UNOFFICIAL. FOR PRIVATE USE ONLY.
1. THE ENEMY'S POSITION.
2. PLAN OF ATTACK.
3. STRENGTH & ALLOTMENT OF ARTILLERY AT ZERO.
4. DISPOSITIONS BETWEEN 27th & 29th SEPT.
5. DUMPING OF AMMUNITION.
6. PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT.
7. ARTILLERY ACTION ON 29th SEPT & SUBSEQUENT DAYS.
8. RESULT OF THE OPERATIONS.
9. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.
10. CASUALTIES TO PERSONNEL.
APPENDICES.
A. MAP SHEWING ARTILLERY DISPOSITIONS, SEPT 26th. [not reproduced]
B. MAP SHEWING ARTILLERY DISPOSITIONS, SEPT 29th. [not reproduced]
C. MAP SHEWING ARTILLERY DISPOSITIONS, OCTR 4th. [not reproduced]
D. EXTRACTS FROM "INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATIONS", (FOURTH ARMY NO. 273 (G) )
1. THE ENEMY'S POSITION.
The HINDENBURG Line, to which the Germans had retreated after 1 _ months' continuous fighting, was a position of great natural strength, chosen deliberately and sited skilfully.
It had been fortified thoroughly in 1916 and 1917, and was provided plentifully with all known artificial aids to defence such as wire, trenches, dugouts, etc.
The defences had not been kept in perfect repair, but cover and protection were ample.
A formidable Outpost Line, which had been defended successfully in 1917, covered the main position. This line was sited well for observation, and comprised an elaborate network of trenches and strong points protected by wire, thrown well forward from the main defensive position, and possessing many covered approaches.
The maintenance of this outpost line was essential to a prolonged defence of the HINDENBURG Line, since its loss facilitated enormously the task of an assailant's Artillery.
On the greater part of the FOURTH ARMY front, the ST. QUENTIN-ESCAUT Canal provided a formidable obstacle immediately in front of the main line of defence. Special pains had been taken to fortify the two open stretches (LE TRONQUOY-LEHAUCOURT and BELLICOURT-LE CATELET), where the Canal runs underground. The two canal tunnels running under these stretches are respectively 1,200 yards and 6,200 yards in length.
In addition the enemy had constructed the BELLENGLISE-MAGNY LA FOSSE tunnel, 2,000 yards long and furnished with numerous lateral shafts, which was capable of affording shell-proof protection to at least a Division.
Some factors which made lighter the formidable task of breaking through the HINDENBURG Line were:
- Although the Germans had plenty of men to man the defences, the Divisions opposed to the Fourth Army had all been beaten in the previous fighting.
- The German Artillery and Air Services were markedly inferior to our own.
- We had learnt the general plan of defence from captured documents.
- The capture of the German outpost line West of the Canal gave us observation over the main line of defence and prevented the enemy from overlooking our back areas. The enemy fought hard for this line, and its capture was not absolutely complete on 28th Sept.
2. PLAN OF ATTACK.
The general plan of attack was as follows:
- The IX Corps to attack the Canal front from 500 yards S. of BELLENGLISE to the junction of the ESTREES-LE CATEAU and ST QUENTIN-BELLICOURT Roads on a one Division front. Frontage of attack 3,000 yards.
- The II American Corps to attack the high ground between BELLICOURT to a point W. of LE CATELET (i.e., the tunnel portion of the Canal). Frontage of attack 6,000 yards.
On the II American Corps reaching its objective, the Austr. Corps to pass through and secure the Final Objective for the day.
- The right Division of the IX Corps on the South, and the III Corps on the North to conform to the main attacks and to form defensive flanks.
3. For STRENGTH & ALLOTMENT OF ARTILLERY AT ZERO - SEE App. "D", para.4(b)
The total of Guns and Howitzers amounted to:
13 pdrs. 18
18 pdrs. 786
4.5" How. 240
60 pdr. 120
6" How. 292
8" How. 78
9.2" How. 56
12" How. 8
6" guns. 36
12" guns. 1
14" guns. 1
TOTAL FIELD ARTILLERY 1,044
TOTAL HEAVY ARTILLERY 592
4. DISPOSITIONS BETWEEN 27th & 29th SEPT.
At the commencement of the preliminary bombardment, the Artillery was sited as shewn on attached map "A".
During the period 26th-28th Sept there was severe fighting on both flanks of the Army front in order to gain the "Start" Line. This fighting necessitated the moving of many batteries during the period covered by the bombardment.
At Zero hour on 29th Sept the Artillery was sited as shewn on attached map "B".
5. AMMUNITION.
For Ammunition dumped, see Appendix "D", para.4 (n).
The task of completing the requisite dumps was made difficult by the fact that fighting was in progress during the preliminary period. This caused heavy expenditure from day to day, and also entailed the moving of many batteries, thus reducing the number of lorries available.
Additional difficulty was caused by the unavoidable late running of trains on the newly opened line. As many as 15 trains had to be cleared in one day, as well as the transference of large amounts by lorry from the Army Reserve Dump.
These difficulties were successfully overcome, and at Zero hour on 29th Sept the dumps at the guns were as laid down approximately.
6. PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT.
For Orders and Instructions, see Appendix "D", paras 4 (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j).
- SPECIAL GAS 'BB' BOMBARDMENT.
The bombardment was carried out according to orders, a total of 26,101 18pdr and 6,236 6" Howr. 'BB' shells being fired.
This bombardment was of special interest as constituting the first occasion on which 'BB' shells were employed by British Artillery. [BB was the British letter code for 'mustard' gas.]
The bombardment was spread over a wide area, Headquarters, communications, and some groups of batteries being the principal objectives.
A large number of prisoners from all Divisions in the line were examined with the object of ascertaining the effects caused by the bombardment. The evidence obtained indicates a wide distribution of casualties, there being a steady dribble of gas cases during the morning of the 27th. There is no good evidence supporting very heavy local losses. The group of batteries in and around LEHAUCOURT, which had been located accurately, appears to have been silenced effectively.
Our troops traversed on September 29th the ground which had been shelled some 50 hours previously, without inconvenience.
- COUNTER BATTERY WORK.
Owing to atmospheric conditions curtailing photography and observation, the positions of hostile batteries were not located with as much accuracy as on some previous occasions, but the German Artillery was dealt with effectively, and caused but small loss to our troops. Subsequent examination of hostile positions revealed a good percentage of direct hits on equipment and of ammunition blown up. The enemy had been forced to a wide distribution of units and of guns. In several cases guns were captured which had evidently not opened fire.
- HARASSING FIRE.
The evidence of prisoners on the effects of this fire is convincing. Rations were cut off; communications interrupted; reliefs prevented from coming up; and heavy casualties were caused. The total result was to bring about disorganization and loss of morale, the effects of which bore their fruits on the day of battle.
- WIRE CUTTING.
In many places the wire was damaged seriously; in some places lanes were cut through it; and, in a few places, it was swept away.
Generally speaking, it was not due to effective destruction of wire defencessuch destruction indeed was outside the power of Artillery, given the nature of the defencesbut to the demoralization of the enemy and to effective Artillery covering fire, that our troops were enabled to penetrate the wire defences. The enemy, presumably owing to the demoralization wrought by our Artillery fire, failed to fill up gaps and passages in the wire which he had made at some previous period.
- BOMBARDMENT OF SELECTED STRONG POINTS & LOCALITIES.
The preliminary bombardment of 48 hours was justified fully by the moral effect caused, nor was destructive effect to material and personnel wanting.
As was only to be anticipated, the use made of enfilade fire proved particularly effective, while the effects of special concentrations of fire, such as that on the BELLENGLISE Salient, were overwhelming. The destruction of the tunnels and deep dugouts were beyond the powers of the Artillery and was not attempted.
Severe damage was caused to the front and support lines east of the Canal. Some of the entrances to mined dugouts were partially blocked. The walls of the Canal were hit at frequent intervals, and banks of debris formed, up which the attackers could scramble. Many of the specially defended localities were rendered mere heaps of debris.
Provided as he was with secure shell cover, the enemy's losses in killed from the bombardment were probably not great. Losses, however, were inflicted, a good example being furnished by a 6" Howr. shell with delay action fuze, which penetrated into a small chamber used as a kitchen at the southern end of the BELLENGLISE Tunnel, killing 13 men and wounding 10.
The great result of the bombardment was that the defenders were driven into their deep dugouts, and so demoralized that to a large extent they failed to man their defences on the day of attack.
7. ARTILLERY ACTION ON THE 29th & SUBSEQUENT DAYS.
The results of our Artillery fire as a death-dealer and as a life-saver are written on the ground and in the trenches by German corpses and unused rifles and ammunition. Special examples of the man-killing effect of Artillery fire were conspicuous, amongst other places, at USIGNY Dumpa strong point for machine guns. Here lie over a hundred German dead, killed by artillery fire whilst drifting to the rear.
Near RAMICOURT are clearly depicted the results of a German endeavour to reinforce the firing line under hostile artillery fire.
At MONTBREHAIN, a good example exists of the destruction of the machine gun strong point and its defenders, while near by trenches and surrounding ground are strewn with dead.
Numerous other instances can be cited, but a few extracts from prisoners' statements will suffice.
"Prisoners state that our 48 hours bombardment prior to the attack was extremely effective, and that it was owing to this that the pioneers of the 2nd Division were unable to blow up the bridges over the canal at BELLENGLISE, as they did not receive food for two days and dared not leave their dugouts owing to the artillery fire."
"The men of the 75th Machine Gun (Marksmen) Detachment, after suffering casualties from our artillery fire, retired to their dugouts and waited for our Infantry in order to surrender."
"2nd Battn, 33rd Regt. (2nd Division) was in reserve at MAGNY LA FOSSE, and was ordered to go forward and reinforce, but was unable to do so owing to our artillery fire."
The advance of the Artillery was carried out successfully, according to programme in spite of the difficulties caused by the limited number of crossings over the Canal, the wired nature of the country, and congestion of traffic on the roads.
8. RESULT OF THE OPERATIONS.
The immediate result of the operations was the capture of the HINDENBURG Line from LE TRONQUOY to VENDHUILLE, with the Villages of THORIGNY, LEHAUCORT, LE TRONQUOY, BELLENGLISE, MAGNY LA FOSSE, ETRICOURT, NAUROY, LEVERGIES, JONCOURT, SEQUEHART, BELLICOURT, BONY, LE CATELET, BOUY, VENDHUILLE, over 14,000 prisoners, and 110 guns.
To the south and to the north a path was opened for the advance of the First French and Third British Armies, resulting in the fall of ST. QUENTIN and CAMBRAI. The victory gained inflicted one of the heaviest blows which German prestige had sustained throughout the whole war. It is not yet possible to estimate at its full value its influence on the minds of German Military leaders and Government.
9. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE.
The expenditure of ammunition during the period noon 26th Sept to noon 4th October was :
13 pdrs. 19,802
18 pdrs. 735,130
4.5" How. 179,555
60 pdr. 90,418
6" How. 210,142
8" How. 29,974
9.2" How. 21,043
12" How. 1,857
6" guns. 11,546
TOTAL FIELD ARTILLERY 934,487
TOTAL HEAVY ARTILLERY 364,980
GRAND TOTAL 1,299,467 Rounds.
10. CASUALTIES TO PERSONNEL.
The casualties to personnel in the Artillery for the period noon 26th Sept to noon 4th October were:
| OFFICERS | OTHER RANKS |
Killed | 8 | 94 |
Wounded | 40 | 576 |
Gassed | 9 | 131 |
TOTAL | 57 | 801 |
GRAND TOTAL 858 |
[signed C.E.D. Budworth]
Major General.
G.O.C. R.A., FOURTH ARMY.
Headquarters R.A.,
FOURTH ARMY.
23rd October 1918.
APPENDIX "D".
EXTRACTS FROM "INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATIONS"
(FOURTH ARMY No. 273(G), DATED 23rd Sept.1918.
4. ARTILLERY.
- PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT.
The bombardment will commence at 10.0pm, 'W' day, and will be continued until Zero hour 'Z' day.
- ALLOTMENT OF ARTILLERY.
The following will be the strength of the Artillery placed at the disposal of Corps:
| Field Arty | Heavy Arty Bdes. | Siege Btys. |
Corps | D. As. | Army Bdes. | Total | Mobile | 8" | 9.2" | Mixed | Total | 6" Gun | 12" How. |
III | 3 | | 6 | | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
Aust. | 7 | 9 | 23 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 4 | 1 |
IX | 4 | 7 | 15 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 |
- BOUNDARIES.
Boundaries between Corps as regards bombardment and counter-battery work coincide with those between Corps on map issued with Fourth Army No. 20.23(G) dated 22.9.18. [Not attached].
- The bombardment will consist of :
- Special gas (BB) bombardment.
- Vigorous counter-battery fire.
- Intensive harassing fire.
- Cutting lanes in hostile wire defences.
- Bombardment of selected strong points & localities.
- SPECIAL GAS (BB) BOMBARDMENT.
This bombardment will be carried out by 18-pdrs and 6" hows. firing BB gas shells in combination with H.E. during intermittent periods between 10.0pm on 'W' day and 6.0am on "X" day. Captured German guns firing yellow cross shells will be employed as far as circumstances permit.
The objectives will be the hostile defensive system and Artillery positions along the whole front so far as the range of guns permits. Arrangements will be made with the French to extend the front of bombardment on the right.
Subsequent to 6.0am 'X" day, no BB gas shell will be fired without the authority of the Army.
- VIGOROUS COUNTER BATTERY FIRE.
,p>This will commence at 6.0am on 'X' day. Surprise attacks on hostile artillery positions should be carried out with H.E. (with instantaneous fuzes) and gas shells (CG or NC). For the methodical bombardment of fortified emplacements and dugouts, delay action fuzes should be employed.
- INTENSIVE HARASSING FIRE.
This will commence immediately after the cessation of the special gas (BB) bombardment at 6.0 am on 'X' day. Corps will prepare definite plans for its direction on the respective fronts. The keynote of its application should be variety and surprise, and plans must be so framed that throughout the 24 hours of the day and night the enemy should be permitted no immunity for security from shell fire.
Facilities of observation must be fully exploited in order to limit the area on which unobserved harassing fire will have to be maintained by day. Areas over which no observation is possible must receive special attention.
In allotting tasks for harassing fire, zones in depth must be allotted to different natures of weapons, including infantry weapons and machine guns, according to their range. In this connection the increased range of 18-pdr guns fitted with air recuperators should be taken into account.
Use should be made of gas shells (CG and NC).
Artillery positions should be included in the programme of harassing fire.
In shelling roads, H.E. with delay action fuzes are NOT to be employed.
- CUTTING LANES IN HOSTILE WIRE DEFENCES.
This will commence at 6.0am on 'X' day, and will be carried out principally with 4.5" hows. and 6" hows. (with instantaneous fuzes) and, where feasible, with 6" Newton mortars. Lanes, once cut, must be kept open by means of rifle and machine gun fire.
- BOMBARDMENT OF SELECTED STRONG POINTS & LOCALITIES.
This bombardment will commence at 6.0am on 'X' day, and will be continued until Zero with a view not only to the destruction of defences but also to the demoralization of the defenders. Gas shells (CG and NC) should be made use of. It is not considered feasible to carry out a thorough destructive bombardment of concrete dugouts and machine gun emplacements.
The tunnels themselves are impervious to artillery fire. Steps should be taken to concentrate a heavy and unexpected fire on their entrances and exits on the day of battle.
Telephone exchanges and specially defended localities such as BELLENGLISE, NAUROY, BELLICOURT, BONY, LE CATELET, and GOUY, should be heavily bombarded.
Blocks in communication trenches should be created where it is considered practicable and advisable.
- LONG RANGE GUN FIRE.
Corps will be responsible for dealing, by means of their long range guns, with the following places opposite their respective fronts.
IX CORPS. | AUST CORPS. | III CORPS. |
LESDINS FRESNOY Rd. | JONCOURT. | FOSSE [?]IGNY Dump. |
SEQUEHART. | RAMIECOURT. | |
LEVERGIES | MONTBREHAIN. | |
| ESTREES. | |
| ESTREES-MARETZ Rd. | |
| BEAUREVOIR. | |
Instantaneous fuzes should be used by all guns firing at long ranges. Railway guns will be retained under Army control, and will engage FRESNOY-le-GRAND, BOIS d'ETAVES, BRANCOURT, BOHAIN PREMONT, MARETZ, BUSIGNY.
- Resting of detachments.
Careful arrangements are to be made for relief of detachments during the course of the bombardment.
- HOSTILE GAS BOMBARDMENT.
In the event of a heavy hostile concentration of fire on 'Y'/'Z' night, especially gas shelling, on any particular part of the Army area, every effort will be made, by concentrating the fire of as many guns as possible, to silence the offending groups of hostile artillery.
At the same time, Counter-battery Staff Officers will indicate as accurately as possible to the 5th Brigade R.A.F. direct the positions of the active German artillery. This will be done with the object of enabling the R.A.F. to bomb the groups concerned.
C.B.S.Os. will likewise inform the 5th Balloon Wing, who have arranged to have a balloon standing by ready to take the air within 30 minutes if weather conditions permit. It is hoped that this balloon will be able to give useful information as to the positions of the batteries concerned.
Each Corps will prepare a plan on the above lines. The decision to put the plan into execution rests with Corps.
If the hostile batteries responsible are located in the counter-battery area of another Corps, arrangements for counter action will be made direct between Corps concerned.
- ISSUE OF INSTRUCTIONS.
Attention is called to the importance of all Artillery Instructions being issued in sufficient time to permit of subordinate formations being afforded ample time to study them and to work them out in detail. No changes in the Artillery programme at a late hour should be permitted without very urgent reasons.
- DUMPING OF AMMUNITION.
The following amounts of ammunition are authorised to be held in front of railheads.
Not less that 25% of these amounts are to be held in Corps Reserve.
In addition, all echelons are to be kept full.
18-pdr. 900 rounds per gun.
4.5" How: 800 -do-
60-pdr Gun 600 -do-
6" How: 700 -do-
8" How: 500 -do-
9.2" How: 500 -do-
6" Gun 400 -do-
12" How: 300 -do-
- Corps will issue orders enjoining the necessity for special measures being taken to ensure accuracy of fire.
A list of trigonometrical points fixed by the Field Survey is being circulated down to Brigades of Artillery. This list is intended to facilitate the fixing of positions in the advance.
- The pace and timings of the barrage and the nature of ammunition to be used on 'Z' day will be decided by Corps.
- In all orders "Rates of Fire" will be described as laid down in G.H.Q., R.A. Circular No. 10.
- Each Corps will work out a time table for lifting the fire of long range artillery on 'Z' day from localities in accordance with the rate of advance laid down for our troops.
- Special attention will be paid to arrangements for adequate Counter-battery work in the later stages of the battle, especially on the flanks.
- Artillery Organization & Allotment Subsequent to 'Z' Day
(see Table "B") [not reproduced]
"The Infantry cannot do with a gun less": The Place of the Artillery in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918
|