Note 1: Armstrong to Welles, July 14, 1941, Welles papers, box 67, folder 3, FDRL; Welles to Pasvolsky, July 15, 1941, Welles papers, box 67, folder 3, FDRL; Harley Notter memoranda, October 20, 1941 and December 8, 1941, box 8, RG 59, Notter Files, National Archives. The most exhaustive account of the history of the postwar planning committees remains Harley Notter's Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation: 1939-1945 (Washington: Department of State Publication, 1950). An excellent account of the historiography of postwar planning can be found in William C. Widenor, "American Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the Right Questions?" Diplomatic History, 6:3 (Summer 1982): 245-265. Back.
Note 2: Sumner Welles, "Commercial Policy After the War," October 7, 1941, speech files, Welles papers, box 195, FDRL. See also, for example, Harley Notter memorandum, October 20, 1941, box 8, RG 59, Notter Files, National Archives; as well as "Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy: Preliminaries," not dated, 1941, RG 59, Notter Files, box 54, National Archives. Back.
Note 3: "Our people realize that at any moment, war may be forced upon us," Roosevelt said in his remarks that same day during Armistice Day ceremonies across the Potomac River at Arlington National Cemetery. New York Times, November 12, 1941. Back.
Note 4: Sumner Welles, "Wilson and the Atlantic Charter," November 11, 1941, speech files, box 195, FDRL. The late president's widow, Edith Bolling Wilson, wrote to Welles the following day. "I asked Mrs. Welles to tell you how deeply I appreciated your making the address yesterday. Aside from its personal side it will stand out as one of the noblest expressions of these soul-searching days." Edith Bolling Wilson to Sumner Welles, November 12, 1941, scrapbook, 1941, Welles Papers, box 241, FDRL. Back.
Note 5: All of Welles's speeches during this period repeated these themes. See, for example, "An Association of Nations," July 22, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; "Commercial Policy After the War," October 7, 1941, speech files, Welles papers, box 195, FDRL; "The Realization of a Great Vision," May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 6: Welles to Roosevelt, October 18, 1941 (with enclosed Welles to Hull draft), Welles Papers, box 151, folder 9, FDRL. Back.
Note 7: Pasvolsky to Welles, October 8, 1941, Notter Files, Box 54; Leo Pasvolsky, "Proposal for the Organization of Work for the Formulation of Post-War Foreign Policies," September 12, 1941, Notter Files, Box 54; Welles to Roosevelt, October 18, 1941, Official File 4351, FDRL; Hull to Roosevelt, December 28, 1941, Official File 4720, FDRL. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle said that the advisory committee was Welles's idea. See, for example, notes from interview with Berle, by Harold Gosnell, February 2, 1948, "Overall History of Department of State," (Sumner Welles) 4E3, 6/29/D, Box 1, RG 59, War History Branch Studies, National Archives. Back.
Note 8: FO 371/26425, Churchill telegram to war cabinet, December 24, 1941, PRO; "Memorandum of Conversation by Welles," December 29, 1941, FRUS, 1942, vol. I, 21-22; rough drafts of Declaration, December 1941January 1942, President's Secretary's File 168, FDRL; "Declaration by United Nations," January 1, 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. I, 25-26.; "Memorandum on Official Statements on Post-War Policy," January 3, 1942, Notter file, box 8, National Archives; Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), 178. Back.
Note 9: Sumner Welles, "The Road Before the Americas," January 15, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 10: Welles's presence at the Atlantic Conference had already further strained his relationship with Hull. The press described Hull as "affronted and sore" at being left behind, and one newspaper reported that "Mr. Hull did not ask Mr. Welles where he was going and does not know." Chicago Times, August 12, 1941. Hull had also taken issue with the Atlantic Conference's joint Anglo-American statement on the Far East and Japan, which he thought dangerously provocative. He worried that the declaration's strong language opposing further Japanese territorial expansion would undermine his ongoing negotiations with Japanese diplomatic representatives, whereas Welles devoted himself to an effort, dubbed another "Welles plan" by the American press, to further squeeze the Axis powers by cornering the market on the strategic materials necessary to wage war. Furthermore, Hull, who had devoted much of his career to promoting free trade, was keenly disappointed by article four of the charter. He believed Churchill's insertion of the phrase "with due respect for their existing obligations" had rendered the article virtually meaningless, and he blamed Welles for not holding his ground on behalf of free trade. See Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1018, 975, 1144; Washington Post, September 19, 1941. Back.
Note 11: Welles cable to Roosevelt, January 24, 1942, Welles papers, box 151, folder 11, FDRL; Berle Diary, February 1, 1942, box 213, Berle Papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 12: According to observers, when Hull heard the radio reports of Welles's endorsement of the compromise resolution, he phoned Welles in Rio and a "violent conversation" ensued. "As I heard the conversation wear on," Berle wrote of the Welles-Hull telephone dispute, "I felt that several careers were ending that night. ... For it is obvious that now there is a breach between the Secretary and Sumner which will never be healedthough the Secretary will keep it below hatches to some extent. Life in this Department under those circumstances will be about as difficult as anything I can think of." Berle Diary, January 24, 1942, box 213, Berle Papers, FDRL. According to one scholar of the Rio Conference, "The greatest significance of the meeting in retrospect may have been the degree to which it deepened the split between Hull and Welles." See Michael J. Francis, "The United States at Rio, 1942: the Strains of Pan-Americanism," Journal of Latin American Studies 6 (1974): 94. Back.
Note 13: Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), 182-183. Back.
Note 14: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives. Back.
Note 15: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives; Welles, Seven Decisions, 182-183. Back.
Note 16: Welles, Seven Decisions, 182-83. Back.
Note 17: Harley Notter, "Official Statements of Postwar Policy," January 2, 1942, Welles papers, box 190, FDRL; P minutes 2, March 14, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives. Back.
Note 18: Harley Notter, "Official Statements of Postwar Policy," January 2, 1942, Welles papers, box 190, FDRL; P minutes 2, March 14, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, National Archives. Several scholars have criticized Roosevelt for being largely uninterested in postwar matters. See, for example, William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 439-440; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 358-359. Back.
Note 19: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, National Archives. Back.
Note 20: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 21: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 22: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 23: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 24: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, April 4, 1942, Notter files, box 54; Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper, 1946), 19, 23-27. Back.
Note 25: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, May 2, 1942. Back.
Note 26: P minutes 17, June 27, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 27: P minutes 17, June 27, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 28: P minutes 17, June 27, 1942, box 55; P minutes 33, November 14, 1942, box 55; Minutes of the Special Subcommittee on International Organization, 34, April 9, 1943, box 85 [hereafter referred to as PIO minutes and PIO documents]; PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 56; S minutes 24, January 22, 1943, box 76; S document 44, "The Character and Functions of a Permanent International Security Organization," August 11, 1942, box 77; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56. Back.
Note 29: It should also be noted that at various times during the war President Roosevelt appeared to agree with Welles on these issues, but in the wake of Welles's resignation, Roosevelt gradually moved away from these positions on regionalism, the collective use of force, and trusteeship. Back.
Note 30: Welles, Seven Decisions, 125, 182-183; Welles, Time For Decision, 367-368. Back.
Note 31: PIO minutes 1, July 17, 1942, box 85, Notter Files, [all references to PIO minutes are from Notter Files, Record Group 59, National Archives, unless otherwise stated]. Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 18. Back.
Note 32: PIO minutes 1, July 17, 1942; PIO document 1, "Statement by Van Kleffens," July 17, 1942, box 86. Back.
Note 33: PIO minutes 1, July 17, 1942; PIO document 1, "Statement by Van Kleffens," July 17, 1942, box 86. Back.
Note 34: PIO minutes 2, July 31, 1942; PIO document 2, James T. Shotwell, "Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization," box 85; PIO document 3, Isaiah Bowman, "Memorandum by Isaiah Bowman on International Organization," box 85; PIO document 4, Benjamin Cohen, "Some Observations Regarding the Form of World Political Organization," box 85; PIO document 5, Clark Eichelberger, "Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization," box 85. Back.
Note 35: While the League of Nations would be abandoned, Welles and the planners aimed to build upon its more useful features. In late August, for example, the committee once again returned to the Wilson era for instruction when it examined a 1918 draft by Colonel Edward House suggesting ways a world organization could be strengthened. See PIO document 24, "Draft of Colonel House, July 16, 1918: suggestion for a Covenant of League of Nations," box 86. Back.
Note 36: PIO minutes 5, August 14, 1942; Wallace to Welles, August 8, 1942, Henry A. Wallace Papers as Vice President, 1941-1945, FDRL. Back.
Note 37: PIO document 30, "Draft Article on International Trusteeship," August 21, 1942, box 86; PIO minutes, 7, September 4, 1942. The subject of trusteeship will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter Six. Back.
Note 38: PIO minutes 14, October 30, 1942; PIO document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," October 28, 1942, box 87; PIO document 123, "Draft Constitution of International Organization," December 3, 1942, box 87. Back.
Note 39: PIO minutes 14, October 30, 1942; PIO document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," October 28, 1942, box 87; PIO document 123, "Draft Constitution of International Organization," December 3, 1942, box 87. Back.
Note 40: P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, 23, 27; Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 85-89, 110-114; P minutes 33, November 14, 1942. Back.
Note 41: Sumner Welles, "The Realization of a Great Vision," delivered at Arlington National Cemetery, May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Welles may have borrowed this concept from Wilson; see, for example, Mark T. Gilderhaus, "Pan-American Initiatives: The Wilson Presidency and 'Regional Integration,' 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 4:4 (Fall 1980): 409-423. Back.
Note 42: Welles, The Time For Decision, 381; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, 23-27; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56. "Roosevelt liked Welles's ideas because they combined the reality of regional power with the idealism of a world agency, and he operated with a strong regional orientation in his dealings with Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill. Although they devoted little of their attention to the subject, the Big Three leaders were in apparent agreement in general terms from the beginning. They saw a universal body to foster continued cooperation among the great powers as the most important requirement for a stable peace, but they also felt that the special interests of each in its own area had to be recognized." See J. Tillapaugh, "Closed Hemisphere and Open World? The Dispute Over Regional Security at the U.N. Conference, 1945," Diplomatic History 2:1 (Winter 1978): 25-42. Back.
Note 43: Welles, Seven Decisions, 184-185; P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political Problems," October 22, 1942, box 56; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56, Notter Files, National Archives. Back.
Note 44: P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political Problems," October 22, 1942, box 56; P minutes 7, April 18, 1942, box 55. Back.
Note 45: PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 56; P minutes 21, August 8, 1942, box 55; P document 33, "French Indochina," August 4, 1942, box 56; P document 42, "Netherlands East Indies," August 14, 1942, box 56. Back.
Note 46: PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 8, 1942, box 86; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56. Back.
Note 47: PIO minutes 4, August 14, 1942. Welles had begun a mid-August meeting of the subcommittee on international organization by reading aloud a confidential report prepared by the Republican foreign policy adviser John Foster Dulles regarding his recent trip to London. He told the planners that Dulles discerned a widespread feeling among the British that postwar Europe should be organized as a series of regional federations. He thought Dulles's report underscored the need for greater consultation and exchanges among the Big Three in the area of postwar planning. Dulles assumed the British had little interest in dismembering Germany and that there was no enthusiasm for reviving the League of Nations. He also sensed much resentment of the "current American tendency to condemn colonial imperialism." Dulles told the colonial office that the American people desired a "New Deal" for the dependent peoples of the colonial world, one that might be underwritten by the controlling powers themselves. Back.
Note 48: PIO minutes 4, August 14, 1942, box 85; FO 371/31525, Jebb to Eden, "World Organization," October 1942, PRO; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 5, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), 2; P document 117, "British Political Ferment Involving Post-War Objectives," October 17, 1942, box 56. Ambassador Halifax (who sat in on a portion of Welles's discussions with Law) was unsettled by Washington's support for a universal organization offering an equal vote to all nations, saying he "could not see the wisdom or the practical possibility of giving Liberia an equal determination in world affairs as the British Government." See Welles memorandum of conversation with Law and Halifax, "Postwar Problems," August 25, 1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 49: See, for example, FO 371/34136 Campbell to Foreign Office: "Mr. Welles's Secret Advisory Committee on Post War Policy," February 16, 1943, PRO. Back.
Note 50: CAB 66/30 WP (42) 480 "Postwar Atlantic Bases," (Van Kleffens's views), November 3, 1942, PRO; FO 371/31518, minute by Gladwyn Jebb, September 3, 1942, PRO. Back.
Note 51: CAB 66/31 WP (42) 516 "Four Power Plan," by Eden, November 8, 1942, PRO; CAB 66/31 WP (42) 532 "Four Power Plan," by Cripps, November 19, 1942, PRO; CAB 65/28 WM (42) 159, November 27, 1942, PRO. Back.
Note 52: FO 371/34136 Campbell to Foreign Office: "Mr. Welles's Secret Advisory Committee on Post War Policy," February 16, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/33 WP (43) 31 "The United Nations Plan," by Eden, January 16, 1943, PRO. Before departing for Washington with Eden, Gladwyn Jebb drafted another paper, which not only served as the basis for future British discussions on the postwar order, but also demonstrated the extent to which Welles's neo-Wilsonian ideas continued to lead the way. Jebb's memorandum acknowledged that, "The principles embodied in the [Atlantic] Charter will be the basis of any international world order after the war." See FO 371/35396, Gladwyn Jebb, "Suggestions for a Peace Settlement," March 6, 1943, PRO. Back.
Note 53: For a more thorough account of Eden's visit, see Warren F. Kimball, "Anglo-American War Aims, 1941-43, 'The First Review': Eden's Mission to Washington," in The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945, ed. Ann Lane and Howard Temperley (London: Macmillan, 1995), 1-21. Back.
Note 54: Welles had less to do with formulating U.S. policy on the concept of international police power. He had instead delegated most of the initial work to Norman Davis's subcommittee on security problems. But to better discuss how the world organization could best be endowed with military capability, in early April 1943 Welles's subcommittee on international organization began holding joint meetings with Davis's subcommittee. Two opposing views quickly emerged. One faction supported a system where nations would contribute forces from their own militaries. Proponents of this view argued that the contribution of individual national forces would pose less of a threat to the sovereignty of the member nations. It might also anticipate opposition from those who would oppose the concept of American forces fighting under the direct command of an international body. There was also some concern that international forces might pursue their own ends and prove impossible to oppose in an otherwise disarmed world. Advocates of the alternative view argued that a permanent, fully integrated United Nations army would have consistent training and thus would possess better esprit de corps. Greater military readiness would be achieved and member nations would have more difficulty withholding support for United Nations operations if their forces were already committed in advance. But finding the means to provide the United Nations Authority with an effective military arm remained one of the most daunting challenges facing the planners. Despite the Welles-Davis joint meetings, the planners remained stymied as to how best to incorporate the concept of police powers into the draft charter. See, for example, PIO minutes 34, April 9, 1943; PIO minutes 35, April 16, 1943; PIO minutes 36, April 29, 1943; Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 21; S document 44, "The Character and Functions of a Permanent International Security Organization," August 11, 1942, box 77, Notter files. Back.
Note 55: PIO document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," October 28, 1942, box 86; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56; Memorandum of conversation, by Welles, March 27, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 35-38; Donald Drummond, "Cordell Hull," in An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 206-207; "Eden's conversations in the United States, March 1943," Notter Files, box 19, National Archives. Back.
Note 56: Memorandum of Conversation, by Welles, March 16, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 19-24; memorandum of conversation, by Hull, March 22, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 34; CAB 65/34 WM(43) 53rd, April 13, 1943, PRO. Back.
Note 57: The British delegation had been in Washington only a few days when it took note of the tension between Welles and Hull, and particularly of Hull's lack of influence. Eden's private secretary, Oliver Harvey, thought Hull to be ill informed and excluded from many decisions. Harvey noted in his diary: "It is an exhausting country where the President can, and insists on, discussing foreign policy without his Foreign Secretary being present and without even wishing him to know what his ideas are." The British also noted that the Welles-Hull feud spilled over into simple matters of protocol, as when the two men held separate receptions for Eden and his delegation. Harry Hopkins casually told the British that Welles and Hull always gave separate official receptions. During one discussion near the end of his visit, Eden expressed surprise that Welles and Hull were together in the same room. "Their relations were vinegar," Eden noted. See Oliver Harvey, The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-45, ed. John Harvey (London: Collins, 1970), 229-240; Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 376-77. Back.
Note 58: Harvey, War Diaries, 232. Eden briefed Welles on Churchill's desire to have the United States take part in a regional council for Europe. Welles replied that the American people might not accept such expanded responsibilities for the United States unless they were sold in purely pragmatic and self-interested terms. Back.
Note 59: Memorandum of conversation by Hopkins, March 27, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 39. Back.
Note 60: FO 371/35368, memorandum of conversation with Welles, by Halifax, April 12, 1943, PRO; Harvey, War Diaries, 232; "Eden's conversations in the United States, March 1943," Notter Files, box 19, National Archives; CAB 66/35 WP (43) 130 "Foreign Secretary's Visit to Washington," by Eden, March 30, 1943, PRO. Reporting on how Eden's visit was being received in official circles in London, H. Freeman Matthews, an American diplomatic official in London, told Washington that the British feared another American withdrawal from world affairs similar to 1919-1920. But Matthews also noted concern in London that a strengthened America would attempt to impose its views on the rest of the world, particularly on the British Empire. "The alternate, or perhaps I should say the corollary, fear of 'American imperialism' is likewise real," Matthews added. See Matthews to Hull, March 20, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 26-28. "[It] is no exaggeration to say," Matthews continued, "that fear of an American withdrawal from its due interest in the building of the new world is the dominant factor in British feeling toward the United States today. Neither the British public nor the British Government dares count too strongly that the changed world and the lessons of the aftermath of 1919 will effectively prevent another American 'back to normalcy' wave with all its power to destroy the spirit of cooperation founded on wartime need." Back.
Note 61: Notes from FDR's press conference of March 30, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 41-42. "If some of you go back," Roosevelt told the assembled reporters, "some of you can, like myself, go back to 1918, the war came to a rather sudden end in November, 1918. And actually it's a fact that there had been very little work done on the post-war problems before Armistice Day. Well, between Armistice Day and the time that the nations met in Paris early in 1919, everybody was rushing around trying to dig up things." Back.
Note 62: FO 371/35366 "Eden memorandum of conversations in Washington," March 29, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/37 WP (43) 233 "The Structure of Postwar Settlement," by Churchill, June 10, 1943, PRO; FO 371/35435; "Churchill's views on postwar problems: May 1943," May 28, 1943, Notter Files, box 19. Back in London, Eden thought the prime minister's luncheon extremely productive. He felt that it had successfully reconfirmed the enthusiasm on the part of the United States, "and most notably Mr. Sumner Welles," for reaching wartime agreements with the other allies about the nature of the new international organization. See Eden, "Postwar Settlement," July 1, 1943, PRO. For a more detailed account of Churchill's views on postwar planning and international organization see, for example, E.J. Hughes, "Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization," Journal of Contemporary History 9:4 (October 1974): 177-194. Back.
Note 63: FO 371/35434 Halifax minute to foreign office and prime minister, June 11, 1943, PRO; FO 371/ 35435 Halifax to FO, June 29, 1943, PRO. Halifax's discussions with Welles prompted the Foreign Office's Gladwyn Jebb to draft a memorandum for the war cabinet outlining the areas of Anglo-American agreement on matters related to the international organization, and Eden followed with a memo recommending that the cabinet endorse Welles's ideas for regionalism. See FO 371/ 35435 "Memo by Jebb," June 12, 1943, PRO; FO 371/ 35435 Eden to Churchill, June 16, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/33 WP(43)31, "The United Nations Plan," by Eden, January 16, 1943, PRO. Back.
Note 64: P minutes 45, February 20, 1943. While Welles emphasized that such a move would send a clear message to Moscow and London that the United States was prepared to play a role in the postwar settlement, he may also have hoped it might forestall further unilateral territorial moves on the part of the Kremlin. Back.
Note 65: Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 94; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1640; Welles, Seven Decisions, 188-189. Back.
Note 66: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 20, 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. III, 522. Back.
Note 67: MacLeish to Welles, April 16, 1942, Welles papers, box 81, FDRL. Back.
Note 68: Sumner Welles, "The Realization of a Great Vision," delivered at Arlington National Cemetery, May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 69: Welles to Archibald MacLeish, August 13, 1942, box 81, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles, "The Realization of a Great Vision," delivered at Arlington National Cemetery, May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 70: New York Times, May 31, 1942; FO 371/31518, "Proposal by Mr. Sumner Welles for the Organization of Peace, " July 9, 1942, PRO; Sherwood to Welles, May 31, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL; Sherwood to Welles, June 25, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 71: New York Herald Tribune, June 9, 1942; New York Times, June 1, 1942. Back.
Note 72: P minutes, March 7, 1942; Sumner Welles, "Free Access to Raw Materials, "delivered at the National Foreign Trade Convention, October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles, "Blueprint for Peace," New York Herald Tribune Forum, November 17, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL. Back.
Note 73: Welles to MacLeish, August 13, 1942, Welles papers, box 81, folder 1, FDRL. Back.
Note 74: New York Times, May 31, 1942; Welles, "Free Access to Raw Materials," October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL. Nevertheless, the Democrats did poorly in the 1942 elections, and the old dictum that the outcomes of American elections do not turn on foreign policy questions was turned on its head. Former isolationists did well in the 1942 primaries, and in the general election the Republicans gained 46 seats in the House, and 10 in the Senate. Many interpreted the results as a repudiation of the president's handling of the war, and some supporters of internationalism voiced concerns that a political coalition was forming that would undermine and ultimately defeat the administration's internationalist goals, as happened to Wilson in 1918. The Democratic defeat at the polls in 1942 profoundly influenced the administration's efforts to promote the new world order. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2nd ed. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1985), 110. Back.
Note 75: They feared that Ohio Senator Robert Taft and other isolationists in the Senate would work to destroy internationalism. Welles thought political trouble might be brewing in the shape of an isolationist backlash in the West and Midwest. He also acknowledged that the political situation in these states had the potential to create political hazards for the administration's foreign policy, and that an accelerated public relations campaign might convince the American people of the virtues of internationalism. See, for example, PIO minutes 17, November 20, 1942. At one meeting shortly after the 1942 elections, Welles read aloud a letter from a recently defeated Democratic Congressman who warned that the country was heading down the same path as in 1918-1920, and attributed his defeat to deep-seated isolationist feeling, predicting that the international question would dominate the elections of 1944. Isaiah Bowman told the committee that he had just returned from the Midwest and he warned the members that the attitude there was one of, "Why should the United States help these people in distant countries?" Back.
Note 76: Welles pushed these accusations further during other speeches, pointing out that the mistakes of 1919 had led directly to the current war, while placing responsibility for avoiding another war in the hands of the American people. During a nationally broadcast address from just outside New York City in December 1942, he repeated the theme that American participation in a postwar organization was a matter of self-interest. "Would we not as a people have been better advised if we had been willing twenty years ago to join with the other free peoples of the earth in promoting an international order which would have maintained the peace of the world and which could have prevented the rise of those conditions which have resulted in the total war of today?" See Sumner Welles, "Dedication to the Future," Mount Vernon, NY, December 6, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; as well as Welles, "The Victory of Peace," February 26, 1943, speech files, box 196, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 77: Hull subsequently felt compelled to deliver a radio address of his own, where he warned it would be necessary to set limits on the Four Freedoms, thereby taking a stance quite contrary to Welles's more sweeping aims. To make matters worse, the ailing Hull was unable to complete his address. Hull remained uncomfortable with Welles's aim of pressing the European colonial powers to grant self-government to their colonies. Hull assumed self-government would come naturally after an adequate period of years. New York Times, July 24, 1942; Welles, Where Are We Headed?, 19-24; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1227-1229, 1599. Back.
Note 78: Welles to MacLeish, August 13, 1942, Welles papers, box 81, FDRL. During a remarkable speech at the May 1943 commencement exercises of the North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham, Welles devoted the majority of his remarks to the question of race and equality in the new world order. Welles stated that, " in the kind of world for which we fight, there must cease to exist any need for the use of that accursed term 'racial or religious minority.' If the peoples of the earth are fighting and dying to preserve and secure the liberation of the individual under law, is it conceivable that the peoples of the United Nations can consent to the reestablishment of any system where human beings will still be regarded as belonging to such 'minorities?' ... equality of human rights and to equality of opportunity every human being is by divine right entitled. If that cornerstone is laid as the foundation of the new world of the United Nations, the blot of the concept of minorities upon the fabric of our civilization will be erased." See Welles, "Commencement Exercises of the North Carolina College for Negroes," May 31, 1943, speech files, box 195, Welles papers, FDRL. Back.
Note 79: Sumner Welles, The World of the Four Freedoms (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), v-vii. Back.
Note 80: P minutes 60, June 19, 1943; P document 234, "Universal International Organization," June 19, 1942, box 57; PIO minutes 44, June 19, 1943 with memo from Sandifer regarding Welles meeting with President, June 19, 1943 [attached], box 85; Welles, Seven Decisions, 189. Back.
Note 81: PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 56; P document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57, Notter files. Welles and the planners underscored the need for United States participation in a future world organization in stark economic terms. They believed the United States needed to participate in an international body to safeguard free trade and the open door to resources. They also concluded that U.S. participation might be necessary to obtain basic resources in the years following the war. The planners thought support for internationalism might be more easily obtained if U.S. postwar aims were presented in more practical and self-interested terms, for example, as crucial to the safeguarding of American security, trade, and standards of living. Back.
Note 82: P document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57, Notter files. British officials had also been revising their own outline for a world organization. Following Eden's visit to Washington, successive British drafts demonstrated how strongly Welles's vision of a world organization continued to influence postwar planning on both sides of the Atlantic. British drafts during the summer of 1943 generally followed the outlines of Welles's proposals. After Churchill's return from the United States, he circulated to the cabinet an account of his conversations in Washington. Following Churchill's report, Eden circulated a memorandum examining in some detail the various proposals for regionalism, and by July 7, Jebb and the Foreign Office had come up with a draft that encapsulated British views on a postwar organization up to that time. The revised British plan closely mirrored the draft Welles had discussed with Eden in March, and restated that the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter "will be the basis of any international world order after the war." See CAB 66/37 WP(43) 217, "Armistice and Related Problems," by Anthony Eden, May 25, 1943, PRO; CAB 65/34 WM(43) June 16, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/38 WP(43) 300, "United Nations Plan for Organizing Peace and Welfare," July 7, 1943, PRO. A few weeks later, on July 22, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee endorsed Eden's proposal that the war cabinet form a standing committee to investigate and study specific questions of a postwar nature. Attlee also recommended that the war cabinet consider an exchange of ideas with the Soviet Union concerning the structure of the postwar world. See FO 371/35386, Attlee to Churchill, July 22, 1943, PRO. Back.
Note 83: Furthermore, in the wake of Welles's resignation Hull would reorganize and revive a new system of planning committees in the fall of 1943 to begin preparing the groundwork for the next steps in the postwar planning process, such as the Quebec, Teheran, and Dumbarton Oaks conferences. Back.
Note 84: "The Charter of the United Nations," August 14, 1943, in Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, Appendix 23, page 526-534; Julius W. Pratt, "Cordell Hull," in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis and Robert Ferrell (New York: Cooper Square, 1964), 723; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1640-1643. Back.
Note 85: President Roosevelt had asked Welles to represent the United States at the Moscow Conference, but Welles declined. Back.
Note 86: Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1647. After his resignation, Welles used his syndicated column to promote the merits of regionalism. See "Welles Urges Regional Seats on World Executive Council," New York Herald Tribune, January 26, 1944. According to J. Tillapaugh, "No satisfactory planning occurred before the San Francisco Conference to relate the [Western Hemisphere] region to the world in a way acceptable to both the great powers and the American republics. In 1943, ... Welles devised a plan for a universal structure based on regional cornerstones. ... Hull rejected the draft because it placed too much emphasis on regional independence. Hull turned matters over to Leo Pasvolsky, who aimed not to reconcile regional and global interests but rather to eradicate regionalism from subsequent proposals." See J. Tillapaugh, "Closed Hemisphere and Open World? The Dispute Over Regional Security at the U.N. Conference, 1945," Diplomatic History 2:1 (Winter 1978): 25-42. Back.
Note 87: Several scholars have made use of the records of Welles's planning committees to trace the origins of U.S. policy in a number of areas. James Edward Miller, for example, notes that the Welles-led planning committees "created a body of coherent policy recommendations and detailed supporting studies, which would powerfully influence American decisions both during and after the war. The value of this kind of work was dramatically pointed out to the Americans at Casablanca, where they were humiliated by the better prepared British. Thereafter, Roosevelt ... did not overlook the existence of this body of information and policy recommendations in preparing for international conferences." See James Edward Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 43. See also the use of postwar planning records in Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 59-61, 92-93; as well as in Rudolf V. A. Janssens, What Future for Japan?: U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era, 1942-1945 (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 1995), and Xiaoyuan Liu, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and their policies for the postwar disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 34, 76-77. Back.
Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943