Notes:
Note 1: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, May 2, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives; P minutes 2, March 14, 1942, Notter files, box 55. During a number of his wartime addresses, Welles repeated the theme that the threat of war anywhere in the world threatened U.S. security. He warned that the "Four Policemen" thus had to be prepared to use their powers to prevent future threats from materializing into wars. See P minutes, March 7, 1942; Welles, "Free Access to Raw Materials, " delivered at the National Foreign Trade Convention, October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL; Welles, "Blueprint for Peace," New York Herald Tribune Forum, November 17, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL. Back.
Note 2: Some have persuasively argued that the global nature of the war helped to promote a new weltanschauung among the American people, what Alan K. Henrikson called an emergent ideology of "Air-Age Globalism." See Henrikson, "The Map as an 'Idea': The Role of Cartographic Imagery During the Second World War," The American Cartographer 2:1 (April 1975): 19-53. Back.
Note 3: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54. Back.
Note 4: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942. Back.
Note 5: Sumner Welles, "Commercial Policy After the War," October 7, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 6: Nevertheless, the administration had reassured Vichy leaders in January 1942 that "the word 'France' in the mind of the President includes the French Colonial Empire." See Hull to Leahy, January 20, 1942, FRUS, vol. II, 123-124. Welles thus told the French ambassador in April 1942 that Washington recognized the jurisdiction of France over its overseas possessions. Robert Murphy also assured French General Henri Giraud that French possessions would be recovered after the war. Nevertheless, these comments did not stop Welles from plotting against the French empire, particularly Indochina, during his leadership of the postwar planning committees. Back.
Note 7: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55; P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P document 158a, "Official Statements and Views Affecting the Future Status of France and the French Empire," January 29, 1944, box 57. Back.
Note 8: An excellent account of the attitudes of Welles and Roosevelt toward de Gaulle and the Free French is Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1994), particularly the essay "The United States and the Free French" by Kim Munholland. Milton Viorst's Hostile Allies: FDR and Charles de Gaulle (New York: Macmillan, 1965) is more sympathetic to de Gaulle, as is Dorothy Shipley White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, Free France and the Allies (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964). Back.
Note 9: This despite U.S. diplomatic relations with Vichy until November 1942. Back.
Note 10: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942. Back.
Note 11: Elizabeth R. Cameron, "Alexis Saint-Léger Léger," in The Diplomats: 1919-1939, ed. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 379. Back.
Note 12: Léger doubled as a Symbolist poet, writing under the name St. John Perse. He had been an ally of the French statesman Aristide Briand in the 1920s, and had fled Paris after the French collapse. See, for example, Elizabeth R. Cameron, "Alexis Saint-Léger Léger," 378-405. Back.
Note 13: Washington Times-Herald, January 6, 1941. Back.
Note 14: Léger to Welles, August 23, 1941, box 70, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Léger, August 25, 1941, box 70, Welles papers, FDRL; Raoul Aglion, Roosevelt and de Gaulle: Allies in Conflict, A Personal Memoir (New York: Free Press, 1988), 115; Nicholas Wahl supports Aglion's view of Welles's role in shaping the American attitude toward the Free French. Wahl adds that, while Léger "didn't get to see Roosevelt personally, he did see Sumner Welles, and Sumner Welles was the single most important counselor for Roosevelt in foreign policy at the time." See Paxton and Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States, 95-97. Welles ultimately brought Roosevelt and Léger together during a dinner at Oxon Hill Manor. Back.
Note 15: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Léger, August 13, 1942, box 80, folder 10, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Roosevelt, August 13, 1942, PSF 77, Papers of FDR, FDRL. Back.
Note 16: Despite de Gaulle's defiance of Hitler, the feeling persisted in Washington that he had fascist inclinations. "[The British] have built up this French Adolf for the past three years," wrote H. Freeman Matthews. See Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," American Historical Review 80:5 (December 1975): 1288. Back.
Note 17: Léger to Welles, August 15, 1942, box 80, folder 10, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Léger, October 19, 1942, box 80, Welles papers, FDRL; Munholland, "The United States and the Free French," in De Gaulle and the United States, 88-89. Back.
Note 18: Welles to Léger, November 26, 1943, with enclosure by Welles, "Our Obligation to the People of France," box 89, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 38, December 19, 1942; P minutes 46, March 6, 1943. Back.
Note 19: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 21, August 8, 1942, box 55; Notter and Rothwell, "The Possibilities of Revolution During and Immediately Following the Present War," August 30, 1941, Notter files, box 8 Back.
Note 20: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942. Back.
Note 21: Welles had been behind Roosevelt's choice of Leahy in December 1940, angering William Bullitt, who was not consulted in the appointment. In the wake of the already deep differences between Bullitt and Welles over the Welles Mission and the sleeping car porter scandal, the Leahy appointment further increased the animosity between them. Back.
Note 22: Welles to Leahy, March 27, 1942, box 80, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 23: This accusation against Herriot is somewhat misleading. The Chamber and Senate were specially convened at Vichy to vote full powers to Petain. Herriot certainly voted in favor, but so did hundreds of others. Neither the Chamber nor Senate met again. Back.
Note 24: Welles to Leahy, March 27, 1942, box 80, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 25: FO 371/31949 Campbell to Foreign Office, April 13, 1942, PRO. "Minister" in this case refers to the number two posting in the embassy, not to a cabinet level position. Back.
Note 26: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, "Free French movement," May 8, 1942, box 164, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 27: FO 371/ 31965, Halifax to Foreign Office, May 8, 1942, PRO; Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 340-41. Back.
Note 28: FO 371/31965, Halifax to Foreign Office, May 8, 1942, PRO. Back.
Note 29: FO 371/31965, Foreign Office to Dominions, May 16, 1942, including copy of Halifax to Foreign Office, May 11, 1942, PRO. Back.
Note 30: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, "Free French Movement," May 25, 1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 31: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, May 28, 1942, FRUS, vol. II, 521-523. Back.
Note 32: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, May 28, 1942, FRUS, vol. II, 521-523; Aglion, Roosevelt and de Gaulle, 114-115. Back.
Note 33: Aglion, Roosevelt and de Gaulle, 114-115. Back.
Note 34: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Tixier, May 13, 1942, box 85, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 35: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Tixier, June 21, 1942, box 85, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 36: Memorandum of conversation between Roosevelt, Welles, Tixier, and Philippe, November 20, 1942, box 85, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 37: P minutes 38, December 19, 1942, box 55; P document 158, "Policies Affecting the Postwar Position of France," December 18, 1942, box 57; P document 158a, "Official Statements and Views Affecting the Future Status of France and the French Empire," January 29, 1944, box 57. Back.
Note 38: P minutes 46, March 6, 1943. More accurately, France had not signed a "separate peace" with Germany, but only an armistice. Back.
Note 39: P document 158, "Policies Affecting the Postwar Position of France," December 18, 1942, box 57. Back.
Note 40: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Tixier, January 29, 1943, box 162, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 41: Léger memorandum to Welles, January 19, 1943, box 89, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 42: After their arrival in Washington, Chautemps and his wife began to annoy Welles after Madame Juliette Chautemps began making requests of Welles to arrange for her to perform with the National Symphony Orchestra. "I do not see my way to becoming a concert agent for his wife," Welles wrote. Welles to Dunn, May 27, 1942, box 77, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles to Juliette Chautemps, February 12, 1942, box 77, Welles papers, FDRL; Juliette Chautemps to Welles, February 8, 1942, box 77, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 43: Chautemps to Welles, February 17, 1943, box 87, Welles papers, FDRL; Atherton to Welles, March 1, 1943, box 87, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 44: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Tixier, March 23, 1943, box 162, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 45: Welles to Atherton, June 16, 1943, box 88, folder 6, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 46: Washington Post, April 26, 1943. Back.
Note 47: FO 371/35994, Foreign Office Minute, April 1943, PRO; Welles to Harry Hopkins, January 2, 1943 with enclosed Matthews telegram to Welles, January 1, 1943, box 88, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 48: See the unedited version of Welles's report to the president in Welles, "Memorandum of Conversation with Churchill," March 12, 1940, Welles Report, 1940, Part II, PSF 6, FDRL. Back.
Note 49: Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 62. For accounts that wartime Anglo-American relations were less than harmonious, see, for example, William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). Back.
Note 50: Welles also had no hesitation about openly clashing with Churchill at the Atlantic Conference. This contrasts with Harry Hopkins, who tended to be enamored of the British, and Churchill in particular. Upon meeting Churchill for the first time, Hopkins sat in a chair muttering "Jesus Christ! What a man!" See FO 371/26179, minute by Cadogan, January 29, 1941, PRO. See also, for example, George McJimsey, Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 137-139. For a critical official British assessment of Welles see FO 371/21541 "Records of Leading Personalities in the U.S.," January 12, 1937, PRO. Back.
Note 51: Welles to Atherton, March 6, 1943, box 88, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL; memorandum of conversation between Welles and Campbell, March 4, 1943, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL. Although Welles often accused the British Embassy of leaking information damaging to the U.S. administration, this was in fact a favorite practice of his own. Welles often used the press to indirectly criticize British policies, but his own newspaper columns after his resignation, when he was suddenly freed from his official status and could now more freely speak his mind, often placed the blame more directly upon the British. See, for example, Drew Pearson, "Confessions of an S.O.B.," Saturday Evening Post, November 3, 1956; Roosevelt to Caroline Phillips, August 30, 1944, President's Secretary's Files, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Sumner Welles, "Welles Sees Opportunity for U.S. to Lead in New Far East Policy," New York Herald Tribune, May 31, 1944; Sumner Welles, "Welles Says Allied Conferences Must Deal with Colonial Issues," New York Herald Tribune, April 4, 1945. Back.
Note 52: As Christopher Thorne has argued, "Britain urgently needed a strong, friendly France after the war, both for reasons of European defense and as a counterweight to the growing predominance in world affairs of the United States and the Soviet Union." See Christopher Thorne, "Indochina and Anglo-American Relations," Pacific Historical Review, 45:1 (February 1975): 85. Back.
Note 53: An example of Welles's views toward the British government can be seen in P minutes 37, December 12, 1942, box 55. In his syndicated column, Welles publicly described the Churchill cabinet as reactionary and intransigent. See, for example, "Welles Sees Colonial Policies Reshaped by Attlee Victory: Believes Labor's Sweep May Challenge Imperial Traditions and Result in Peace Settlements in Keeping With Popular Aspirations," New York Herald Tribune, August 8, 1945. Back.
Note 54: P minutes 37, December 12, 1942; P minutes 48, March 20, 1943; "Problems confronting the United States in connection with the British Empire," by Division of European Affairs, December 12, 1942, box 193, Welles papers, FDRL; P document 218, "Agenda for Meeting of April 3, 1943," April 1, 1943, box 193, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 55: Donovan to Welles, February 21, 1942 and March 6, 1942, box 77, folder 12, Welles papers, FDRL; E document 200, "The Financial Problems of Postwar Britain," October 26, 1943. Back.
Note 56: Welles to Roosevelt, April 6, 1942, box 150, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 57: Welles memorandum of conversation with Law and Halifax, "Postwar Problems," August 25, 1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 58: CAB 65/19 WM(41) 89th, September 4, 1941, PRO; CAB 65/19 WM(41) 91st, September 8, 1941, PRO. The British also noted that the Russians seemed less than satisfied with the results of the Atlantic Charter. In London, Soviet ambassador Ivan Maisky complained to Eden that it seemed "as if England and the USA imagine themselves as almighty God called upon to judge the rest of the sinful world, including my country." See Lloyd Gardner, Spheres of Influence: The Great Powers Divide Europe from Munich to Yalta (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993), 102. Back.
Note 59: FO 371/ 31525, "Four Power Plan," by Jebb, September 9, 1942, PRO; WP(42)516, "Four Power Plan," by Eden, November 8, 1942, PRO. Back.
Note 60: FO 371/31525 "Four Power Plan," by Eden, November 8, 1942, PRO. Back.
Note 61: CAB 65/28 WM(42) 157th conclusions, November 23, 1942, PRO; memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, November 30, 1942, FRUS, vol. III, 1-2. Back.
Note 62: P minutes 37, December 12, 1942. Back.
Note 63: Welles often dominated such discussions because of his long association with the German question. He had visited Germany almost annually throughout his life, beginning as a boy during his yearly visits to Europe with his family. He also spoke the language and had a wide circle of German friends. Welles's long association with Germany is explained in Welles to Bailey, March 8, 1948, box 129, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 64: "The Realization of a Great Vision," May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 65: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 18, 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. III, 520. Back.
Note 66: P minutes 7, April 18, 1942, box 55 Back.
Note 67: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 18, 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. III, 520. Back.
Note 68: Several scholars have commented on the views Welles held at that moment on the Germany question. Keith Sainsbury has noted that, "it is significant that the party in favour of partition in this committee was led by Sumner Welles, widely regarded as 'Roosevelt's man' in the State Department, and one who might be presumed to know the trend of presidential thinking." See Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The War They Fought and the Peace They Hoped to Make (London: Macmillan, 1994), 146. But Welles's views on Germany were constantly evolving. While he favored some kind of partition of Germany, he sought to find a middle ground between complete unification and more draconian aims being developed in Washington to pastoralize Germany or fragment her into hundreds of tiny states. He soon came to support a federation of several autonomous German states within a new Zollverein, or German customs union. He also toyed with the idea of having autonomous German states integrated into a larger, federated, Western Europe. See P document 175, "Agenda for Meetings on Germany," January 15, 1943, box 57; P document 186, "Memorandum to Welles from Division of Political Studies," January 22, 1943, box 57; P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 6, April 11, 1942; as well as Welles's chapter "The German Menace Can Be Ended" (including a detailed map of Welles's recommendations for Germany) in The Time For Decision, 336-359. Back.
Note 69: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 6, April 11, 1942; P minutes 7, April 18, 1942; P document 12, "Why the Division of Germany is Desirable," 1942, box 56; Welles to Representative John Bennett, February 19, 1948, box 129, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 70: Throughout the course of the subcommittee's discussions on Germany, Welles would change his mind several times on the postwar status of Austria. By the June 20, 1942 meeting of the political subcommittee Welles would return to his initial impulse and recommend that an independent Austria be restored at the end of the war. He would note that this decision received "almost unanimous" approval. See P minutes 16, June 20, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 71: P minutes 7, April 18, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 72: P minutes 7, April 18, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 73: P minutes 42, January 23, 1943, box 55; P minutes 43, January 30, 1943, box 55; P document 187, "Some Economic Problems Involved in Application of a Proposals to Divide Germany into Three Independent States," January 30, 1943, box 57; P minutes 7, April 18, 1942, box 55; P minutes 30, October 24, 1942, box 55; P document 177, "Postwar Policies Related to Germany," January 15, 1943, box 57. Back.
Note 74: P minutes 9, May 2, 1942, box 55; P minutes 16, June 20, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 75: A Harvard graduate with an American mother, Hanfstangl served Hitler for a time as a press adviser and unofficial court jester. While on a flight to Spain at the height of that country's Civil War in 1937, Hanfstangl learned that he was to be thrown out in mid-air over Republican-held territory. He escaped during a stopover in Switzerland. Back.
Note 76: John Franklin Carter to Ronald Campbell, May 26, 1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL; John Franklin Carter, "Memorandum for Mr. Welles: Plan to Recruit German and Italian Nationals," October 22, 1942, box 77, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 77: Ronald Campbell to Welles, January 27, 1943, Welles papers, box 164, FDRL; Welles to Carter, September 13, 1946, with enclosure, box 116, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 78: P minutes 30, October 24, 1942, box 55; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56. Back.
Note 79: P minutes 29, October 17, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 80: T document 130, "Transfer of German Populations From Eastern Europe to the Reich," October 22, 1942, box 61; T document 131, "German Capacity to Absorb Additional Population into a Reduced Territory," October 21, 1942, box 61; P minutes 29, October 17, 1942, box 55; P minutes 30, October 24, 1942, box 55; P document 175, "Agenda for Meetings on Germany," January 15, 1943, box 57; P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 6, April 11, 1942. Back.
Note 81: P document 175, "Agenda for Meetings on Germany," January 15, 1943, box 57; P document 186, "Memorandum to Welles from Division of Political Studies regarding Germany," January 22, 1943, box 57; P document 182, "Myron Taylor memorandum on Germany," January 23, 1943, box 57; P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 6, April 11, 1942; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56. Back.
Note 82: P document 236, "Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57; P document 182, "Memorandum Concerning an Approach to the Post-War Rehabilitation of Germany and to a Basis for Lasting Peace on the European Continent," Jan 23, 1943, box 57. Back.
Note 83: CAB 66/37 WP(43)217 "Annex: Armistice and Related Problems," March 24, 1943, PRO; P document 236, "Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57; P document 182, "Memorandum Concerning an Approach to the Post-War Rehabilitation of Germany and to a Basis for Lasting Peace on the European Continent," Jan 23, 1943, box 57; P document 186, Division of Political Studies memo to Welles (Germany), January 22, 1943, box 57; P document 186, "Postwar Policies Relating to Germany," January 15, 1943, box 57; P minutes 42, January 23, 1943, box 55. Back.
Note 84: P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56; P minutes 42, January 23, 1943, box 55; P minutes 43, January 30, 1943, box 55; P document 187, "Some Economic Problems Involved in Application of a Proposals to Divide Germany into Three Independent States," January 30, 1943, box 57. Back.
Note 85: "In terms of hours of discussion," wrote William Roger Louis, "the amount of talk and paperwork [at the State Department] must have surpassed the British equivalent a hundredfold." See Louis, Imperialism at Bay (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 70. Back.
Note 86: CAB 66/34 WP(43)96, "The Future of Germany," by Anthony Eden, March 8, 1943, PRO. Back.
Note 87: Keith Sainsbury has argued that Eden tacked "backwards and forwards on the issue of German partition, which left both allies and colleagues in doubt as to his real views, and does not add to his reputation as Foreign Minister." See Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War, 140. See also CAB 66/34 WP(43)96, "The Future of Germany," by Anthony Eden, March 8, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/35 WP(43)144, "The Future of Germany," by Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, April 8, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/35 WP(43)322, "Postwar Settlement-Policy in Respect of Germany," by Attlee, July 19, 1943, PRO; CAB 65/35 WM(43)107th Conclusions, July 29, 1943; CAB 66/39 WP(43)350, "Ministerial Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration," by Churchill, August 4, 1943, PRO. Back.
Note 88: Pasvolsky memorandum of conversation with Roosevelt and Hull, October 5, 1943, FRUS, 1943, vol. I, 541-543; Minutes of the seventh meeting of the foreign ministers, Moscow, October 25, 1943, FRUS, 1943, vol. I, 631-632; Cordell Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1265-1266. Back.
Note 89: Welles's ideas for an East European Union will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven. Back.
Note 90: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 7, April 18, 1942; P minutes 8, April 25, 1942; P minutes 9, May 2, 1942; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56; P minutes 31, October 31, 1942, box 55; P minutes 39, January 2, 1943, box 55. Czechoslovakia held a special place in many of their hearts. Several planners believed Woodrow Wilson had been the midwife of the Czechoslovak republic, born at Paris in 1919, and which between the wars formed an island of democracy in Central Europe. Welles had visited Czechoslovakia numerous times before the war and had much respect for Thomas Masaryk. Back.
Note 91: Palacky: "Assuredly, if the Austrian state had not already existed, the interests of Europe and indeed of humanity would have required that we create it, and that as soon as possible." For Welles's use of Palacky's dictum see, for example, P minutes 45, February 20, 1943, box 55. Back.
Note 92: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 10, May 9, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 93: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 10, May 9, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 94: P minutes 11, May 16, 1942, box 55; P minutes 13, May 30, 1942; P minutes 14, June 6, 1942; P document 16, "Plan for Central European Union," May 27, 1942, box 56; E document 25, "Economic Subcommittee memorandum to Political Subcommittee: Tentative Economic Organization of the East European Federation: Economic Relations of the East European Federation with the United Nations Organization," box 56. Back.
Note 95: P minutes 10, May 9, 1942, box 55; P minutes 8, April 25, 1942; Welles to Roosevelt, August 30, 1942, PSF 77, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Gen. Joseph McNarney to Welles, August 29, 1942, Roosevelt Papers, PSF 77, FDRL. Back.
Note 96: Welles to Roosevelt, March 31, 1942, box 77, folder 12, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 97: Sforza to Welles, November 21, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, folder 10, FDRL. Back.
Note 98: P minutes 12, May 23, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 99: Welles's ideas on postwar planning for the Soviet Union will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven. Back.
Note 100: T document 228, "Soviet Rule in Eastern Poland, 1939-1941," January 23, 1943, box 62; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56; P minutes 2, March 14, 1942, box 55; P minutes 19, July 18, 1942, box 55; P minutes 35, November 28, 1942; P document 236, "Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57; T document 378, "Soviet Rule in the Baltic States, June 1940-June 1941," September 16, 1943, box 65. Back.
Note 101: The most exhaustive study of U.S. postwar planning for Italy has concluded that the planning committees "had laid the basis for wartime American political reconstruction policy by mid-January 1943." See James Edward Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 44. Back.
Note 102: P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 26, September 26, 1942, box 55; P minutes 39, January 2, 1943, box 55; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56; Miller, The United States and Italy, 35-37. Back.
Note 103: Sforza to Welles, June 19, 1941, Sforza to Welles, September 2, 1941, Welles to Atherton, September 10, 1941, box 73, folder 3, Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 39, January 2, 1943, box 55; P document 163, "Italy," January 1, 1943, box 57; T document 202, "The Italian Empire: Political Considerations," December 29, 1942, box 61; Miller, The United States and Italy, 44. Back.
Note 104: Welles to Roosevelt, February 24, 1942, box 151, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 105: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Ronald Campbell, "Free Italian Movement," August 14, 1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL; memorandum of conversation between Welles and Sforza, February 8, 1943, box 92, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 106: Jones to Welles, November 14, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 107: Welles to Berle, November 9, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL. Count Sforza returned to Italy in September 1943 but refused to join Marshal Pietro Badoglio's government until the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel, whom Sforza called the "Petain of Italy." He was elected president of Italy's parliamentary assembly in September 1945. Back.
Note 108: P document 236, "Political Subcommittee: Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57; T document 202, "The Italian Empire: Political Considerations," December 29, 1942, box 61. After the war, the guidelines for the future of Italy produced by the planners would be for the most part realized. Italy would be stripped of its African empire and reconstructed along liberal, democratic, and capitalist lines. Back.
Note 109: Agenda for the meeting of January 2, 1943, "The Territorial Problems of Italy," box 193, Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 39, January 2, 1943, box 55, Notter files; T document 202, "The Italian Empire: Political Considerations," December 29, 1942, box 61, Notter files; P document 168, "The Italian Colonies," January 2, 1943, box 57; P document 164, "The Dodecanese Islands," January 2, 1943, box 57; P document 167, "The Metropolitan Islands," January 2, 1943, box 57. Back.
Note 110: Berle Diary, May 12, 1943, Berle papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 111: Welles, Time For Decision, 272-276; P minutes 20, August 1, 1942, box 55, Notter files; P minutes 47, March 13, 1943, box 55, Notter files; P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: Part I: Treatment of Japan," March 10, 1943, box 193, Welles papers, FDRL; S document 18a, "Conditions for Japanese Surrender to the United Nations," March 13, 1943, box 76, RG 59, Notter Files; E document 155, Japanese Postwar Economic Considerations," July 21, 1943, box 82, Notter files. Back.
Note 112: Akira Iriye, Power and Culture, 66-69; Francis Clifford Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 332. Back.
Note 113: P minutes 20, August 1, 1942, box 55, Notter files; P minutes 47, March 13, 1943; P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: Part I: Treatment of Japan," March 10, 1943, box 193, Welles papers, FDRL Back.
Note 114: Akira Iriye has noted that, even at this early date (c.1942), "postwar Japan was being visualized as a nonaggressive, noncolonial country whose survival would hinge upon the establishment of an economically interdependent world." See Iriye, Power and Culture, 61. Back.
Note 115: P minutes 20, August 1, 1942, box 55; P minutes 47, March 13, 1943; P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: Part I: Treatment of Japan," March 10, 1943, box 193, Welles papers, FDRL; E document 155, "Japanese Postwar Economic Considerations," July 21, 1943, box 82, Notter files. Back.
Note 116: An excellent summary of America's more draconian suggestions for postwar Japan can be found in Rudolf V. A. Janssens, What Future For Japan?: U.S. Wartime Planning For The Postwar Era, 1942-1945 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), 52-54; as well as in Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 3-4; and the early portions of John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: Norton, 1999). Back.
Note 117: Roosevelt and Welles were less concerned about a Soviet or revolutionary threat in East Asia than they were about the continuance of the British Empire in the region. According to Michael Schaller, the British "in particular feared that American policy had determined to pull down the foundations of the empire even before a final verdict was rendered. ... Churchill believed Roosevelt's game was to make China strong enough to 'police' Asia while remaining essentially dependent upon the United States. The prime minister complained to subordinates that the Americans expected to use China as a 'faggot vote on the side of the United States in an attempt to liquidate the British overseas Empire.'" See Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 91-93. Back.
Note 118: Welles offered a detailed description of his wartime views of China in his "Milwaukee Town Hall Speech," October 23, 1950, speech files, box 199, FDRL. See also E document 109 "Postwar Problems of China," April 15, 1943, box 81, RG 59, Notter Files; and P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: further problems for consideration: Part II: the Problems of China," March 10, 1943, box 193, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; as well as P minutes 47, March 13, 1943, box 55, Notter files. Back.
Note 119: For a detailed analysis of U.S. policy toward China during the First World War see, for example, Warren I. Cohen, "America and the May Fourth Movement: The Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1917-1921," Pacific Historical Review 35:1 (February 1966): 83-100. Back.
Note 120: Welles, "Milwaukee Town Hall Speech," October 23, 1950, speech files, box 199, Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 47, March 13, 1943, box 55, Notter files; Ta Jen Liu, A History of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations, 1840-1974 (Taipei: China Academy, 1978), 250-251. Back.
Note 121: "What Do We Desire of China? Preliminary Considerations," no date [c.1942], box 11, Notter Files; P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: further problems for consideration: Part II: the Problems of China," March 10, 1943, box 193, folder 9, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, 290. Back.
Note 122: See, for example, Sumner Welles, Time for Decision, 220-223. See also: Irwin Gellman, Good Neighbor Policy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 172-174; and Frank McCann, Jr., The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 53, 282-283, 325. Back.
Note 123: P minutes 47, March 13, 1943, box 55, Notter files; P document 213, "Agenda for the meeting of March 13, 1943: further problems for consideration: Part II: the Problems of China," March 10, 1943, box 193, Welles papers, FDRL; P minutes 21, August 8, 1942, box 55, Notter files. Back.
Note 124: A detailed account of Britain's prewar indifference toward the plight of China can be found in Aron Shai, "Was there a Far Eastern Munich?" Journal of Contemporary History 9:3 (July 1974): 161-169; while London's low opinion of the Chinese during the war is partially explained in Shai's "Britain, China and the End of Empire," Journal of Contemporary History 15:2 (April 1980): 287-297. Back.
Note 125: FO 371/31632 Foreign Office Minute on China, January 26, 1942, PRO. Back.
Note 126: T document 137, "The Problem of Hong Kong: Possible Solutions," October 25, 1942, box 61, Notter files; T document 136, "The Problem of Hong Kong: Basic Data," October 23, 1942, box 61, Notter files; P minutes 22, August 15, 1942, box 55, Notter files; Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," 1280. Back.
Note 127: FO 371/31632 Foreign Office Minute on China, January 26, 1942, PRO; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 4 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975), 488-522; T document 302, "The Suez Canal and Egyptian Interests," April 1, 1943, box 63, Notter files. Back.
Note 128: CAB 65/34 WM(43) 53rd, April 13, 1943, PRO; P document 117, "British Political Ferment Involving Postwar Objectives, " October 17, 1942, box 56, Notter files. Back.
Note 129: See, for example, Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 46-50. Washington's extensive investments in China went beyond the political and military spheres and included the State Department's pursuit of an aggressive cultural policy toward China. See, for example, Frank Ninkovich, "Cultural Relations and American China Policy, 1942-1945," Pacific Historical Review 49:3 (August 1980): 471-498; as well as Wilma Fairbank, America's Cultural Experiment in China, 1942-1949 (Washington: Department of State, 1976); and Christopher Jespersen, American Images of China, 1931-1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 130: With the American island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, the Chinese theater became more peripheral to Roosevelt's wartime strategy. In any event, in May 1944 Roosevelt began easing his efforts to develop China as one of the four great powers. See LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina," 1288. For an account that Roosevelt held exaggerated beliefs about China's prospects, see Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind, 307-309, 724. Furthermore, Michael Schaller in his The U.S. Crusade in China sees U.S. officials as having been blind to significant changes occurring within wartime China. Back.
Note 131: The July 1945 Potsdam declaration on Japan closely resembled the conclusions of Welles's planning committees. Akira Iriye has declared that, "the Potsdam declaration was clearly an American product, summing up more than three years of planning and deliberations within the United States government. See Iriye, Power and Culture, 263. Back.
Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943
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