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In the early days they were so separated, that they were of little assistance to one another. As the war progressed, they drew nearer and nearer, until they finally worked in very close co-operation, and practically became one service. The creation of the Artillery Survey companies has finally joined them together. Counter battery work probably provides the best example in the Army of close co-operation between Operations and Intelligence. All fighting intelligence must be red hot, and hardly a shot is fired from the operations branch of the counter battery office, the reason of which cannot be seen at a glance in the intelligence branch. Furthermore, should the intelligence branch collapse, counter battery work practically ceases. Counter battery work, tactically speaking, was very much neglected during the war, except by those immediately concerned with it. To the majority of officers it was practically a closed book. When people do not understand an organisation, they can do little to help it, and counter battery work needs all the help it can get from every possible source. The average infantry or field artillery officer in France knew little of the science of counter battery work. He knew nothing of what went on behind him when the heavy shell were passing over head. He heard them continually droning above him, but as that always went on, it called for little comment. He knew less of what the shell were aimed at, or why. During the war this was largely unavoidable, but in peace time it is necessary to reduce this apathy by education and propaganda for two reasons:
Knowledge and realization of our own strength always increases our moral. A demonstration of the system in a counter battery office was generally a complete revelation to a battalion commander. He was then able to tell his men about what was continually being done, night and day, to defeat the enemy's guns; and also to explain the difficulties of the work and the reasons why it cannot always be effective. Then failure to stop the enemy firing was not put down to callousness or inefficiency, and mutual esteem resulted. From this stage a desire to give assistance will develop, since the value of it, and the possible results to be obtained from it will be realized, and mutual co-operation will be greatly improved. As I will show later, reliable information about the hostile shell on landing is of great value in dealing with the gun that fired it. Counter battery work is a tactical operation which is actively con-tinuous day and night, whenever the opposing forces are in contact. The same offensive principles govern it as other operations. It can be divided into two phases.
Before the late war, artillery in covered positions was practically immune from hostile artillery fire. Numerous instances can be quoted both from the Russo-Japanese War, and every phase of the late war, of the paralysing effect of modern gun fire on infantry, when the circumstances have been such that counter battery work was either non-existent or ineffective. As the Artillery came to take a larger and larger share in the fighting, it became essential to counter its fire. Various means to this end were involved.
They were as follows:
A thorough grasp of the capabilities and limitations of each service is essential before the study of counter battery tactics can be com-menced.
Artillery Survey companies contain three units:
The object of Sound Ranging is to locate a hostile battery by means of the sound wave which is made by the piece being discharged. It can also be used to range our own batteries by locating the burst of each projectile.
A sound ranging detachment consists of 3 officers and some 75 men providing three reliefs for both apparatus and linesmen. The apparatus consists of 6 microphones, or automatic detectors, connected to a timing apparatus.
The latter is set in motion by a human observer called a "forward observer" in an "advanced post," so that the sound waves reach him a few seconds before they arrive at the microphones.
The forward observer is usually some 1000 to 1500 yards in front the microphones, in some spot where the hostile artillery is heard to the best advantage.
The microphones, for technical reasons, should be placed behind the main field artillery line.
The position of each microphone has to be surveyed very exactly, as an accurate knowledge of the relative positions of the microphones to each other, combined with the times the sound takes to reach each microphone successively, is the essence of the whole apparatus.
The surveying of the microphone base and the laying of the necessary connecting lines are the two factors which may cause the installation of a sound ranging detachment to be a somewhat lengthy affair.
In a well mapped country, a base can be quickly laid out and, as a temporary measure, cable can be laid instead of erecting air lines. In manner a detachment can be placed in action in 24 hours, although, as a general rule, it is not worth while to order a sound ranging detachment into action unless a halt of 48 hours is expected.
The instrument itself is placed well back for the following reasons:
The sound waves produced by the discharge of the hostile artillery and the bursting of the shells are heard by the microphones and recorded by the instrument on a piece of photographic printing paper. From it can be worked out the position of the piece and the locality of the burst, thereby establishing a shelling connection.
Sound ranging also gives a good deal of information regarding the nature of the piece which generally leads to correct deductions as to its calibre. This information is usually very difficult to obtain from other sources.
In France these detachments were placed all along the front to meet two general considerations:
From this the reader will see the necessity of centralised control, as the positions of the detachments depended on the enemy's artillery groupings and not any corps or other boundaries we chose to make. The front covered by a sound ranging detachment is usually about 8000 yards. It can only function at very small angles beyond this base on both sides.
Sound ranging suffers from several limitations.
As regards the Observation Groups.
The object of these is to locate hostile batteries by means of intersections by visual observations on their gun flashes.
The group consists of a headquarters and a varying number of observation posts working as a unit. Each post is manned night and day and is located in some commanding spot. High up and some way back is the best place to see flashes, and if convenient hills or church towers are not available structures are built in high trees. Each post has a spotting instrument with a graduated arc and is connected by telephone with its headquarters. The latter consist of the telephone exchange and a plotting board on which the positions and arcs of each observation post are accurately plotted. The chief difficulty in action is to ensure that all the posts working together as a unit are operating on the same flash. Special measures are taken to ensure this, so that very accurate trisections and even quadrusections are sometimes obtained.
Observation Groups are much quicker to install than sound ranging detachments, and can even function continuously in semi-mobile warfare. Under good conditions, they can set up and start work in 6 to 8 hours.
They can function to a great distance on a clear night, but are dependant on suitable ground for the best results. Their installation is subject to somewhat the same conditions and requirements as sound ranging, but the frontage is only limited by the necessity of getting intersections.
Neighbouring posts of adjoining groups can always be brought in for this purpose.
The headquarters can be well up with the posts if time is not available to lay long telephone lines.
Neutralization etc. is carried out in the same manner as with sound ranging.
Both flash spotting and sound ranging can be used for ranging our guns, but it is not advisable to do this as a rule with sections that are used for intelligence purposes, as by doing so valuable information may be missed.
Other posts, if available, can be installed for the purpose and good results obtained.
As regards the compiling Office :
During the late war this was located at Army Head Quarters. In future, it is probable that each Corps will have its own compiling office under the control of the C.B.S.O.
Its object is to examine all photographs of the counter battery area and accurately to plot the position of every actual or suspected emplacement in the area. It is really the authority for position. The Compiling Office and the Artillery Intelligence Office are in very close touch, so that it is hard to make an exact division of their titles.
Broadly speaking, the Compiling Office is responsible for technical accuracy from the Survey point of view while the Artillery Intelligence Office is concerned with the technical artillery point of view and for making deductions from the information supplied.
There is of course a lot of common land in between which they traverse together, the technical artillery and technical survey knowledge thus brought together enabling a true course to be steered.
The nature of their work makes the officers in the compiling office the photographic experts as regards battery positions.
The results of the Observation Group and Sound Ranging detachments are tabulated and examined in the compiling office and activity charts are prepared either by this office or the artillery intelligence office as a general check on hostile artillery activity.
Under the 1918 organisation two very important documents were prepared in the army compiling office.
Both are kept up to date as much as possible and renewed whenever required, according to the changes in the hostile artillery.
The hostile battery position list shows every hostile battery position known on the Army front. It is not a list of hostile batteries but of places where they are or may be. Particulars are given about each battery position which may be useful to battery commanders for shooting purposes such as the exact map co-ordinates of each pit and those thought to be unoccupied.
This list is therefore for artillery use and is the bible of a battery detailed for counter battery work. All the batteries in its area are carefully marked up on the fighting map from the co-ordinates given in the list.
The counter battery map is usually printed on 1/20,000 scale and is a specially prepared map with detail not clear from the air fined down and other detail shown up. The map in fact is primarily for use from the air and is made to stand out clearly. All the battery positions which have been active lately are shown on this map in a clear mannerusually in black. The chief point to notice is that the batteries are marked on this map exactly as they appear to the eye. Thus a battery may be situated in a hedge running off a roadthe four pits are shown in the positions in the hedge which they appear to occupy from the air, i.e. according to the photo, and marked with the zone number.
It is quite possible, however, that the hedge or even the road may be incorrectly marked in on the map, so that from the battery point of view the real position of one of the pits may be in the middle of the road, this being the real spot on the ground as given in the list. This would be unsuitable for the air observer as his map and the eye would not agree.
These two publications are entirely distinct and it is dangerous to mix up their issue; one goes to the R.A. and the other to the R.A.F.
This brings us to the part played by the R.A.F. in counter battery work.
Three units are used, viz :
The Corps squadron does the greater part of the counter battery work. It has three flights, two of which are usually detailed for artillery work, while the third is employed on photographic work.
The remainder of the work, which is not so great in volume nor so continuous, being fitted in between the flights.
It is important to recognize the smallness of the corps squadron, as this greatly limits the amount of artillery work that it is able to do. If possible, the interior organization of the Heavy Artillery is made to fit in with the squadron organization, i.e. two artillery flights, so that the whole control can be decentralised by way of direct dealings between flight commanders and subordinate artillery commanders.
The squadron maintains an artillery patrol in the air during daylight. This means several machines in the day, especially in the summer. This patrol is of great value as it is a great source of information as regards activity, i.e. which positions are occupied. This information is sent down by means of the N.F. call which is taken in by all wireless masts and thus goes direct to the C.B.S.O.
It is also the duty of the patrol to examine the area and endeavour to locate new flashes or new positions together with any other artillery information which may be of value. The pilot uses his judgment as to the amount which he departs from his proper role, to engage hostile batteries or other targets seen.
Information is required about all natures of targets as this patrol is an artillery patrol, not a counter battery patrol only.
The other main counter battery duty of the artillery flights is the observation of destructive shoots. In France these shoots were a most important counter battery task. The policy, as regards the hostile artillery, was a relentless attack which was practically continuous. The R.A.F.-observed shoot was the chief means by which this policy was carried out.
All that these observers are asked to do is to locate correctly the burst of each round and wireless it to the battery. Certain preliminary arrangements are essential to success. The observer must be given time to study the photo of the battery or batteries he is going to engage, and the pit most clearly distinguishable from the air should be selected for ranging upon. Furthermore the observer wants to know the position of the battery ground strips, by means of which the battery communicates with the plane, and also the calibre and mark of the battery together with the charge, so that the time of flight may be looked up. The observer requires this in order to be certain he is locating the right burst.
When actually observing, the plane flies in an elipse between the battery and the target.
The observer cannot keep his eye upon the target all the time, and moreover parts of the plane will obstruct the view during various portions of the elipse.
Hence it is vitally important that the gun should be fired immediately the observer gives the order.
The breaking of the windows of motor cars passing in front of batteries during the war was, needless to say, due to the observer's order, and not to any desire on the part of the batteries to shake up the august ones inside!
The return half of the elipse is utilised by the observer to wireless his observation on the last round.
The two artillery flights thus do all the observation from the air, and provide good information as regards activity. In actual practice in the war the pressure of work on these flights was so great, and always will be so, that the duty of intelligence is apt to take a rather bad second place. This deficiency is made up by the work of the photographic flight. This forms the basis of all counter battery intelligence.
The photograph is the eye of the counter battery artillery. From it may be obtained, in a complete manner, almost every thing which is collected piecemeal from other sources, and moreover in not nearly so accurate a manner.
On the photograph, position is absolutely accurate. It is almost impossible to hide a battery from the camera, however good the camouflage.
The camera will fail only when:
The indications produced by blast marks, tracks, etc., forms first evidence of activity when the photograph is in the hands of an expert.
Photographs are of two kinds, operations and reconnaissance. The former are used for actual shooting and considerable detail is required. They are not usually taken at over 10,000', though cameras of greater focal length enable them to be taken at greater heights with approximately the same detail, but not always with the same definition. The latter are used for photographic reconnaissance of probable reinforcing areas or any artillery reconnaissance of that nature. They may be taken at 17000'. In this class of work a greater area with less detail is usually required. It is therefore necessary to state the approximate height required when photographs are ordered, always bearing in mind that photographic machines run considerable risk from enemy aircraft. The importance of the work must always be gauged against the probability of disaster when ordering low photographs any distance beyond our own lines.
The reconnaissance photos are perhaps used chiefly by the Artillery Intelligence at Army Headquarters who require to look ahead, and endeavour to forecast the enemy artillery operations. The Corps counter battery office is more occupied with the intelligence immediately connected with the actual fighting in progress.
The frequency with which photos are required in a stabilised battle varies according to the operations in progress. On a battle front new photos are required after any move on the enemy's part and in addition at normal intervals of about 3 days. This amounts to some hundreds of photos in a short time and entails an immense amount of work in connection with them, the organisation of which will be dealt with later. The speed with which a photograph can be taken, printed and distributed to the actual fighting unit is a matter of prime importance.
In order to expedite the delivery of the more important copies a primary and secondary issue is generally ordered. The primary copies can be distributed in a few hours, the secondary copies following the next day.
In France a normal primary issue of a counter battery photo was as follows:
Each squadron is provided with a "squadron artillery officer." In heavy fighting it may be necessary to have two officers as the duties are twofold.
The S.A.O. is the link between the C.B.S.O. and the observer. It is his duty to see that every atom of useful information is obtained after each flight. To this end he interviews all observers after landing, with the maps and photos, in order to check the information that has been sent in by wireless, and also to examine the observer with a view to finding out any further details regarding the hostile artillery generally.
He is in constant touch with the C.B.S.O. by telephone and attends all the C.B.S.O's conferences.
The A.O. has other duties to perform in connection with the actual shooting. He generally assists the squadron commander in allotting his resources to the work which has to be performed, as the demands are often in excess of what can be done.
He also visits the batteries and investigates failures, which are otherwise likely to cause lack of confidence on both the part of the B.C. and the observer.
When casualties are frequent and the observers young and inexperienced, he is also used to instruct them, so that they may have some knowledge of the causes that affect shooting and what the battery requires of them.
The Army Wing R.A.F. does no artillery work except photographs beyond the squadron line. These are either reconnaissance photos or special work for spotting the locations of long range artillery. This latter work can also be done by the special flights attached to the Corps Wing Headquarters. These flights would be used for this long range counter battery work when undertaken and in many respects it is better that they should take any photos required.
They are equipped in a special manner for their highly dangerous task. They have fighting machines of the first class as they have to observe many thousand of yards inside the enemy's lines. Sometimes, they are protected by special patrols provided by the Army Wing R.A.F., but it may not be possible to do this always. The machines are fitted with a wireless receiving set as well as a sending set, so that it is not necessary to return to the battery to read the ground strips. The battery has also to be specially equipped with a sending set. All sets have to be of a long range type suitable for the work. These flights only work with the long range guns, so that a very high degree of personnel liaison is possible between the guns and the observers.
There is an A.O. at Corps Wing Headquarters and his functions regarding these special flights are similar to those of a squadron artil-lery officer. He also deals with the artillery staff at Army Head-quarters and generally supervises the squadron artillery officers.
Balloons are organised in a Wing consisting of a headquarters in a varying number of balloon companies. Each Army in France had a wing and each corps a company. The company consisted of usually two and sometimes three sections, each section having one balloon with its personnel and transport.
The section was really the fighting unit. The company and wing headquarters being really administrative and training units; the wing being in close touch with the army and the company with the corps.
I mean by this that all operations work passed straight from the balloon to the fighting unit or military staff concerned and did not go through the company headquarters, although the latter was of course responsible for the technical efficiency of the balloons and their personnel in every way.
It is often thought that anyone can go up in a balloon and observe. This is by no means so. Balloon observers need a careful training in order to be as efficient as aeroplane or ground observers; in fact it is much more difficult to observe from a balloon than from an aeroplane. The specialities of map reading have also to be learnt and the art of using glasses in a balloon. The latter is a good deal easier nowadays than it was with the old unstable balloons. The work of balloons is almost entirely connected with artillery. It is incumbent on them to report general information when obtained in the same manner as other units. In Europe troop movements cannot be seen from balloons except in very large numbers, so that information of this kind is rarely obtained from them and does not justify the use of special balloons for this purpose.
In the East the situation is often entirely reversed. In Palestine, in times of good visibility, it was possible to see single Turks at 6000 yards; small bodies of troops and vehicles could be seen at much greater distances.
In any case the moral effect of balloons is very great. They are credited with absurd powers of vision. I do not refer specially to this but rather to the way in which they advertise the advances made to the whole line. From any eminence the line of balloons can be seen for miles, and is a visible and tangible picture of the success of the victors and of the straights in which the vanquished have been placed.
Their real work and that for which they have been organised is counter battery intelligence and observation of artillery fire.
Shoots are arranged in much the same way as with aeroplanes. Balloons however have the advantage that the observer can talk to the officer commanding the guns all the time; the balloon is in fact only a glorified observation post.
All natures of guns can be ranged on targets in the forward area, but at longer ranges balloon observers find difficulty in ranging unless there is something definite to range upon, such as a hedge, so that the targets require carefully selecting.
The intelligence obtained from balloons is limited to N.F's, which, of course, can be seen with great ease. The observer is on a comparatively steady platform high enough to overlook all flash cover and very little should escape him. Difficulties however come in when he tries to make out the exact map square of the active hostile battery. His observations are bound to be inaccurate unless there is something definite to give him a guide, such as a wood or hedge. All the same, they are able to send in a lot of accurate information and furthermore produce a lot of confirmatory evidence as regards activity in certain localities which can be more accurately located by other means, such as photos.
This ability to locate active hostile groups of batteries is of particular value at night.
Balloons can send out N.F. calls if required like an aeroplane, in which case they are treated in the same way.
When communications stand, certain batteries are usually affiliated to balloons so that shooting can commence at once, and catch the hostile detachment at the guns.
This is particularly useful in the case of enemy balloon guns. The observer in the balloon sees the flash, and between that and the arrival of the shell he has plenty of time to ring up the battery con-cerned and get a shell back. If the enemy balloon guns are a nuisance they can be kept quiet by this method as casualties will be inflicted at the guns and balloon chasing ceases to be a pleasant afternoon sport! Balloons have great difficulty in doing accurate night work as they cannot say exactly where they are, so that any rays taken by them are somewhat unreliable. Good work has been done at times, but it cannot be depended upon.
Balloon communications are a somewhat complicated affair. They usually have a forward exchange in the battery area from which lines radiate to the people concerned. The personnel of balloon units are not very numerous so that, as in the case of observation groups, sound ranging, etc., they have to be helped out by the heavy artillery signal sectionvery often assisted by the Corps.
Balloons are quite mobile and do not advance through telephone lines regardless of other people's communications as commonly supposed! The balloon advances best inflated and can be warped over obstacles on the ground such as telegraph lines, without doing any harm or blocking the road. In fact fewer gas lorries are required by this method.
It does not take much imagination to see the use to which balloons can be put in open warfare provided they are in really close touch with the artillery, so many other sources of information having disappeared for the moment.
In order to get this close touch, balloon sections have been affiliated to heavy artillery brigades. The balloon is thus relieved of all com-munication responsibility except the line from the balloon bed to the heavy artillery brigade exchange, which in open warfare need not be long, as the balloon can approach much nearer.
The balloon then flies over its own artillery brigade and does observation and intelligence work in that brigade zone.
(To be continued).
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