Appendix 42: Draft memo from MGRA, GHQ to GS, GHQ, 23 August 1916
Source: Rawlins Papers, RAI, file 12a

1. On several occasions in the present battle Division Commanders have altered the artillery programme of attack of their own guns previously ordered by the Corps and approved by the Army.

2. The success of artillery attack depends on concentration of forces and violence of effort, and any interference with artillery programmes based on these two principles will generally lead to disaster.v

3. Any concentration of artillery to be successful must be placed under the orders of one man who must make it plain to all concerned when the component parts of the concentration shall revert to the command of subordinate formations.

It is to be clearly understood that the command of the whole of the artillery of a Division, of a Corps, or of an Army, may be assumed at any moment by the next higher formation for the purpose of combined action, whether offensive or defensive.

When command has thus been assumed, orders or instructions issued to the resulting artillery mass are not to be modified by subordinate commanders except when a change in the tactical situation has occurred after the orders or instructions have been issued and time does not admit of reference to higher authority.