them of these fears. **27**

In 1943, real or imagined "unfaithfulness of wife" rated high on the list of cases commonly seen by Red Cross social workers in Fiji. A medical department report for the same island in 1944 noted that by contrast to *Tokyo Rose*, whose broadcasts were consistently amusing, mail from home was often "depressive, especially when the men learn that their girl friends were running around or their wives stepping out."⁴⁹ Soldiers' letters communicate their anger and despair: **28**

When most of us return home we won't have our girl friends or wives there to greet us. You probably see what's going on with the women running around. It's very cheap on their part. God almighty don't they have any respect for us? We are fighting for freedom so we can live a happy life with our families. Can't anything be done about what's going on back home?⁵⁰

Some servicemen blamed unfaithful wives and sweethearts for the high rate of suicide and mental disorders among troops in the Pacific. Particularly during the later stages of the war, their letters contained many violent expressions of hostility toward civilians, much of it directed at wives suspected of infidelity, usually in the company of 4-F boyfriends.⁵¹ Worries about unfaithful wives and predatory 4-Fs were common to soldiers in all theaters of operations, but in the Pacific, many blamed *Tokyo Rose* for fostering this anxiety.⁵²

Rose's reputation for wrongly accusing American women of infidelity became more pronounced in the postwar period. During the war, she was best known for predicting movements and attacks. But when the fighting was over and the difficult process of veterans' readjustment had begun,⁵³ hindsight made her slander of American women more strident. The accusation that *Tokyo Rose* preyed on soldiers' fears of marital infidelity appeared more regularly in FBI interviews and postwar news features than they had in earlier accounts. These later stories allowed their tellers to repudiate, sometimes violently, earlier suspicions by attributing them to *Tokyo Rose*. When the members of an Ohio American Legion post requested clemency for Iva Toguri in 1956, a Massachusetts post quickly and unanimously denounced the plea, demanding revocation of the other post's charter. The Massachusetts veterans claimed that forgiving Toguri and reinstating her citizenship would equate her with (or even elevate her above) those American women who had (despite doubts fostered by the treacherous *Tokyo Rose*) remained faithful to the soldiers: **29**

[Tokyo Rose] made an effort, unsuccessful though it was, . . . to destroy in the still formative minds of these young men, not only the faith they had in the principles of their country, in their leaders and in their way of life, but she attempted to destroy the faith and love they felt so deeply for their loved ones at home, their wives, sweethearts, sisters, and mothers. Yes comrades, . . . turn to your wife and tell her that you recommend heroine-worship for the famous Tokyo Rose, the same wartime "Rose" who, in her broadcasts, quite often in your hearing, accused her and all the wives and sweethearts like her, of unfaithfulness

and moral laxity at home. These same wives and sweethearts who were spending all their spare time in prayer for your safety, or in efforts to make your lot an easier one if possible.⁵⁴

By insisting on the difference between American women and *Tokyo Rose* (and by ensuring that Iva Toguri would not regain her American citizenship), former servicemen could disavow their own distrust. But during the war, the notorious announcer was not so different from other women.

Taunting, female, and unreal, *Tokyo Rose* resembled the women soldiers left behind, for wartime separation bred suspicion and estrangement between the sexes.⁵⁵ During the war, *Tokyo Rose* was defined by femininity more than race and nationality. Although Americans often pictured her as a seductively oriental woman, the very white Amelia Earhart was also a prime candidate for the role.⁵⁶ Most Japanese radio announcers were male, but "Tokyo Tony" lacked the resonance of *Tokyo Rose*, *Madame Tojo*, or *Miss Tokio*.⁵⁷ Like the alluring and horrifying images of women that have historically embodied men's fear of castration, a seductive female voice best articulated servicemen's anxieties.⁵⁸ Representing both sexual danger and difference, *Tokyo Rose* enabled men to acknowledge, displace, and later repudiate wartime fears of emasculation. 30

Transferring this fear onto *Tokyo Rose*, American servicemen blamed her for the widespread rumor that Atabrine, the antimalarial drug used by the American armed forces in the Pacific, would make men sterile or impotent. According to her accusers, *Tokyo Rose* urged the men to refuse to take their daily dose of the drug, thus convincing them to disobey orders, ruin their health, and endanger the American war effort. In 1948, Walter Winchell published an elaborate version of this story in the form of an angry letter to Toguri (addressed as "Rosie") from newspaper columnist Frank Farrell. Farrell, who had served as an officer with the First Marine Division, purported to quote a broadcast to marines on Guadalcanal (months before Toguri began her Radio Tokyo broadcasts in November 1943): 31

You poor little Marines, I wish you could spend the night with me. I am a little Japanese pin-up girl. But it wouldn't be any use. Your officers won't tell you because they want you to take these atabrine pills every day. . . .

Your officers don't dare tell you—but I will—that when you swallow those bitter little pills, they will not only turn you yellow for the rest of your life, but they will also prevent you from ever being able to make love again.

Farrell attributed to *Tokyo Rose* the high incidence of self-inflicted casualties as well as the "shameful" necessity of imposing an Atabrine discipline among the marines on Guadalcanal. Medical and intelligence officers likewise blamed *Tokyo Rose* for this misinformation, but

even assigning the blame to an enemy agent did not check the spread rumors about Atabrine. They circulated among the troops throughout the war despite regular malaria education lectures.⁵⁹

Soldiers feared they had been sexually impaired and would remain so even after the war's end. One lieutenant, who was later reprimanded for his letter, confided his anxieties in a letter to friends: "[T]hey claim [Atabrine pills] make you sterile for about 9 to 12 mos. after you stop taking them. And if a woman does catch it may disform the child. So now I [know] I won't have any children for quite a spell after I get home."⁶⁰ This lieutenant, like many of his comrades, foresaw a future of sterility, impotence, and possible internment, purportedly proposed and publicly denied by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Roosevelt was rumored to advocate the temporary internment of all men who had served in the Pacific on their return to the States. Depending on the teller, the purpose of internment was to cure the men of tropical diseases or wartime brutality and to protect civilians from the same.⁶¹ The men who circulated these rumors feared that military service had rendered them physically and psychologically unfit to return to their homes and families. Despite vigorous efforts to assure servicemen that Atabrine was harmless, medical and intelligence officers were unable to calm servicemen's fears. **32**

A drug that turned white skin yellow and whose other side effects were unknown,⁶² Atabrine heightened servicemen's sense of exile from "civilization" and their estrangement from national goals. White men feared loss of status as much as the loss of their health; their yellow skin underscored the lack of difference between them and the island natives who lived in villages nearby most military bases. African American servicemen were even more likely than their white counterparts to believe that Atabrine endangered their reproductive health; institutional racism had cemented their distrust of the Army orders.⁶³ Both black and white soldiers thought that their personal well-being was of little concern to the American military. **33**

As months and years passed by with little hope of rotation, many servicemen came to see the Army as their enemy. Among American soldiers, the "general consensus" was that instead of fighting for their country, men were "fighting to get out of the Army and to get back home." Both widespread resistance to the administration of Atabrine and the resulting epidemic of malaria demonstrated a strong shared desire to evade military service. Some men tried to catch malaria, because they hoped for a discharge or transfer. Once hospitalized, patients often prolonged their stay by secretly spitting out the Atabrine pills they were required to swallow.⁶⁴ Men commonly feared the effects of malaria as much as they did Atabrine,⁶⁵ but many sought (consciously or not) to catch the disease, because they could see no other way out of the military. Atabrine discipline and policies prohibiting medical discharge for malaria would later block this avenue of escape. Under this discipline, each soldier's canteen cup would be filled with no more than half an inch of water by an enlisted man assigned to that **34**

duty. Carrying the cup in his left hand, the soldier would proceed to the Atabrine table, careful to keep three feet between himself and the next man. Another enlisted man would place the Atabrine pill in the open palm of the soldier's right hand, and without closing his hand, the soldier was required to face the supervising officer who would watch him put the pill in his mouth, finish the cup of water, and place the cup face down on the table.⁶⁶

As the difficulties of administering Atabrine demonstrated, many American soldiers in the Pacific shared a lack of faith in officers, training, and national ideology. These feelings of alienation found an outlet in the creation of *Tokyo Rose*, the radio broadcaster who articulated the emotions servicemen did not wish to acknowledge. In the guise of reporting her words, soldiers accused civilians of indifference; they charged women with betrayal; and they aired the suspicion that Army superiors had emasculated them. This act of wartime ventriloquism served to externalize the breaches between American soldiers and civilians, officers and enlisted men, and men and women, but it depended on the belief that *Tokyo Rose* was a real woman and that she was responsible for the statements attributed to her. **35**

Once the war ended, this fiction became difficult to maintain. American journalists quickly identified Iva Toguri as *Tokyo Rose*, and, initially at least, she proved willing to play the part. For the promised fee of \$2,000, she agreed to an exclusive interview with reporters Clark Lee and Harry Brundidge, signing their 1 September 1945 contract "Iva Ikuko Toguri (Tokyo Rose)." Lee and Brundidge got their interview, but Toguri never received her pay; Brundidge's editor refused to cover the high cost of the exclusive. Learning of the interview, Sgt. Dale Kramer, a reporter for *Yank* magazine, convinced Toguri to call a press conference, and on 4 September 1945, she shared her story with journalists gathered at a Yokohama hotel. Toguri informed her audience that she was only one of several English-language female broadcasters employed by Radio Tokyo, and she denied accusing soldiers' sweethearts of infidelity and taunting the men with their "forgotten" status. "I didn't think I was doing anything disloyal to America," Toguri told reporters, but her professions of innocence were unconvincing to those in attendance. Already there was talk of a treason trial,⁶⁷ but in September 1945, Toguri's fate was unclear. Detained and interrogated by Army counterintelligence officers after her press conference, she was quickly released and became a minor celebrity in occupied Japan. The 15 September issue of the Marine Corps newspaper *The Chevron* hailed Toguri as "the best morale builder we had" and claimed that Pacific war veterans were forming a "Tokyo Rose Club."⁶⁸ Toguri was slated to star in Army and Navy newsreels and dogged by Army autograph hounds. She obliged her fans by signing her name Iva Toguri and "Tokyo Rose"; these autographs would later serve as evidence against her.⁶⁹ **36**

A month later in mid-October, Toguri was arrested. She remained in prison for more than a year, although no charges were filed. During that time Army intelligence officers in Japan investigated Toguri's activities as an employee of Radio Tokyo. They interviewed her former **37**

colleagues and examined all available radio scripts. The investigating officers found that while American soldiers applied the name *Tokyo Rose* to Toguri (among others), "there is no evidence that she ever broadcast greetings to units by name and location, or predicted military movements or attacks indicating access to secret military information and plans, etc, [as] the Tokyo Rose of legend and rumor is reported to have done." Toguri's broadcasts "had little, if any, of the [demoralizing] effect intended" by her Japanese employers and did not violate any military law. Nevertheless, if civilian officials chose to pursue a case against Toguri, her broadcasts for Radio Tokyo could be construed as treasonous or as violations of the Espionage Act of 1917.⁷⁰

Meanwhile in the United States, DoJ officials conducted their own investigation of Toguri's wartime activities. From fall 1945 through summer 1946, FBI special agents interviewed FBIS officials, journalists, Toguri's friends and acquaintances, and a wide range of military personnel.⁷¹ Based on these interviews and an analysis of available scripts and recordings, Nathan T. Elliff, chief of the DoJ's Internal Security Section, concluded that prosecution for treason was unwarranted. Toguri's broadcasts, he reported, "contained nothing whatever of propaganda, troop movements or any apparent attempts to break down the morale of the American forces." Months later he reiterated this assessment. Although employed by Japanese propagandists, Toguri's broadcasts were "innocuous and could not be considered giving aid and comfort to the enemy." Assistant Attorney General Theron Caudle concurred with Elliff's assessment of the case; he recommended to the attorney general that the case be closed, "subject, of course, to being reopened in the event more information is received at a later date."⁷² Toguri was finally freed from prison on 25 October 1946, but she would soon be jailed again. **38**

Army officials feared that Toguri's release might result in a flood negative publicity,⁷³ but the response bordered on indifferent. The story merited only a bland wire service story buried on a back page of the *New York Times*.⁷⁴ It did not even merit a mention in *Time* or *Newsweek*. Toguri's attempt to reestablish American citizenship in 1947, however, was big news. It provoked angry protests from former servicemen and civilians intent on preventing her, and the troubling associations attached to her, from ever returning home. **39**

The day Assistant Attorney General T. Vincent Quinn informed state department officials that the DoJ had "no objection" to issuing Toguri a U.S. passport,⁷⁵ her situation changed. That same day, 24 October 1947, James F. O'Neil, National Commander of the American Legion, publicly called on the U.S. government not simply to prevent Toguri's return to the United States but to charge her with treason. "By her treasonable attempts to discomfort and demoralize American fighting forces, this woman renounced her citizenship in spirit if not in fact," he declared. "It is unthinkable that she should be accorded a haven by the government whose extinction she sought during the war." A treason conviction, he argued, would prevent **40**

this outcome.⁷⁶ Others, most notably news columnist and radio broadcaster Walter Winchell, joined O'Neil's call. In his November 12 column, Winchell took aim at the soft treatment of "Hitler's American-made radio hucksters of hate," including Ezra Pound, Constance Drexel, Donald Day, and Mildred Gillars (a.k.a. *Axis Sally*). He also railed against the treatment of "Japanazis," like "'Tokyo Rose' Toguri," who "radiated for the Japanese in Tokyo" but faced no punishment for their treachery. A few weeks later, Winchell broadcast a letter from Gold Star mother Mrs. H. W. Copeland protesting Toguri's plans to return home.⁷⁷

These pleas provoked concerned citizens and members of Congress to contact DoJ officials in order to communicate their displeasure. One message written on a newspaper photograph of Toguri simply read: "No! This worse than poisonous snake cannot claim U.S. as her home." Another indignant citizen insisted that allowing Toguri to return to the United States would be tantamount to "selling out the brave boys who gave their lives in the late wars." Many others agreed, charging Toguri with responsibility for servicemen's sufferings and even their deaths. Veterans' groups and California nativists added their voices to the protest, petitioning government officials to prevent Toguri's return.⁷⁸

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Bowing to public pressure and hoping to appease Walter Winchell, the DoJ publicly reopened the case against Iva Toguri on December 3, less than a week after Winchell broadcast Mrs. Copeland's letter. The following day, James Carter, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of California, met with Winchell, who, according to Carter, was pleased with the news but was disappointed that he was not publicly credited with spurring the DoJ to act. Carter, who was accompanied by his predecessor Charles Carr, tried to convince Winchell to tone down his attack on Toguri, explaining that the case against her was weak. Carr told Winchell that as United States Attorney he had received letters from "GIs all over the world, criticizing [him] for his announced intention of prosecuting 'Tokyo Rose' and claiming that the 'Tokyo Rose' broadcast[s] . . . were morale builders." Winchell replied that Carr's correspondents were "probably communists" but conceded that many of Toguri's broadcasts were "innocuous." He agreed with Carter that "prosecution without a proper case" would be worse than letting the matter drop.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Winchell continued his attacks on *Tokyo Rose*, goading the government to gather more evidence against Toguri and other traitors. He would later compare Toguri's purported broadcasts to statements by Paul Robeson, better known to Winchell fans for his communist beliefs than for his musical and theatrical accomplishments.

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In preparing a case against Toguri, FBI special agents interviewed veterans from across the nation, despite concerns that ear-witness accounts were of limited evidentiary value.⁸¹ The problem was that few of the men were previously acquainted with Toguri, and none told the same story. Most of the veterans' *Tokyo Rose* stories also failed to conform to the realities of Radio Tokyo broadcasts.⁸² Furthermore, many of those interviewed would not admit to

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having been demoralized. Some even claimed that *Tokyo Rose* was an inadvertent morale builder; her show was entertaining and the propaganda ineffective. When pressed one ear-witness admitted that "weaker soldiers" might have been affected but insisted that most servicemen "got a big kick out of the broadcasts and thought they were a big joke."⁸³ Yet veteran ear-witnesses contributed a great deal to the government's credibility. Without the testimony of former soldiers, the prosecution would have depended on the statements of Toguri's former colleagues, both Japanese military officials and Nisei collaborators, who, unlike Toguri, abandoned their American citizenship. By contrast, the most important witnesses for the defense were three former Allied prisoners of war who testified that they had been forced to assist Japanese propaganda efforts at Radio Tokyo. These men insisted that Toguri was a loyal American who, like themselves, broadcast for the enemy only under duress and without the intent of betraying her country.

Although the case against Toguri was weak, the government won an indictment in October 1948. Special Assistant Attorney General Tom DeWolfe, a veteran of radio treason prosecutions, reported that some of the grand jurors were skeptical of the government's case. Complaining "it was necessary for me to practically make a fourth of July speech in order to obtain an indictment," DeWolfe urged the DoJ to shore up the case by conducting further investigation in "the Orient."⁸⁴ But the DoJ's detective work in Japan created new problems for DeWolfe. Soon after the government won its indictment, witness Hirom Yagi admitted that his grand jury testimony was perjured. Harry Brundidge, who with Clark Lee had broken the *Tokyo Rose* story in 1945, had approached Yagi in the spring of 1948, promising him a free trip to the United States. All Yagi had to do was testify that while visiting Radio Tokyo, he had witnessed Iva Toguri broadcast demoralizing statements, such as "Soldiers, your wives are out with the war workers." Because a treason conviction requires two witnesses to the same overt act, Brundidge urged Yagi to recruit a friend to corroborate the story. Toshikatsu Kodaira, however, refused to give false testimony and later exposed the scheme. When confronted with the evidence, Brundidge denied the allegations, but Assistant Attorney General Alexander Campbell was unconvinced. However, Campbell advised against charging Brundidge with "subornation of perjury," because it would "completely destroy any chance of a conviction in [Toguri's] case." Brundidge continued to assist the DoJ but would be disappointed when he was not called as a witness against Toguri.⁸⁵

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Ultimately the government's case depended on perjured testimony. Kenkichi Oki and George Mitsushio, two of Toguri's former Radio Tokyo superiors, both swore they had seen and heard her broadcast this statement during the Battle of Leyte Gulf: "Now you fellows have lost all your ships. You really are orphans of the Pacific. How do you think you will get home?" The two men later recanted their testimony, claiming they had been compelled to make false statements.⁸⁶

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For several days in September 1949, it looked as though even the perjured evidence was insufficient to convict. On the second day of deliberations, jury foreman John Mann attempted to call a hung jury. The jurors were divided nine to convict and three to acquit until day four, when the three holdouts came to the conclusion that Judge Michael Roche's instructions left them no alternative but to vote with the majority. Iva Toguri was found guilty of one of the eight overt acts of treason with which she was charged—that of broadcasting from Tokyo "concerning the loss of ships."⁸⁷ After he delivered the verdict, Mann stated to reporters that he would have preferred to acquit. Others on the jury shared Mann's concern that the "prosecution did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" and would later agree to meet with Toguri's attorneys in an effort to overturn the verdict.⁸⁸ **46**

Despite jurors' ambivalence, their decision to convict dispelled any doubts about the veracity of soldiers' stories that the trial might have raised. Banner headlines reading "Tokyo Rose Guilty"⁸⁹ made it easy for Americans to believe that a real woman had broadcast the taunts and threats routinely attributed to *Tokyo Rose*—in other words, that Pacific area disaffection had been fomented by Japanese propagandists rather than generated by American soldiers. The verdict at once affirmed wartime suspicions of Japanese-American loyalty and fulfilled the Cold War imperative to identify and punish homegrown traitors.⁹⁰ Fined \$10,000, sentenced to ten years confinement, and deprived of her citizenship, Toguri was threatened with deportation upon release from prison in 1956.⁹¹ Although allowed to continue living in the United States, she remained a stateless person until pardoned by President Gerald Ford in 1977. **47**

By the mid-1970s, excesses had discredited the search for internal subversion, and many Americans had come to view the internment and relocation Japanese Americans as a blot on the nation's honor. In 1974, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) took up Iva Toguri's case as part of a campaign to rectify wartime injustices that included the rescission of Executive Order 9066 and reparations for detainees. Asserting that Toguri was the "victim of a legend" and wartime racism, the JACL urged President Ford to pardon her and restore her citizenship. The pardon campaign drew a great deal of support from the popular press, political office holders (particularly from California), and civic and veterans' organizations. The national board of the American Veterans Committee came out in support of Toguri, along with three VFW posts and the 41st Infantry Division Association.⁹² **48**

To the chagrin of Toguri's JACL supporters, the American news media failed to distinguish between legend and reality when reporting her story. Even sympathetic stories tended to reinforce the *Tokyo Rose* legend. Although he later quoted from actual scripts, English professor and World War II veteran John Leggett opened his article on Iva Toguri with a description of entertaining and wholly imaginary broadcasts about lost ships and unfaithful wives. One member of the 41st Infantry Division put a positive spin on *Rose's* legendary **49**

threats in a letter to the *Jungleer*: "I can remember how on two different occasions Tokyo Rose warned us of an air attack at Oro Bay. . . . I could be one of the lives she saved." Another 41ster insisted that *Tokyo Rose's* broadcasts improved division morale and cohesion when she referred to them as "a mighty enemy," probably referring to the proudly remembered rumor that she called them "the Butchers."⁹³

More than sixty years after the end of World War II and thirty years since Toguri's pardon, the *Tokyo Rose* legend remains intact. World War II veterans still believe they heard words and voices never broadcast by Radio Tokyo, and their memories have become our history. John Costello's *Pacific War*, published in 1981, four years after the pardon, featured a "sinister" and "taunting" *Tokyo Rose* whom he identified as Iva Toguri. More recently, Eric Bergerud, while admitting that some of the stories might have been "exaggerated," nevertheless insisted that "[*Tokyo*] *Rose* did personalize many messages to specific units, which both amused and unsettled the soldiers involved."⁹⁴ Many other historians have perpetuated this distortion.⁹⁵ **50**

The persistence of the *Tokyo Rose* legend is a symptom of a widespread desire to believe in a "greatest generation." By disguising unpatriotic impulses, this legend enables the construction of a heroic narrative of suffering, sacrifice, and unswerving commitment. But *Rose's* reputed pronouncements also betray what they were designed to conceal, alerting careful listeners to the emotional conflicts that characterized military service in the Pacific. **51**

Notes

Note 1: I italicize *Tokyo Rose* to denote that the name refers to a legendary woman rather than to a real radio announcer.

Note 2: See Clover Koopman's interviews with World War II veterans in "War of Words and Music: Veterans Remember *Tokyo Rose*" (M.A. thesis, University of Montana, 1988); Rosa Maria Fazio's pre-test interview and questionnaire "The Effects of the Broadcasts of 'Tokyo Rose' During World War II" (M.A. Thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1968); and many of the interviews collected online by the Rutgers Oral History Archives, <http://fas-history.rutgers.edu/oralhistory/orlhom.htm> (accessed 1 January 2007).

Note 3: Contract signed by journalist Harry T. Brundidge and "Iva Ikuko Toguri (Tokyo Rose)," 1 September 1945. Toguri agreed to give him exclusive rights to her story for the fee of \$2,000. A copy of this contract was Exhibit III attached to 1 May 1946 letter transmitting Iva Toguri's case files to the DoJ, File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, Records of the Army Investigative Records Repository (IRR Files), Army Staff, RG 319, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).

Note 4: Associated Press, "No Record of Tokyo Rose," *New York Times* (8 August 1945); "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 5: Exhibit XIX, Transmittal of Case Record, Toguri, Ikuko (Iva), (1 May 1946), File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP. Attachment to Summary of Treason Case (23 February 1948), Tokyo Rose file, FBI. This material is now available at NACP.

Note 6: Exhibit XIX, Transmittal of Case Record, Toguri, Ikuko (Iva), (1 May 1946), File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP. Attachment to Summary of Treason Case (23 February 1948), Report by Chester C. Orton (2 September 1948), and Report by Joseph T. Genco (9 May 1949) Tokyo Rose file, FBI. FBIS transcripts of "Zero Hour" broadcasts, Folder 3/7, Box 2, Item 2, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, National Archives, Pacific Region (NAPR).

Note 7: Ibid. See also "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 8: See, for example, "By Any Other Name," *Time* 43 (10 April 1944): 60; "'Tokyo Rose' on a New Scent," *Stars and Stripes*, London ed. (20 August 1945); "Words and Music," *Time* 46 (20 August 1945): 57; and "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 9: "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP; Report by Joseph Genco (30 July 1948), Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 10: FBIS employees first heard tales of *Tokyo Rose* in the spring of 1943 and began receiving inquiries about her that summer. "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 11: Masayo Duus, *Tokyo Rose, Orphan of the Pacific*, trans. Peter Duus (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1979), 198–203; Rex B. Gunn, *They Called Her Tokyo Rose* (privately published, 1977), 32–4.

Note 12: The agency recorded most broadcasts on wax cylinders that were retained for a week to ten days and reused; however, a few permanent recordings were produced using an acetate disk recorder. Amory F. Penniwell testimony, Transcript of *United States v. Iva Ikuko Toguri*, vol. XVI, pp. 1667, 1676–78, Folder 35/73, Box 266, Case 31712, District Courts of the United States, RG 21; Report by Cassius E. Rathbun (9 January 1946), Folder 4/4, Box 3, Item 4, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118; both in NAPR.

Note 13: "Radio Report on the Far East #75: Special Report: Japanese Broadcasts to American Servicemen" (15 June 1945), Box 6, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, RG 262, NACP.

Note 14: Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman argue that while legends are "couched in the language of fact," they should not be read as the "literal truth" but rather as metaphors for larger emotional truths. *The Psychology of Rumors* (1947; reprint, New York: Russell & Russell, 1956), 162–9.

Note 15: From Stanton Delaplane for the *San Francisco Chronicle*: "Tokyo Rose on the Air: Radio Program Records Are Played in Court" and "U.S. Detonates a Saipan Mine Under the Defense" (2 and 3 August 1949). From Francis B. O'Gara for the *San Francisco Examiner*: "Jurors Hear Playing of Tokio Rose Records" and "Vet Says Tokio Rose Tried to Scare Yanks with Saipan Land Mines Tale" (2 and 3 August 1949).

Note 16: Francis B. O'Gara, "Tokio Rose Forecast of Bomb Raids Told" *San Francisco Examiner* (4 August 1949).

Note 17: Marshall Hoot testimony, Transcript of *United States v. Iva Ikuko Toguri*, vol. XX, pp. 2181–2215, Folder 39/73, Box 266, Case 31712, District Courts of the United States, RG 21, NAPR. See also Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 180–3; Stanton Delaplane, "The Lawyers Scream at Each Other" *San Francisco Chronicle* (4 August 1949); and O'Gara, "Tokio Rose Forecast of Bomb Raids Told."

Note 18: Marshall Hoot testimony, Transcript of *United States v. Iva Ikuko Toguri*, vol. XX, pp. 2195–96, 2203–05, 2213–14, Folder 39/73, Box 266, Case 31712, District Courts of the United States, RG 21, NAPR; Delaplane, "The Lawyers Scream at Each Other"; O'Gara, "Tokio Rose Forecast of Bomb Raids Told."

Note 19: Marshall Hoot testimony, Transcript of *United States v. Iva Ikuko Toguri*, vol. XX, pp. 2196–98, 2214–15, Folder 39/73, Box 266, Case 31712, District Courts of the United States, RG 21, NAPR; Delaplane, "The Lawyers Scream at Each Other," 6; Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 181–2.

Note 20: Report by Chester C. Orton (12 June 1948) and Report by Gary W. Sawtelle (18 April 1949), Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 21: Susan J. Douglas, *Listening In: Radio and the American Imagination* (New York: Times Books, 1999), 24–36.

Note 22: A War Department survey of the radio listening habits of Army personnel found that in the fall of 1943, 19 percent of American radio listeners in New Guinea listened to Radio Tokyo broadcasts. A later survey found an even higher percentage of listeners on Guam and Saipan; 43 percent of servicemen on Saipan reported listening to Radio Tokyo. In China and India-Burma, the respective percentages were 32 and 24. Research Branch, Army Service Forces, "Survey of Radio Listening and Facilities" [ca. 1943], File: SWPA-8, Box 1025; Research Branch, Information-Education Section, Research Branch, Information-Education Section, "Radio Listening in Pacific Ocean Area" (December 1944), File: CPBC-13, Box 1027; both in Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP. Research Unit, Information and Education Section, IBT, "Radio Listeners Among Enlisted Men in India and Burma"

(16 April 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Morale Surveys, IBT, Enlisted Men in India and Burma, Box 1312, Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 23: See, for example, "Weekly Report No. 43" (19 August 1944), File: 32nd C.I.C. Det. Weekly Reports #41–60 (August 1944–January 1945), Box G-1466, Weekly Reports & Correspondence of Counter-Intelligence Detachments, OCCIO, G-2, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (SWPA), NACP. This report noted that times when the division was "relieved of combat" and operations were "static" were "very productive of a varied assortment of rumors pertaining to future moves . . ."

Note 24: Report by Joseph Genco (3 February 1948) Folder 5/6, Box 3, Item 5, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR.

Note 25: 6th Counter-Intelligence Detachment, "Weekly Report #19" (28 August–3 September 1944) and attachments, File: 6th CIC Det. Reports 15–23 (August–September 1944), Box G-1462, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (SWPA), NACP.

Note 26: In the late summer of 1944, one soldier wrote, "I think the Japanese are starting to use poison gas against us so maybe we will start using it too. That gas is pretty mean stuff, it creates mass murder and it's a horrible death with this new gas they have." "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (September 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 27: Report by Harvey D. Kutz (7 June 1948), Folder 4/6, Box 3, Item 5, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR. (My copy of this report from the FBI reading room expunged this informant's comments about Lt. G's "excitable" nature.) Report by Fred G. McGeary (19 April 1948), Report by Joseph T. Genco (30 July 1948), Report by Samuel J. Levis (3 August 1948), and Report by Frank J. Ford (22 April 1949) Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 28: 6th Counter-Intelligence Detachment, "Weekly Report #19" (28 August–3 September 1944) and attachments, File: 6th CIC Det. Reports 15–23 (August–September 1944), Box G-1462, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (SWPA), NACP. See also "Inter-Services Monthly Security Summary, Counter Intelligence S.E.A. and India Commands" (February 1945), File: 117320, Box 1339, Intelligence Reports, Entry 16, Office of Strategic Services, RG 226, NACP.

Note 29: According to an American report on Japanese use of chemical weapons against Chinese soldiers and civilians, "poison gas was employed as 'a weapon of last resort.'" Report cited in Yuki Tanaka, "Poison Gas: The Story Japan Would Like to Forget," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (October 1988): 16.

Note 30: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (December 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 31: On the plane *Tokyo Rose*, see E. Bartlett Kerr, *Flames over Tokyo: The U.S. Army Air Forces' Incendiary Campaign against Japan, 1944–1945* (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1991), 92–3; Gary M. Valant, *Vintage Aircraft Nose Art* (Osceola, Wis.: Motorbooks International, 1989), 195. On fire raids against the Japanese mainland, see Michael Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), 219–323 and Kerr above. On the use of flamethrowers, see Craig Cameron, *American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle, 1941–1951* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 176–83; John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 91–3.

Note 32: Report by Joseph T. Genco (30 July 1948) Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 33: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (March 1945), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 34: "Tokyo Rose Wins U.S. Navy Citation," *New York Times* (8 August 1945). Text of citation reproduced in Fazio, "The Effects of the Broadcasts of 'Tokyo Rose,'" 59–60.

Note 35: Elliot R. Thorpe, *East Wind, Rain: The Intimate Account of an Intelligence Officer in the Pacific, 1939–49* (Boston: Gambit Incorporated, 1969), 225–7.

Note 36: Report by Robert T. McIver (16 May 1949) Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 37: Paul Fussell argues that wartime rumors often "compensate for the insignificance of actuality." *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 36.

Note 38: Francis B. Catanzaro, *With the 41st Division in the Southwest Pacific: A Foot Soldier's Story* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 50; William Schofield, *Treason Trail* (New York: Rand McNally, 1964), 177; George S. Andrew Jr., "The 41st Didn't Take Prisoners," *Saturday Evening Post* 219 (27 July 1946), 22–3, 37, 39; Dower, *War Without Mercy*, 69; "Medical Department Activities in New Guinea" (September 1944), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Extracts, Miscellaneous Reports from the Pacific, Box 1349, Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 39: See Report by Joe W. Rice (6 August 1948), Report by Oliver G. Nordmarken (18 April 1949), Report by Stanley T. Blaszek (22 April 1949), Report by Joseph T. Genco (25 May 1949), all in Tokyo Rose file, FBI. Anthony Arthur, *Bushmasters: American's Jungle Warriors of World War II* (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), 150; Gerald Astor, *Crisis in the Pacific: The Battles for the Philippine Islands by the Men Who Fought Them* (New York: Donald I. Fine, 1996), 223; John S. Whitehead and George B. Bennett, *Escape to Fight on: With 204 Military Mission in China* (London: Robert Hale, 1990), 171; Frank Farrell's letter published in Walter Winchell's column *Daily Mirror* (28 October 1948), reel 23, series 3, Walter Winchell Papers, New York Public Library.

Note 40: One former member of the 32nd Infantry Division contacted the National Archives in the early 1970s to obtain a recording of the broadcast from 1942 or 1943 in which *Tokyo Rose* called his unit "the Bloody Butchers of Buna." An archivist wrote back that the collection of propaganda broadcasts did not include such a recording. The 24 December 1971 letter to the National Archives and the Archives' response are both located in the Tokyo Rose/Iva Toguri reference file in the Motion Picture, Sound, and Video Research Room at NACP.

Note 41: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (January and March 1945), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 42: *Voice of Truth* (1945), Item 35.1, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, RG 56, NACP.

Note 43: Ibid.

Note 44: Although almost all of the soldiers who listened to Radio Tokyo concluded that the programs were "mostly lies," 34 percent of those surveyed agreed that the broadcasts contained "maybe a little more truth than we cared to admit." Research Branch, Information-Education

Section, "Radio Listening in Pacific Ocean Area" (December 1944), File: CPBC-13, Box 1027, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.

Note 45: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (July 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 46: English language leaflets are reproduced in Heiwa Hakubutsukan o Tsukuru Kai, *Kami No Senso Dentan: Boryaku Senden-Bira Wa Kataru* (Emirusha, 1990), 5–43.

Note 47: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (September 1944), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 48: This story is suspiciously similar to the opening scene of the 1946 movie *Tokyo Rose*. Alexander C to Thomas E. DeWolfe (1 September 1949), case file 146–28–1941, Criminal Division, Department of Justice (DoJ). All material from the DoJ's Criminal Division was received in response to a FOIA request.

Note 49: For more on wartime anxieties about wifely infidelity, see chapter 1. "South Pacific Area, Base Surgeon's Report—Annual, 1943 (Fiji)," File: 73- (Neuropsychiatry) South Pacific, Annual Report, Box 1350 and Forbes H. Burgess, "Report of Medical Department Activities in Fiji Islands" (28 October 1944), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Interviews, Miscellaneous Interviews in the Pacific, Box 1349, both in Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31(ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 50: "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (January 1945), Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP.

Note 51: Army censors noted a large increase in letters revealing "domestic problems" and "antagonism" toward civilians in the spring and summer of 1945. See especially March, April, and July 1945 editions "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda," Box T-1429, G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE), NACP. See also Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, *No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century, vol. 3, Letters from the Front* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 5.

Note 52: Advice books addressed to soldiers' families, for example, blamed *Tokyo Rose* and her German counterparts for fostering distrust between American men and women. See Herbert I. Kupper, *Back to Life: The Emotional Adjustment of Our Veterans* (New York: L. B. Fischer, 1945), 101–2; Benjamin Bowker, *Out of Uniform* (New York: Norton, 1946), 146.

Note 53: For more on readjustment, see chapter 1.

Note 54: Associated Press, "Tokyo Rose Pardon Asked," *New York Times* (16 February 1956); William F. O'Donnell to American Legion National Headquarters (8 April 1956), Tokyo Rose file, American Legion Archives.

Note 55: See Gilbert and Gubar, *No Man's Land*, vol. 3, chapter 5, and Cameron, *American Samurai*, 70–82.

Note 56: The rumor that Amelia Earhart was *Tokyo Rose* showed up in censorship letters and FBI interviews and has been published in Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 12; Fussell, *Wartime*, 39; Gunn, *They Called Her Tokyo Rose*, 2, 29.

Note 57: Lt. I. Henry Strauss used the name "Tokyo Tony" to refer to a male disc jockey on the program that also featured Iva Toguri. "The Zero Hour," *Colliers* 113 (8 January 1944), 56. *Miss Tokio* and *Madame Tojo* were other names American servicemen gave to the female voices they heard over Radio Tokyo.

Note 58: See Neal Hertz, "Medusa's Head: Male Hysteria under Political Pressure," *Representations* 4 (Fall 1983): 27–54.

Note 59: Frank Farrell's letter published in Walter Winchell's column *Daily Mirror* (28 October 1948), reel 23, series 3, Walter Winchell Papers, New York Public Library. Farrell repeated this story to the FBI, Report by Joseph T. Genco (25 May 1949), Tokyo Rose file, FBI. For other versions of this rumor, see Medical Department, United States Army, *Preventive Medicine in World War II*, vol. 6, *Communicable Diseases* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1963), 468; Koopman, "War of Words and Music," 126–7. 31st Counter-Intelligence Detachment, "Security Talk for Troops" (n.d.), File: 31st C.I.C. Det. Weekly Reports Nov.–Dec. 1944, Box G-1465, Weekly Reports & Correspondence of Counter-Intelligence Detachments, 1943–45, OCCIO, G-2, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (SWPA); Associated Press, "Tokyo Rose Held Overseas for Frisco Trial," *The Baltimore Sun* (26 August 1948), File: X6035862, Iva D'Aquino, Box 33, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319; both in NACP.

Note 60: Peter L. Dal Ponte, Report of Investigation-Censorship Violation (29 March 1945), File 252 (APO 32, Information Slips), Box T-1430, Military Censorship Detachment, Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (AFPAC), NACP.

Note 61: Comment Sheet 545 (7 April 1943), File: Comment Sheets 1943, H-P, Box T-1419; "Censorship Survey of Morale, Rumors, Propaganda" (August, September, and December 1944, January, March, and April 1945) Box T-1429; all in G-2 Theater Censor, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, RG 496 (USAFFE). See also Lee Kennett, *G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987), 132; Fussell, *Wartime*, 38.

Note 62: Atabrine was suspected to be a source of psychoses. Medical Department, United States Army, *Neuropsychiatry in World War II*, vol. 2, *Overseas Theaters* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1973), 576–7, 626–7, 757, appendices I and K.

Note 63: See S. Alan Challman, "Report of Medical Department Activities in Southwest Pacific Area" (13 September 45), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Interviews, Miscellaneous Interviews in the Pacific, Box 1349; Jerome D. Frank, "Adjustment Problems of Successful Negro Soldiers," File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Adjustment and Maladjustment Problems of Soldiers, Box 1293; both in Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 64: Medical Department, United States Army, *Neuropsychiatry in World War II*, 2:531–2; S. Alan Challman, "Staff Study Presentation: Treatment of Psychiatric Casualties in New Guinea" (12 July 1944), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) NP Consultants, Ebaugh, Activities in 1945 in WESPAC and AFPAC, Box 1347; S. Alan Challman, "Report of Medical Department Activities in Southwest Pacific Area" (13 September 45), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Interviews, Miscellaneous Interviews in the Pacific, Box 1349; Milton Spark, "Report of Activities, Neuropsychiatric Section, 60th General Hospital" (29 January 1945), File: 730 (Neuropsychiatry) Lt. Col. Alan Challman—NP C I-58, Box 1297; all in Office of the Surgeon General, World War II Administrative Records, Entry 31 (ZI), RG 112, NACP.

Note 65: Research Unit, "Attitudes of a Cross-Section of Enlisted Men in the South Pacific Area on Medical Care, Malaria, and Malaria Control" (1944), File: SPA-2, Box 1024, Research Division, Attitude Reports of Overseas Personnel, Entry 94, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NACP.

Note 66: Medical Department, United States Army, *Preventive Medicine in World War II*, 6:553–4.

Note 67: Dale Kramer, "Second-Hand Rose," *Yank* 4 (19 October 1945): 5; United Press, "Tokyo Rose Talks, M.P.'s Arrest Her," *New York Times* (6 September 1945); Jim Williams, "It Was Just a Job to Tokyo Rose, She Tells Press," *Stars and Stripes*, South Germany ed. (8 September 1945); "Tokyo Rose," *Time* 46 (17 September 1945): 73–4; "Peace of Roses," *Newsweek* 26 (17 September 1945): 96–7; Russell Warren Howe, *Hunt for 'Tokyo Rose'* (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1990), chapter 6; Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, chapter 1.

Note 68: "Marines List 'Tokyo Rose' First on Jap Sight Seeing," *The Chevron* (15 September 1945), reproduced in Report by William H. Wilson (23 January 1946), Folder 2/4, Box 3, Item 4, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR. On Toguri's celebrity, see Howe, *Hunt for 'Tokyo Rose'*, 75–78; Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 33–5.

Note 69: Stanton Delaplaine, "Slowly, Carefully, the Federal Prosecutor Shows How He Intends to Convict Girl for Treason" and "Some Radio Scripts Get into the Record," *San Francisco Chronicle* (7 and 23 July 1949). Report of Chester C. Orton (2 September 1948); Report by Charles J. Harkins (28 February 1949); Report by Gary Sawtelle (18 April 1949); Report by Joseph Genco (9 May 1949); all in Tokyo Rose File, FBI.

Note 70: Legal Section to OCCIO (OPS), Re: CIC Memorandum Report, subject: Toguri Ikuko (Iva) (17 April 1946), File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.

Note 71: Records of this investigation can be found in Item 4, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR and in Entry 1082, Select Subject Files Relating to the Treasonable Utterances of Iva Ikuko Toguri (a.k.a. Tokyo Rose), General Records of the Department of Justice, RG 60, NACP.

Note 72: Nathan T. Elliff to Theron L. Caudle, Re: Iva Ikuko Toguri, with aliases Tokyo Rose, Orphan Annie, Ann—Treason (15 May 1946); Nathan T. Elliff to Theron L. Caudle, Re: Iva Ikuko Toguri, with aliases Tokyo Rose, Orphan Annie, Ann—Treason (19 September 1946); Theron L. Caudle to Tom C. Clark (24 September 1946), Re: Iva Ikuko Toguri, with aliases Tokyo Rose, Orphan Annie, Ann; Treason; all in case file 146–28–1941, DoJ. See also Stanley I. Kutler, *The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 10–2.

Note 73: "Problem Disposition of case of Ikuko Toguri" [c.a. spring 1946], File: XA528483, Iva Toguri, Box 231A, IRR Files, Army Staff, RG 319, NACP.

Note 74: Associated Press, "Tokyo Rose Case Dropped," *New York Times* (22 October 1946).

Note 75: T. Vincent Quinn to Secretary of State (24 October 1947), case file 146–28–1941, DoJ.

Note 76: Apparently Toguri's plan was no secret; American Gold Star Mothers had already protested her plan to return in a 14 August 1947 letter to President Harry S. Truman, Iva Toguri's case file 146–28–1941, DoJ. American Legion press release R-112–47 (24 October 1947), Tokyo Rose file, American Legion Archives.

Note 77: Walter Winchell column, *Daily Mirror* (12 November and 7 December 1947), reel 23, series 3, Walter Winchell Papers, New York Public Library.

Note 78: Undated messages (signatures withheld); Franklin Maloney to Tom Clark (5 February 1948); Lucas County Council American Legion to Tom Clark (9 March 1948); Grand Parlor Americanism Committee, Native Sons of the Golden West to T. Vincent Quinn (22 December 1947); Gen. Lloyd M. Brett Post, Eightieth Division Veterans Association to Tom Clark (16 December 1947); Ruthven Post #33, American Legion to Department of Justice (3 December 1947); Native Sons of the Golden West to James Carter (13 November 1947); all in Iva Toguri's case file 146–28–1941, DoJ.

Note 79: James Carter to Tom Clark (5 December 1947), Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Gerald R. Ford Library (Ford Library). See also Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 109–16; Kutler, *American Inquisition*, 16–8.

Note 80: Walter Winchell's column, *Daily Mirror* (5 January and 20 February 1948 and 14 October 1949), reels 23 and 24, series 3, Walter Winchell Papers, NYPL; Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 116–8.

Note 81: T. Vincent Quinn to FBI Director (23 December 1947), case file 146–28–1941, DoJ.

Note 82: Attorney Tom DeWolfe complained of this fact in his 29 December 1948 letter Alexander Campbell, Folder 6/7, Box 1, Item 1, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR.

Note 83: Report by Samuel J. Levis (3 August 1948), Tokyo Rose file, FBI.

Note 84: DeWolfe had earlier advised against prosecuting Toguri in a 25 May 1948 "Statement of the Case" (available from the Ford Library). Tom DeWolfe to Raymond Whearty (12 November 1948) and Tom DeWolfe to Alexander Campbell (12 November 1948), all in Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library. Tom DeWolfe to Alexander Campbell (12 November 1948), Folder 7/7, Box 1, Item 1, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR.

Note 85: John B. Hogan to T. Vincent Quinn (12 April 1948), Section 5, Box 2, Entry 1082: Select Subject Files Relating to the Treasonable Utterances of Iva Ikuko Toguri (a.k.a. Tokyo Rose), General Records of the Department of Justice, RG 60, NACP. Statements by Toshikatsu Kodaira (28 May 1948) and by Hirom Yagi (5 November 1948), Tokyo Rose Investigative Case Files, Provost Marshal General, RG 389. Alexander M. Campbell to the Attorney General (2 December 1948, 5 January 1949, and 8 June 1949), Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library. Frank J. Hennessy to Alexander Campbell (29 July 1949), Folder 3/7, Box 1, Item 1, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR. See also Kutler, *American Inquisition*, 25–7; Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, 163–9.

Note 86: Ronald Yates, "Tokyo Rose's Accusers Claim U.S. Forced Them to Life," *Chicago Tribune* (22 March 1976), Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library. Stanton Delaplaine, "U.S. Stars Detailing the Eight Alleged Overt Acts It Claims Were Treason" and "Japanese Are 'Requested' to Testify—So Here They Are," *San Francisco Chronicle* (19 and 20 July 1949); Francis O'Gara, "Witness Accuses Tokio Rose of Eight Treasonable Acts" and "Tokio Rose Accused by Ex-Radio Boss," *San Francisco Examiner* (19 and 20 July 1949). See also Kutler, *American Inquisition*, 30, 250 n41.

Note 87: For more extensive accounts of Iva Toguri's treason trial, see Kutler, *American Inquisition*, 13–32; Duus, *Tokyo Rose*, chapters 5 and 6; and Howe, *Hunt for "Tokyo Rose,"* chapter 15.

Note 88: Notes by Jury Foreman John Mann (ca. September 1949), Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library. Tom DeWolfe to James M. McInerney (7 March 1950), Folder 2/7, Box 1, Item 1, Records Related to Criminal Case 31712, U.S. v. Iva Ikuko Toguri, U.S. Attorneys, RG 118, NAPR. Stanton Delaplaine, "Tokyo Rose Guilty," *San Francisco Chronicle* (30 September 1949).

Note 89: *The San Francisco Chronicle* ran this headline on 30 September 1949.

Note 90: For more on how the *Tokyo Rose* trial became entwined in Cold War concerns about disloyalty, see Caroline Chung Simpson, *An Absent Presence: Japanese Americans in Postwar American Culture, 1945–1960* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), chapter 3.

Note 91: Under Section 401H of the Nationality Act of 1940.

Note 92: JACL Committee for Iva Toguri, "Iva Toguri (D'Aquino): Victim of a Legend," second ed. (May 1976); Clifford Y. Uyeda to Robert T. Hartmann (18 November 1976); Saul Rosen to Don Hayashi (17 November 1976); all in Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library.

Note 93: John Leggett, "Tokyo Rose: Traitor or Scapegoat?" *New York Times Magazine* (5 December 1976) and Clifford I. Uyeda to JACL Committee for Iva Toguri (2 December 1976), Box 11, Myron Kuropas Files, Ford Library. "41sters: Tokyo Rose Should Be Pardoned," *Jungleer* 27 (July 1976), Box 20, Kenneth Lazarus Files, Ford Library.

Note 94: John Costello, *The Pacific War* (New York: Rowson, Wade Publishers, 1981), 185, 194, 476, 499, 541; Eric Bergerud, *Touched with Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific* (New York: Viking, 1996), 491–92. See also John Costello, *Love, Sex, and War: Changing Values, 1939–45* (London: William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd, 1985), 74, 243–4. Costello's later account is more sympathetic to Toguri, but he never seems to doubt the accuracy of popular depictions of her broadcasts.

Note 95: For other examples of historians' depictions of *Tokyo Rose*, see Arthur, *Bushmasters*, 150; Astor, *Crisis in the Pacific*, 71, 194, 223, 225, 232, 347; James Bradley and Ron Powers, *Flags of Our Fathers*, reissue ed. (New York: Bantam, 2006), 147; William B. Breuer, *Retaking the Philippines: America's Return to Corregidor and Bataan, October 1944–March 1945* (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), 32, 101; Michael B. Graham, *Mantle of Heroism: Tarawa and the Struggle for the Gilberts, November 1943* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1993), 106; Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, 15 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947–1962), 4:158; 6: 231; 13:172; Wilbur H. Morrison, *Point of No Return: The Story of the Twentieth Air Force* (New York: Times Books, 1979), 193; William A. Renzi and Mark D. Roehrs, *Never Look Back: A History of World War II in the Pacific* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), 133, 173; Stanley Sandler, ed. *World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Garland, 2001), 172, 497, 577–9; Frank E. Walton, *Once They Were Eagles: The Men of the Black Sheep Squadron* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1986), 49–50; Peter Young, ed. *The Almanac of World War II* (New York: Bison Books, 1981).