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4. Creating a New League: The Postwar Planning Process, 1941-1943

 

The efforts of Welles's advisory committees would meaningfully influence U.S. policy both during and after the war, but the first nine months of 1941 were a period of uncertainty and doubt for the advocates of postwar planning. He urged the resumption of more detailed planning, but the day-to-day realities of the war and other political controversies made further progress difficult. Throughout 1941, he discussed with other senior officials the possibility of creating new advisory committees, and the creation of the Atlantic Charter in August provided an opening for a broader discussion of postwar planning and international organization than had previously been possible. By the autumn of 1941 (nearly two months before the U.S. officially entered the war), a new timetable for action began to take shape and, before the end of the year, Welles and his colleagues would obtain the mandate they desired, with the president lending his support for specific and detailed postwar planning. 1		 1

After his return from the Atlantic Conference, Welles remained anxious that the administration should at once begin long-term planning. Speaking in New York in October, he warned against the dangers of the United States taking a passive policy of "wait and see" and repeated his call for an immediate examination of postwar reconstruction issues. He increased the frequency of such statements because he continued to worry about the state of public opinion. He feared that a resurgent isolationism would lead to yet another rejection of his quest for America to play a leading role in world affairs. He believed that the decline in the isolationists' strength was almost wholly due to wartime factors. He worried that, by the time a postwar settlement came before the Senate, the spur of wartime spirit might be a distant memory, and war weariness, combined with the traditional impulse to resume peacetime lifestyles, would further undermine internationalism. 2		 

Welles thus endeavored to give a further boost to internationalism and postwar planning during his Armistice Day remarks at Woodrow Wilson's tomb in the Washington Cathedral, where he expanded the meaning of the Atlantic Charter by linking it to Wilson's Fourteen Points. Many of those gathered at the tomb came in anticipation of hearing an affirmative declaration of the internationalist cause. The world had been at war for more than two years, and those gathered at Wilson's gravesite knew it might not be long before Americans found themselves embroiled in the conflict, as the U.S. now seemed to be gradually departing from its announced neutrality and moving into an undeclared war. 3		 

Taking note of the solemnity of the occasion and venue, Welles aimed to embolden those who wanted to hear portents of what America's war and peace aims would be in the coming conflict. "The heart-searching question which every American citizen must ask himself on this day of commemoration is whether the world in which we have to live would have come to this desperate pass had the United States been willing in those years which followed 1919 to play its full part in striving to bring about a new world order based on justice and on a steadfast concert for peace." 4		 

A full month before Pearl Harbor, Welles did not shrink from offering the most detailed explanation of his vision of internationalism, going much further than the president was willing to go at the time. At Wilson's tomb Welles called for participation in a new postwar international organization, defining the Atlantic Charter as a continuation of the Wilsonian legacy, giving "new hope and new courage to millions of people throughout the earth." He called on the public to accept American leadership of a postwar organization founded on principles such as the Charter, Wilsonianism, and the Four Freedoms.		 5

U.S. participation in a new league remained central to Welles's vision of an American-led future. He assumed such participation would cement America's leadership of the world by committing Washington to an internationalist future. Only by taking its rightful role of global leadership could America begin to shape the world to its own interests. Economic planning on a grand scale would be necessary, he believed, for only through a systematic approach to the problems of postwar economic dislocation could the new international order ensure "freedom from want." Free markets, free trade, and free access to the world's resources (the "open door") would be the cornerstones of his "new economic order." 5		 

Welles also aimed to expand the meaning of the Atlantic Charter through his leadership of postwar planning. Just a month earlier he had drafted a letter to Roosevelt urging the reestablishment of secret advisory committees to begin work on all aspects of postwar planning, including the design of, and U.S. participation in, an international organization. He hoped to guide this effort personally and use it to create a blueprint for a new order for the postwar world. 6		 

But the growing crisis with Japan and the subsequent attack on Pearl Harbor diverted the administration's attention from postwar issues for several weeks, and it was not until December 28 that President Roosevelt, who had been so reluctant to discuss postwar matters in the past, finally signed on. 7 		 

The effort to commit America to a postwar international organization received another important boost when, on January 1, 1942, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and twenty-two other nations involved in the war against the Axis issued a "Declaration by the United Nations." The declaration represented a major step in the direction of internationalism, for the signatories accepted the principles of the Atlantic Charter and pledged not to seek a separate peace. In Welles's view, this declaration henceforth expanded the Atlantic Charter into a universal covenant applying to all parts of the world. 8 		 

A few weeks later, he traveled to Rio de Janeiro to head the American delegation to a conference of foreign ministers of the American republics. His remarks in Rio stressed hemispheric solidarity, but he also reasserted his universal vision of what the war could achieve, telling the delegates that the new world order would bring about "the world's regeneration." 9		 10

The American delegation labored to obtain agreement on a joint declaration of war against the Axis, but Argentina and Chile objected, and the original declaration was replaced by a compromise statement merely recommending the severing of diplomatic relations. Welles's acceptance of this compromise generated a violent outburst from Hull. 10 The differences between the two men over the resolution may have represented for the secretary the final straw in his ongoing battle with his subordinate, particularly when Welles appealed directly to the president for support against him. 11		 

Hull angrily rebuked Welles for acting beyond his authority, but when the secretary looked to the president for support, Roosevelt backed Welles by suggesting that they leave the resolution unchanged. Hull, beside himself with anger, furiously drafted a cable replacing Welles as the U.S. representative in Rio but eventually relented. Hull, humiliated and exhausted by this confrontation (and "nervously and spiritually torn to pieces," according to Berle), took to his bed and remained there for a week. 12		 

Despite the increasing deterioration of his relationship with Hull, Welles nevertheless had a mandate to go forward with postwar planning. Most importantly, with the United States now in the war, and the president providing support, postwar planning could proceed without the fits and starts of the previous advisory committee efforts of 1940. Once again he aimed to dominate the administration's plans to design and shape the postwar world. But the drafting of the United Nations Declaration and his trip to Rio delayed for several weeks an immediate convening of the new postwar planning committee. At the beginning of the year, after Hull had departed for his lengthy annual leave from Washington, Welles took control of the State Department. Discovering that Hull had failed to appoint the members of the new postwar planning committee, Welles promptly sent out his own invitations. 13 		 

The committee's ranks would include administration officials with an interest in postwar planning such as Leo Pasvolsky and Harley Notter of the State Department's Division of Special Research; Benjamin Cohen and David K. Niles of the president's staff; Milo Perkins of Henry Wallace's Board of Economic Warfare; and another Wallace ally, Paul Appleby of the Department of Agriculture. Five invitations also went out to people from outside the administration, including Welles's longtime friend and ally, Norman Davis; Anne O'Hare McCormick, a columnist and foreign affairs correspondent for the New York Times who frequently wrote effusively of Welles; Hamilton Fish Armstrong of the Council on Foreign Relations; Myron Taylor, formerly of U.S. Steel, who had served as Roosevelt's envoy to the Vatican; and Isaiah Bowman, a geographer, President of Johns Hopkins University, and formerly the leading member of Wilson's Inquiry. Welles thought that Bowman, whom he had befriended in the 1920s, would provide valuable knowledge of the Inquiry's work. State Department officials such as Adolf Berle, Dean Acheson, and Herbert Feis joined shortly thereafter, and the committee would be expanded to include a bipartisan group from the House and Senate. 14 		 

Welles thought Congressional representation particularly important, for it might help avoid a repetition of the political problems Wilson had experienced while at the same time serving as an informal liaison between the administration and Capitol Hill on matters of postwar planning and war aims. In the early summer of 1942 he welcomed the addition of Senators Tom Connally and Warren Austin. Connally, a Democrat from Texas, had been a supporter of Wilson's foreign policies while a member of the House of Representatives. In 1941, he rose to become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and became one of the Senate's most powerful supporters of a new international organization. Austin, a Republican from Vermont and a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had opposed the New Deal, but during the war he made a major contribution to the development of internationalism within the Republican Party.		 15

The membership of the planning committees would later be expanded further with the addition of Senator Walter George, Democrat from Georgia and a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senator Elbert Thomas, Democrat from Utah, who spent five years in the Far East as a Mormon missionary and had been a consistent supporter of Roosevelt's foreign policies; Representative Sol Bloom, Democrat from New York and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee since 1939; and Representative Charles Eaton, Republican from New Jersey, the ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 15		 

Throughout the postwar planning process Welles kept Roosevelt apprised of the work of the planners, while the president, primarily concerned with the military aspects of the war, granted him a large amount of autonomy. "What I expect you to do," the president told Welles, "is to have prepared for me the necessary number of baskets and the necessary number of alternative solutions for each problem in the baskets so that when the time comes all I have to do is to reach into a basket and fish out a number of solutions that I am sure are sound and from which I can make my own choice." 16 		 

Welles sought to anticipate many of the political problems the president might confront during the war. He and Roosevelt shared many views on most of the broad questions of postwar planning. Roosevelt thus had confidence that his interests would be well represented on the committees. This was made even more likely by Hull's almost total disengagement from the planning process during its first year.		 

From its very beginning the postwar planning committee resolved to adhere to the spirit of the Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, and the Declaration by the United Nations. These pronouncements would serve as guideposts for the eventual peace settlement and the new international order that would emerge after the war. Welles thought the global expansion of these principles would benefit the United States since, if the rest of the world shared America's political and economic values, the postwar system would ultimately be more amenable to U.S. interests. Thus, while he and the other planners began their work based on the assumption of the total defeat of the Axis powers, it was imperative that the peace somehow be consistent with the values and interests of the United States. 17		 

At the outset, the committee agreed to keep its meetings secret. The war appeared to be going badly for the Allies, and Welles told the planners he wished to delay telling the public of the committee's existence until a more favorable moment, when an announcement about the creation of the postwar planning operation could to touted as a confident gesture on the part of the Allies. He told the planners that the president would focus on the military aspects of winning the war, while the postwar planning committees would work out the details of complicated international political and economic problems. He would thus provide the president with their findings on a regular basis. 18 He reassured the other planners that their efforts would be just as important as the military conduct of the war and reminded them that the failure to construct a lasting peace would make another war almost inevitable, thereby nullifying the sacrifices of millions. 19		 20

Due to the unrestricted nature of their mission, Welles told the members that it would be necessary to divide the group into a number of smaller subcommittees, each assigned to investigate more specific aspects of postwar planning. The subcommittees would meet weekly and report back to the full group on a regular basis. He created a system whereby, when the president faced war-related political questions, the subcommittees would provide him with a series of prearranged options.		 

In Hull's continuing absence, Welles appointed himself chairman of the subcommittee on political problems and assigned it nothing less than the task of reordering world politics and designing an international organization. He arranged to have his friend Norman Davis lead the subcommittee on security problems, while another close ally, Assistant Secretary Berle, would run the subcommittee on economic reconstruction. The subcommittee on economic policy would be headed by Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson, and the subcommittee on territorial problems would be led by Isaiah Bowman.		 

As chairman of the subcommittee on political problems, Welles led the effort to draft a timetable for the peacemaking process. He initially favored a "transitional period" between the end of hostilities and the actual signing of the final peace. He thought the raw emotions of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, still inflamed by the just-ended war, had led to many rash and ill-advised decisions, and that such matters might be better handled after the formal end of conflict. But he soon concluded that many postwar decisions could no longer be delayed, and would have to be taken up immediately. The subcommittee thus focused on urgent and specific questions related to the future map of the postwar world and the launching of a new international organization. 20		 

Seeking to capture the spirit of the recently proclaimed United Nations Declaration, Welles suggested at the end of March 1942 the creation of a "United Nations authoritative body," which might begin meeting during, rather than after, the war. He feared that certain matters, such as relief and territorial questions, could not adequately be addressed until the creation of an international forum of some kind. He believed one of President Wilson's greatest mistakes had been his failure to reach firm agreements on the precise nature of the postwar order prior to the end of the last war.		 

He also understood that Washington would gain greater leverage over the other allies on postwar matters by taking the lead on postwar planning and then making detailed and complete proposals to the other powers. He therefore wanted the planners to complete the details of their desired blueprint for world order quickly so that they could then begin the process of promoting their vision to the other powers. 21		 25

At this time, Roosevelt somewhat vaguely supported a postwar consortium of great powers, a sort of continuation of the Grand Alliance. Like Roosevelt, committee member Benjamin Cohen feared that an organization consisting of all nations would degenerate into an unwieldy mess. Cohen supported the concept of a smaller council of four or five great powers to promote more efficient decision making, whereas Welles leaned in favor of a world body that would include all the nations of the world, great and small powers alike. Hamilton Fish Armstrong endorsed Welles's views, suggesting they would assist the United States in aligning the smaller nations into a pro-American bloc against the other great powers. Some officials in Washington and London had vaguely promoted a kind of postwar Anglo-American partnership to run the world. But several of the members of the advisory committees thought Britain a slender reed upon which to base such a strategy, and feared that an Anglo-American consortium might not be sufficiently strong to impose its aims on the other powers. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. and British war aims did not always converge, especially in the areas of trade, postwar economics, and colonialism. 22 		 

Welles helped fashion a compromise between Armstrong and Cohen's views. He suggested that any new international forum would need to consist of both an assembly of all member nations as well as a smaller executive council. He thought the members of the executive council could allow the smaller nations to join them on a rotating basis. He also advocated the concept of endowing a postwar international organization with regional councils. His support for the regional concept stemmed from his belief in the effectiveness of the inter-American system and the Pan-American Union. A regional approach to world order might also satisfy the U.S. desire to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine and would avoid endangering U.S. preeminence by preventing outside interference in what Washington considered its primary sphere of interest, the Western Hemisphere. 23 		 

In a report to the full advisory committee in early April 1942, Welles outlined how his political subcommittee urged the creation of a "United Nations Authority" which would include all the countries fighting the Axis, but with the "Four Policemen"—consisting of the United States, Britain, Russia, and China—playing dominant roles as permanent members of the executive council. France, which Welles believed had lost its claim to great power status, would be excluded from the executive council.		 

He also repeated his suggestion that the organization feature strong regional groupings. If the regional bodies were unable to resolve specific problems, or if disputes emerged between regions, the matter would be appealed to the executive council. Welles thought the regional councils could help reconcile differences among the four permanent members of the executive council over the desired nature of the postwar settlement. They might also allow the great powers to pursue an initial adjudication of disputes in their respective areas of responsibility. Such councils would thus preserve each great power's dominance within its sphere of interest. The regional approach might also resolve disputes within the Roosevelt administration over how best to address the construction of this new world organization. 24 		 

When Hull returned to Washington in the spring of 1942, he disbanded the full advisory committee but allowed the subcommittees to continue their work. This move inadvertently strengthened Welles's hand, as his political subcommittee soon assumed the duties of the now-disbanded advisory committee. The subcommittee thus emerged as the locus of postwar planning; its judgment was sought by the other subcommittees, and they delivered regular reports delivered to it about their progress. 25		 30

In an effort to allow for a more detailed examination of the specific and complex problems of designing a new world body, Welles proposed the creation of a special subcommittee on international organization. 26 This subcommittee, of which he also appointed himself chairman, assumed a position of major importance in the postwar planning process and would continue in existence as long as the political subcommittee itself, holding a total of 45 meetings between July 1942 and June 1943. 27		 

Its tasks included an examination of other international organizations (with special attention paid to the League of Nations), the drafting of a constitution for the new world body, a detailed examination of international trusteeship and, later, formulating suggestions on how to endow a new world organization with a military capability. During its existence the subcommittee on international organization would succeed in creating the blueprint for a new world body that would evolve into the United Nations. 28		 

Welles also used his leadership of the postwar planning process to spearhead three other (ultimately unsuccessful) drives to shape the postwar world. Had these efforts succeeded, the United Nations and the postwar order might have evolved in notably different ways.		 

First, based on his experience designing and implementing the Good Neighbor Policy and the "American system," Welles advocated a regional approach to a postwar organization that envisioned "open" spheres of responsibility, where the great powers would exercise enough influence to protect their physical security but would leave smaller nations to determine their own internal policies. Second, he desired to provide the United Nations with a strong and effective military arm. He believed the League of Nations failed because it did not possess the military strength to halt acts of aggression in the 1930s. He concluded that a new organization could only be effective if it possessed a credible threat of force. Lastly, he urged the creation of an extensive system of international trusteeship over all colonial possessions through which the world organization would implement and oversee a timetable for the gradual emancipation of all dependent colonial peoples.		 

His lack of success in these three areas is noteworthy, and an examination of these questions offers insight into the breadth of his internationalist vision. His inability to gain acceptance for a regional basis for the United Nations may have made it more difficult for Washington to countenance Moscow's aims in Eastern Europe, while the failure to endow the United Nations with a credible military force contributed to that body's ineffectiveness in the postwar decades. Furthermore, the failure of the trusteeship plan meant that the United States would ultimately cast its lot with many of the European powers over the matter of colonialism in the postwar era. 29 		 35

Welles's advocacy of regionalism did not mean that he had abandoned his larger aim of creating a largely universalist world order. It instead demonstrated his conviction that the postwar settlement had to take into account local and regional practicalities. He still assumed that Wilson had been correct in pushing his Fourteen Points, but he believed the late president had been too rigid in the application of his principles. Welles thought a more flexible and creative approach to the problems of erecting a postwar order might succeed where Wilson had failed. While he remained passionate about many aspects of the Wilsonian approach, he believed much of the earlier effort at postwar planning had been flawed from the outset. He aimed to avoid a repetition of such mistakes as the failure to create the League Covenant during the war, Wilson's refusal to consult Congress (particularly the Republican members) in the planning process, and the flawed nature of the mandates system. Welles also sought to avoid repeating other weaknesses, such as the League's inability to support collective security with the threat of force, the League's lack of safeguards for America's predominance in the Western Hemisphere, and the failure to include Russia in the postwar settlement. 30 		 

Welles saw his leadership of the international organization subcommittee as an opportunity to succeed where Wilson had failed by creating a new league and securing American participation. Meeting weekly on Saturday mornings in his office, the new subcommittee included other strong advocates of international organization such as Isaiah Bowman, Ben Cohen, and Leo Pasvolsky, along with James T. Shotwell, a Columbia University history professor who had headed the League of Nations Association, Green H. Hackworth, the state department legal adviser, and later, Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Clark Eichelberger, the director of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, served as a consultant. Their experience on the international organization subcommittee would continue to be utilized in the months and years after its disbandment, most particularly during the August 1944 Dumbarton Oaks Conference, where all of the members of the subcommittee (with the exception of Welles and Shotwell) would play important roles. 31 		 

Welles inaugurated the first meeting of his international organization subcommittee on July 17, 1942 by circulating a draft outline on world organization given to him by the exiled Dutch diplomat Eelco Van Kleffens, whose views resembled Welles's. Van Kleffens had spent much of the war in London, serving as foreign minister of the Netherlands government-in-exile. Welles thought Van Kleffens's outline worth examining in some detail, and he circulated it in the hope of establishing a framework for future discussions.		 

The draft began with a review of the strengths and weaknesses of the League of Nations and emphasized the importance of U.S. participation in a future world body. Van Kleffens endorsed the view that the old League should be abandoned and replaced by something conceptually different. He criticized proposals for a purely universal world organization, questioning whether the great powers would ever truly give consideration to the interests of smaller nations. Instead, he endorsed regional groupings arranged by oceans: Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean councils, with similar bodies for the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. 32		 

After discussing Van Kleffens's outline, Welles suggested that the planners each draft their own blueprints for a world organization and meet again in two weeks. 33 When the planners reconvened with their proposals on July 31, James Shotwell emphasized the importance of an international court of justice, whereas Isaiah Bowman underscored the need for an organization that would enjoy widespread support from the American people. Ben Cohen stressed the need for strong regional councils, and Clark Eichelberger emphasized universality as the basis of a new world body. Welles endeavored to hammer together what he thought were the best ideas from each proposal. 34		 40

He next led the committee on an article-by-article examination of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Like a team of pathologists performing an autopsy, they examined different aspects of the League and attempted to diagnose the reasons for its failures. Using Van Kleffens's arguments in support, Welles soon convinced the other planners to avoid resurrecting the old League. 35 They subsequently began drafting blueprints for a completely new international organization. 36 Welles wanted to avoid having the draft extensively debated and revised by the larger political subcommittee, and thus wanted the smaller subcommittee on international organization to submit a draft that would be as complete and thorough as possible. For example, he sought to address the question of where the colonial world would fit into the new global order, and over the next two months he and the planners labored to produce a draft plan for trusteeship to be submitted along with a draft outline on an international organization. 37		 

By late October, the draft outline of an international organization began to take shape. Its details demonstrated the degree to which Welles and the other committee members wanted to reform the world through universalist means, but also the extent to which they desired to globalize the New Deal and the "American system." To him, the outline met many of the requirements of the Atlantic Charter by pledging to improve living standards and provide security while at the same time offering safeguards for regional diversity. The key features of the proposed organization included an Executive Committee made up of the "Four Policemen"; a General Council consisting of all members; an Annex grouping the member nations by regions; and a General Security and Armaments Commission, which would monitor arms making and enforce international laws through collective security backed by an international police force. 38		 

The draft outline also called for the creation of a number of agencies to support the world organization, such as an international court of justice for the resolution of global disputes. Welles appreciated how the U.S.'s vast new power and wealth gave it leverage in shaping the postwar economic order, and he aimed to create a multilateral global economic structure in which America's commercial system could prosper and expand. Thus, an "Economic Organization" would feature an International Monetary Commission to stabilize exchange and interest rates and an International Labor Organization for regulating global employment practices, while an "Economic Commission" would oversee the regulation of international commodities, price stabilization, global investments, and economic development.		 

Such institutions would help establish a global economic order where the United States would be preeminent. Furthermore, an International Organization for Health and Social Welfare would oversee an International Health Organization and a Commission on Drug Trafficking, while an Organization on International Cultural Relations would promote scholarship, the arts, education, the sciences, international radio broadcasts, and the dissemination of motion pictures. Other proposed agencies included a Refugees Board, an International Committee on Nutrition, an International Communications Organization, and an agency to coordinate international air traffic. These far-reaching proposals demonstrated the planners' efforts to erect a comprehensive new international order to assist in the ultimate exportation and homogenization of American institutions, economic systems, culture, and lifestyles throughout the world. 39 		 

While the draft plan for an international organization continued to take shape, a number of problems emerged. Welles insisted that the new world order have a universal nature, even if the "Four Policemen" served as guardians of particular regions in the postwar era. Therein lay a dilemma, for it proved difficult to reconcile the notion of these regional policemen with the universalist vision that foresaw all nations, great and small, cooperating through a new league. 40		 45

He thus thought regional councils could help reconcile differences among these four great powers over the desired nature of the postwar settlement. He envisioned a form of global regional integration modeled after what he believed had been achieved in the Western Hemisphere. He spoke often of the New World providing the rest of the world with an example to emulate after the war, seeing recent inter-American cooperation as an example of an informal regional federation that might serve as "a cornerstone in the world structure of the future." 41		 

With the memory of Wilson's struggle over the League in mind, Welles also sought a regional solution exempting the Monroe Doctrine from the supervision of the world organization, thereby avoiding the risk of outside powers meddling in the United States' regional sphere of influence. He harbored a concern that the other great powers might also be reluctant to cede to a world body the responsibility for their spheres of interest. A regional approach to the postwar order might resolve some of those fears. Regionalism might also prevent the postwar settlement from being undermined by bitter territorial disputes that might erupt at the end of the war, particularly in Eastern Europe, where he had noted that local national aspirations would inevitably clash with Moscow's desire for security and friendly neighbors. A regional approach might allow each of the great powers a measure of autonomy within their security zones. Furthermore, regionalism might temper the kind of unqualified support for minority rights and national self-determination that had the potential to turn the new world order into dysfunctional chaos.		 

Welles's advocacy of a regional approach also sought to heal a breach within the administration. Several of Roosevelt's advisors and special envoys, such as Cordell Hull, Henry Wallace, and Wendell Willkie, advocated a quasi-universalist world order, where all nations would cooperate through a new world organization. Others, such as Henry Stimson and Frank Knox, thought Wilson's dream impractical and advocated spheres of influence and great power politics. Welles believed an organization incorporating both regional and worldwide councils might partially reconcile these divergent views. 42 		 

He had regularly briefed Roosevelt on the work of his subcommittee on international organization, at times bringing draft plans to the White House for the president's perusal. At the beginning of January 1943, as Roosevelt prepared for the upcoming Casablanca conference, Welles held a two-hour tutorial for the president on postwar planning, outlining the essential features of the subcommittees' findings.		 

He shared with the president the collective wisdom of more than 40 postwar planning meetings dating back to early 1942. As he briefed Roosevelt, a sketchy design began to take shape. Welles underscored his belief that a new postwar international organization was absolutely necessary to ensure a lasting peace. United States participation, he emphasized, would be essential to the future success of such a body. Regional and local disputes would be resolved through regional councils, which would be subordinate to the overall world organization, and a program for international trusteeship would be created for dependent areas. Furthermore, economic and political sanctions would be strengthened by endowing the world organization with substantive police powers. 43 		 50

Drawing on the preliminary work done by the other subcommittees, the political subcommittee had thus far concluded that an international organization should be composed of an executive board consisting of representatives of the four great powers (the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China), with the addition of hand-picked representatives from the regions of Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, the Far East, and possibly the Near East. While the executive council would have final say on the terms of an armistice, a larger body, or general assembly, would consist of all the members of the United Nations. 44 		 

Welles saw European-style colonialism as a threat to the world order he desired to create, believing that the European empires were a blight on the world's conscience and that they created a climate ripe for future conflict. International trusteeship was thus an integral part of his design. He proposed that a system of trusteeship might care for the world's "backward peoples" until they were able to stand on their own. 45 He feared the new international organization would not succeed unless more radical measures were taken with dependent colonial areas all over the world. Early on in the postwar planning process it had been agreed that the mandates system had been a dismal failure and that all responsibilities for the mandated territories should be transferred to the new international organization. But several committee members felt that trusteeship should be limited to the present mandated territories and the Axis dependencies. This divergence would continue to animate postwar planning debates throughout the first half of 1943, with Welles leading the forces backing a far-reaching approach to trusteeship and Hull favoring a more moderate and less extensive plan. 46		 

The early months of 1943 proved to be a significant turning point in the war. On the military front, the Red Army had forced the Germans to begin withdrawing from the Caucasus in the wake of the epic Battle of Stalingrad, while in the Pacific the Allies had recently won a significant strategic victory at Guadalcanal, and Axis capitulation grew nearer in North Africa. It would also prove to be an important moment for postwar planning. While Welles and his fellow planners had spent much of 1942 conducting a general survey of the new global order they desired, in 1943 they hoped to begin presenting more definitive blueprints to the other members of the Grand Alliance.		 

He understood that his extensive plans for a new world order would succeed only if prior consensus emerged among the Big Three. He had earlier told the planners that he remained concerned about the direction of British thinking on postwar planning. 47 U.S. officials had a better sense of British views on such matters in the wake of an August 1942 visit to Washington by Foreign Office official Richard Law, while the British came away with a better idea of the aims of the planning committees. Welles reminded Law that one of the gravest errors of the last war was that the allied nations had not had sufficient time to coordinate peace aims among themselves. 48		 

The British shared U.S. concerns about reaching agreements over the shape and structure of the postwar world and became increasingly curious about Welles's postwar planning committees. 49 They, too, had studied Van Kleffens's outline for an international organization, and Foreign Office planners had taken a keen interest in regional arrangements, hoping the United States, but not China, would take a lead in a regional body in the Far East and noting that regionalism might be desirable in Eastern Europe to help resolve its many ethnic and territorial problems. British officials also noted that Welles and other U.S. officials had publicly called for a new world organization based on the wartime United Nations coalition. Several officials in London subsequently felt Britain should more definitively establish its own postwar aims. "His Majesty's Government have not yet defined their views on questions or made any response to Mr. Welles's expression of opinion," wrote Gladwyn Jebb, head of the Foreign Office's Economic and Reconstruction Department. "It is clearly important that the view of the two Governments should be harmonized as early as possible." 50		 55

Anthony Eden subsequently told the war cabinet that Welles's public pronouncements demonstrated an American desire to begin bilateral discussions about postwar matters and he urged that London act with alacrity and take advantage of U.S. eagerness to work toward an international organization. 51 In January 1943, Eden explained to the war cabinet that only through the construction of a new world body could Britain continue to function as a world power. He enthusiastically endorsed regionalism and, hoping to reassure Washington that the other powers did not seek to interfere in the affairs of the Americas, he suggested that matters concerning the Western Hemisphere might best be handled by the already-functioning Pan-American Union. "If, therefore, we believe that the United Nations Plan offers the best hope for the future," Eden's draft concluded, "we should make every possible effort to get it generally agreed without delay." 52		 

In late March 1943, the day before the foreign secretary's arrival in Washington for a meeting with senior American officials, Welles again briefed the president on postwar matters, particularly on plans for an international organization. 53 Welles endeavored to achieve a compromise among three different groups: the advocates of regionalism, those who supported a more universal world organization, and those who desired that supreme power be vested in the four great powers. When Roosevelt met with Eden the following day, the president offered this blueprint as the kind of world organization he desired. But to Welles, the draft was still not complete, for it contained no provision for fully integrated international forces and merely called for each nation to make troops readily available. 54 He also believed that any decision to use force should require the approval of at least three of the four powers, thereby denying a veto to any one power. Welles felt they could not permit any nation, great or small, to veto action against itself if it undertook policies of aggression. 55 		 

Welles offered a more detailed version of his postwar plans during a follow-up meeting with Eden and Halifax on March 24. He outlined the functions of the executive committee, the regional assemblies, and the general assembly. He suggested that the members of the new world body be compelled to agree to a "Bill of Rights" that would expand the principles of the Four Freedoms to all member states. He also urged Eden to join him in creating a joint Anglo-American planning group to discuss political problems, something akin to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 56 It soon became apparent to the British officials that Welles's views on postwar matters dominated American thinking, for the president had just explained to them an almost identical, if somewhat less detailed, outline, thereby demonstrating the often seamless nature of Welles's and Roosevelt's thinking. 57		 

Despite Welles's private fear of the volatile nature of American public opinion, he told Eden that internationalism was slowly building momentum throughout the country and that Senator Joseph Ball, a Republican from Minnesota, would soon propose a resolution calling for the creation of a new international organization. 58 		 

Eden's further meetings with Welles and the president succeeded in giving the British a better idea of American designs for an international organization. While the foreign secretary was in Washington, Churchill had in London called for the establishment of a world order based upon regionalism, specifically recommending the creation of a "Council of Europe" and a "Council of Asia." Welles and the president expressed to Eden their opinion that, while regional representation would be desirable, all nations should also be members of an all-inclusive body. 59 After his meetings in Washington, Eden told the war cabinet that London and Washington shared many of the same general aims and that the Foreign Office should move to achieve greater coordination of allied plans for a postwar organization. 60		 60

The president summed up his own views of Eden's visit in a news conference on March 30, where he publicly concurred with Welles's view that planning should be coordinated with the other members of the Grand Alliance without delay. Roosevelt explained that such meetings served to further clarify Allied views on planning, and he offered a detailed account of what he hoped such meetings could achieve, particularly in the area of postwar planning and peacemaking. He added that early and frequent meetings between the Big Three would be necessary to ensure the avoidance of the problems that had afflicted the peace process in 1919. 61		 

Anglo-American exchanges in the area of postwar planning continued apace. During a visit by Churchill to Washington in May 1943, he hosted a luncheon at the British Embassy for Americans interested in postwar questions (such as Welles, Wallace, Stimson, Ickes, and Senator Connally), where the prime minister reiterated his support for regionalism. 62 At the end of the luncheon, Welles took Halifax aside and repeated his desire to reach concrete agreements soon on the essential outlines of postwar planning. He told the ambassador that he thought it particularly important to secure agreement with Moscow on postwar plans while relations among the Big Three remained reasonably friendly.		 

Welles subsequently provided Halifax with further details about his plans for an international organization. He did not put his ideas in writing because he had not yet discussed them with Hull, and he may have also feared that the ambassador would leak the details of the plan to the press. "[Welles] developed his ideas of a supreme world council and regional councils in great detail," Halifax reported to London, "and he hopes to be able to get the President's approval of his plans so that he could let us have it all on paper...." Welles reassured Halifax that the British should not fear a repeat of Wilson's failure in 1919. He told the ambassador that he was "more and more impressed with the way in which public feeling in the country as regards postwar cooperation was ahead of Congress." 63		 

But Welles's views on postwar planning continued to deepen his rift with Hull, most particularly Welles's backing of a Senate resolution calling for the creation of an international organization during the war. Welles believed that, despite the risks involved, a Congressional resolution calling for U.S. participation in an international organization would crystallize public opinion and inform other governments of Washington's commitment to internationalism. In February 1943, Welles had taken the liberty of telling his political subcommittee (which had now been expanded to include, in addition to Senators Connally, Austin, and Thomas, and Representatives Bloom and Eaton, Senators Walter George and Wallace White and Representative Luther Johnson) that, despite Hull's opposition, Congress could best aid the postwar planning process and reassure the allies by passing such a resolution. 64		 

While Hull rested in Florida in the spring of 1943, Welles met with the resolution's sponsor, Senator Ball, encouraging him to introduce the resolution as soon as possible. He also arranged a meeting between Ball and the president to discuss the proposal. Hull wanted to block the resolution, and he was further distressed when he later learned that Welles had already arranged meetings at the White House between the president, Harry Hopkins, James F. Byrnes, Senator Ball, and a number of other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To Hull, Welles's actions seemed reckless. Not only was Hull opposed to the measure, but the president, long Welles's chief defender, sought to keep a safe distance from any Congressional resolution. Hull was also infuriated by Welles's efforts to sell the concept of regionalism to the British, as he remained opposed to anything other than a strictly universal world body. 65 		 65

The controversy over the Ball resolution reinforced the fears of Welles and the other planners that the U.S. public might resist increased responsibilities in world affairs. Welles wanted more strenuous efforts to be mounted to develop public support for American participation. He believed administration officials should seek publicly to stress the urgent need for the United States to assume its rightful global responsibilities. Throughout his tenure as under secretary, he devoted much of his time to such public relations aspects of his position, believing that many of his postwar aims could be better promoted through public diplomacy. President Wilson's failure to sell the peace treaty to the American public after returning from Paris in 1919 taught Welles that the public presentation of diplomacy was a crucial component of a successful foreign policy. He also believed that public pronouncements by senior administration officials could be useful propaganda weapons in fighting the war.		 

He thought the American people would be more inclined to support national war aims with a strong idealistic tinge. He explained that he believed "history clearly showed that peoples would fight indefinitely for ideals and for principles and for the attainment of liberty." 66 Writing to Archibald MacLeish in April 1942, Welles explained that, "the creation of an offensive spirit among our people requires that we give them a cause to fight for. If our people believe that all we are fighting for is the status quo ante, it will be difficult to keep them fighting if the enemy offers a return to that status." 67		 

In late May 1942, Welles had acted on this conviction when he explained the administration's postwar objectives during his Memorial Day remarks at Arlington National Cemetery. He endeavored to use the speech as an opportunity to flesh out the sketchy framework of the Atlantic Charter with a more definitive program for the postwar era, while at the same time winning support for the administration's postwar program, but he also wanted to expand America's war aims to include the liberation of all peoples. "This is in very truth a people's war," he said. "It is a war which cannot be regarded as won until the fundamental rights of the peoples of the earth are secured." 68		 

With postwar planning going at full speed behind a veil of secrecy at the State Department, he offered his most detailed public explanation of the aims and meaning of the war, claiming that the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration would be the basis of a new world organization. The reach of the Atlantic Charter would be stretched to cover the entire globe. "Our victory must bring in its train the liberation of all peoples. Discrimination between peoples because of their race, creed, or color must be abolished. The age of imperialism is ended. The right of a people to their freedom must be recognized. ... The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole—in all oceans and in all continents."		 

Welles had thus expanded his vision of American war aims by publicly describing the current conflict as a "people's war" that would inaugurate global reform and lead to American leadership in the postwar era. By proclaiming the conflict a "people's war," he affirmed his view of the war's revolutionary potential to recast the world order, but he also hinted that, when the war was over, the American people, and the peoples of the wider world, could expect something in return for their sacrifices. The war would lead to a realignment of world power, with new forces such as the Soviet Union and China joining with the United States to enforce the peace. He assumed that at the end of the war only the United States would have the strength and resources to lead the world toward a reformed world order. 69 		 70

As Welles had anticipated, reactions to his remarks came from many quarters. The New York Times placed its account of the speech on its front page, emphasizing his call that the United Nations should become the "nucleus of a world organization of the future." The Times hailed his proclamation of a "new frontier of human welfare" and called the Arlington speech a remarkable and advanced explication of war aims, once again going beyond Roosevelt's vision of what the war could achieve. The Times also highlighted his call for the United States to lead the way toward a new world order where "freedom from want" could be achieved, and where the U.S. would accept its rightful place as a global power. The Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright Robert Sherwood, now director of the Office of War Information's Overseas Division, applauded the speech as "revolutionary" and arranged its rebroadcast on All India Radio. 70		 

Walter Lippmann, writing in his nationally syndicated column, added, "Mr. Welles was not making Utopian promises for the distant future but was announcing a policy which is very seriously meant," while Anne O'Hare McCormick noted in her column that Welles's speech "is the most concrete statement of postwar intentions and policy yet made by a spokesman of this Government," adding that "the idea of a New Deal for the world" now represented the central theme of the administration's postwar planning policy. 71 		 

Welles's Memorial Day remarks had once again revealed his aim that the war should bring about a worldwide extension of New Deal-style reforms. He anticipated the war would give rise to America's eclipse of Europe not only in the areas of economic, military, and political power, but also in terms of moral example. He felt American leadership to be better suited to the challenges of the postwar world and that the two world wars had once again demonstrated the failure of European primacy. 72		 

Welles believed such public pronouncements went a long way toward persuading the American people to support a new world order as a result of the war. "I am only an amateur politician and therefore I may be wrong," he wrote to MacLeish in August 1942. "But if one can judge by the temper of the American people during the Civil War, they fight better when they know for what they are fighting and when that 'common hope' is responsive to their own aspirations and to their own idealism, and when they believe that its realization will make for the security of their country, their children and their faith." 73 He thus resolved to lead an aggressive public relations effort for a new international organization in anticipation of the 1942 mid-term elections, delivering a series of partisan blasts at the Republicans, all the while decrying partisanship on the part of the opposition. 74 		 

Welles and the planners often felt great uneasiness about the level of public support for their postwar plans. 75 Welles thus aimed to convince the American people that only through active participation in an international organization could they avoid another disaster like the current war. Even after the 1942 elections he continued to attack the administration's opponents, who, he charged, must take responsibility for causing the current war and who once again stood poised to take America down the path of isolation. 76 		 75

Departmental infighting regularly flared up over Welles's handling of postwar planning, but his public remarks about a new world order particularly angered Hull, who labored to exert more control over the entire planning process, which he thought resembled a runaway locomotive. The secretary eventually demanded that all statements on postwar matters be submitted to him for prior approval. He was further angered when Welles explained that the president had authorized him to use his public pronouncements to issue a series of "trial balloons" on postwar matters. To Hull, this seemed again to confirm Welles's disloyalty and insubordination. 77 		 

Yet Welles feared that the administration risked missing an important opportunity to shape public opinion. He privately lamented that it would prove more difficult to find agreement on common ideals or "a common hope" as the war neared an end. "I am more and more anxious," he wrote to MacLeish, "that the Administration should at least let people know what that common hope should be. And still the trend is ... to deal solely in platitudes and generalities on the ground that politically it is unwise to hold up to the American people as a common hope anything more than the Beatitudes." 78		 

Despite Hull's admonitions, Welles continued to make unauthorized public remarks about postwar aims, and his efforts took another step forward in the summer of 1943 when Simon & Schuster came out with Prefaces to Peace, featuring addresses from Welles, Willkie, and Wallace about their postwar aims, but not including any contributions from Hull. In June, Columbia University Press followed with a collection featuring twelve of Welles's best-known wartime speeches under the title The World of the Four Freedoms. 79		 

Hull had meanwhile grown increasingly restive over his inability to control postwar planning, and in the spring of 1943 he assumed the full-time chairmanship of the political subcommittee after its forty-seventh meeting. Yet the bulk of its work had already been done, and the broad outlines of the kind of world order America desired had begun to emerge. A number of problems still remained to be ironed out, but the subcommittees had thoroughly and systematically examined U.S. war and peace aims in some detail. The Draft Constitution of the United Nations was by then largely completed, and Welles briefed the president on the findings of the advisory committees at a White House meeting on June 19, where Welles obtained Roosevelt's approval of the latest drafts of the United Nations Protocol and the Draft Constitution of the International Organization. 80		 

The drafts urged that some form of world organization be launched before the war's end. The planners felt that the League of Nations, despite its failings, had established significant precedents for international cooperation, marked a revolutionary advance over previous relationships among nations, and should serve as a prototype for the new organization. The drafts explained that the League failed not only because the U.S. refused to join, but also because it did not have sufficient power to support its actions. A future international organization should henceforth have the strength to enforce peace, with an international military force giving sanctions a meaning and substance they had lacked under the League. The planners endorsed a system where nations would contribute armed forces as needed.		 80

The drafts also endorsed the need for a strong universal world organization, but argued that many local problems would best be handled by regional bodies. The regional bodies would be subordinate to the overall world organization, with the universal body having ultimate appellate jurisdiction. 81 The members also foresaw some peril in forming regional bodies, particularly in the Far East and the Pacific region, where the interests of several great powers might conflict. 82 		 

When Hull finally disbanded the planning committees in July 1943, he at last succeeded in ending Welles's domination of postwar planning. A few days after Hull's action, the Draft Constitution of the United Nations was made public, but over the next few weeks the decline of Welles's influence became more apparent, depriving the administration of a strong advocate for regionalism. Hull had now become an open opponent of Welles's regional ideas, and the secretary would see to it that the redraft of the plan omitted the concept altogether.		 

Hull disagreed with the belief that a regional approach would serve to safeguard the Western Hemisphere. The secretary instead feared that regionalism would mean that European and Asiatic powers would find their way onto regional councils for the Americas. When he subsequently received Welles's draft constitution, he instructed Leo Pasvolsky to make revisions to its treatment of regionalism. 83 The revised version differed little from Welles's previous efforts, and it became the foundation upon which much of the work would be conducted at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944. But one notable omission from the redraft was the concept of regionalism, which Hull succeeded in eliminating from all future drafts. 84 		 

During Welles's leadership of postwar planning, Roosevelt had supported regionalism and remained somewhat distant from Hull's brand of universalism. Roosevelt also supported Welles's more advanced interpretation of trusteeship. But the president's support for regionalism ebbed in mid-1943, roughly at the moment of Welles's resignation, and by late summer the president was moving closer to the kind of universalism favored by Hull. By the time of the Teheran Conference in December 1943, Roosevelt seemed to have lost interest in regionalism, a startling change of mind in only a matter of months. Nonetheless, at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg successfully pushed for Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, permitting member nations to enter regional security pacts, which later allowed for U.S. participation in military alliances such as NATO and SEATO.		 

At the Moscow Conference in October 1943, internationalism and the effort to construct a new league received an important boost when representatives of the four great powers at last consulted over postwar matters. 85 Most importantly, the delegates reached a consensus agreement pledging to establish a postwar international organization. Hull interpreted the agreement as a triumph of his approach over Welles's. "The emphasis," he later wrote, "was now on a general international organization. Nothing was said of regional security organizations in the declaration, and in the discussions at Moscow I argued strongly against them." 86		 85

Nevertheless, the political subcommittee's final report would become the basis for the next steps in the postwar planning process, including serving as a blueprint of American policy goals at Dumbarton Oaks and at future Allied conferences. When delegates from 39 nations met at Dumbarton Oaks, for example, it soon became apparent that they relied heavily on the preliminary work and decisions made by Welles's subcommittees. Nearly all of the members of Welles's international organization subcommittee participated at Dumbarton Oaks, and the draft framework for a United Nations organization which emerged—featuring a security council, a general assembly, and an international court of justice—differed little from the initial drafts Welles's committees had first created in 1942 and 1943.		 

Furthermore, the San Francisco conference, which served as the inaugural meeting of the United Nations, was based on the draft proposals that had emerged from Dumbarton Oaks six months before. Welles and his fellow planners had thus laid the foundations for the United Nations concept. In addition, the influence of the postwar planning committees would continue to be felt indirectly, reflected in the advice and proposals that Welles and the other planners had made to the president and the secretary of state. Many subsequent wartime decisions would demonstrate acceptance of the findings of the committees, and their work would contribute to the shaping of American assumptions throughout the war, as well as significantly influencing the framework of America's strategic doctrine during the Cold War. 87 		 


Notes:

Note 1: Armstrong to Welles, July 14, 1941, Welles papers, box 67, folder 3, FDRL; Welles to Pasvolsky, July 15, 1941, Welles papers, box 67, folder 3, FDRL; Harley Notter memoranda, October 20, 1941 and December 8, 1941, box 8, RG 59, Notter Files, National Archives. The most exhaustive account of the history of the postwar planning committees remains Harley Notter's Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation: 1939-1945 (Washington: Department of State Publication, 1950). An excellent account of the historiography of postwar planning can be found in William C. Widenor, "American Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the Right Questions?" Diplomatic History, 6:3 (Summer 1982): 245-265.  Back.

Note 2: Sumner Welles, "Commercial Policy After the War," October 7, 1941, speech files, Welles papers, box 195, FDRL. See also, for example, Harley Notter memorandum, October 20, 1941, box 8, RG 59, Notter Files, National Archives; as well as "Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy: Preliminaries," not dated, 1941, RG 59, Notter Files, box 54, National Archives.  Back.

Note 3: "Our people realize that at any moment, war may be forced upon us," Roosevelt said in his remarks that same day during Armistice Day ceremonies across the Potomac River at Arlington National Cemetery. New York Times, November 12, 1941.  Back.

Note 4: Sumner Welles, "Wilson and the Atlantic Charter," November 11, 1941, speech files, box 195, FDRL. The late president's widow, Edith Bolling Wilson, wrote to Welles the following day. "I asked Mrs. Welles to tell you how deeply I appreciated your making the address yesterday. Aside from its personal side it will stand out as one of the noblest expressions of these soul-searching days." Edith Bolling Wilson to Sumner Welles, November 12, 1941, scrapbook, 1941, Welles Papers, box 241, FDRL.  Back.

Note 5: All of Welles's speeches during this period repeated these themes. See, for example, "An Association of Nations," July 22, 1941, speech files, box 195, folder 2, Welles papers, FDRL; "Commercial Policy After the War," October 7, 1941, speech files, Welles papers, box 195, FDRL; "The Realization of a Great Vision," May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 6: Welles to Roosevelt, October 18, 1941 (with enclosed Welles to Hull draft), Welles Papers, box 151, folder 9, FDRL.  Back.

Note 7: Pasvolsky to Welles, October 8, 1941, Notter Files, Box 54; Leo Pasvolsky, "Proposal for the Organization of Work for the Formulation of Post-War Foreign Policies," September 12, 1941, Notter Files, Box 54; Welles to Roosevelt, October 18, 1941, Official File 4351, FDRL; Hull to Roosevelt, December 28, 1941, Official File 4720, FDRL. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle said that the advisory committee was Welles's idea. See, for example, notes from interview with Berle, by Harold Gosnell, February 2, 1948, "Overall History of Department of State," (Sumner Welles) 4E3, 6/29/D, Box 1, RG 59, War History Branch Studies, National Archives.  Back.

Note 8: FO 371/26425, Churchill telegram to war cabinet, December 24, 1941, PRO; "Memorandum of Conversation by Welles," December 29, 1941, FRUS, 1942, vol. I, 21-22; rough drafts of Declaration, December 1941January 1942, President's Secretary's File 168, FDRL; "Declaration by United Nations," January 1, 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. I, 25-26.; "Memorandum on Official Statements on Post-War Policy," January 3, 1942, Notter file, box 8, National Archives; Sumner Welles, The Time For Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), 178.  Back.

Note 9: Sumner Welles, "The Road Before the Americas," January 15, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 4, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 10: Welles's presence at the Atlantic Conference had already further strained his relationship with Hull. The press described Hull as "affronted and sore" at being left behind, and one newspaper reported that "Mr. Hull did not ask Mr. Welles where he was going and does not know." Chicago Times, August 12, 1941. Hull had also taken issue with the Atlantic Conference's joint Anglo-American statement on the Far East and Japan, which he thought dangerously provocative. He worried that the declaration's strong language opposing further Japanese territorial expansion would undermine his ongoing negotiations with Japanese diplomatic representatives, whereas Welles devoted himself to an effort, dubbed another "Welles plan" by the American press, to further squeeze the Axis powers by cornering the market on the strategic materials necessary to wage war. Furthermore, Hull, who had devoted much of his career to promoting free trade, was keenly disappointed by article four of the charter. He believed Churchill's insertion of the phrase "with due respect for their existing obligations" had rendered the article virtually meaningless, and he blamed Welles for not holding his ground on behalf of free trade. See Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1018, 975, 1144; Washington Post, September 19, 1941.  Back.

Note 11: Welles cable to Roosevelt, January 24, 1942, Welles papers, box 151, folder 11, FDRL; Berle Diary, February 1, 1942, box 213, Berle Papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 12: According to observers, when Hull heard the radio reports of Welles's endorsement of the compromise resolution, he phoned Welles in Rio and a "violent conversation" ensued. "As I heard the conversation wear on," Berle wrote of the Welles-Hull telephone dispute, "I felt that several careers were ending that night. ... For it is obvious that now there is a breach between the Secretary and Sumner which will never be healed—though the Secretary will keep it below hatches to some extent. Life in this Department under those circumstances will be about as difficult as anything I can think of." Berle Diary, January 24, 1942, box 213, Berle Papers, FDRL. According to one scholar of the Rio Conference, "The greatest significance of the meeting in retrospect may have been the degree to which it deepened the split between Hull and Welles." See Michael J. Francis, "The United States at Rio, 1942: the Strains of Pan-Americanism," Journal of Latin American Studies 6 (1974): 94.  Back.

Note 13: Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York: Harper, 1950), 182-183.  Back.

Note 14: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives.  Back.

Note 15: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives; Welles, Seven Decisions, 182-183.  Back.

Note 16: Welles, Seven Decisions, 182-83.  Back.

Note 17: Harley Notter, "Official Statements of Postwar Policy," January 2, 1942, Welles papers, box 190, FDRL; P minutes 2, March 14, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives.  Back.

Note 18: Harley Notter, "Official Statements of Postwar Policy," January 2, 1942, Welles papers, box 190, FDRL; P minutes 2, March 14, 1942, Notter files, box 54, RG 59, National Archives. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, National Archives. Several scholars have criticized Roosevelt for being largely uninterested in postwar matters. See, for example, William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 439-440; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 358-359.  Back.

Note 19: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, February 12, 1942, Notter files, box 54, National Archives.  Back.

Note 20: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55.  Back.

Note 21: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55.  Back.

Note 22: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55.  Back.

Note 23: P minutes 4, March 28, 1942, box 55.  Back.

Note 24: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, April 4, 1942, Notter files, box 54; Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper, 1946), 19, 23-27.  Back.

Note 25: Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Policy, May 2, 1942.  Back.

Note 26: P minutes 17, June 27, 1942, box 55.  Back.

Note 27: P minutes 17, June 27, 1942, box 55.  Back.

Note 28: P minutes 17, June 27, 1942, box 55; P minutes 33, November 14, 1942, box 55; Minutes of the Special Subcommittee on International Organization, 34, April 9, 1943, box 85 [hereafter referred to as PIO minutes and PIO documents]; PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 56; S minutes 24, January 22, 1943, box 76; S document 44, "The Character and Functions of a Permanent International Security Organization," August 11, 1942, box 77; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56.  Back.

Note 29: It should also be noted that at various times during the war President Roosevelt appeared to agree with Welles on these issues, but in the wake of Welles's resignation, Roosevelt gradually moved away from these positions on regionalism, the collective use of force, and trusteeship.  Back.

Note 30: Welles, Seven Decisions, 125, 182-183; Welles, Time For Decision, 367-368.  Back.

Note 31: PIO minutes 1, July 17, 1942, box 85, Notter Files, [all references to PIO minutes are from Notter Files, Record Group 59, National Archives, unless otherwise stated]. Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 18.  Back.

Note 32: PIO minutes 1, July 17, 1942; PIO document 1, "Statement by Van Kleffens," July 17, 1942, box 86.  Back.

Note 33: PIO minutes 1, July 17, 1942; PIO document 1, "Statement by Van Kleffens," July 17, 1942, box 86.  Back.

Note 34: PIO minutes 2, July 31, 1942; PIO document 2, James T. Shotwell, "Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization," box 85; PIO document 3, Isaiah Bowman, "Memorandum by Isaiah Bowman on International Organization," box 85; PIO document 4, Benjamin Cohen, "Some Observations Regarding the Form of World Political Organization," box 85; PIO document 5, Clark Eichelberger, "Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization," box 85.  Back.

Note 35: While the League of Nations would be abandoned, Welles and the planners aimed to build upon its more useful features. In late August, for example, the committee once again returned to the Wilson era for instruction when it examined a 1918 draft by Colonel Edward House suggesting ways a world organization could be strengthened. See PIO document 24, "Draft of Colonel House, July 16, 1918: suggestion for a Covenant of League of Nations," box 86.  Back.

Note 36: PIO minutes 5, August 14, 1942; Wallace to Welles, August 8, 1942, Henry A. Wallace Papers as Vice President, 1941-1945, FDRL.  Back.

Note 37: PIO document 30, "Draft Article on International Trusteeship," August 21, 1942, box 86; PIO minutes, 7, September 4, 1942. The subject of trusteeship will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter Six.  Back.

Note 38: PIO minutes 14, October 30, 1942; PIO document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," October 28, 1942, box 87; PIO document 123, "Draft Constitution of International Organization," December 3, 1942, box 87.  Back.

Note 39: PIO minutes 14, October 30, 1942; PIO document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," October 28, 1942, box 87; PIO document 123, "Draft Constitution of International Organization," December 3, 1942, box 87.  Back.

Note 40: P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, 23, 27; Harley Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 85-89, 110-114; P minutes 33, November 14, 1942.  Back.

Note 41: Sumner Welles, "The Realization of a Great Vision," delivered at Arlington National Cemetery, May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL. Welles may have borrowed this concept from Wilson; see, for example, Mark T. Gilderhaus, "Pan-American Initiatives: The Wilson Presidency and 'Regional Integration,' 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 4:4 (Fall 1980): 409-423.  Back.

Note 42: Welles, The Time For Decision, 381; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, 23-27; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56. "Roosevelt liked Welles's ideas because they combined the reality of regional power with the idealism of a world agency, and he operated with a strong regional orientation in his dealings with Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill. Although they devoted little of their attention to the subject, the Big Three leaders were in apparent agreement in general terms from the beginning. They saw a universal body to foster continued cooperation among the great powers as the most important requirement for a stable peace, but they also felt that the special interests of each in its own area had to be recognized." See J. Tillapaugh, "Closed Hemisphere and Open World? The Dispute Over Regional Security at the U.N. Conference, 1945," Diplomatic History 2:1 (Winter 1978): 25-42.  Back.

Note 43: Welles, Seven Decisions, 184-185; P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political Problems," October 22, 1942, box 56; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56, Notter Files, National Archives.  Back.

Note 44: P document 121, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on Political Problems," October 22, 1942, box 56; P minutes 7, April 18, 1942, box 55.  Back.

Note 45: PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 56; P minutes 21, August 8, 1942, box 55; P document 33, "French Indochina," August 4, 1942, box 56; P document 42, "Netherlands East Indies," August 14, 1942, box 56.  Back.

Note 46: PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 8, 1942, box 86; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56.  Back.

Note 47: PIO minutes 4, August 14, 1942. Welles had begun a mid-August meeting of the subcommittee on international organization by reading aloud a confidential report prepared by the Republican foreign policy adviser John Foster Dulles regarding his recent trip to London. He told the planners that Dulles discerned a widespread feeling among the British that postwar Europe should be organized as a series of regional federations. He thought Dulles's report underscored the need for greater consultation and exchanges among the Big Three in the area of postwar planning. Dulles assumed the British had little interest in dismembering Germany and that there was no enthusiasm for reviving the League of Nations. He also sensed much resentment of the "current American tendency to condemn colonial imperialism." Dulles told the colonial office that the American people desired a "New Deal" for the dependent peoples of the colonial world, one that might be underwritten by the controlling powers themselves.  Back.

Note 48: PIO minutes 4, August 14, 1942, box 85; FO 371/31525, Jebb to Eden, "World Organization," October 1942, PRO; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 5, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), 2; P document 117, "British Political Ferment Involving Post-War Objectives," October 17, 1942, box 56. Ambassador Halifax (who sat in on a portion of Welles's discussions with Law) was unsettled by Washington's support for a universal organization offering an equal vote to all nations, saying he "could not see the wisdom or the practical possibility of giving Liberia an equal determination in world affairs as the British Government." See Welles memorandum of conversation with Law and Halifax, "Postwar Problems," August 25, 1942, box 164, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 49: See, for example, FO 371/34136 Campbell to Foreign Office: "Mr. Welles's Secret Advisory Committee on Post War Policy," February 16, 1943, PRO.  Back.

Note 50: CAB 66/30 WP (42) 480 "Postwar Atlantic Bases," (Van Kleffens's views), November 3, 1942, PRO; FO 371/31518, minute by Gladwyn Jebb, September 3, 1942, PRO.  Back.

Note 51: CAB 66/31 WP (42) 516 "Four Power Plan," by Eden, November 8, 1942, PRO; CAB 66/31 WP (42) 532 "Four Power Plan," by Cripps, November 19, 1942, PRO; CAB 65/28 WM (42) 159, November 27, 1942, PRO.  Back.

Note 52: FO 371/34136 Campbell to Foreign Office: "Mr. Welles's Secret Advisory Committee on Post War Policy," February 16, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/33 WP (43) 31 "The United Nations Plan," by Eden, January 16, 1943, PRO. Before departing for Washington with Eden, Gladwyn Jebb drafted another paper, which not only served as the basis for future British discussions on the postwar order, but also demonstrated the extent to which Welles's neo-Wilsonian ideas continued to lead the way. Jebb's memorandum acknowledged that, "The principles embodied in the [Atlantic] Charter will be the basis of any international world order after the war." See FO 371/35396, Gladwyn Jebb, "Suggestions for a Peace Settlement," March 6, 1943, PRO.  Back.

Note 53: For a more thorough account of Eden's visit, see Warren F. Kimball, "Anglo-American War Aims, 1941-43, 'The First Review': Eden's Mission to Washington," in The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945, ed. Ann Lane and Howard Temperley (London: Macmillan, 1995), 1-21.  Back.

Note 54: Welles had less to do with formulating U.S. policy on the concept of international police power. He had instead delegated most of the initial work to Norman Davis's subcommittee on security problems. But to better discuss how the world organization could best be endowed with military capability, in early April 1943 Welles's subcommittee on international organization began holding joint meetings with Davis's subcommittee. Two opposing views quickly emerged. One faction supported a system where nations would contribute forces from their own militaries. Proponents of this view argued that the contribution of individual national forces would pose less of a threat to the sovereignty of the member nations. It might also anticipate opposition from those who would oppose the concept of American forces fighting under the direct command of an international body. There was also some concern that international forces might pursue their own ends and prove impossible to oppose in an otherwise disarmed world. Advocates of the alternative view argued that a permanent, fully integrated United Nations army would have consistent training and thus would possess better esprit de corps. Greater military readiness would be achieved and member nations would have more difficulty withholding support for United Nations operations if their forces were already committed in advance. But finding the means to provide the United Nations Authority with an effective military arm remained one of the most daunting challenges facing the planners. Despite the Welles-Davis joint meetings, the planners remained stymied as to how best to incorporate the concept of police powers into the draft charter. See, for example, PIO minutes 34, April 9, 1943; PIO minutes 35, April 16, 1943; PIO minutes 36, April 29, 1943; Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks, 21; S document 44, "The Character and Functions of a Permanent International Security Organization," August 11, 1942, box 77, Notter files.  Back.

Note 55: PIO document 99, "Provisional Outline of International Organization," October 28, 1942, box 86; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the Subcommittee on International Organization: July 17 to October 9, 1942," October 22, 1942, box 56; Memorandum of conversation, by Welles, March 27, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 35-38; Donald Drummond, "Cordell Hull," in An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 206-207; "Eden's conversations in the United States, March 1943," Notter Files, box 19, National Archives.  Back.

Note 56: Memorandum of Conversation, by Welles, March 16, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 19-24; memorandum of conversation, by Hull, March 22, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 34; CAB 65/34 WM(43) 53rd, April 13, 1943, PRO.  Back.

Note 57: The British delegation had been in Washington only a few days when it took note of the tension between Welles and Hull, and particularly of Hull's lack of influence. Eden's private secretary, Oliver Harvey, thought Hull to be ill informed and excluded from many decisions. Harvey noted in his diary: "It is an exhausting country where the President can, and insists on, discussing foreign policy without his Foreign Secretary being present and without even wishing him to know what his ideas are." The British also noted that the Welles-Hull feud spilled over into simple matters of protocol, as when the two men held separate receptions for Eden and his delegation. Harry Hopkins casually told the British that Welles and Hull always gave separate official receptions. During one discussion near the end of his visit, Eden expressed surprise that Welles and Hull were together in the same room. "Their relations were vinegar," Eden noted. See Oliver Harvey, The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941-45, ed. John Harvey (London: Collins, 1970), 229-240; Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), 376-77.  Back.

Note 58: Harvey, War Diaries, 232. Eden briefed Welles on Churchill's desire to have the United States take part in a regional council for Europe. Welles replied that the American people might not accept such expanded responsibilities for the United States unless they were sold in purely pragmatic and self-interested terms.  Back.

Note 59: Memorandum of conversation by Hopkins, March 27, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 39.  Back.

Note 60: FO 371/35368, memorandum of conversation with Welles, by Halifax, April 12, 1943, PRO; Harvey, War Diaries, 232; "Eden's conversations in the United States, March 1943," Notter Files, box 19, National Archives; CAB 66/35 WP (43) 130 "Foreign Secretary's Visit to Washington," by Eden, March 30, 1943, PRO. Reporting on how Eden's visit was being received in official circles in London, H. Freeman Matthews, an American diplomatic official in London, told Washington that the British feared another American withdrawal from world affairs similar to 1919-1920. But Matthews also noted concern in London that a strengthened America would attempt to impose its views on the rest of the world, particularly on the British Empire. "The alternate, or perhaps I should say the corollary, fear of 'American imperialism' is likewise real," Matthews added. See Matthews to Hull, March 20, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 26-28. "[It] is no exaggeration to say," Matthews continued, "that fear of an American withdrawal from its due interest in the building of the new world is the dominant factor in British feeling toward the United States today. Neither the British public nor the British Government dares count too strongly that the changed world and the lessons of the aftermath of 1919 will effectively prevent another American 'back to normalcy' wave with all its power to destroy the spirit of cooperation founded on wartime need."  Back.

Note 61: Notes from FDR's press conference of March 30, 1943, FRUS, vol. III, 41-42. "If some of you go back," Roosevelt told the assembled reporters, "some of you can, like myself, go back to 1918, the war came to a rather sudden end in November, 1918. And actually it's a fact that there had been very little work done on the post-war problems before Armistice Day. Well, between Armistice Day and the time that the nations met in Paris early in 1919, everybody was rushing around trying to dig up things."  Back.

Note 62: FO 371/35366 "Eden memorandum of conversations in Washington," March 29, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/37 WP (43) 233 "The Structure of Postwar Settlement," by Churchill, June 10, 1943, PRO; FO 371/35435; "Churchill's views on postwar problems: May 1943," May 28, 1943, Notter Files, box 19. Back in London, Eden thought the prime minister's luncheon extremely productive. He felt that it had successfully reconfirmed the enthusiasm on the part of the United States, "and most notably Mr. Sumner Welles," for reaching wartime agreements with the other allies about the nature of the new international organization. See Eden, "Postwar Settlement," July 1, 1943, PRO. For a more detailed account of Churchill's views on postwar planning and international organization see, for example, E.J. Hughes, "Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organization," Journal of Contemporary History 9:4 (October 1974): 177-194.  Back.

Note 63: FO 371/35434 Halifax minute to foreign office and prime minister, June 11, 1943, PRO; FO 371/ 35435 Halifax to FO, June 29, 1943, PRO. Halifax's discussions with Welles prompted the Foreign Office's Gladwyn Jebb to draft a memorandum for the war cabinet outlining the areas of Anglo-American agreement on matters related to the international organization, and Eden followed with a memo recommending that the cabinet endorse Welles's ideas for regionalism. See FO 371/ 35435 "Memo by Jebb," June 12, 1943, PRO; FO 371/ 35435 Eden to Churchill, June 16, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/33 WP(43)31, "The United Nations Plan," by Eden, January 16, 1943, PRO.  Back.

Note 64: P minutes 45, February 20, 1943. While Welles emphasized that such a move would send a clear message to Moscow and London that the United States was prepared to play a role in the postwar settlement, he may also have hoped it might forestall further unilateral territorial moves on the part of the Kremlin.  Back.

Note 65: Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 94; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1640; Welles, Seven Decisions, 188-189.  Back.

Note 66: Memorandum of conversation between Welles and Halifax, February 20, 1942, FRUS, 1942, vol. III, 522.  Back.

Note 67: MacLeish to Welles, April 16, 1942, Welles papers, box 81, FDRL.  Back.

Note 68: Sumner Welles, "The Realization of a Great Vision," delivered at Arlington National Cemetery, May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 69: Welles to Archibald MacLeish, August 13, 1942, box 81, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles, "The Realization of a Great Vision," delivered at Arlington National Cemetery, May 30, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 5, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 70: New York Times, May 31, 1942; FO 371/31518, "Proposal by Mr. Sumner Welles for the Organization of Peace, " July 9, 1942, PRO; Sherwood to Welles, May 31, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL; Sherwood to Welles, June 25, 1942, box 83, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 71: New York Herald Tribune, June 9, 1942; New York Times, June 1, 1942.  Back.

Note 72: P minutes, March 7, 1942; Sumner Welles, "Free Access to Raw Materials, "delivered at the National Foreign Trade Convention, October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; Welles, "Blueprint for Peace," New York Herald Tribune Forum, November 17, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL.  Back.

Note 73: Welles to MacLeish, August 13, 1942, Welles papers, box 81, folder 1, FDRL.  Back.

Note 74: New York Times, May 31, 1942; Welles, "Free Access to Raw Materials," October 8, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, FDRL. Nevertheless, the Democrats did poorly in the 1942 elections, and the old dictum that the outcomes of American elections do not turn on foreign policy questions was turned on its head. Former isolationists did well in the 1942 primaries, and in the general election the Republicans gained 46 seats in the House, and 10 in the Senate. Many interpreted the results as a repudiation of the president's handling of the war, and some supporters of internationalism voiced concerns that a political coalition was forming that would undermine and ultimately defeat the administration's internationalist goals, as happened to Wilson in 1918. The Democratic defeat at the polls in 1942 profoundly influenced the administration's efforts to promote the new world order. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 2nd ed. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1985), 110.  Back.

Note 75: They feared that Ohio Senator Robert Taft and other isolationists in the Senate would work to destroy internationalism. Welles thought political trouble might be brewing in the shape of an isolationist backlash in the West and Midwest. He also acknowledged that the political situation in these states had the potential to create political hazards for the administration's foreign policy, and that an accelerated public relations campaign might convince the American people of the virtues of internationalism. See, for example, PIO minutes 17, November 20, 1942. At one meeting shortly after the 1942 elections, Welles read aloud a letter from a recently defeated Democratic Congressman who warned that the country was heading down the same path as in 1918-1920, and attributed his defeat to deep-seated isolationist feeling, predicting that the international question would dominate the elections of 1944. Isaiah Bowman told the committee that he had just returned from the Midwest and he warned the members that the attitude there was one of, "Why should the United States help these people in distant countries?"  Back.

Note 76: Welles pushed these accusations further during other speeches, pointing out that the mistakes of 1919 had led directly to the current war, while placing responsibility for avoiding another war in the hands of the American people. During a nationally broadcast address from just outside New York City in December 1942, he repeated the theme that American participation in a postwar organization was a matter of self-interest. "Would we not as a people have been better advised if we had been willing twenty years ago to join with the other free peoples of the earth in promoting an international order which would have maintained the peace of the world and which could have prevented the rise of those conditions which have resulted in the total war of today?" See Sumner Welles, "Dedication to the Future," Mount Vernon, NY, December 6, 1942, speech files, box 195, folder 7, Welles papers, FDRL; as well as Welles, "The Victory of Peace," February 26, 1943, speech files, box 196, folder 1, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 77: Hull subsequently felt compelled to deliver a radio address of his own, where he warned it would be necessary to set limits on the Four Freedoms, thereby taking a stance quite contrary to Welles's more sweeping aims. To make matters worse, the ailing Hull was unable to complete his address. Hull remained uncomfortable with Welles's aim of pressing the European colonial powers to grant self-government to their colonies. Hull assumed self-government would come naturally after an adequate period of years. New York Times, July 24, 1942; Welles, Where Are We Headed?, 19-24; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1227-1229, 1599.  Back.

Note 78: Welles to MacLeish, August 13, 1942, Welles papers, box 81, FDRL. During a remarkable speech at the May 1943 commencement exercises of the North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham, Welles devoted the majority of his remarks to the question of race and equality in the new world order. Welles stated that, " in the kind of world for which we fight, there must cease to exist any need for the use of that accursed term 'racial or religious minority.' If the peoples of the earth are fighting and dying to preserve and secure the liberation of the individual under law, is it conceivable that the peoples of the United Nations can consent to the reestablishment of any system where human beings will still be regarded as belonging to such 'minorities?' ... equality of human rights and to equality of opportunity every human being is by divine right entitled. If that cornerstone is laid as the foundation of the new world of the United Nations, the blot of the concept of minorities upon the fabric of our civilization will be erased." See Welles, "Commencement Exercises of the North Carolina College for Negroes," May 31, 1943, speech files, box 195, Welles papers, FDRL.  Back.

Note 79: Sumner Welles, The World of the Four Freedoms (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), v-vii.  Back.

Note 80: P minutes 60, June 19, 1943; P document 234, "Universal International Organization," June 19, 1942, box 57; PIO minutes 44, June 19, 1943 with memo from Sandifer regarding Welles meeting with President, June 19, 1943 [attached], box 85; Welles, Seven Decisions, 189.  Back.

Note 81: PIO document 95, "An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples," October 21, 1942, box 56; P document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57, Notter files. Welles and the planners underscored the need for United States participation in a future world organization in stark economic terms. They believed the United States needed to participate in an international body to safeguard free trade and the open door to resources. They also concluded that U.S. participation might be necessary to obtain basic resources in the years following the war. The planners thought support for internationalism might be more easily obtained if U.S. postwar aims were presented in more practical and self-interested terms, for example, as crucial to the safeguarding of American security, trade, and standards of living.  Back.

Note 82: P document 236, "Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943," July 2, 1943, box 57, Notter files. British officials had also been revising their own outline for a world organization. Following Eden's visit to Washington, successive British drafts demonstrated how strongly Welles's vision of a world organization continued to influence postwar planning on both sides of the Atlantic. British drafts during the summer of 1943 generally followed the outlines of Welles's proposals. After Churchill's return from the United States, he circulated to the cabinet an account of his conversations in Washington. Following Churchill's report, Eden circulated a memorandum examining in some detail the various proposals for regionalism, and by July 7, Jebb and the Foreign Office had come up with a draft that encapsulated British views on a postwar organization up to that time. The revised British plan closely mirrored the draft Welles had discussed with Eden in March, and restated that the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter "will be the basis of any international world order after the war." See CAB 66/37 WP(43) 217, "Armistice and Related Problems," by Anthony Eden, May 25, 1943, PRO; CAB 65/34 WM(43) June 16, 1943, PRO; CAB 66/38 WP(43) 300, "United Nations Plan for Organizing Peace and Welfare," July 7, 1943, PRO. A few weeks later, on July 22, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee endorsed Eden's proposal that the war cabinet form a standing committee to investigate and study specific questions of a postwar nature. Attlee also recommended that the war cabinet consider an exchange of ideas with the Soviet Union concerning the structure of the postwar world. See FO 371/35386, Attlee to Churchill, July 22, 1943, PRO.  Back.

Note 83: Furthermore, in the wake of Welles's resignation Hull would reorganize and revive a new system of planning committees in the fall of 1943 to begin preparing the groundwork for the next steps in the postwar planning process, such as the Quebec, Teheran, and Dumbarton Oaks conferences.  Back.

Note 84: "The Charter of the United Nations," August 14, 1943, in Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, Appendix 23, page 526-534; Julius W. Pratt, "Cordell Hull," in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis and Robert Ferrell (New York: Cooper Square, 1964), 723; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1640-1643.  Back.

Note 85: President Roosevelt had asked Welles to represent the United States at the Moscow Conference, but Welles declined.  Back.

Note 86: Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, 1647. After his resignation, Welles used his syndicated column to promote the merits of regionalism. See "Welles Urges Regional Seats on World Executive Council," New York Herald Tribune, January 26, 1944. According to J. Tillapaugh, "No satisfactory planning occurred before the San Francisco Conference to relate the [Western Hemisphere] region to the world in a way acceptable to both the great powers and the American republics. In 1943, ... Welles devised a plan for a universal structure based on regional cornerstones. ... Hull rejected the draft because it placed too much emphasis on regional independence. Hull turned matters over to Leo Pasvolsky, who aimed not to reconcile regional and global interests but rather to eradicate regionalism from subsequent proposals." See J. Tillapaugh, "Closed Hemisphere and Open World? The Dispute Over Regional Security at the U.N. Conference, 1945," Diplomatic History 2:1 (Winter 1978): 25-42.  Back.

Note 87: Several scholars have made use of the records of Welles's planning committees to trace the origins of U.S. policy in a number of areas. James Edward Miller, for example, notes that the Welles-led planning committees "created a body of coherent policy recommendations and detailed supporting studies, which would powerfully influence American decisions both during and after the war. The value of this kind of work was dramatically pointed out to the Americans at Casablanca, where they were humiliated by the better prepared British. Thereafter, Roosevelt ... did not overlook the existence of this body of information and policy recommendations in preparing for international conferences." See James Edward Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 43. See also the use of postwar planning records in Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 59-61, 92-93; as well as in Rudolf V. A. Janssens, What Future for Japan?: U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era, 1942-1945 (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 1995), and Xiaoyuan Liu, A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and their policies for the postwar disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 34, 76-77.  Back.

 

Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943